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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the experiences of the 4l Canadian Armoured Division as it 
prepared for and carried out its role in the battle of Normandy and the liberation of 
France in 1944. The factors that limited opportunities to practice the formation in large -
scale exercises are noted as are the methods used by the General Officer Commanding, 
Major-General George Kitching, to compensate for the limitations. The thesis argues that 
through the development of an effective commander-staff dynamic Kitching, his staff and 
his subordinates commanders ,were able to meet the challenges and chaos of combat in 
the final stages of the Normandy campaign and in the subsequent pursuit phase of 
operations into Belgium. 
1 
PREFACE 
The purpose of this thesis is to advance our understanding of the role played by 
the 4th Canadian Armoured Division in the first stages of the campaign to liberate western 
Europe in 1944. While many historians have commented on the division's performance 
in Normandy this thesis is the first study focused on the division in both the training and 
combat periods. The argument of this thesis may be briefly summarized. During the 
preparatory stage factors beyond the control of the division commander severely limited 
opportunities to practice the formation in large-scale exercises at the divisional or brigade 
level. Major-General George Kitching, the General Officer Commanding (GOC) was 
forced to concentrate on unit-level training (infantry battalion, armoured and artillery 
regiments) relying on Tactical Exercises Without Troops (TEWTS) and skeleton 
command and communication exercises to prepare for co-ordinated action in the field. 
Kitching, it is argued, was successful in developing a commander-staff dynamic that 
permitted division and brigade staff officers to function effectively in Normandy despite 
exceptionally challenging conditions. A close examination of combat operations and their 
logistical basis demonstrates that the division was a far more effective force than the 
current literature suggests. 
The thesis is based upon archival records from the Library and Archives of 
Canada (LAC) especially Record Group 24. This basic body of source material is 
supplemented by interviews, interview transcripts and personal correspondence. The 
thesis begins with a review of the secondary literature followed by a discussion of a 
theoretical construct, the commander -staff dynamic which the author has worked with 
and developed as a professional military educator. The subsequent chapters on the 
ii 
training and combat periods are organized chronologically and include a chapter on the 
"pursuit" phase of the division's history a heretofore entirely neglected subject. 
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Introduction 
War is essentially chaos, and the line between control and sickening confusion is paper-
thin. If one takes care, the violence applied can be focused with precision, yet even when 
care is taken, it can easily degenerate into wild and formless mayhem. 
General Chuck Horner 
A general's foremost duty is to win his nation's battles, no matter when or where 
they might take place. To this end, a general must prepare himself and his men as best he 
can in the periods that precede conflict. It has been a frequent criticism by historians and 
contemporary writers that generals have performed the latter poorly. When it came time 
to fight, they found it was not the battle for which they had prepared and, as a result, 
many generals were deemed to have failed either to prepare their men or to win.2 
Among this group of generals was Major-General (Maj Gen) George Kitching, 
the General Officer Commanding (GOC) 4th Canadian Armoured Division (4 Cdn Armd 
Div) in the battles of Normandy in August 1944. Kitching was relieved of his command 
by Lieutenant-General (Lt Gen) Guy Simonds, commander of 2 Canadian Corps (2 Cdn 
Corps), on 21 August after 21 days of combat, 14 of which involved heavy fighting to 
break out of the Normandy bridgehead and trap the remnants of the German Army in 
Normandy in the area around Trun, St Lambert-sur-Dives and Chambois, known as the 
Falaise Gap. The story of Kitching and the 4th Cdn Armd Div in Normandy, as portrayed 
by current literature, is not a positive one. 
Each commander is bound by a unique set of situational and organizational 
constraints that must be taken into consideration before any valid evaluation of a unit or 
its commander's performance can be rendered. The current body of literature concerning 
1
 Tom Clancy and Chuck Horner, Every Man A Tiger (New York: G.P. Putmam's Sons, 1999), 234. 
2Alistair Irwin, "The Buffalo Thorn: The Nature of the Future Battlefield," Journal of Strategic Studies 19, 
no. 4 (December 1996), 227. 
the 4 Cdn Armd Div is missing three very important examinations relevant to any 
discussion of the performance of the division: 
• There is no clear description of the division command environment and how 
Kitching and his staff interacted to create the operational tempo required in 
operations 
• There has been no comprehensive examination of the training of the division to 
ascertain whether the division was properly prepared for its role in Normandy, 
and if not, why not? and 
• There has been no comprehensive examination of how the 
administrative/logistical processes within the division either facilitated or 
hindered the operational tempo of the division. Simply discussing the operations 
of the division, as has been done to date, does not provide the fidelity of 
information to determine whether the division was capable, from a material 
perspective, of actually carrying out the operations ordered. 
The division, its leadership cadre and the methods through which the division operated 
throughout the Normandy campaign must therefore be scrutinized. In so doing, this 
dissertation will establish that, despite entering battle for the first time during one of the 
most challenging phases of Allied operations in August 1944, the 4th Armoured Division, 
under Kitching's leadership proved resilient and adaptive in overcoming the volatile and 
unpredictable nature of warfare in Normandy. The combat operations of August 1944 
transformed the division into a battle-hardened combat formation that would distinguish 
itself through its ability to generate a sustained drive across France out of the chaos and 
destruction of the Normandy battles. Geoffrey Hayes' assessment of the Lincoln and 
Welland Regiment at that time is pertinent in describing the rest of the division: "It was 
3
 Eliot Cohen, A. and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of Failure in War (London: Collier 
Macmillan Publishers, 1990), 246. 
2 
an organization far different from the one which had landed in France not one month 
before." 4 
Armoured forces feature in this dissertation and their origins and early 
development form a subject of immense historical importance. There has been 
considerable debate concerning the defeat of British armoured forces in May 1940 and 
the "poor" performance of British and Canadian armour formations in Normandy. The 
historiography involved in this debate is substantial with the many factors involved given 
widely varying weight. One view has emphasized the economic and strategic aspects of 
British (and Canadian) rearmament to explain operational and tactical factors that 
influenced the effectiveness of the armoured forces.5 Another view contends that the 
Allies won through the massive application of resources, artillery and air power and that 
this material superiority compensated for the "poor" combat performance on the part of 
the Anglo-Canadians.6 Some authors, supported in part by the reflections of some 
Canadian generals such as Maj-Gen Charles Foulkes and Maj-Gen Harry Foster, have 
developed the notion of a hierarchy of operational and tactical effectiveness, placing the 
Germans first, followed in order by the Americans, the British and finally the Canadians.7 
4
 Geoffrey Hayes, The Lines: A History of the Lincoln and Welland Regiment at War. (Alma: Maple Leaf 
Route, 1986), 40. 
Williamson Murray, "Armoured Warfare: The British, French, and German experience," in Military 
Innovation In the Interwar Period, ed. Williamson Murray and Allan R. Millett (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 7. See also Brian Bond, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars 
(New York: Oxford University Press 1980), Harold, Winton, "Tanks, Votes, and Budgets: The Politics of 
Mechanization and Armoured Warfare in Britain, 1919-1939." In The Challenge of Change: Military 
Institutions and New Realities, 1918-1941, ed. Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, 74-107. (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 2000). 
C. Wilmot, The Struggle for Europe. (London: Collins, 1952), 477. Other sources supporting these views 
include C. D'Este, Decisions in Normandy. (New York: Harper Perennial, 1994), Martin Blumenson, 
Breakout and />«r.SMif,(Washington, Department of the Army, 1961). 
7
 John Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign (London: Frank Cass, 2004), 2. 
3 
Foulkes, the GOC of 2m Canadian Infantry Division (Cdn Inf Div) stated that the 
Canadians were "no match" for the battle-hardened German troops and Canadians would 
not have been successful "had it not been for our air and artillery support."8 Foster's 
assessment is even more compelling when he stated that Canadians were "no match for 
the Germans once they were dug in." 
It could be argued that everything being equal, defenders always hold an 
advantage over attackers. But in Normandy everything wasn't equal. We held the 
advantage in the air, at sea and on the ground. Yet every time out troops got 
beyond the range of supporting artillery or sour weather grounded our fighter-
bomber cover, the Germans stopped us cold.9 
The blame for this tactical ineffectiveness has usually been focused on how the forces 
were employed or operational technique. 
In Raising Churchill's Army, David French argued that three years of setbacks 
finally taught the British how to fight and that from 1942 onwards the army discovered 
how to make its system work, emphasizing its strengths and masking its weaknesses. 
French highlights the British techniques by citing a report from Italy in 1943: 
Our tactical methods are thorough and methodical but slow and cumbersome. In 
consequence our troops fight well in defence and our set-piece attacks are usually 
successful, but it is not unfair to say that through lack of enterprise in exploitation 
we seldom reap the full benefit of them. We are too flank-conscious, we over-
insure administration, we are by nature too apprehensive of failure and our 
training makes us more so.10 
Constrained by a finite supply of manpower, but supplied with an abundance of 
resources, the British, and in particular General B.L. Montgomery, developed an 
operational policy that avoided manoeuvre in favour of set-piece attrition battles 
8
 Foulkes was the GOC of the 2nd Cdn Inf Div from 11 Jan 44 to 9 Nov 44. C. P. Stacey, Official History of 
the Canadian Army in the Second World War, Volume III, the Victory Campaign: The Operations in North-
west Europe 1944-1945 (Ottawa: The Queen's Printer and Controller of Stationary, 1960), 276. 
9
 Tony Foster, Meeting of Generals (Toronto: Methuen, 1986), 366. 
l0David French, Raising Churchill's Army: The British Army and the War Against Germany, 1919-1945 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 273. 
4 
conducted according to a "master plan" designed to conserve manpower. French 
concluded that this system served the needs of the British Army "remarkably well."12 
In British Armour in the Normandy Campaign, 1944 John Buckley argued that any 
assessment of the employment and effectiveness of British armour, and by extension 
Canadian armour, during the Normandy campaign must be viewed in the light of 21st 
Army Group's operational technique. He stated that 
...early expectations placed on British armoured forces were quite at odds with 
the realities of warfare in 1944 and demonstrated an unrealistic view of the 
capabilities of armour. Moreover, the balancing of 21st Army Group's operational 
techniques with the employment of armour did not always take place effectively. 
The consequences of firepower reliance, narrow front attacks, and close control 
and its impact on the use of armour were not fully appreciated by British planning 
and operations staff. The impact of this was that at times commanders and 
planning staff called upon armour to fight in a quite unsuitable manner in 
northwest Europe in 1944, and this has provided the yardstick by which British 
armour has come to be measured.13 
While it remains unlikely that the discussion over the effectiveness of Anglo-Canadian 
armoured forces will ever be definitively settled two deductions can be made from the 
debate. While Canadian armoured divisions were never as potent as those of the German 
Army, through the efforts of the officers and men who made these divisions a fighting 
force, they would become good enough to do their part in winning the war. 
Criticism of the Canadian Army efforts in Normandy has centered on the 
argument that the 2nd Cdn Corps operations designed to trap the German forces in 
Normandy were not pressed forward with sufficient resolve, resulting in the escape of 
some quarter million German soldiers.14 The expectation was that the Canadians should 
11
 Ibid., 246. 
12
 Ibid., 272. 
13
 Buckley, British Armour, 67-68. 
14
 J. L. Granatstein, The Generals: The Canadian Army's Senior Commanders in the Second World War, 
(Toronto: Stoddart, 1993), 169-170. 
5 
have been more successful in operations TOTALIZE and TRACTABLE and that 4 Cdn 
Armd Div, as the spearhead for the Canadian advance, should have closed the Falaise 
Gap sooner to prevent the escape of those German soldiers. C.P. Stacey expressed his 
thoughts as follows: 
It is not difficult to put one's finger upon occasions in the Normandy campaign 
when Canadian formations failed to make the most of their opportunities. In 
particular, the capture of Falaise was long delayed, and it was necessary to mount 
not one but two set-piece operations for the purpose at a time when an early 
closing of the Falaise gap would have inflicted grievous harm upon the enemy. 
And might even, conceivably, have enabled us to end the war some months 
sooner than was actually the case. A German force far smaller than our own, 
taking advantage of strong ground and prepared positions, was able to slow our 
advance to the point where considerable German forces made their escape.15 
Stacey concluded that "Dissatisfaction with the division's operations south of Caen was 
reflected, almost inevitably, in a change of command..."16 Consequently statements such 
as "Major-General George Kitching was dismissed following what Simonds considered 
4th Canadian Armoured Division's poor performance in Totalize and Tractable," populate 
the current literate.17 
Kitching receives tepid support in Reginald Roy's book, 1944: The Canadians in 
Normandy, (1984) which provided a detailed re-examination of the Canadian actions 
highlighting many of Kitching's troubles. Nonetheless, Roy leaves readers to decide 
whether or not Kitching was fairly treated. Donald Graves' South Albertas: A Canadian 
Regiment at War (1998) and John Marteinsen's The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps: 
15
 Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 276. 
16
 Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 276. 
17Paul Douglas Dickson, A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.D.G. Crerar 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007), 321. Kitching's dismissal was used by the Somali Inquiry as 
an example of replacing ineffective commanders. Pg 10 of 15. Somalia Commission, "Report of the 
Somalia Commission of Inquiry, Defining Leadership," Government of Canada, 
http://www.dnd.ca/somalia/vol2/v2cl5e.htm (accessed 09/25, 2006). 
6 
An Illustrated History (2000) have cast different lights on the events of August 1944 but 
offer no real assessment of Kitching's generalship. 
The harshest Canadian criticism of Kitching comes from John English in The 
Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign (1991) who argued that the "less than 
successful performance of Canadian formations" can be explained by the inability of 
Canadian commanders to leverage the strengths of British/Canadian doctrine to achieve 
success on the battlefield.18 He argued that Simonds' plans for TOTALIZE and 
TRACTABLE were "essentially sound" and that the "lacklustre showing of Canadian 
arms in Normandy must be laid at the feet of division commanders."19 English concluded 
that they were at best "mediocre performers."20 In particular, English characterized 
Kitching as "youth without knowledge" and implied that his actions "compromised" the 
operations of the 4th Canadian Armoured Division during these two operations.21 
Terry Copp in Fields of Fire (2003) has conducted the most recent re-evaluation 
of the Canadian Army's contribution to the Allied campaign in Northwest Europe. Copp 
offers a new balance sheet for the Normandy campaign concluding that the Canadian 
Army that fought in the Normandy "played a role all out of proportion to its relative 
strength among the Allied armies." The conclusion that one takes away from this book 
is that the combat environment was much more complex than the typical operations-
John English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign: A Study of Failure in High Command 
(New York: Praeger, 1991), 313. 
19
 Ibid., 306. 
20
 Ibid., 307. 
21While Kitching was a young Maj Gen at 33 years old, he had considerably more military experience than 
the average Canadian general from his previous service with the British Army, his continuously 
employment with Simonds as his General Staff Officer 1 (GSO 1) in the Sicilian and Italian campaigns and 
in his brief time as commander of the 11 Cdn Inf Bde. The "youth without knowledge" moniker for 
Kitching is therefore misleading. Ibid., 308. 
22
 Terry Copp, Fields of Fire the Canadians in Normandy, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2003), 
267. 
7 
focussed narrative would have you believe and that the Canadian Army deserves greater 
credit than the current histories have been willing to offer. 
Commenting on Canadian generalship in Normandy, Copp concluded that it was 
not possible "... to argue that any of the three Canadian divisional commanders passed 
the test of battle [at Falaise]," but at the same time stating that it was "not clear how 
much this failure of leadership at the divisional level mattered" since the command 
decisions of Montgomery and General Omar Bradley were more instrumental in the final 
outcome at Falaise. Commenting on Kitching, Copp stated that "assigning major 
responsibility for the events of 17-21 August to the senior commanders [Montgomery and 
Bradley] does not explain or excuse the command failures that marred the record of 4th 
Armoured Division during this crucial period." 24 He asserts that during TOTALIZE and 
TRACTABLE Kitching "functioned as little more than a spectator," and remains critical 
of Kitching's decision to advance "his entire division on a single axis to the Falaise-Trun 
road" during the advance to close the gap on 17 August.25 These statements are 
representative of the assessments of Kitching's performance. 
The official reason given by Simonds for Kitching's dismissal was that he 
[Kitching] "while possessing many excellent military characteristics and a most attractive 
personality maj gen KITCHING has not shown in operations that grip of a situation and 
that power of definite decision so requisite in a DIVISIONAL COMD."26 In fact, 
Kitching fails to come to his own defence in his book Mud and Green Fields. Operations 
23
 Ibid., 266 
24
 Ibid., 236 
25
 Ibid., 236 
26
 Message Crerar to Stuart [Kitching Dismissal], 211900B August 44. Crerar Papers MG30 E 157 Vol 3 
File 958C.009 (D178 ) GOC-in-C File 5-0-3, HQ First CDN ARMY. Higher Command- Canadian Army 
Overseas Period 29 May44 to 22 Dec 44. 
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TOTALIZE and TRACTABLE are not discussed in any great detail although he does 
highlight many of the key issues that he had to deal with during these operations and 
during the closing of the Falaise gap.27 Kitching concluded this portion of his book by 
stating that, given the circumstances within which he had to command he doubted that 
anyone could have done any better.28 
Since military organizations are built on strict hierarchical lines of rank and 
authority it has been natural for many writers to focus their evaluations and conclusions 
of fault on the generals who were in charge. In Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of 
Failure in War (1990) a detailed examination of failure on the battlefield, Eliot Cohen 
and John Gooch concluded that blaming defeat in battle on any one individual 
commander was typically inappropriate and that closer examination of the organization 
was needed.29 They concluded that any "... view that ascribes all fault or praise to a 
commander is the equivalent of concentrating only on operator error when highly 
complicated machines malfunction."30 Blaming the commander alone for the lack of 
success on the battlefield without an equivalent examination of the structures through 
which he worked and how these structures stood up to the stressors they encountered 
provides only a partial answer. 
Since this dissertation is concerned with division command a fundamental 
understanding of the command environment within a division is necessary. Command has 
been defined as the "authority vested in an individual for the direction, coordination and 
27
 During discussions with Kitching on a 1990 tour of the Normandy battles, I learned that the manuscript 
for his memoirs was actually much larger and that Kitching had a number of difficulties with the original 
publisher. Given Kitching's close association with Simonds that lasted until their deaths I believe Kitching 
would have never criticized Simonds in any way had there been further discussions of these battles. 
28
 Kitching, Mud and Green Fields: The Memoirs ofMajor-General George Kitching, (St Catherines: 
Vanwell Publishing, 1993), 206. 
29
 Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes, 2-3. 
30
 Ibid., 232 
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control of military forces."31 In its purest form, the role of the commander is to decide on 
a course of action, allocate specific tasks to subordinate commanders and the resources 
necessary to accomplish those tasks. In accepting a command position, the commander 
accepts the additional burden of accountability to his superiors for the outcome of his 
actions and those of his subordinates. This accountability can never be shared nor 
delegated.32 
Unlike command, leadership is not rank or function specific. Any member of the 
military can display leadership qualities or characteristics at any time. Three elements can 
be characterized as central to leadership. It is a process, it involves influence within a 
group context and it is focussed towards the attainment of a common objective or goal.33 
Leadership, for the purposes of this dissertation, is, therefore, defined as "a process 
whereby an individual influences a group of individuals for the attainment of a common 
goal."34 
Military staffs evolved over time as a means of helping commanders manage the 
growing complexity of warfare. The function of the staff was to provide the commander 
and his subordinate commanders with the information, recommendations and 
coordination required for them to make informed and timely decisions. A Second 
World War Canadian division had two types of staffs: the general staff, which was 
concerned with the planning, co-ordinating and execution of operations; and the special 
staff, which provided the commander and general staff with advice and assistance in 
31
 Canada, Department of National Defence, Command (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1996), 1-4. 
32
 Ibid., 1-6 
33
 Peter Northouse, Leadership Theories and Practice, 3rd ed. (Thousand Oakes: Sage Publications, 2004), 
2-3. 
34
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35
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specific professional or technical areas. A consequence of the increased complexity of 
warfare during the Second World War was that the staff came under enormous stresses 
that could cause the division to fail, especially if the staff was not properly trained and 
led. This study will therefore focus on the two key leaders of the general staff, the 
General Staff Officer 1 (GSO 1) and the Assistant Adjutant & Quarter Master General 
(AA&QMG) and evaluate how they functioned in leading their respective staffs in 
supporting the division commander. 
Kitching inherited a staff team that for the most part had been together since 1943 
but there has been no clear assessment of their effectiveness prior to Kitching taking 
command. The staff teams in the GSO and AA&QMG branches would remain intact 
throughout the timeframe examined in this dissertation and would become as Kitching 
I T 
described "a powerhouse of talent" that would provide exceptional service to the 
division in Normandy and beyond. As a testament to their talent and abilities, many 
would become senior leaders in Canadian industry and in the Canadian military after the 
war.38 
In The Art of War Sun Tzu identified doctrine as one of the five "fundamental 
factors" of war.39 Doctrine attempts to bring order to the chaos of battle by advocating 
standard ways of operating among the people, units and organizations of a military force. 
Specialists held designated appointments in general staff branches by virtue of their expertise in specific 
subject areas such as medicine, law or religion. Canada, DND, Command, 5-7 
37
 Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 186. 
38
 For example, Capt Clarence Campbell would become Commissioner of the National Hockey League, 
Major Mike Dare would become a future Vice-Chief of Defence Staff and Capt Clarence Shepard would 
become the Chairman of Gulf Oil Canada. Ibid. 
39
 The other four fundamental factors are moral influence, weather, terrain and command. Sun Tzu, The Art 
of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 63-65. 
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It articulates "what shall be employed" and "how it shall be employed." The challenge 
in the formulation of doctrine was the development of standard operating procedures that 
balanced the requirement for uniform and predictable action with the need to maintain 
flexibility and freedom of action on the battlefield.41 The challenge for commanders was 
finding a delicate balance between these two imperatives. 
The Canadian Army initially lacked any comprehensive training or experience on 
how to command, lead or operate armoured forces in battle before the start of the Second 
World War. What did exist was almost exclusively based on the knowledge, efforts and 
ability of Maj Gen Frank Worthington, the recognized founder of the Canadian 
Armoured Corps.42 With the outbreak of war, the Canadian Army had a considerable task 
ahead in deciding how its armoured formations would be trained, equipped and led. As a 
member of the Commonwealth, the Canadian Army turned to the British Army, resulting 
in the Canadian adoption of British theories and practices. 
In the British and Canadian armies, doctrine was established through a series of 
publications and pamphlets. These pamphlets provided the detailed information on the 
composition, training and tactics to be used by the British and Canadian armies and they 
also provided the information on how armoured formations were supposed to operate.43 
Military Training Pamphlet No.41: The tactical handling of the Armoured Division and 
Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the Wars, 
(Ithaca: Cornel University Press, 1984), 13. 
41The ingredients of doctrine include "the nature of weapons technology, the influence of formative 
experiences, organizational and institutional interests, ideology, national culture and the political/strategic 
situation." Doctrine also analyzes recent conflicts in order to learn from them. Both the British and 
Canadian armies would struggle with armoured doctrine throughout the war. John Gooch, "Military 
Doctrine and Military History," in The Origins of Contemporary Doctrine: Papers Presented at a 
Conference Sponsored by the Director General of Development and Doctrine. Camberley, The Strategic 
and Combat Studies Institute, 1997, 6. 
42John Marteinson and Michael McNorgan, The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps: An Illustrated History, 
(Kitchener: The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps Association, 2000), 85-86. 
43
 Timothy Harrison Place, Military Training in the British Army, 1940-1944 from Dunkirk to D-Day 
(London: Frank Cass, 2000), 8. 
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Its Components was the key document. The main pamphlet, The tactical handling of 
Armoured Divisions (Part I), detailed the characteristics, structure and roles of an 
armoured division across the spectrum of tactical operations. This pamphlet was 
supported by two other pamphlets, which detailed the characteristics and tactics for an 
armoured regiment (Part 2) and the motor battalion (Part 3) in greater detail. 
Timothy Harrison Place has argued that British armour doctrine was issued "too 
casually", and "too late" and was "too vague and imprecise to resolve the problems 
generated" by three years of confusion over the proper structure and employment of 
armoured forces.45 This argument, however, is moot since the British War Office gave 
local commanders considerable latitude to use and operate armoured forces differently 
from the official doctrine.46 How an armoured division operated therefore became a 
reflection of the personality of the commander and his leadership style. No two 
commanders would command or run the same division in the same way. Each 
commander would establish a unique command environment. Consequently, 
understanding the structures, working relationship between the GOC, his subordinate 
commanders and the key division staff members is vital to understanding how and why 
an armoured division operated as it did. 
Since the 4th Cdn Armd Div was a subordinate unit of three higher formations, 2nd 
Canadian Corps (2nd Cdn Corps), First Canadian Army (First Cdn Army) and 21st Army 
Group, the operational policies of the three commanders, Simonds, General (Gen) Harry 
Crerar and Montgomery, respectively, must be examined to see if their operational 
44
 Great Britain, War Office, The Tactical Handling of the Armoured Division and its Components: 
Military Training Pamphlet no. 41, Part 1, The Tactical Handling of Armoured Divisions, 1943 (Ottawa: 
The War Office, July 1943). 
45
 Buckley, British Armour, 72. 
46
 Ibid, 81. 
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policies on the employment of armoured forces differed, and, if so, how, from the official 
doctrine. Of particular interest are a series of pamphlets issued by Montgomery during his 
appointments as commander 8th Army and as Commander 21st Army Group. The 
pamphlets, Eighth Army: Some Brief Notes for Senior Officers on the Conduct of Battle, 
194247 and Notes on the Employment of Tanks in Support of Infantry in Battle (1944) 
outlined his thoughts on a wide range of topics, including command and leadership. 
While Montgomery's writings extolled the need for initiative on the battlefield events 
would show that his leadership and command style rarely allowed his subordinates much 
room for either innovation or initiative on the battlefield. 49 
Simonds' approach to operations and training has been described as "pragmatic" 
and "analytical."50 His "Operational Policy" for 2 Cdn Corps, 17 February 1944, and his 
thoughts on "Command Efficiency" were issued to all formation commanders of 2nd Cdn 
Corps on 19 Feb 44. In his operational policy Simonds outlined how he expected to fight 
the battles in Normandy. Two points were stressed: when the Germans decided to stand 
and fight a defensive battle, success could only be achieved with proper reconnaissance 
and preparation. The second point was that success of the offensive battle hinged "on the 
defeat of the German counter-attacks..."51 These two principles would guide the conduct 
of Simonds' planning and operations in Normandy. 
In his "Efficiency in Command" directive Simonds articulated his thoughts on 
commanding Canadian soldiers, the removal of officers and promotions. In an annex to 
47
 B.L. Montgomery, Eighth Army: Some Brief Notes for Senior Officers on the Conduct of Battle (London: 
Great Britain, War Office, 1942). 
48
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49
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50
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ix. 
51
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his directive Simonds addressed what he considered the essential qualities of a leader 
under the headings of "Moral", "Mental" and "Physical" qualities. Of particular 
importance to this dissertation are Simonds thoughts on "youth." Simonds stated that a 
man was never too young for a job, but he may well be too old, for "age reduces speed of 
mental and physical reaction."52 Experience was only useful insofar as it represented 
knowledge acquired or knowledge confirmed by practical application.53 This emphasis on 
youth over experience is the most common explanation listed in the current literature to 
explain Simonds' decision to replace Worthington with Kitching as the commander of the 
4 Cdn Armd Div in February 1944. 
In trying to understand the context within which Canadian and British 
commanders developed their ideas about "generalship,"54 two publications stand out, the 
first, Generals and Generalship, the Lee Knowles Lectures delivered at Trinity College, 
Cambridge in 1939 by Gen Sir Archibald Wavell, and the second, Generalship: Its 
Diseases and Their Cure: A Study of the Personal Factor in Command (1936) by Maj 
Gen J.F.C. Fuller, a noted proponent of armoured warfare during the interwar period. In 
the three lectures of the Lee Knowles Lectures series, "The Good General", "The General 
and His Troops" and "The Soldier and the Statesman," Wavell viewed the true crux of 
"generalship" as administration, understanding what he called the "true mechanisms of 
war" as most important, with tactics and the handling of troops second. He viewed 
robustness and the ability to stand the shock of war as the key character trait of a general 
since all decisions in war involved men's lives. Wavell provided two simple rules for a 
52
 Ibid., 24 
53
 Ibid., 24 
54
 Information was restricted to those books or sources that would have been reasonably available to British 
and Canadian officers during the inter-war period up to 1944 when Kitching took the Division into France. 
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general when commenting on command: never try to do your own staff work and never 
let the staff get between you and your troops.55 
Fuller viewed "generalship" as having three pillars: courage, described as being 
up front, being seen by your men and experiencing the same hardships; creative 
intelligence, described as originality of thought, doing the unexpected and always 
thinking ahead; and physical fitness, since good health and a robust constitution were 
invaluable to a general.56 Almost all the texts on command and leadership reviewed, 
including those by Montgomery and Simonds, mirrored Fuller's three pillars in one form 
or another. The recurring characteristics were courage, mental agility and physical 
fitness. 
The issue of primary sources for this dissertation proved problematic. James Jay 
Carafano in his book, After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout 
(2000), stated: "We do not write the history of what happened but the history of the 
records that remain."57 This statement holds true for the history of the 4th Cdn Armd Div 
and is responsible in part for its current reputation. 
No two war diaries within the division contained the same level or type of 
information or supporting documentation in the appendices. Most of the war diaries of 
the units and regiments of 4th Cdn Armd Div during the month of August 1944 are 
incomplete when compared to the war diaries of other divisions and brigades. The level 
of detail varies greatly among units and between months, ranging from single sentences 
55
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to complete paragraphs for entries on the same day by units that were fighting in close 
proximity to, or in support of, each other. Typically, documents listed as appendices in 
the war diaries were missing altogether and copies of exercise and training reports, which 
one would expect to be filed in the months in which they occurred were found as 
appendices in the war diaries months later! 
Of specific concern is the state of the war diary for Headquarters (HQ) G Branch 
4th Cdn Armd Div. The evidence would suggest that the existing documents for July and 
August were rebuilt after the fact. This suspicion comes from the incompleteness of the 
July and August 1944 diaries when compared to the diaries before and after those months 
and by the fact that Foster signed off the diary for July 1944 even though he did not take 
command of the division until 21 August. Kitching had signed the 4th Cdn Armd Div war 
diary entries from February 1944, when he took command, to June 1944 and his signature 
should, therefore, have appeared on the July 1944 entry. Generally, the August war diary 
is complete with respect to daily situation reports, operation orders for TOTALIZE and 
TRACTABLE and intelligence reports, but vital evidence such as map traces and the 
operations log (ops log) were missing completely from the material reviewed. The war 
diaries of units that fought with or adjacent to 4 Cdn Armd Div proved invaluable in 
filling in this missing information. 
The crucial documents that could have provided insight into the actions and 
thoughts of the division commander are the armoured command vehicle logs, operation 
orders and Summary of GOCs 0[rders] Groups. Unlike the daily entry in the war diary, 
which may have been written at any point after the fact, the armoured command vehicle 
logs are essentially transcripts of the dialogue between the division commander and his 
17 
subordinate commanders. These logs reported real-time information and facts that can be 
assumed to be the most accurate information available at the time of transmission.58 
Without these logs, it is difficult to track what was going on among the different 
commanders. Unfortunately, the armoured command vehicle logs for the division are 
missing for the month of August 1944.59 
The surviving command vehicle logs from the two brigades of the division, the 
available "Summary of GOC O Grp" and formal operation orders do provide insight into 
the character of the commander. These documents allow the researcher to develop an 
understanding of the subject's problem-solving abilities and the way he used his staff. 
Formal orders, for example, represent the commander's solution to his assigned military 
problem. They are framed around a number of different criteria but involve an assessment 
of intelligence information, forces available, geography, weather and a host of other 
important factors. An assessment of the plan, therefore, can answer such questions as: Is 
there innovation and resourcefulness in the formulation of the plan or was there stringent 
adherence to doctrine? Did the commander clearly understand the mission he was 
assigned? Was he given the proper resources to carry out his assigned mission? The ops 
logs, on the other hand, can provide insight into the cognitive flexibility, fortitude and 
emotional character of the commander as they unveil how he reacted to the chaos, 
uncertainty and volatility of the events of the battle once joined. 
Donald Graves, South Albertas: A Canadian Regiment at War (Toronto: Robin Bass Studio, 1998), 14. 
59
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Two other pieces of vital primary source material seem to have been largely 
ignored by previous histories. The first is the Administration & Quartermaster Branch (A 
& Q) war diary from the Division. These records proved invaluable in providing 
information on the preparation of the division for Normandy. Once in theatre, the 
available daily administrative reports (ADREPs) provided a daily snapshot of the state of 
the division from a material perspective, and hence a useful tool for measuring whether 
the operational tempo was being influenced by the resources or lack thereof in the supply 
system. As with the other major pieces of evidence the ADREPs are missing from 17 to 
30 August and for the month of September 1944. 
The second piece of vital information is the summary of the commander's 
intentions. At the corps level Simonds' intent for operations were issued as a daily 
memorandum typically titled "Intentions" or "Intent" personally signed by Simonds. This 
document outlined the proposed operations and the assigned tasks for each unit under 
command of 2nd Cdn Corps for the next day. There was a significant gap in the "Intent" 
documents from 16-21 August making it difficult to determine exactly what Simonds 
wanted accomplished over those days. This may be explained in part by the fact that after 
16 August, Simonds apparently stopped issuing written orders, instead preferring to tell 
his divisional commanders what he wanted done. His intent during this timeframe, 
therefore, must be extracted from other sources such as message logs. 
Simonds' intent and tasks formed the basis for the division commander's orders 
for the same time period. The GOC's intentions were usually briefed at the commander's 
orders group and then formally recorded and issued by the GSO 1 to subordinate 
formations as "Summary of the GOC O Group." These documents are vital in 
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understanding what was supposed to happen as opposed to what actually happened. 
Much of the current narrative on operations in Normandy has been written on what 
actually happened. Division summaries are unfortunately missing from 14-21 August. 
Within the war diary of the 18 Canadian Armoured Car Regiment (18 Cdn Armd C 
Regt), however, were found hand written notes summarizing Kitching's intent for 
operations on 11-13 August bringing new light to the proposed conduct of operations 
after TOTALIZE stalled on 10 August. 
To augment the war diaries, the "Canadian Military Headquarters (CMHQ) 
Reports" 1940-1948 and "Army Headquarters Reports (AHQ)" provide detailed, 
extensively referenced information from writers who had generally open access to the 
primary sources, key figures and commanders involved in the training and execution of 
operations in northwest Europe. These reports were authored by the personnel, including 
Field Historical Officers, who gathered material at the corps and divisional headquarters 
during the campaign. 
A comprehensive history of the 4th Cdn Armd Div as a division has yet to be 
written. All of the regiments/battalions have published official histories that deal with 
their respective actions during August 1944 but they varied greatly in quality and utility. 
An interesting find not in general circulation was a book called Some Reminiscences of 
the Lanark and Renfrew Scottish Regiment and the Governor General's Foot Guards. 
(December 1984), by Lt Col A.B. French. The book provided detailed information on the 
workings of the regimental supply system and how the processes were modified within 
the regiment to meet the demands of the pursuit across France.60 The extent of the supply 
60
 French was the Quartermaster of the Governor General's Foot Guards during the timeframe in question 
and French maintained extensive notes including map references of the echelon forces and tanks from the 
crisis resulting from the Allied pursuit is portrayed in great detail in the Administrative 
History of the Operations of 21 Army Group on the Continent of Europe: 6 June 1944-8 
May 1945 (1945), an invaluable resource to this dissertation. 
It is interesting to note that when one reviews the literature on Canadian military 
history that the names of certain individuals come up time and again either as authors or 
as those listed in the acknowledgements as having contributed to the publication of 
various books. The task of recounting the Canadian experience in war was championed 
by a small group of Canadian historians such as C.P. Stacey, Desmond Morton, George 
Stanley and J.L. Granatstein, to name a few. Most of the authors, at one time or another 
were either sponsored or mentored by C.P. Stacey or worked in the history directorate in 
National Defence Headquarters. Consequently, the post 1945 to early 1970s literature has 
perpetuated many of Stacey's conclusions about the Canadian record in the Second 
World War.61 
It was not until the late 1980's and early 1990s that a resurgence in the 
publication of military-oriented topics occurred. Historians embarked on a campaign of 
intense research and investigation to reappraise the Canadian Army contributions and 
actions during this period. Within the secondary sources a number of books were 
time the regiment landed to the end of the war. The book was found in the Governor General's Foot Guard 
Museum in Ottawa. 
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instrumental in providing the framework necessary before the detailed analysis of the 
primary sources could be conducted. In addition to the books already mentioned Dr. 
Geoffrey Hayes The Lines (1986, republished in 2007), Dr R. Fraser's Black Yesterday's: 
The Argyll's War (1996) and Brian Reid's detailed analysis of operation TOTALIZE in 
No Holding Back: Operation Totalize (2005) were valuable resources. In addition, having 
access to the personal correspondence between Dr. Reginald Roy and many of the 
individuals discussed herein during the writing of his book and to the interviews that Dr 
R. Fraser conducted for his book provided details of events missing from many of the 
current histories. 
Canadian generals of the Second World War published few memoirs. Kitching 
wrote Mud and Green Fields (1993), which is his account of his career to the end of the 
war and Tony Foster, the general's son, wrote Meeting of Generals (1986), a biographical 
work on his father's military career. Research for this dissertation revealed that both 
Kitching and Foster had extensive notes and personal records that survived. Kitching had 
an extensive private collection of correspondence that was correlated by historian Dr. R. 
Roy and returned to the family. Tony Foster wrote his book essentially from a journal 
that his father kept. Attempts to gain access to these documents for this dissertation 
proved unsuccessful. 
A full biography on General H.D. Crerar, Commander of the First Canadian 
Army, who had been called Canadian military history's "most famous nobody" is now 
available.62 Paul Dickson's 1993 doctoral dissertation63 on Crerar has finally been 
62
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published as A Thoroughly Canadian General: A Biography of General H.D.G. Crerar 
(2007). Crerar is one of the few Canadian generals to have his "papers" and wartime 
correspondence deposited in the Library and Archives Canada and they contained 
detailed information of immense importance to any evaluation of the Canadian Army. 
Simonds' biography The Price of Command: A Biography of General Guy Simonds 
(1993) by Dominik Graham was of limited use in this examination because of the lack of 
a detailed examination of Simonds actions and decisions particularly during the closing 
of the Falaise Gap. Of greater utility and importance was Terry Copp's Guy Simonds and 
the Art of Command (2007) which is a compilation of directives, letters and orders issued 
by Simonds on the topics of command and leadership. Jack Granatstein's valuable study 
The Generals (1993) provides important background on eight Canadian general's but 
does not address training or operational history in any detail.64 Douglas Delaney's study 
of major-general Bert Hoffmeister, The Soldier's General (2005)65 includes a discussion 
of his command style at the divisional level which is helpful for comparative purposes 
but the circumstances under which 5th Canadian Armoured Division trained and fought 
were significantly different from those experiences by 4th Armoured Division. 
Despite the considerable volume of literature on the Normandy campaign and the 
Canadian Army this dissertation will focus on an area that has received little dedicated 
effort- the organization, people and structures that comprised the division command 
environment of the 4 Cdn Armd Div. More specifically, this dissertation will analyze the 
effectiveness of the command and control of the 4th Cdn Armd Div during two specific 
64
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types of operations - "the breakout battles" exemplified by operations TOTALIZE, 
TRACTABLE and the operations designed to close the Falaise Gap, under Kitching and 
"the pursuit" exemplified by the actions to pursue the retreating German Armies across 
France and Belgium ending with the attack on Moerbrugge on 8 September 1944 under 
Foster. The investigation will centre on the effectiveness of the interaction between the 
GOC, the 4th Cdn Armd Div unit commanders, and the two key division staff members, 
the GSO 1, and the AA&QMG. The goal is to determine how well they facilitated the 
operational tempo of the division in the breakout and pursuit operations while withstand 
the stressors of combat. 
The selection of these operations is deliberate. The closing of the Falaise Gap and 
the pursuit were specifically chosen because they each represent a period of time where 
the division commander was able to operate with a certain amount of autonomy. In each 
case, the GOC was not under specific direction from Simonds at 2nd Cdn Corps. 
Conversely, TOTALIZE and TRACTABLE provide examples of the opposite where 
Kitching was operating within the direction of a deliberate operational plan. The evidence 
will reveal that nature of the command environment operated differently in each scenario. 
While the command influence was prominent in the breakout battles, it was the effective 
work of the staff in managing division logistics that ensured that the resources were 
available to sustain the division's operational tempo in the pursuit across France. This 
feat was accomplished at a time when the availability of vital supplies and resources was 
falling rapidly across the entire theatre and entire Allied divisions were grounded for lack 
of transport and supplies. 
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The framework required to examine the commander -staff effectiveness of the 
division during the stated operations will include elements from other disciplines. It will 
involve discussions and analyses of such topics as leadership, command and 
organizational dynamics; both the art and science, military operations and, most 
importantly, the human element involved in these areas. This dissertation will begin by 
providing a fundamental understanding of what an armoured division was, how it was 
organized and equipped and how it was to be employed. It will then introduce the key 
individuals and examine the unique roles, duties and responsibilities required to provide a 
greater understanding of how and why decisions were made and executed. Collectively, 
the men, institutions and structures of the Division will be examined to explore how they 
operated and how they stood up to the stresses encountered in combat to determine how 
effective they were in generating combat capability. 
Two measures will be used to assess performance. Operational tempo has three 
elements: speed of decision, speed of execution and the speed with which a force 
transitions from one activity to another. This assessment will determine how well the 
commander-staff dynamic worked. The second performance measure will be a subjective 
assessment of the quality and effective execution of the decision(s) made, measured 
against the possible and reasonable alternatives available.66 Key questions will include: 
what were the critical tasks? how were they completed? and what key events determined 
the outcome? The goal of this assessment will be to determine the effectiveness of the 
David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Understanding Command and Control (Washington: CCRP 
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commander and his staff in performing their implied and assigned tasks in the execution 
of the mission. 
The current body of literature concerning the 4th Cdn Armd Div has concentrated 
on the outcome of operations and has drawn conclusions on division and leadership 
effectiveness without a true understanding of the human effort required to facilitate, 
execute and sustain the operations. This dissertation will challenge the current reputation 
of Kitching as an ineffective division commander, and will argue that Kitching's 
contribution to the legacy of the 4th Cdn Armd Div was significant and lasting. It was he 
who effectively trained the divisional staff who, after five months of training in England 
and two weeks of continuous combat under his guidance and direction, had figured out 
how to operate and sustain the division effectively in combat operations. This dissertation 
will also evaluate the fighting effort of the division as a whole, place their effort in proper 
context within the Normandy campaign and establish a reputation for the senior staff 
officers of the division as skilled and innovative leaders of combined arms staffs. This 
dissertation will demonstrate that the 4th Cdn Armd Div was a well-led and well-managed 
division that was responsive, adaptive and resilient to the internal and external forces 
inherent in war that could have rendered the division ineffective. 
67 Cohen and Gooch, Military Misfortunes, 52. 
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Chapter One: The Division Command Environment 
The effective use of an armoured division in battle required the coordinated 
interaction of thousands of men and machines in time and space against an assigned 
objective. The key to this interaction was intellectual rather than physical and occured 
through a process that will be called the commander-staff dynamic (CS dynamic). The 
CS dynamic refers to the cognitive interface between the commander and his staff that 
processes the multitude concepts and information generated in the normal operation of a 
division. The elements of the CS dynamic include the commander, his subordinate 
commanders, the staff, and the leadership environment. Each element has a crucial role to 
play in generating situational awareness thereby ensuring coordinated action on the part 
of the division in the attainment of its assigned objectives. The measurable output of this 
process is operational tempo or the ability of the formation to carry out sustained combat 
operations against an equally determined foe that is also trying to achieve his assigned 
objectives. A well functioning CS dynamic will facilitate success in combat while a 
dysfunctional CS dynamic will lead to failure in operations. Understanding the 
effectiveness of the CS dynamic and all of its elements in the 4 Cdn Armd Div is vital, 
therefore, to understanding the combat performance of the Division in Normandy. 
A commander exists as both a position and a person. The GOC of 4 Cdn Armd 
Div had known duties and functions within the accountability framework of 2nd Cdn 
Corps. Kitching was deemed to have had the appropriate skills and competencies 
necessary to realize his potential as commander of an armoured division when he was 
appointed to the position. Kitching was entrusted with the authority to direct, coordinate 
and control the military forces placed under his stewardship and if need be to "commit 
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Canadians to battles from which they may not return or may return permanently maimed, 
incapacitated, or disfigured."68 
Kitching had the authority to issue lawful orders to those individuals and 
formations under his command and he expected in return, their cooperation, loyalty and 
energy in the execution of his orders. He had the right to delegate to subordinate 
commanders a portion of his overall authority commensurate with the assigned task or 
mission. While Kitching had the right to hold a subordinate commander responsible for 
the successful completion of a mission, Kitching remained responsible and accountable to 
Simonds for the effective execution of the mission entrusted to him. The tracing of 
accountability was, therefore, relatively straightforward and proceeded through the 
respective commander at each level of command.69 
The commander had the ultimate responsibility for achieving his assigned mission 
objectives. In most cases, the commander made decisions in battle where a climate of 
volatility, uncertainty, confusion and disorder existed and where risk, violence, fear and 
danger were prevalent. He may be further challenged by deficiencies in his own forces, 
poor equipment and discontinuities among such factors as strategy, doctrine, tactics, 
enemy forces and the training or experience level of his own forces. The commander 
could also be constrained by orders so specific that he could not shape ways, ends and 
means to achieve his objective.70 Whatever the challenges, the successful division 
commander was expected to overcome them to achieve mission success. 
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The division was considered the highest formation within which a commander 
could retain personal contact with the soldiers under his command. Some commanders 
chose to be very directive, overseeing every detail of their operations, while others were 
content to give general guidance and allowed the staff to work out the details. The 
division commander was completely accountable for the training and leadership of the 
troops under his command and for the efficiency of their support. Montgomery outlined 
two tasks for the commander: first, "to create the fighting machine, and to forge the 
weapon to his liking," and to "create the HQ organization, or setup that will enable the 
weapon to be wielded properly and to develop its full potential."71 Consequently, the 
attitude, confidence and fighting efficiency of the division was significantly influenced 
and moulded by the personality, leadership style and abilities of the commander as a 
leader, tactician and trainer. The division, therefore, given time and the resources to train, 
became a reflection of the leadership style and character of the commander. 
The function of the divisional commander in operations was to synchronize the 
resources and capabilities of his forces to produce maximum combat power at the 
decisive point at the required time.72 In this case, Kitching would inherit a mission, set of 
tasks or objectives and conditions from Simonds. He would then translate the mission 
into tasks for his own forces including defining and assigning roles, resources and the 
nature of the interactions that should and should not take place within the units of the 
division.73 Next he would consider the level of risk that was acceptable in pursuing the 
objective before issuing orders. With this guidance, his subordinate commanders worked 
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out their own respective plans. Once the operation was initiated, the experienced 
commander would retain a secure hold over the basic operational aspect of the battle but 
try to allow his subordinate commanders the latitude to achieve their assigned tasks.75 
One of the key issues faced by a commander was where to position himself on the 
battlefield to influence ongoing operations. The commander had to consider his position 
in relation to the forces he commanded and his mission. The decision as to where he 
positioned himself could have important consequences, not only for the command 
organization but also for the conduct of operations. If a commander was too close to the 
action, he ran the risk of becoming a casualty or being caught up in a "side-show" that 
distracted him from maintaining an appreciation of the situation over the entire 
battlefield. If he was too far from the battlefield, he could compromise his ability to read 
the battle and take advantage of opportunities as they presented themselves. The 
commander, therefore, had to choose a position for himself that would allow him to 
assess progress, interact with staff and subordinate commanders and to influence, in a 
timely manner, events on the battlefield. The experienced commander would typically 
sense where the critical point or battle would be fought and would place himself, in a 
position where he could bring divisional resources to bear to influence that crucial battle 
in his favour. Kitching's decisions with respect to his position on the battlefield would 
play an important role in the examined battles. 
Normal practice was to have the division commander direct operations with a 
very small staff from a tactical headquarters well forward in the battle area. This practice 
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was very much personality driven and this is how Kitching operated. Control was 
exercised by personal visits to brigade commanders and by conferences, when needed, 
with divisional staff and commanders of the supporting arms. Liaison officers were 
often used to convey orders and provide "eyes and ears" in higher headquarters and 
neighbouring formations so that the commander could maintain an awareness of what 
was going on above him in the chain of command and around him on the battlefield. In 
this way, Kitching retained situational awareness on the battle and kept his subordinate 
commanders and staff informed of his intentions, both immediate and future.79 This was 
important since his focus would constantly be shifting between future plans to current 
operations as required by the tactical situation. 
A superior commander may at times feel compelled to remove a subordinate 
commander when his performance was judged to be unsatisfactory. Both Simonds and 
Crerar made their views known on this subject through personal correspondence and 
directives. Simonds felt that it was the first duty of every commanding officer to ensure 
that the command of his subordinate formations was in "fit, competent and energetic 
hands."80 Simonds felt that a commanding officer who tolerated ineffective subordinates 
was himself, unfit for command. Simonds' ideas were further amplified in a letter to Lt 
Gen Miles Dempsey, GOC-in-C of Second Army, when asked to assess the suitability of 
command of Maj Gen R Keller, GOC of 3rd Cdn Inf Div. After assessing the combat 
record of the division and present state of the division since landing on D-Day, Simonds 
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felt that a change in senior leadership would have an adverse effect on troop morale and 
that the removal of Keller would be regarded as censure on the efforts of the division. 
Simonds felt that it would only be appropriate to make a change after the division had 
had a success in battle. He concluded that the individual qualities of Keller were 
"unimportant at the moment in comparison with the bigger problem of maintaining 
morale" of the division.81 Simonds seemingly changed his position in this matter in 
dealing with Kitching a month later. 
Crerar's thoughts on the dismissal of a commanding officer are portrayed in a 
letter he wrote to Simonds on 29 Aug 44 after Simonds dismissed had Brig J.E. Ganong 
from command of 4 Cdn Inf Bde. Crerar's letter highlighted the negative effect that the 
removal of a commanding officer could have on a formation and stressed that the 
removal had to be based on the "soundest grounds." He felt that frequent removal of 
commanding officers created a scapegoat mentality for non-success on the battlefield 
regardless of whether the tasks assigned were actually achievable. He also felt that 
repetitive dismissal of commanders would have a bad effect on other ranks since it could 
encourage them to not do their best leading to mission failure with the blame directed on 
the commanding officer. Crerar felt that obvious "inefficiency" was the measure by 
which the commander should be judged even though "inefficiency" is never defined. 
Crerar concluded by saying that frequent changes in command, as had happened in the 
Normandy battles of July and August can "otherwise have a most deleterious general 
81
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effect on the morale and cohesion of Canadian formations and units." The evidence 
would suggest that when and why a commander was removed was not based solely on 
failure in operations but was a function of many variables. 
A commander had a very real and often forgotten function of identifying and 
preparing those to succeed the current officers in key command and staff positions within 
the division including his own. The task was not only to identify possible candidates but 
to train them so that they were prepared to take over the assigned roles at a moment's 
notice. Properly training future leaders was a critical task since officers would inevitably 
be lost either as casualties or through promotion and the division had to continue to 
function seamlessly. Kitching was cognizant of this important function and took steps to 
discuss and prepare his commanders for this eventuality during their training. The 
replacement of lost commanders would prove to be a serious issue for 4 Cdn Armd Div in 
August 1944. 
Command and control is today defined as the formal structure by which a 
commander, assisted by his staff, plans, directs and coordinates the activities of his 
assigned forces. The purpose of command and control is to bring all available 
information and assets to bear towards the achievement of the assigned task, objective or 
goal.83 A command and control structure is important to achieve co-ordinated action 
since the division, at times had units attached from outside the division for the execution 
of a particular operation.84 
The functions normally associated with command and control include: 
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• Establishing intent 
• Determining roles, responsibilities and relationships 
• Establishing rules and constraints 
• Monitoring and assessing the situation 
• Inspiring, motivating and engendering trust 
• Training and education 
• Allocating of resources and the search for additional ones 
The Second World War division commander had a number of avenues available to 
control the movement of his assigned forces in relation to factors, both internal and 
external to the division. He could control the initial move of his forces by issuing timings 
at which formations would cross the start line. Control was achieved by giving various 
report lines astride the axis of advance, each of which had a code name. The use of report 
lines enabled the divisional commander to monitor and control his forward troops and the 
heads of his various columns. By comparing the location of the various prongs of his 
advanced guard, in conjunction with other information in his possession, the commander 
was able to obtain a picture of the rate of advance, the degree of opposition met or of 
obstacles encountered.86 
Once the operation was launched, the function of the commander was one of 
inspiring, motivating and continuously assessing the situation, responding with orders 
when needed to ensure the successful completion of the operation.87 The whole procedure 
of command and control demanded situational awareness, clear-cut decisions, risk 
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management, mutual confidence among the command team and absolute congruence 
between the commander, his subordinate commanders and the divisional staff. 
In any command system there is an inherent tension between centralized control 
and delegating authority, between a commander's desire to have firm control of all 
aspects of command and the initiative and latitude he was prepared to allow his 
subordinates. The British/Canadian command style that existed in 21st Army Group was 
one that emphasized a high degree of centralized control. The array of controls 
represented by report lines, intermediate objectives, bomb lines and strict timings were 
typical in operational orders originated from 2nd Cdn Corps.89 This was a reflection of the 
command style preferred by Montgomery and Simonds, based on the philosophy that 
tighter control of the battlefield from the top would allow the materiel superiority of the 
Allies to be brought to bear to defeat the Germans. 
The Canadian Army of the Second World War had a well-defined staff system. 
The staff organization at all levels was composed of three branches: the General Staff 
Branch (G), the Adjutant General's Branch (A) and the Quartermaster-General's Branch 
(Q). The G staff was lead by the GSO 1 at Main Headquarters. The G staff had primary 
responsibility for operations, intelligence, training and liaison, The G staff was 
responsible for confirming in writing or by signal all operational and movement orders; 
for issuing such staff duty and training directives as the commander may wish and for 
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keeping the war diary. The staff was primarily concerned with detail which 
Montgomery called the "providence of the staff."91 
The A staff was responsible for those services, which had a direct bearing on the 
morale of the troops. The A staff typically dealt with such issues as replacements, 
discipline, prisoners, military police, medical, pay, etc. The Q staff was responsible for 
all issues involving supply, transport, maintenance and technical services. The A and Q 
staffs were under the control of one individual known as the Assistant Adjutant and 
Quartermaster-General (AA&QMG). There were three levels of support within the 
division, at division, brigade and battalion/regiment level, with each delegated specific 
responsibilities. 
Administrative units, whose task in battle did not necessitate their being in the 
forward battle area, were formed into administrative groupings or echelons and 
positioned at various distances to the rear of the battle area. During the Second World 
War there were typically two echelons: A and B echelons. The A echelon consisted of all 
vehicles of headquarters and units required with, or to be available to join, the unit in 
battle. The A echelon was further divided into two sub-groups: Al echelon and A2 
echelon. 93 
Al echelon included the transport required to carry stores and equipment required 
in the immediate battle area. The battalion or regimental commander generally controlled 
this echelon. A2 echelon contained the transport required to carry equipment and stores 
90
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needed in the battle, but at a later stage. This echelon was normally controlled by the 
brigade and was centralized or "brigaded" with similar brigade units in one location. B 
echelon included the transport carrying stores and equipment not required until a pause 
occurred in the fighting. The B echelon was normally situated in the Divisional 
Administrative Area (DAA), which was located at the rear of the allotted division 
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space. 
Figure 1-1 Infantry Battalion Support Structure. Copp, The Canadian Battlefields in Normandy, 146. 
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The efficient and effective command of an armoured division depended to a large 
extent upon the relationships between the GOC, GSO 1 and the AA&QMG. Each had his 
duties to perform in controlling different components of the division. The key to an 
efficient and effective operating environment was a clear understanding of the 
commander's intent and a fundamental understanding of the strengths and abilities of the 
men who made up the command team. Teamwork at divisional headquarters had to be 
founded on mutual trust that started at the top and permeated throughout every branch.95 
Coordination was achieved by ensuring that operations had primacy and that all 
staff actions were arranged to support operations. In the absence of the commander, 
therefore, the GSO 1 provided decisions necessary to implement the commander's policy 
and intentions. Despite the primacy of operations, it was imperative that the 
administrative arrangements for operations were just as comprehensive to ensure that 
they facilitated the commander's intent and the tactical plan.96 
The staff structure of the division was mirrored at the brigade level with the 
Brigade Major (BM) responsible for operations and a deputy AA&QMG (DAA&QMG) 
responsible for the relevant A& Q functions. The BM prepared and issued all plans and 
operation orders within the brigade on behalf of the brigade commander and was also 
responsible for the transmition of information to the Div HQ and to neighbouring 
formations. The staff captain had a different role in each brigade. In the infantry brigade 
he was the staff officer responsible for personnel related issues while in the armoured 
brigade he was the assistant to the DAA&QMG.97 
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In the conduct and planning of operations, the staff officer had the dual 
responsibilities of advising the commander on the one hand and passing on the 
commander's instructions on the other. Due to the nature of their work, staff officers 
became a conduit and sometimes a filter of information up and down the chain of 
command. They frequently had information of which the commander was not aware or 
they may have had ideas that did not coincide with those of the commander. In these 
circumstances, it was the duty of the staff officer to brief the commander and to provide 
honest advice. However, when the commander decided on a course of action, the role of 
the staff became one of translating the intentions of the commander into timely, complete 
and properly-related actions on the part of division units. Decisions were translated into 
plans or directives that informed the elements of the force of their tasks or objectives and 
how the assets of the division and accompanying forces would be coordinated in support. 
Resources or assets available were identified, boundaries and other control measures 
were de-conflicted and contingencies identified if plans had to be altered.98 
All staff coordination would take place within the three components (Tactical, 
Main and Rear) that comprised division headquarters. The commander usually operated 
from his tactical headquarters while the GSO staff was located in Main Headquarters 
where they provided oversight of operations. Rear Headquarters controlled the 
administrative functions and contained the commander and staff of the Adjutant General 
and Quartermaster-General branches, the heads of services and their staffs and 
administrative personnel attached to the division." 
Canadian Army, The Armoured Division in Battle: 1952, 13. 
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Staff officers were trained to deal effectively with a wide range of problems and 
were to be broadly employable in the full range of staff positions. 10° The Canadian 
Army, however, was plagued with a shortage of effective staff officers. Personnel 
movement brought about by the rapidly expanding army meant that officers had little 
time to learn a job before they were moved on, typically with a promotion. It was 
generally considered that a "good staff officer could not be trained in less than a year."101 
The last critical piece in the command environment is known as the chain of 
command. The chain of command is the structure by which command is exercised 
through a series of superior and subordinate commanders. It depicts the path of decision-
making and authority within a military force. The staff was not part of the chain of 
command. The staff supported the chain of command but had no authority independent of 
the commander. Staff derived authority from the commander and exercised it in his 
name. Therefore, all of the activities were undertaken on behalf of the commander.102 If a 
commander within the division objected to direction being provided by a staff member, 
the subordinate commander would address the issue through the chain of command to the 
GOC and not through the staff. 
An officer had to understand the characteristics and limitations of staffs in order 
to become an effective leader in a staff environment. Staffs were designed to provide 
commanders with the information, recommendations and coordination required for them 
to make informed and timely decisions.103 The staff process provided a structured and 
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logical sequence to the thinking and planning within a division.104 At various times the 
staff officer was negotiator, taskmaster and diplomat. At all times, he had to be energetic 
and boldly strive toward mission accomplishment.105 A good staff could often save even 
the most incompetent commander but, given the complexity of modern war, a 
commander was no longer likely to prevail without a competent staff.106 
The importance of staff training was imprinted on Kitching very early in his tour 
as GSO 1 for the 1st Cdn Inf Div during the invasion of Sicily. Each morning during the 
transit to Sicily, Kitching asked Simonds to draw the names of three ships, which 
contained Canadian equipment and supplies from a hat. These ships were then considered 
sunk and the staff was then tasked to evaluate the impact of the equipment loss and 
provide Simonds with appropriate recommendations. During the transit the three ships 
carrying all of the divisional headquarters and communication vehicles were sunk. The 
landing proceeded on schedule but Kitching improvised processes and procedures that 
allowed Simonds to exercise control of the division until replacement vehicles could be 
acquired.107 The headquarters was used to operating with a communication setup of 
twelve vehicles and an administrative backup of twenty-five. Kitching's improvisation 
allowed the division to effectively operate with four vehicles. 
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Decision making on the battlefield is a dynamic process. Decisions must be made 
in real time, which creates a state of fluid decision-making on the part of opposing 
commanders as they try to exert their respective will on their foe. Continuous evaluation 
and assessment of the battlefield conditions on the part of the commander and his staff 
becomes essential. Having the time needed to make decisions and being able to 
implement the corresponding action first is, therefore, crucial to any successful 
commander 108 
The commander and staff counterbalance each other. The commander is the 
creator of military art whose creative expression is balanced by the military science of the 
staff. In this relationship the commander would consider such elements as tempo, 
geometry, synchronization, synergy and risk in the formalization of his course of action. 
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The commander's thinking was therefore unconstrained in developing the solution to his 
assigned task. The staff provides the sober assessment of the commander's thinking 
through the application of military science. The staff considers such factors as forces, 
supplies, time and distance to determine whether the commander's desired course of 
action is feasible. This interactive dialogue between the desired and the possible is 
designed to balance ends (objectives) ways (operational design) and means (resources) 
resulting in a common situational awareness of what course of action was supportable. 
The ultimate decision on what action to take always rests with the commander. This 
constant interaction between commander and staff, art and science is critical however to 
an effective command team and success in battle. 
In operations, the division commander will be in a continuous process of 
examining the external environment, known as an "appreciation." When presented with a 
new mission, the commander assesses his observations and assumptions against the new 
assignment and develops a shared awareness with higher and subordinate commanders 
and the staff. At this point the commander will be focusing the staff effort to gain a 
common understanding of the mission assigned and in creating common situational 
awareness of the operating environment. 
Kitching provided an example of how the commander-staff process worked in the 
1st Canadian Infantry Division (1st Cdn Inf Div) during the Allied campaigns in Sicily and 
Italy where Kitching was the GSO 1 for Simonds, the GOC of the division. In his 
memoirs, Kitching states: 
General Simonds kept a regular schedule which allowed me to adjust my 
own activities to conform to his. He would be awakened before 6:00 a.m., 
given a briefing of the night's activities at about 6:30 a.m., and after a 
quick breakfast, visit the brigades. By noon each day he would have a fair 
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idea of the way he wanted to develop operations on the next day so I 
would meet him at some point in the forward area when he would give me 
advance warning of the probable course of the next day's operations. This 
allowed me to return to the headquarters and brief the senior members so 
that they could make the preliminary moves to ensure that their units were 
able to support the intended plans.10 
Kitching adopted a similar routine when he became the GOC of 4 Cdn Armd Div. 
Success in operations depended largely upon the accuracy and speed of transition 
of information about both the enemy and friendly forces. Information was gained and 
conveyed through a number of different avenues such as visits, reports from liaison 
officers, situation reports, appreciations from a higher commander and intelligence 
information. The most common form of reporting in operations was through situation 
reports. 
Situation reports, known as SITREPS, were transmitted from subordinate units to 
higher headquarters at specific times each day. SITREPs were to contain summaries of 
operations and movements during the period of the report. In 4 Cdn Armd Div, SITREPs 
were generated by the brigades twice daily to reflect the operational situation as of 1200 
hrs (to reach Main Div HQ by 1400 hrs daily) and as at 2400 hrs (to reach Main Div HQ 
by 0200 hrs). Subordinate commanders reported important developments to Main Div 
HQ, usually by radio, and then confirmed through the appropriate SITREP.110 
In addition to the operations oriented reports, there was a plethora of 
administrative reports that had to be completed in order to ensure that operations would 
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be properly supported. Divisional units submitted Daily Administrative Reports, known 
as an ADREP, as of 1600 hrs daily and were to reach Rear HQ by 1900 hrs. This report 
was then forwarded to HQ Rear 2nd Cdn Corps. The ADREP was a short message 
sequenced from A to K with each letter representing a specific commodity.111 Tracking 
these reports provided an important tool in assessing the materiel state of the division in 
Normandy. 
In total, there were 24 returns required from A Branch that were reported to 2nd 
Cdn Corps. Of these, seven were due daily: seven, weekly; seven, monthly; and three, as 
required. In Q Branch, there were 45 different returns to be filed.112 Many of the daily 
returns were required twice, typically at 0600 and 1800 hrs. The staff gathered 
information to produce over 20 daily reports.113 The administrative burden to sustain 
operations in the Canadian staff system was considerable. 
During an operation, the higher commander (i.e., a corps commander) in the chain 
of command provided each of his division commanders with a mission, normally after a 
preliminary warning and an opportunity to discuss ways and means of achievement. The 
mission became the focus of the division commander's "appreciation" or estimate from 
which he with his staff formulated a plan. The division commander then issued a 
Warning Order that contained preliminary information, which allowed everybody to start 
thinking ahead to the coming operation. The division commander then issued full orders 
assigning tasks to his subordinate commanders, who then repeated this cycle within their 
'"For example, A represented day's rations held; B, miles in Petrol Oil Lubricants (POL) held in lsl and 2nd 
line; C, ammunition expenditure in total rounds in previous 24 hours, and G represented the battle-
worthiness of the fighting vehicles subdivided by tanks, armoured cars and scout cars. Item F identified 
those units that had fallen below 85 percent of their war establishment strength. War Diary, 4th Canadian 
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own commands. This process facilitated continuous information-sharing from higher to 
subordinate formations. The result of this continuous process was that subordinate levels 
in the organization received early information on a future mission allowing two or more 
levels to plan for the same operation almost simultaneously. 
To manage the military decision-making process, the British and Canadian 
Armies implemented a prescriptive, highly formalized step-by-step model in which 
decisions were developed linearly. The thought process for the execution of command in 
battle was founded on a recognized practice that divided the process into sequences of 
problem definition, course of action generation, refinement of course of action and 
selection.114 Commanders would vary their interpretation of the process, but the main 
elements remained constant. 
The principle of "appreciating the situation," and then issuing orders remained 
exactly the same whether the recipient had to execute those orders ten minutes or ten 
days after receipt.115 Whether written or verbal, appreciations followed the same logical 
sequence and considered the following factors: 
• The objective to be achieved 
• Factors which effect the attainment of this objective 
• Relative strength—present dispositions, mobility, armament and morale of the 
enemy in relation to one's own forces 
• Terrain 
• Time and space 
• Weather 
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• Hours of daylight and darkness 
• The need for operational security 
• Communications 
• Courses open to own troops, to the enemy 
• The plan 
A commander was involved in a constant process of appreciating the situation so that 
when an actual task or mission was received, he merely assembled the main factors and 
then proceeded to formulate the outline plan.116 Critical to the understanding of the 
commander's plan by subordinate commanders and staff members was the commander's 
description of the main factors and deductions which led him to his plan, and the level of 
risk that the commander was willing to accept in the execution of the plan. 
There were two types of orders: orders given before a major operation or set piece 
attack and those given in the heat of battle.117 The former usually involved detailed 
coordination and collaboration and were typically written rather than verbal. The guiding 
principal for issuing orders was to convey to the concerned units only that information 
that they required to carry out their assigned task. The information was to be confined to 
essential information, as brief in subject matter, headings and appendices as was possible. 
The goal was to ensure that every man down to the lowest levels had a clear 
understanding of what he had to do and the part he was to play in the main battle.118 
The Canadian Army pamphlet, Aide Memoire for Orders: Corps Level, provided 
the outline, headings and sequence of information to be given in seven different military 
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operations—advance, movement, attack (day), attack (night), river crossing, assault 
obstacle, withdrawal, and defence. Each operation was further divided into four 
headings—warning order, immediate, to follow and may be required. The warning order 
for each of the seven different operations varied in length but a core of information was 
common across all seven operations. These headings included: intention, direction, 
objectives, no move before (the start time for own troops to move), re-grouping of own 
troops, rendezvous (RV) and time for orders. This information helped to orient the 
formation to what was coming and allowed the troops to prepare for further action.119 The 
goal was to initiate the required action on the part of all formations and units involved 
with a minimum loss of time. 
Immediate information was information that had to be issued to the formations as 
soon as possible. It included more detailed information on the enemy, including 
locations; more detailed information on own forces, including objectives; the allotment of 
troops under command; centre line of advance; boundaries; concentration and assembly 
areas; and the general support plans from the artillery, engineers and signals. The "to 
follow information" included more detailed information from the support plans and 
administrative information on the moves of HQs, and medical plans. The "may be 
required" information included more administrative information on such topics as supply 
and fuel plans, prisoner of war (PW) handling and traffic control information in the 
forward areas. 120 
Understanding what type of information was going to be conveyed in a particular 
operation helped to streamline the transmission of information throughout the formation 
9
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since everyone down the chain of command understood the process, what information 
was essential and what information would be conveyed next in the transmission. 
Standardizing the orders-process helped to facilitate the transmission and understanding 
of verbal orders issued during operations. Montgomery was a great proponent of verbal 
orders and wrote repeatedly of the requirement to have a staff and subordinate 
commanders who could work and act on verbal orders or instructions. 122 
Operational tempo, for the purposes of this discussion, is the rate of activity or 
intensity of operations, relative to that of the enemy. Operational tempo was important 
because he who controlled the operational tempo retained the initiative and was able to 
dictate the where and when of operations, forcing the opponent into a continuous state of 
reacting. Operational tempo has three elements: speed of decision, speed of execution and 
speed with which a force transitions from one activity to another. 
Success in operations was dependent on a formation's ability to generate and 
maintain operational tempo. Operational tempo was a function of effective leadership, 
training and esprit de corps of a formation. As illustrated in the commander-staff 
dynamic, each leader within the framework had to assimilate and understand inputs from 
different sources which when combined formed a common situational awareness among 
the key decision makers. Achieving a quicker decision cycle than ones opponent ensured 
that the commander maintained the initiative and was able to dictate the tempo to his 
opponent despite the challenges encountered on the battlefield. 
The ability to seize and keep the initiative in battle by getting ahead of the 
opponent's decision cycle was, and still is, viewed as being of vital importance in 
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combat. Trying to determine whether a decision was timely, correct or incorrect can only 
be judged truly in hind-sight when all of the second and third order consequences are 
known from both sides in the conflict. The commander is left, therefore, to deal with 
what he sees and perceives of the battle immediately in front of him in order to carry on 
with his mission. It is left to the historian to determine the accuracy and validity of that 
decision. 
The division command environment was a complex space both intellectually and 
physically that required the co-ordination of countless processes and thousands of men 
and machines to achieve the operational tempo required. Key among these processes was 
the forming of a common situational awareness and common intent among the 
commander, his subordinate commanders and the key staff officers within the division. 
This ensured that everyone understood the task at hand. Also of vital importance was 
battle procedure. If not conducted properly the division and its troops would be 
committed to battle lacking the proper preparations necessary to carry out their assigned 
mission. Breakdowns in common situational awareness, common intent and battle 
procedure would plague the 4 Cdn Armd Div in its first major battle. 
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Chapter Two: The Key Players 
The typical Canadian battlefield general of the Second World War leading troops 
in action was in his mid-30s at the beginning of the war, with some ten-fifteen years 
service. He was a Permanent Force (PF) soldier, likely from the artillery or infantry, 
educated at the Royal Military College (RMC) in Kingston and the British Army Staff 
College. At the beginning of the war, he was a junior officer (lieutenant or captain) and 
had risen with extraordinary speed through the ranks as the army expanded.124 The 
Canadian Army was fortunate that it was almost four years before any of its divisions 
saw sustained action and five years before all were involved. This allowed for an 
extended time in training to help the new crop of Canadian generals learn their craft and 
at the same time weed out those who could not make the grade.125 
Kitching belonged to a small cadre of senior officers who had gained experience 
in Sicily and Italy before landing in Normandy. His military career encompassed service 
in both the British and Canadian Armies. He was accepted into Sandhurst in January 
1929, graduated 35th out of 175 in July of 1930 and was commissioned into the 2nd 
Battalion of the Gloucestershire Regiment.126 In the 1930's, he was a platoon and 
company commander with the British Army, initially in Singapore and later in India 
where he stated that he participated in a number of extensive manoeuvres involving as 
many as 20,000 men.127 Kitching resigned his commission and immigrated to Canada in 
1938. After the outbreak of the war, Kitching joined the Royal Canadian Regiment as a 
2nd lieutenant in September 1939. He rose rapidly in rank serving in a number of staff and 
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command positions. In 1940, he attended the Staff College in Camberley for six months 
and in 1942, as a lieutenant-colonel, he was given command of the Loyal Edmonton 
Regiment. Kitching was appointed the GSOl of the 1st Cdn Div Division in 1942 and 
participated in the invasion of Sicily. He was promoted to brigadier in 1943 and was 
given command of the 11th Cdn Inf Bde in Italy. In February 1944, Kitching was 
promoted Maj Gen and given command of 4 Cdn Armd Div without any further formal 
education or training but with a considerable amount of practical experience of combat 
operations from his time in Sicily and Italy under Simonds' mentorship.128 By modern 
standards, this rise through the ranks represents a fantastic accomplishment but in the 
rapid expansion of the Canadian Army in the Second World War, this was not 
uncommon for those identified for higher level command. 
The Canadian Army kept a detailed list of its senior officers, Lieutenant-Colonel 
and above, with notes on their potential for future assignments. The Canadian Army 
practice was to reward an individual with higher command, based on perceived potential, 
regardless of their arm of service.129 For example, Crerar wrote, "I do not consider that 
previous armoured experience is essential but it is certainly an important factor."130 This 
resulted in the selection of officers with infantry and artillery backgrounds to lead 
armoured divisions. 
The report, Recommendations for Promotion Officers, 1st Cdn Corps, dated 14 
January 1943, commented upon both Lt Col Harry Foster (Kitching's successor) and Lt 
Col Kitching. The report tracked the performance of these two officers from 5 June 1942 
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to 9 January 1943. The comments on Foster are extensive and highlight his diverse 
experience. He was viewed as a future commander rather than senior staff officer and his 
final report from this document stated he was "fit to be promoted to the rank of 
Brigadier" to command an infantry brigade.131 There is only one remark on Kitching 
dated 9 January 1943, which stated "Good prospect for Bde Comd with more 
experience." This statement is a reflection of the assessment made on Kitching by Maj 
Gen H.L.N. Salmon in a letter to the corps commander, 1st Canadian Corps, dated 4 
November 1942.133 Kitching's skill as a staff officer grew under Salmon, and Kitching 
recalled having learned much under his command.134 
Kitching's strong performance as the GSO 1 of 1st Cdn Inf Div in the Sicilian and 
Italian campaigns brought him to the attention of the senior leadership of the Canadian 
Army. On 26 September 1943 a special meeting of the senior army leadership considered 
recommendations and appointments within the army command structure.135 The minutes 
reflected that Lt-Gen A.G.L. McNaughton Commander of First Canadian Army was 
prepared to accept either Kitching or Lt Col B. Hoffmeister to command either the 9th or 
11th Cdn Inf Bdes. In a message dated 27 September 1943, McNaughton informed 
Simonds that Kitching and Hoffmeister had been selected as Infantry Brigadiers in 3rd 
Cdn Div and 5 Cdn Armd Div. Crerar, in a letter on the following day to McNaughton, 
l3lDuring this timeframe he held positions as a brigade major (BM) of 1st Cdn Inf Bde, GSO 2 1st Cdn 
Div, OC 4 Cdn Recce Regt and GSO 1 of 1st Cdn Div Canada. Army, Recommendations for Promotions 
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expressed his desire for a quick decision on who—Kitching or Hoffmeister—would be 
selected to command 9 Cdn Inf Bde. Crerar wanted the new brigade commander in place 
before the start of exercise "PIRATE," scheduled to begin on 17 October 1943.136 
Events in Italy, however, worked to resolve the issue. Simonds was taken ill with 
jaundice, causing a ripple-down effect in the Canadian command structure. Maj Gen 
Vokes replaced Simonds as GOC 1 Cdn Div and Hoffmeister was designated to replace 
Vokes. Therefore, on 29 September 1943, Hoffmeister assumed temporary command of 
the 2nd Cdn Inf Bde.137 Hoffmeister's appointment and, coincidently, the appointment of 
Kitching to command 11th Cdn Inf Bde of the 5th Armd Div, was authorized by message 
on 20 October 1943.138 
In January 1944, Simonds asked Kitching if he would consider returning to 
England to be the Brigadier General Staff (BGS) for 2nd Cdn Corps;139 in effect, 
recreating the working relationship that they had established during their time in 1st Cdn 
Div. Kitching agreed to this suggestion, which meant that he would have to give up his 
much coveted brigade command. Simonds made the initial request to have Kitching 
appointed as his BGS to Crerar by telephone on 16 January 1944, and followed the 
requested with a letter dated 17 January 1944. Simonds stated, 
If I am to go back and take over 2 Corps, it would be of great assistance to me if 
Kitching could be spared as B.G.S. .. .He knows my formula for the organization 
and functioning of a HQ. Thinking over the potential B.G.S's I know of no one 
with a better background and training.140 
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The fact that Kitching was prepared to give up a command to follow Simonds speaks to 
the deep admiration that Kitching had for Simonds. This admiration transcended the 
events in Normandy and continue until their respective deaths. 
In an undated letter written to Lt Gen E.L.M. Burns, 1st Cdn Corps Commander in 
Italy, Crerar discussed the "slate" of commanders available to command either armoured 
divisions or armoured brigades. Kitching was third on the list with Brig R.A. Wyman at 
the top. The body of the letter indicated that Wyman, based on his long armoured 
experience in Italy, was best suited to replace Worthington. The letter revealed that 
Simonds was unhappy with Wyman and suggested Kitching. Foster's name does not 
appear on either list for command of an armoured brigade or division.141 The underlying 
text in this letter is that finding the right individuals to command the two armoured 
divisions was weighing on the minds of both Crerar and Burns. The other interesting 
observation is that the decision had been made at the time the letter was written to replace 
Worthington. 
In a follow-up letter from Burns to Crerar, dated 7 February 1944, Kitching was 
now the top selection for command of an armoured division because of his "active 
experience" and Brig L. Booth was listed at the top of the list for those slated to 
command an armoured brigade. Latter in the letter, in a paragraph interestingly starting 
with the phrase " May I suggest the following solution to the concrete problem...," Burns 
recommended Kitching for command of the 4th Cdn Armd Div with Brig J.D.B Smith to 
remain in command of the 4th Cdn Armd Bde. Burns left the final decision for command 
141
 Ibid. 
55 
of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde to Crerar. On 12 February 1944, Crerar informed Burns that 
official notification had been received appointing Kitching to command 4th Cdn Armd 
Div. 143 
Did Kitching have the correct set of competencies to command an armoured 
division in Normandy? He had no previous armoured training or armoured command 
experience.144 He was an infantry officer. While it was not uncommon to have armoured 
divisions commanded by officers from the other branches, a conscious decision was 
made, based on his proven ability, to appoint Kitching to command 4th Cdn Armd Div. 
Simonds must have felt him capable to command, otherwise he would not have 
recommended the appointment. Even with his unique combination of education and 
experience, Kitching would have been forced into a steep learning curve on armoured 
warfare when he took over command of 4th Cdn Armd Div. What he did have, however, 
was a practical sense on how the main elements of the division, armoured, infantry and 
artillery, and their supporting elements, should work. 
While commanding the 11th Cdn Inf Bde, Kitching's men fought a bitter battle 
against the veteran German 1st Parachute Division in January 1944 in the Arelli area. 
Although the attack was repulsed, Kitching professed to have learned a number of 
important lessons, which he discussed in Mud and Green Fields. He summarized his 
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thoughts as follows: "The degree of co-operation between infantry and tanks, particularly 
in an armoured division, is frequently the measure of success or failure."145 There is also 
another interesting passage in his book in which he evaluates Canadian success in battle. 
He attributed earlier Canadian success to the fact that control of the battle was with the 
companies and battalions who were fighting it. Unit commanders were told what to do 
and were given the room in which to do it.14 The fog of war, infantry-tank cooperation 
and mission-specific orders would become important elements in Kitching's 
understanding of battle. The key question was whether he would have the opportunity 
and time to impart his knowledge, experience and will upon the units and leaders of his 
division. 
Kitching inherited a staff whose members had been with the division since 
1943.The GSO 1 for 4th Cdn Armd Div when Kitching took over command was Lt Col 
Ed Ganong. Little has been written about Ganong in secondary sources. He had been the 
CO of the 48th Highlanders of Canada prior to becoming the GSO 1 of 4th Cdn Armd 
Div.147 The 1943 Recommendations for Promotion document stated that Ganong was a 
good prospect for brigade command with more experience.148 When, as GOC of 4th Cdn 
Armd Div, Kitching provided recommendations for brigade command, he selected 
Ganong. The 27 May 1944 Recommendation for Command submitted by Kitching on 
Ganong stated that he was a sound and capable officer who had been previously 
recommended by Worthington for command of a brigade. Ganong had commanded the 
10th Cdn Inf Bde satisfactorily in an acting capacity for a period of one month when the 
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division was in Norfolk. Simonds' additional comments on the recommendation noted 
that when Ganong took over command of the 48th Highlanders, he (Simonds) was the 
commander of 1st Cdn Inf Bde. Simonds watched Ganong improve the tactical training 
and administration of the unit to a high standard of efficiency and it was largely as a 
result of this successful command that Simonds had recommended Ganong for Staff 
College.149 
Ganong was selected to attend the Senior Staff Course at Minley Manor from 3 
December 1942 to 6 May 1943. He was one of only six Canadian officers to attend this 
course throughout the war.150 Ganong was appointed GSO-1 of the 4th Cdn Armd Div on 
7 May 1943 and would remain in that position until 3 August 1944 when he was selected 
to command the 4th Cdn Inf Bde. 
Lt Col Fred Wigle replaced Ganong as the GSO 1 in August 1944 and soon 
established a system that Kitching described as bringing "more life to the general 
staff."151 Wigle was young, capable and full of enthusiasm. He was described by his 
subordinates and peers as a brilliant man, a fearless and inspirational leader who inspired 
trust from those with whom he worked. Before joining the army Wigle was a successful 
business man and athlete who had been the captain of the McGill University football and 
hockey teams.152 Wigle was renowned for his elaborate orders groups where he was 
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known to be quite explicit in what he wanted and rarely did he invite discussion. 
Wigle would remain GSO 1 until 29 January 1945 when he was appointed to command 
the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Argylls). The Regimental history of 
the Argylls, Black Yesterday's, is replete with concerns expressed by regimental 
members over the loss of Lt Col Dave Stewart as their commanding officer and the fact 
that he was being replaced by a staff officer from division. These concerns quickly faded 
but one of the noted remarks about his time in command was that "his [Wigle's] orders 
were complete right down to the last comma."154 While Wigle's style was by the book, it 
is clear that he made an immediate impression on Kitching and the staff as a whole. 
Wigle like Kitching inherited a cohesive staff that had been through an extensive 
training program conducted by Kitching in England. The members of his GSO U and 
GSO III ops staff joined the division either shortly before or shortly after Kitching took 
over command. This in part explains the successful transition of staff leadership from 
Ganong to Wigle during the first week of August 1944.155 
Lt Col J.W. Proctor was appointed AA&QMG of 4th Cdn Armd Div on 27 August 
1943. Like Ganong, very little information exists about this officer. Prior to his 
appointment to 4th Cdn Armd Div, he had been the 2nd Cdn Inf Bde staff captain and then 
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became the AQMG of 2n Cdn Corps. After taking command, Kitching soon realized 
that Proctor was the driving force in his headquarters. Kitching described him as having a 
good military grounding at RMC, physically strong and a hard worker who knew what 
was wanted.157 Proctor was promoted to colonel on 13 March 1945 and was appointed 
commander, First Canadian Army Terminals.158 
The senior staff team of Ganong and Proctor would become a formidable 
combination in the training of the division in the run up to their entry into battle. The 
Wigle/Proctor tandem would become equally as impressive in the execution of operations 
in Normandy. Together, these men and their collective abilities nicely complimented 
those of Kitching producing a capable command team. 
Supporting Ganong/Wigle and Proctor were the brigade majors of the two 
brigades. Wigle's counterpart in 10 Cdn Inf Bde was Major J.G. Armstrong. He joined 
the Brigade in August 1943 as did the majority of his subordinate staff. Proctor's 
counterpart was Maj E.W. Cowdry who joined the Brigade on 2 May 1944. The majority 
of Cowdry's officers joined the Brigade in 1943159 
Maj A.G. Chubb was the BM for the 4 Cdn Armd Bde. Chubb joined the Brigade 
in December 1943. The members of Chubb's subordinate staff were all with the division 
by March 1944 and the key senior staff officers remained in place throughout August 
1944.160 The majority of the staff at both brigade and division level that trained with the 
Foster, Meeting of Generals, 380. 
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division before entry into theatre would remain with the division during the timeframe 
examined herein. 
On the surface, Kitching was seen to be lucky in having a number of commanders 
with combat experience posted to the division. 10th Cdn Inf Bde was commanded by Brig 
Jim Jefferson. Kitching viewed him as a quiet-spoken man who gave the impression he 
was slow on the uptake because he always mulled over a question before replying. 
According to Kitching, that period of thought and his slow spoken replies fooled many 
people. Jefferson, who had commanded the Loyal Edmonton Regiment and won a 
Distinguished Service Order (DSO) in Italy, was promoted to Brigadier to command the 
10th Cdn Inf Bde while Lt Col Leslie Booth, who had commanded the Three Rivers 
Regiment in Italy, took over the armoured brigade. Brig Herm Lane took over command 
of the division artillery.161 
While the concept of bringing back experienced regimental COs from Italy to 
command the brigades was viewed as a smart move, the reality was that not all officers 
could successfully make the transition to higher level command. Booth was viewed as 
one who did not make the transition. Chubb made this observation about Booth. While 
Booth was viewed as a fearless individual, Chubb later claimed that Booth was a poor 
brigadier and had no clear understanding of how to use his staff, which made it very 
difficult to achieve the synergy needed in battle. He also claimed that Booth's tactical 
knowledge was very limited as were his ideas for training.162 The other shortcoming was 
alcohol abuse, for which Kitching counselled him. Many of these shortcomings would 
161
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come back to influence negatively the conduct of operations for the division in August 
1944. 
Brig Robert (Bob) Moncel made a successful transition from staff to brigade 
command. Like Kitching, Moncel had joined the RCR at the outbreak of war as a 
lieutenant and was promoted to captain one year later. He commanded the 18th Cdn Armd 
C Regt from 31 January 1943 to 26 August 1943 and was then selected as the GSO 12nd 
Cdn Corps in August 1943. Moncel remained there until he took over command of 4th 
Cdn Armd Bde on 19 August 1944. Simonds had recommended Moncel for command 
of an armoured brigade on 30 May 44164 and on 8 August Simonds and Kitching agreed 
that Moncel would take over command of 4 Cdn Armd Bde on a permanent basis if 
Booth became a casualty.165 
Of the four regimental commanders of the 4th Cdn Armd Bde—Lt Col D.G. 
Worthington British Columbia Regiment (BCR), Lt Col M.J. Scott Governor General 
Foot Guards (Foot Guards), Lt Col W.W. Halpenny Canadian Grenadier Guards 
(Grenadier Guards) and Lt Col J.E.V. Murrell of the Lake Superior Regiment—none had 
previous combat experience. Most of these officers had taken over their regiments in 
1943 and had had the time to gain familiarity with and train them in England. Of this 
group, only Halpenny would be in command of his regiment when Kitching was relieved 
on 21 August. Kitching judged Worthington to be the "most outstanding regimental 
163He had been the GSO III, 1st Cdn Army Tk Bde, then the Brigade Major of the unit and by 1943, the 
GSO II, HQ 5 Cdn Armd Div, LGen G. G. Simonds, Memorandum, Recommendation for Command of an 
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commander in the armoured brigade" stating that he was young, "full of energy and quick 
to seize an opportunity."166 
Lt Col Gordon Dorward de Salaberry "Swatty" Wotherspoon of the South Alberta 
Regiment (S AR), Lt Col Dave Stewart of the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of 
Canada (Argyll's), Lt Col J.Q. McQueen of the Lincoln & Welland Regiment (Lines), 
and Lt Col Don Hay of the Algonquin Regiment were the regimental commanders in 10th 
Cdn Inf Bde.167 Kitching viewed Jefferson as an experienced, solid brigade commander. 
Wotherspoon claimed that Jefferson lacked the imagination needed to properly apply 
combined arms tactics and, as a result, he (Wotherspoon) and Stewart ran the tactics in 
the brigade. Wotherspoon had taken over command of the SAR in April 1943. Previously 
he had been a student and then an instructor at the Senior Officers' School in Oxford 
where he is reported to have received one of the highest marks ever given a student. As a 
result, he believed his understanding of combined arms tactics was superior to Jefferson's 
even though Jefferson had much more combat experience.168 
Stewart was recognized as the most competent of the infantry battalion 
commanders in the division and the Argyll's were to gain a reputation as one of the better 
infantry regiments, well capable of executing the infantry-cum-tank tactics needed in 
Normandy and beyond. Lt Col D. Hay had held temporary command of the Argylls as a 
major from 10 July 43 -23 September 43 until Stewart took over.169 He remained a 
member of Stewart's Argylls before moving over to take command of the Algonquin 
Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 187. 
167
 Ibid. 
168
 Bill Wiley and Robert L. Fraser, transcript of interview of Brigadier Gordon Dorward de Salaberry 
Wotherspoon for Black Yesterdays, 25 September 1986, n.p. 
169
 H.M. Jackson, ed. The Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders of Canada (Princess Louise's) 1928-1953. 
(Hamilton: The Regiment, 1953), 323. 
63 
Regiment in March 1944. Lt Co; J.Q. McQueen took over command of the Lines on 2 
January 1944. He had previously served with the Calgary Highlanders and in 1942 he had 
been the senior Canadian officer of the First Canadian Special Service Battalion.170 
170
 Together the First Canadian Special Service Battalion and two American battalions were known as the 
First Special Service Force. Hayes, The Lincs,16. 
64 
D
iv
 
C
om
d 
M
aj 
G
en
 
G
eo
rg
e 
K
itc
hi
ng
 
1 
M
ar
ch
 
44
 
G
SO
l 
Lt
 
Co
l G
an
on
g 
7 
M
ay
 
43
-2
 
Au
g 
44
 
Lt
Co
lW
ig
le 
3 
Au
g 
44
 
G
so
n
 
M
aj 
M
.R
.
 
D
ar
e 
16
 
Ap
ril
 
44
 
G
SO
 
H
I (
OP
S)
 
Ca
pt
 
J.A
.
 
Be
rt
hi
au
m
e 
22
 
M
ar
 
44
 
G
SO
 
III
 
(C
W
) 
Ca
pt
 
V
 
J.
 
M
as
sie
 
10
 
M
ar
 
44
 
G
SO
 
m
 
(A
IR
) 
Ca
pt
 
C
D
.
 
Sh
ep
pa
rd
 
21
 
Ia
n
 
44
 
G
SO
 
m
 
(IN
T)
 
C
ap
tG
.R
.M
cM
or
ei
ch
 
12
 
Ja
n
 
44
 
CR
E 
Lt
 
Co
l T
.R
.B
.
 
Jo
ne
s 
24
 
Fe
b 
44
 
A
A
&
QM
G
 
Lt
 
Co
l J
 
W
 
Pr
oc
to
r 
27
 
A
ug
 
43
 
r 
D
A
A
G
 
M
aj 
C.
L.
 
M
CG
ow
an
 
26
 
M
ar
 
43
 
D
AQ
M
G
 
M
aj 
T.
E.
 
Si
ss
on
 
24
 
N
ov
 
42
 
St
af
f C
ap
ta
in
 
Ar
m
d 
M
aj 
G
.R
.
 
G
al
lo
w.
 
24
 
M
ar
 
44
 
4 
Cd
n
 
Ar
m
d 
Di
v
 
St
af
f O
rg
an
iza
tio
n
 
1 
Au
gu
st
 
19
44
 
A
ss
t D
ep
ut
y 
M
ed
ica
l S
er
vi
ce
s 
A
/C
O
L 
G
.D
.
 
G
os
sa
ge
 
25
 
Fe
b 
44
 
D
A
D
M
S 
M
aj 
N
.J.
 
En
gl
an
d.
 
20
 
N
ov
 
43
 
A
ss
t P
ro
vo
st
 
M
ar
sh
al
 
M
aj 
E.
H
.
 
St
ev
en
so
n
 
20
 
A
ug
 
43
 
H
QS
QN
 
Lt
 
Co
l V
.P
.
 
Fe
ll 
23
 
Se
p 
43
 
A
ss
t D
ep
ut
y 
O
rd
na
nc
e 
Se
rv
ice
s 
Lt
 
Co
l A
.G
. P
ou
po
re
 
1 
Se
p 
43
 
ON
 
Kitching inherited a division that had a reasonable mix of new and seasoned 
commanders and staff officers. Some were newly appointed but had recent combat 
experience in either Sicily or Italy, and others lacked combat experience but had been 
training with their respective commands for some time. It would be up to Kitching to 
mould these men into a cohesive team that was able to operate effectively in their 
assigned roles in Normandy and beyond. Kitching had a significant amount of experience 
to impart in preparing his division for the coming battle. The time available to train the 
division was to be short and filled with many challenges. 
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Chapter Three: The Formation of the 
4 Canadian Armoured Division 
Armoured forces significantly changed the nature of warfare during the Second 
World War. Understanding their origins and development during the inter-war years is 
crucial to understanding the outcome of operations during the war. Political imperatives, 
technological advances, and decisions on doctrine and training that were put in place 
before the start of hostilities determined in large part the outcome of the early battles. 
David French stated: 
Politicians must bear some of the blame for the defeats that the British army 
suffered between 1940 and 1942. Their decisions about the priorities to be given 
to defence and other spending programmes, and the low priority they accorded the 
army compared to the navy and air force, left the army woefully unprepared in the 
physical sense for the kind of war it faced after September 1940. But those defeats 
also stemmed from the army's own failures to develop appropriate concepts about 
how to fight the next war.171 
The same can be said of the Canadian Government and Canadian Army during this same 
timeframe. 
In Britain, armoured warfare and mechanization172 developed in four fairly 
distinct periods between 1919 and 1939. From 1919 to 1926, the army demobilized after 
the First World War and a small group of "thinkers" hypothesized over the nature, tactics 
and operational concepts of a future mechanized force. Actual field trials with an 
171
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experimental force were conducted on Salisbury Plain from 1927 to 1928. From 1929 to 
1933 the results of these trials were codified in army doctrine while trials continued to try 
and address questions of force structure and equipment. By 1933 the army, like all other 
British institutions, had to deal with the devastating impact of economic depression and 
experimentation was curtailed as financial resources dwindled.174 
During the period from 1934 to 1938 the army struggled with moving the 
development of armoured formations from the brigade level to the division level. The 
evolution of the Tank Brigade stalled from 1935 to 1937, until a decision was finally 
made to equip the British cavalry units with light tanks. The resulting Mobile Division 
was reduced in size and re-designated as the 1st Armoured Division. Despite progressive 
advances in engine designs, transmissions, turrets, tracks, radios and armaments that 
increased the combat potential of the tank, the British experienced no significant changes 
in armoured doctrine or organization from mid-1938 to the outbreak of war in September 
1939.175 
The clearest example of the dichotomy between the Germans and the British 
exists in their armoured force manuals of 1940. The German manual of 1940 stated that 
panzer divisions were especially suited for rapid concentration of considerable fighting 
power, obtaining quick decisions by breakthroughs and deep penetrations on wide fronts 
that would disrupt the opponent's ability to organize and execute an effective defence. 
The offensive nature of German doctrine is evident. The British manual stated that 
Army and the Theory of Armored Warfare 1918-1940 and Williamson Murray's chapter "Armored warfare: 
The British, French and German experiences" in Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (1996), 
effectively cover the evolution of British armoured forces and their doctrine during the inter-war period. 
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armoured divisions were designed for exploitation after the enemy's position had been 
broken.176 This implied a supporting role for armour rather than the decisive role implied 
in German doctrine. These two positions represent fundamental different positions on the 
purpose of armoured formations. 
The fundamental difference between the German and British experience was that 
the Germans had concentrated on the evolution of a combined arms armoured or panzer 
division while the British had concentrated on the evolution of the tank as a weapon of 
war.177 The British inability to evolve their doctrine led to a split in the employment of 
tanks as either an infantry support weapon or as a breakthrough weapon. This indecision 
manifested itself in the manufacture of different tanks for each role.178 Even as late as 
1942, British operations in the African desert underscored the British struggling to 
rationalize a coherent doctrine for its armoured forces.179 
During the interwar period, the Canadian Army suffered from the same doctrinal 
confusion over the future roles of cavalry and the tank. Doubting the reliability of the 
current generation of tanks and motor vehicles, Maj Gen James H. MacBrien the 
Canadian Chief of the General Staff from 1920-27 argued that it "was unwise to alter 
R. M. Ogorkiewicz, Armoured Forces: A History of Armoured Forces and their Vehicles (London: 
Arms and Armour Press, 1970), 21-22. 
177In the German Army of the Second World War the German soldiers, NCOs and officers were all trained 
to understand the value of combination of tanks, infantry artillery and engineers. This not only allowed 
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divisions to do this in concert with non-motorized infantry divisions. This doctrine and its practice had 
been stressed as the basic German armoured doctrine before the war. R. L. DiNardo, Germany's Panzer 
Arm (Wesport: Greenwood Press, 1997), 64. The extent of the influence of British armoured theory on 
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178This duality led to the development of different types of tanks: infantry tanks and cruiser tanks. The 
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organization and tactical doctrines in anticipation of technological change that might well 
fall short of expectations." 18° Given the cost of mechanization, the lack of money, and 
the lack of an identified enemy this was not an unreasonable position. 
While the materiel well being of the army was clearly an issue, the lack of 
equipment was no excuse for failing to produce an officer corps that was well versed in 
the art and science of war. This is the opinion expressed by Stephen Harris in, Canadian 
Brass: The Making of a Professional Army (1988). Harris argued that the study of 
battlefield tactics did not require an army to possess every weapon system expected to be 
in use in the next war. "Critical reading" of foreign military journals could have provided 
insights into new technologies and methodologies that with imagination and ingenuity 
could have been incorporated into training programs and exercises. Harris has rightly 
argued, for example, that "it was better to simulate new tactics and doctrine by dropping 
flour bags from airplanes and to designate trucks and automobiles as tanks and armoured 
cars rather than to ignore air power and armoured warfare altogether." He concluded 
that the Canadian Army was never "so poorly equipped, so starved for funds, that such 
measures were altogether impossible."182 
Douglas How's The 8th Hussars: A History of the Regiment (1964) is one of the 
few regimental histories that provides a glimpse into the Canadian struggle to come to 
grips with mechanization and armoured warfare. Keltie Kennedy, the Officer 
Commanding (OC) the Regiment in 1936, stated: "Remember our role and our tasks are 
the same as they were in the days of Genghiz Khan. Our mounts and weapons have 
180
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changed and our job at present is to learn how best to use them." He listed their tasks 
as reconnaissance for information and for protection, distant action including raids, a role 
in major battles that might embrace seizure of tactical features and rapid intervention in 
crises, pursuit and covering withdrawals. The Hussars' Lt E. W. George rendered an 
interesting insight into the complexity of armoured warfare when reflecting on the time 
element of tactics: "With a speed of 20 to 50 m.p.h., we will have to learn to have more 
respect for an enemy which has been reported seen about 100 miles east two hours 
ago."184 Of course, letting go of old traditions was never easy as expressed in this final 
selection from the Hussar's official history of the Orders issued to the Regiment in July 
1936: "Dress spurs will not be worn during periods of training when cars are being 
used."185 The Hussar regimental history outlines the attempts at experimentation and 
innovation using automobiles as tanks as suggested by Stephen Harris but in the end How 
perhaps said it best when he described the Canadian Army's development of armoured 
warfare in the interwar period as the "great era of make-believe." 
The main Canadian source of intellectual debate on military issues was found in 
the pages of Canadian Defence Quarterly (CDQ). There was the perception that the 
armour/mechanized debate was for the most part, non-existent in Canada; however, a 
detailed review of the articles published during the 1930s reveals a limited but healthy 
debate of the issues surrounding mechanization, tanks and armoured warfare. There is at 
least one article in each CDQ volume in the 1930s that deals with these topics either 
directly or indirectly. Canadian officers serious about their professional competence, as 
183
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Harris suggested, should therefore have been aware of the emerging concepts on 
mechanization and armoured warfare and the implications they would have on the 
Canadian Army regardless of the financial constrains or size of the Canadian Army 
during this period. 
The debate that garners the greatest attention in Canada over the use of the tank in 
combat occurred in a series of articles published in CDQ between 1934-1939 by then Maj 
E. L. M. Burns and Capt Guy Simonds; both of whom would briefly command armoured 
divisions in the coming war. The two could not agree on how to resolve the dilemma but 
neither was afraid to criticize current British doctrine or offer alternatives to it. In the end, 
the intellectual debate viewed tanks as a weapon to be used in co-operation with other 
arms rather than a weapon that could change the nature of future wars.187 No clear 
evidence was found to suggest that this intellectual debate was the source of 
experimentation for the Canadian Army as was the case in Britain. 
In 1936, the Canadian Militia was reorganized creating permanent tank battalions. 
To train and guide the newly formed tank battalions, the Canadian Tank School was 
created on 1 November 1936 in London, Ontario, under the command of Maj Frank 
Worthington of the Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI). In May 1938 
the school moved to Camp Borden and became the Canadian Armoured Fighting Vehicle 
School (CAFVS) with the first course conducted from 11 to 23 July 1938. Initial tactical 
training was rudimentary, since no one really understood how to move tactically with a 
group of armoured vehicles. This was not a significant problem since the doctrine of the 
187The Canadian Defence Quarterly ceased publication at the outbreak of war in 1939. James H. Lutz, 
"Canadian Military Thought, 1923-1939: A Profile Drawn from the Pages of the Old Canadian Defence 
Quarterly," Canadian Defence Quarterly 9, no. 2 (Autumn 1979), 47. 
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day classified the tank as an infantry support vehicle meant to accompany the infantry in 
the assault on enemy positions at infantry speed.188 
Prior to the start of the Second World War, the common perception was that any 
tank units provided by Canada in time of war would be equipped with tanks produced in 
Britain.189 When war broke out in September 1939, Canada possessed a total of only 
sixteen outdated British Light Mk VI tanks and 12 Carden-Loyd carriers. While four of 
the six established tank battalions had begun to master some of the basis tenets of 
armoured warfare through the improvised use of automobiles, progress was slow and 
uneven. 190 The Fort Garry Horse, as late as July 1939, was still conducting its annual 
training with horses despite being designated the 10th Armoured Regiment.191 The Lord 
Strathcona's Horse, another armoured regiment, received its first tank training in 1940 on 
two-man Renault tanks left over from the First World War and did not receive any true 
"modern" tanks until two Ram tanks arrived in the unit in the third week of March 
1941.192 
The rapid success of German armoured forces in France in May 1940 convinced 
the Canadian government of the need to create armoured forces as a permanent 
component of the Canadian Army. General Order 250 formally created the Canadian 
Armoured Corps (CAC) on 13 August 1940 with a headquarters and "such other 
formations and units, which may later be authorized."193 The formation of the 1st 
188
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Canadian Armoured Brigade occurred the same day under the command of Worthington, 
now promoted to Colonel (Col). Worthington was given broad authority for 
organizational matters and training standards for the whole CAC and he became the 
advisor to Ottawa on all matters concerning the equipping and training of armoured 
units 194 
Mobilized in September 1940, the 4th Canadian Division was originally formed 
as an infantry division and contained in its order of battle, the 10th, 11th and 12 th 
Canadian Infantry Brigades 195 
4 Cdn Div 
I 3_ 
lOCdnlnfBde HCdnlnfBde 12CdnInfBde 
British Columbia 
Regiment 
South Alberta 
Regiment 
Royal Winnipeg 
Rifles 
10 Anti-tank 
Comnanv 
Lake Superior 
Regiment 
Irish Regiment of 
Canada 
Elgin Regiment 
11 Anti-tank 
Comnanv 
Governor General's 
Foot Guards 
Canadian 
I Grenadier Guards, 
Grey and Simcoe 
Foresters 
12 Anti-tank 
Comnanv 
Figure 3-1:4 Canadian Division Order of Battle from General Order 184 5 Sep 1940 
Some regiments, such as the Grenadier Guards and the Foot Guards had long histories as 
part of the Canadian militia, while others, such as the South Alberta Regiment, were 
newly formed units. Four of the units the SAR, BCR, the Grenadier Guards and the Foot 
Guards began the war as infantry regiments. The Lake Superior Regiment was also an 
194
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infantry regiment but it was converted to a motorized infantry battalion. Few within the 
regiments had any clear idea of what the change from an infantry to armoured regiment 
really involved. In the case of the Foot Guards, the news of the conversion was met with 
mixed emotions since the unit had reached a high level of proficiency in infantry training 
and the conversion meant starting over again with basic level training in armour tactics 
and drills.196 
The start of the war triggered mobilization with all regiments reporting intakes of 
new recruits that surpassed their wartime-established strengths.197 These unexpected 
numbers created considerable logistical problems, particularly in the areas of 
accommodation, feeding and in outfitting the troops with proper uniforms and 
weapons.198 Training was rudimentary and concentrated on individual skills, soldier skills 
and physical training as the units waited for Canadian factories to produce the weapons 
needed to properly outfit the regiments and provide realistic training. New weapons were 
discussed but it was to be many months before they were actually seen or handled. The 
challenge was to keep the men busy. Route marches and sports competitions were 
stressed since "physical exhaustion" was seen as a "useful mental safety valve."199 
The history for the division's future regiments, for 1939 to 1941 can be 
summarized in one word— training! Endless weeks and months were spent familiarizing 
the men with new equipment and tactics. Unit proficiency was tested in progressively 
more complex exercises as potential leaders who could make the grade and those who 
196
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could not were weeded out of the formations. Units struggled with coordinating forces in 
time and space as they sought to perfect battle procedure. While many knew the theory of 
battle procedure, "few had ever actually attempted to move, reconnoitre and issue orders, 
when time and space were real and urgent factors."200 Officers studied the "Notes from 
France''' which embodied the practical lessons derived from the fighting in France.201 
Selected officers and Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs) began rotations to formal 
training schools and to England and other battlefields in order to gain experience, which 
they then brought back to further educate the troops on new tactics and procedures.202 
4 Cdn Armd Div 
3 Cdn Armd Bde 
British Columbia 
Rp.crimp.nt 
• 
South Alberta Regiment 
r 
Elgin Regt 
Lake Sup Regt 
Mntnr Rn 
4 Cdn Armd Bde 
Governor General's Foot 
fr i inrrk 
Canadian Grenadier 
fr i iarrk 
Sherbrooke Fusiliers Regt 
Princess Louise Fusiliers 
Mntnr Rn 
Figure 3-2: 4 Canadian Armoured Division Order of Battle January 1942 
On 26 January 1942, the decision was made to convert the division to an 
armoured role, a move that required considerable re-organization and re-training. An 
armoured division at that time was composed of two armoured brigades and in the 
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restructuring of the division only six of the original nine infantry battalions became 
armoured regiments. The remainder were diverted to other formations. 
The problem of training the units of the division in armour tactics represented a 
considerable challenge since no one in the division had any experience with tanks or tank 
tactics. Worthington initially trained these units using a mixture of obsolete and in some 
cases First World War vintage tanks, gradually replacing them with Canadian Ram 
tanks,204 once the latter became available. The training of the division was considered 
more advanced because of its use of the Ram tank, which allowed for more realistic 
training. The conversion of the division from infantry to armour was accomplished in 
only five months and in August and September of 1942 the division crossed to England 
to complete its training in Aldershot.205 The 4th Cdn Armd Div was not, however, 
formally mobilized until the autumn of 1943 under Mobilization Order No. 91 on 7 
October 1943.206 
On 6 January 1943, the War Committee of the Cabinet approved the structure of 
the Canadian Army as two corps with three infantry divisions, each of three brigades, two 
armoured divisions, each of one infantry and one armoured brigade, and two independent 
tank brigades.207 The Canadian Army reorganization to reflect the new order of battle, 
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began on 11 January 1943. Mirroring the composition of British formations facilitated 
more effective cooperation between the armies of the two countries. 
,th The units of the 4 Cdn Armd Div were organized as follows: 
4 Cdn Armd Div 
South Alberta 
Regiment 
_r r lOCdnlnfBde Div Troops 4 Cdn Armd Bde 
Lincoln & Welland 
Reg 
Argyll & Sutherland 
Highlanders of Canada 
Algonquin Regt 
10 Indep Machine Gun 
Company 
15 Field Artillery Reg 
23 Field Artillery Reg 
(self-propelled) 
8 Light Anti-Aircraft 
Reg 
5 Anti-Tank Reg 
Governor General's 
Foot Guards 
Canadian Grenadier 
Guards 
British Columbia Reg 
Lake Superior Reg 
Figure 3-3: 4 Cdn Armoured Division Order of Battle January 1943 
The adoption of British War establishments meant that the 4m Cdn Armd Div ith 
would now be composed of one armoured and one infantry brigade.208 In addition, the 
divisional artillery was increased with a field regiment to support each brigade. An 
armoured reconnaissance regiment mounted in tanks replaced the armoured car regiment. 
An independent machine-gun company was added to support the infantry.209 In keeping 
with this reorganization, the 10th Cdn Inf Bde replaced the 3rd Armd Bde and the South 
208
 The interesting dynamic that continued with the restructuring of armoured forces throughout the war 
was that armour steadily lost predominance as the war progressed. The unit ratio of armour to infantry to 
artillery shifted from 6:2:2 in 1939 to 4:4:4 in 1945. Place, Military Training, 97. 
Grodzinski, Operational Handbook, 9. 
78 
Alberta Regiment became the division armoured reconnaissance unit. The formation 
retained the 4th Cdn Armd Bde as the division's armour brigade. 
The 10th Cdn Inf Bde was officially created on 26 April 1943. It had no units 
under command and only four officers and four other ranks on strength when created. 
The only brigade unit that was in England at that time was the SAR. The remainder of the 
brigades' units would arrive in England between June and September 1943. The 
division was fortunate that most of the units arrived in theatre with 75 to 100 percent of 
their scales of equipment. 
The wartime establishment of a 1943-44 armoured division was 724 officers and 
14,240 Other Ranks. The armoured division had a total of 3,414 vehicles. Among these 
were 246 cruiser tanks, 44 light tanks, 261 armoured tracked carriers, 100 armoured scout 
cars and 2,098 trucks and lorries.211 The armoured division was organized for 
employment as a single fighting entity under the direct control of a divisional 
919 
commander. The defined roles of an armoured division were: 
• co-operation with the main army in effecting the complete destruction of 
the enemy, usually by envelopment or by deep penetration through his 
defences after a gap has been made in his main position by other 
formations 
• pursuit 
• co-operation with other arms in the defence, usually by counterattack 
210
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• threatening the enemy and so force him to alter or disclose his 
disposition213 
It was an all-arms (infantry, artillery and armoured) formation designed to exploit the 
breeches in the enemy defence network by driving deep into the rear areas of the enemy 
defences and pursuing broken enemy formations.214 
Each arm or branch within the armoured division had a vital part to play in the 
execution of the division's mission and the effective co-operation of these arms was 
paramount to mission success.215 The armoured brigade was designed as the striking 
power of the division and whenever possible, the armoured brigade would be employed 
as a concentrated force attacking over a narrow front of 500 to 1,000 yards to a depth of 
3,000 to 3,500 yards.216 An armoured brigade consisted of a brigade headquarters, three 
armoured regiments and a motorized infantry battalion representing a total of 220 cruiser 
and light tanks and 3000 all ranks. 
The armoured brigade was not designed to attack organized defences and was 
subject to definite limitations with respect to how and when it could be employed. It 
required suitable ground over which to operate and, by itself, was not designed to hold 
ground. While it was possible to use the armoured brigade for operations at night, this 
was not the norm.217 At night, the armoured regiments typically withdrew into a harbour 
for rest, replenishment and maintenance but even then they were susceptible to attack by 
enemy troops. The motor battalion was an integral part of the armoured brigade and was 
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tasked with providing the armoured brigade with immediate infantry support; 
consequently, the motor battalion was organized for maximum mobility and flexibility. 
The function of the infantry brigade was to enable the armoured brigade to come 
into action in favourable conditions. The infantry brigade consisted of a brigade 
headquarters, three infantry battalions and one support group consisting of 3500 all ranks. 
The normal roles of the infantry brigade involved, but were not restricted to, such tasks 
as: 
• clearing and covering the advance of the armoured brigade in enclosed or 
difficult country 
• attacking hastily prepared enemy positions which were covered by 
obstacles 
• securing a "pivot"219 or a series of pivots on which the operations of the 
armoured brigade would be based 
• mopping up and in conjunction with engineers 
• consolidate and hold areas of ground captured by the armour.220 
The infantry in an armoured division normally moved in vehicles.221 They possessed a 
wide range of weapons, could move quickly and could operate dismounted in support of 
the tanks or carry out all of the typical tasks associated with the infantry particularly at 
night. 
The 1943 to 1944 timeframe witnessed the introduction of a host of new weapons 
systems that had to be learned and incorporated into Canadian doctrine. The anti-tank 
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regiments of the armoured divisions were provided with the new 17-pounder (pdr) anti-
tank guns and each regiment consisted of two 17-pdr batteries and two three-inch M-10 
self-propelled batteries. Another change arose from the decision to provide one of the two 
field regiments in the armoured division with self-propelled 25-pounders. This weapon 
was called "Sexton" and was a 25-pdr mounted on a Ram tank chassis. The 23rd Cdn 
Field Regt of the 4th Cdn Armd Div had its full complement of 24 vehicles.222 
The key equipment issue for the Canadian armoured formations was the Ram 
tank. By June 1943 enough Ram tanks (1,147) were in the hands of the Canadian Army 
in England to outfit the complete establishment of Canadian armoured regiments. 
However, an undated memorandum written in March 1943 identified a total of 113 major 
and minor modifications required to the tank.223 Increased protection and arming the tank 
with a 75 mm gun were identified as the top priorities. In order to equip the armoured 
formations with what was considered a battle-worthy tank, Canada either had to produce 
a new tank or undertake radical modifications to the Ram tank. 
Brig Wyman, commander of the 1st Cdn Tk Bde, carried out a detailed 
comparison of the Ram and American Sherman tanks since his unit had used both 
vehicles. Wyman's findings, detailed in a report dated 31 May 1943, stated that the Ram 
II did not meet the requirements of a first-line operational tank and that its disadvantages 
were far more numerous than its advantages in comparison with the Sherman.225 In 
November 1943, the decision was made not to employ the Ram as a cruiser tank. The 
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Sherman would equip all Canadian tank formations. The Ram tank would, however, 
retain its role in armour training while others were converted to specialty roles, including 
assault and recovery vehicles for the engineers.226 
While the British and Canadian Armies had finally settled on a common 
organizational structure for their armoured divisions, the Canadian decision to equip all 
armoured formations with the Sherman M4 fitted with a 75 mm gun as their basic battle 
tank created a considerable problem. The Sherman was inferior, in almost every sense, to 
German tanks in the field.227 British intelligence had confirmed the existence of the 
Panzerkamphwagen (Pzkw)VI (Tiger) tank as early as September 1942 and captured 
tanks were examined after the German Afrika Corps surrendered in Tunisia. The Tiger 
had 102 mm of frontal armour and mounted an 88-mm gun. Furthermore, the Pzkw MK 
V (Panther) with a high velocity 75-mm gun and 100 mm of frontal armour was 
identified in early 1943. The British had also learned that the Germans were using anti-
aircraft and anti-tank guns mounted on a variety of self-propelled chassis to augment 
their armour forces.228 The armour protection of the Sherman tank was insufficient to 
stop the shells from any of the guns on these tanks. Senior Allied commanders were 
sending their armoured forces into Europe with inferior tanks and doctrine. The hope, 
however, was that the considerable quantities of Sherman tanks would eventually 
overcome the qualitative German advantage. While this assumption was to prove true, it 
came at a terrible cost in lives and materiel. 
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Panzer IV H/J 
Crew: 5 Weight: 25 tons Speed: 24mph 
Armour: front 50 to 80mm; side 30mm 
Main Armament: 75mm L48 
L: 19ft4in H: 8ft lOin W: 10ft 8in 
Panther 
Crew: 5 Weight: 45 tons Speed: 28mph 
Armour: front 80 to 120mm; side 50mm 
Main Armament: 75mm KvvK 42 
L: 22ft 7in H: 9ft lOin W: lift 3in 
Stiarmgeschutz III 
Crew: 4 Weight: 24 tons Speed: 24mph 
Armour: front 80mm; side 30mm 
Main Armament: 75mm Stik 40 
L: 18ft4in H: 7ft W:9ft9in 
Tiger I 
Crew: 5 Weight: 54 tons Speed: 18mph 
Armour: front 100mm; side 80mm 
Main Armament: 88mm KwK 36 
L: 20ft 4in H: 9ft 5in W: 12ft 3in 
Figure 3-4: German Tanks. Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign, 111. 
The British War Office solution to the "tank capability gap" was to install a 17-
pdr gun in a portion of the Sherman tanks. These tanks were called "Fireflys" and were 
initially allocated at fifteen tanks per armoured regiment. At the end of 1943, the 4th Cdn 
Armd Div was to have 271 cruiser tanks, 63 light tanks, 27 command tanks and nine 
recovery tanks. The division actually had on strength 44 Sherman and 266 Ram tanks, 
four light tanks and no command or recovery tanks. By early February 1944, the process 
of crew conversion from the Ram tanks to the Sherman tanks became the main focus of 
divisional training.229 
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M4 Sherman 
Crew: 5 Weight: 30 tons Speed: 24mph 
Armour: front 50 to 80mm; side 45mm 
Main Armament: medium velocity 75mm 
L: 19ft lOin H: 9ft W:8ft7in 
M4 Sherman Firefly 
Crew: 4 Weight: 30 tons Speed: 24mph 
Armour: front 50 to 80mm; side 45mm 
Main Armament: 17-pdr 
L: 19ft lOin H: 9ft W:8ft9in 
A27M Cromwell 
Crew: 5 Weight: 30 tons Speed: 35mph 
Armour: front 63 to 76mm - maximum later 
increased to 101mm; side 32 to 63mm 
Main Armament: medium velocity 75mm 
L:20ftl0in H: 8ft 2in W: 10ft 
A42 Churchill 
Crew: 5 Weight: 40 tons Speed: 12mph 
Armour: front 140 to 152mm; side 95mm 
Main Armament: medium velocity 75mm, 
6-pdr or close support weapons 
L:24ft5in H: 9ft W: 10ft 1 in 
M3/5 Stuart or Honey 
Crew: 4 Weight: 15 tons Speed: 40mph 
Armour: front 40mm; side 25mm 
Main Armament: 37mm 
L: 15ft lOin H: 7ft lOin W: 7ft 6inn 
Figure 3-5. Allied Tanks. Buckley, British Armour in the Normandy Campaign, 110. 
The 4 Cdn Armd Div spent the time from September 1943 to February 1944 
absorbing new men and equipment in order to bring the division up to its established 
strength. Armed with common doctrine, organization and tanks, the hope was that British 
and Canadian armoured brigades and division would be inter-operable thereby increasing 
the operational flexibility available to Simonds, Crerar and Montgomery. Events would 
reveal that British and Canadian armoured units would eventually be equally able to 
support each other's operations but only after having gained crucial experience in 
combat. As the last Canadian division to enter the theatre the units of the 4 Cdn Armd 
Div would be injected into some of the most intensive fighting in Normandy. The men of 
the division and its commanders would have to learn on the go. 
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The Canadian Army was late entering the armoured warfare arena and Canadian 
armoured forces had much to learn before they could effectively challenge the Germans 
on the battlefield. How the forces were initially employed was a reflection in part of the 
Canadian experiences in the interwar period. German philosophy stressed quality in 
materiel, boldly used by their commanders who were trying to achieve quick victories. 
The Anglo-Canadian approach was more measured where materiel abundance and 
firepower were designed to save manpower and compensate for any possible shortfall in 
quality or experience. In the end, the British Army would lead the way for the Canadian 
Army in thought, experimentation and organization of armoured warfare but not in 
success on the battlefield. That honour would be equally shared. 
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Chapter Four: Preparation for Battle 
Maj Gen George Kitching succeeded Maj Gen Frank Worthington as GOC, 4th 
Cdn Armd Div, on 29 February 1944. Kitching, on the basis of his experience in combat 
determined that the division required extensive combined arms training if it was to 
assume its planned role as a break-out formation in the liberation of France. Kitching also 
knew that he had a finite period of time to imprint his policies on how the division would 
function under his command. While Kitching embarked upon a comprehensive scheme of 
education and training for his division, external factors that included waterproofing,230 
distinguished visitor visits, and the division's place on the priority list for training limited 
Kitching's training efforts. 
John Marteinson lends support to Kitching's assessment of training priorities 
through his examination of the training conducted by the 4th Cdn Armd Div after its 
reorganization in January 1943. The division was given until early September 1943 to 
train itself to a point where it could conduct a series of division-level exercises in 
Norfolk. The first two weeks of these exercises were given to squadron operations, 
followed by regimental level, brigade level and finally divisional level exercises in 
GRIZZLY II on 22 October and BRJDON, which started on 2 November 1943.231 
Grizzly II was designed to practice the division in an advance-to-contact, the 
crossing of a river obstacle and a frontal assault upon an enemy position. While the 
230Waterproofing involved a 3-step process of protecting vehicles against the corrosion involved in wading 
the vehicles ashore through salt water. Once the waterproofing process was complete, vehicles were 
restricted in how far and how fast they could travel. After stage "A" vehicles could be driven 200 miles, 
after Stage "B" they could move 10 miles and after stage "B2" they could not be driven. War Diary, 
Governor-General Foot Guards, 1-30 June 1944, App 5. 
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exercise reached a successful conclusion, mistakes were plenty. In an open letter to all 
of the officers of 4th Cdn Armd Bde after GRIZZLY II, Brig J.D.B. Smith, the 4th Cdn 
Armd Bde commander, was very critical of their collective performance. While the 
efforts of the other ranks drew high praise, Smith was clear in stating that the officers 
were the ones responsible for not getting food to the men when they should have had it, 
for getting them lost, for driving them extra hours in the rain and blackout; for the 
"damnable" business of men not knowing where they were at times; and for most of their 
discomfort which could have been avoided. He went on to state that, although their part 
in the exercise apparently satisfied a lot of onlookers, "you and I know quite honestly that 
we have done and can do much better."233 He expected the lessons learned from 
GRIZZLY II to be applied in exercise BRIDON. 
Exercise BRIDON pitted the 4th Cdn Armd Div in Canadian Ram tanks against 
the 9th British Armd Div equipped with the faster British Cromwell tank. Each division 
represented the forces of a fictitious nation bordering a neutral nation that possessed a 
mine that both countries desired. In the exercise scenario, negotiations broke down 
between the two nations, causing both to invade the neutral country in order to obtain the 
desired mine. The 4th Cdn Armd Div manoeuvred quickly and drove straight to the mine 
arriving before the British. The Canadians established defensive positions and awaited 
the British attack. 
The 9th Br Armd Div attacked, and over the span of two days, ran into well-
prepared anti-tank defenses that umpires declared had destroyed many of the British 
tanks. Ninety percent of the British tank kills were claimed by the guns of the 15th Cdn 
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Field Regt. British forces were judged to have been soundly defeated by the Canadians, 
forcing the early termination of the exercise.234 The 4th Cdn Armd Div was judged to 
have performed well in its first test as a full division. 
Despite this seemingly convincing performance, Brig Pat Grieve, who at the time 
was a lieutenant with the Grenadier Guards, recalled that there was not much tactical 
realism in these exercises: 
It was all this naval formation-type of manoeuvre. I can't remember any exercise 
where we worked in support of the infantry. On the final exercise we simply 
drove to the objective, everyone moving at once.235 
Even though Worthington proclaimed that he had complete confidence in his division, 
the conditions under which it had been evaluated were questionable.236 After these 
exercises, the 4th Cdn Armd Div moved back to Sussex in November. Unfortunately, 
BRIDON proved to be the last division-level exercise ever conducted by the 4th Cdn 
Armd Div. 
The First Cdn Army training directive No 18 dated 15 December 1943 warned 
that 1944 was the last opportunity for all commanders to make their men fighting fit. 
Individual training was to receive top priority. Collective training was to reach platoon 
level by January 1944; company and battalion levels, in February and March, except in 
the case of the 4th Cdn Armd Div, which would continue with brigade and division 
training in the latter part of January and early February. On 24 December 1943, the 
division issued training instruction No 18 which covered tactical training for armour 
234
 Robert A. Spencer, History of the Fifteenth Canadian Field Regiment: Royal Canadian Artillery 1941-
1945 (London: Elsevier, 1945), 49-50. 
235
 Marteinson, The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, 124. 
236As the Allies began to encounter more fixed German positions in Africa and Italy the reports from the 
field now put greater emphasis on closer co-operation between the arms, both in planning and in battle. The 
naval type of manouevre displayed in BRIDON was typical of the armoured thinking between the war on 
how armoured formations would operate. Graves, South Albertas, 83, 86. 
during the period 1 January - 31 March 1944. This training instruction directed that tank-
infantry cooperation was to be the subject of study in all units. It also directed that the 4th 
Cdn Armd Bde would train closely with 10th Cdn Inf Bde. After reviewing the respective 
war diaries, it does not seem that this portion of the directive was followed.237 By early 
February, the process of crew conversion from the Ram tanks to the Sherman tanks 
became the main focus of divisional training. 
Worthington had established a four-phase training scheme for the brigades. Phase 
I required the completion of all individual training. This entailed knowing, by heart, all of 
the individual tasks inherent in a soldier's position as either a trooper in an armoured 
regiment or soldier in an infantry battalion. Other requirements included first aid training, 
use of personal equipment and map reading. Phase II for infantry involved training at the 
sub unit level. Battle drill was emphasized during this phase. Phase III concentrated on 
company and battalion tactics, again using battle drill as the basis. Phase IV involved a 
concentration of the entire division in action.239 Woven throughout these phases was a 
one-day-a-week officers' study session where commanding officer's would concentrate 
on the training or professional development of their officers. The fundamental 
assumption in the training cycle was that the lower level components such as companies 
and platoons had to get the elements of combat down first before the higher level 
formations, the battalions and brigades could manoeuvre properly. 
The emphasis in training in the armoured regiments was different. Phase I was 
common across the division. Phase II involved crew drill, crew control and fire orders, 
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vehicle decontamination, march discipline, the digging of weapons pits and the use of 
binoculars in searching terrain. Phase III involved formation tactics, including formations 
on roads and cross country, fire positions, orders, crossing obstacles, locating the enemy 
and dismounted patrols. This phase consisted of a progressive use of training aids and 
methodologies, which normally started with the use of blackboards and sand or cloth 
table lessons, advanced to tactical exercises without troops (TEWTs) where the crews 
would walk the ground and ended with mounted exercises and field fire exercises. The 
syllabus was designed to have troops and squadrons trained and ready for squadron and 
regimental exercises by 21 March 1944.240 
A typical week of training included such topics as compass, map reading, 
studying French maps, cross country marches, maintenance, first aid training, 75 mm 
gunnery, range practice on personal weapons and lectures on German tactics. These 
topics were studied independently among the six sub units of the regiment (Sqn Adm, 
A/A tip, Recce trp and the three fighting squadrons). Each of the sub-units had its own 
training syllabus for the week built around these topics.241 
Saturdays were usually half days of work and, depending on the unit, Sundays 
had either mandatory or voluntary church parades. Leave was widely available and unit 
vehicles were typically tasked to take the troops into the local towns on Saturday and 
Sunday. Dances, movies and sports competitions were regularly scheduled to keep the 
troops occupied. Extended leave was not restricted until June.242 
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The routine in the field depended in large part on the type of unit either armoured 
or infantry and the type of training "scheme" being carried out. The infantry units would 
have more time to execute their schemes than the armoured units since the armoured 
units had to devote a portion of their time to vehicle maintenance, while the infantry 
soldier only had to worry about himself. The quality of training at the ranges for the 
armour units was largely dependent upon the weather and ammunition. Numerous entries 
in the war diaries for March and April indicate that squadron shoots were delayed or 
restricted by bad weather and by faulty ammunition.243 
Any assessment of the training regime and readiness state of the division prior to 
its entry into theatre must start with an assessment of the impact that external factors, 
over which Kitching had little or no control, had on his ability to train the division to a 
standard he felt was acceptable. These external factors can be broadly grouped under 
three main areas: planning assumptions made in the design of the OVERLORD plan; 
planning decisions made at senior headquarters; and administrative decisions. Taken as a 
whole, these factors had a decidedly negative impacted on the division's ability to 
achieve a high state of readiness prior to its entry into battle. 
In the administrative category, three factors came into play: VIP visits, the 
reorganization of the armoured reconnaissance regiments and tank troop, and the policy 
of the incremental exchange of Ram tanks for Shermans and, in particular, Sherman 
Firefly tanks. The 4 Cdn Armd Div was tasked to perform a number of parades for 
distinguished visitors. These included King George VI on 9 March, Prime Minister W.L. 
Mackenzie King on 17 May, and Gen Eisenhower on 29 May. These visits absorbed a 
considerable amount of staff work, usually entailed rehearsals, which directly took away 
243
 War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1-30 March 1944. 
92 
from training time, and, in some cases, caused the postponement of exercises. In one 
case, one of the armoured regiments working with 6 Cdn Inf Bde was recalled from the 
field so that they could participate in a parade.245 The typical routine for visits was to 
notify the division of an impending visit but not to give them the name of who was 
coming nor a specific visit date. The division was then given 24 to 48 hours warning. 
A case in point was the visit of the Prime Minister. On 24 April the division was 
placed on 48-hours notice for a visitor who turned out to be Prime Minister Mackenzie 
King. The entire division was to be paraded. The visit was initially scheduled for 13 May 
and a rehearsal of the march past was carried out on 4 May while the troops were in the 
training area.246 A full rehearsal was run on 11 May with Simonds as the reviewing 
officer. The visit was then postponed and then rescheduled and finally executed on 17 
May 44. Four training days were lost preparing for this one visit. 
The second administrative issue was the exchange of Ram tanks for Sherman 
tanks. The war diaries of the armoured regiments recorded receiving continuous 
allotments of small numbers of Sherman tanks between March and late May, with the 
regiments receiving their complete complement of Sherman Firefly tanks only in late 
June. The low numbers of available Sherman tanks with which to practice meant that 
available resources had to be widely shared and that tactics had to be practiced with 
mixed tank units; i.e., Sherman and Ram tanks, each with different performance and 
characteristics, a scenario that hampered realistic training. In addition to the already 
limited range time, the tank crews now had to become proficient in the 75 mm and 17 pdr 
guns on borrowed Sherman tanks. Not having an assigned tank and the limited number of 
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days allotted to the regiments for range practice had a negative impact on gunnery 
accuracy. 
The decline in gunner proficiency was of such concern that, on 1 May 44, the 
regimental adjutant of the Foot Guards issued a memorandum on gunnery training 
describing the quality of range results as "not at all satisfactory considering the previous 
high standard of shooting and the amount of initial training given.. ,"247 The 
memorandum identified the education of the gunner as having been neglected during the 
"... long periods that elapse when he is not actually on the range and practicing his 
trade."248 The memo viewed this problem not only as a gunner issue but also as a crew 
team training issue and directed that the training of a gunner would be given in his own 
tank, with his own crew, under the supervision of his own crew commander. As the 
memo pointed out, bad gunnery was not always the fault of the gunner. The Foot Guards 
was the only regiment to record taking its entire complement of Sherman and Stuart tanks 
to the ranges on two occasions, 19 and 25 May, to specifically give their tank crews 
practice in gunnery.249 Compounding the training problem was the fact that the regiment 
did not receive its first Sherman Firefly until 11 June. 
The second issue was the ordered reorganizations of the armoured reconnaissance 
regiments and tank troops, which took place during March 1944. The reorganization of 
the armoured reconnaissance regiments resulted from a decision made by Montgomery 
that all armoured reconnaissance regiments in 21st Army Group were to organize on the 
war establishment of an armoured regiment. The regiments would retain their armoured 
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reconnaissance designations but would now possess 78 tanks (61 Sherman, 11 Stuart and 
six Crusader tanks), and nine Humber scout cars.250 
The second reorganization involved the tank troop. The war establishment of the 
armoured regiments changed from three to four Sherman tanks in each tank troop: three 
tanks with the 75mm gun and one armed with the 17 pdr.251 This change meant that troop 
drills had to be modified, relearned and honed until the new required drills and actions 
became second nature. These decisions impacted the SAR more significantly than the 
armoured regiments of 4th Cdn Armd Bde since the SAR had to first reorganize as a 
regiment and then learn new tank troop tactics. 
Concerning the planning assumptions in the OVERLORD plan, there are a 
number of significant decisions that must be noted. The first decision was the 
requirement to mandate waterproofing of all vehicles that were due to land up to D+42.252 
The expectation of 21st Army Group planners was an early and deep penetration to Caen 
on D-Day, consequently, there was an expectation that the 4th Cdn Armd Div would enter 
the theatre soon (within days) of the invasion. This expectation drove a requirement to 
have all the division vehicles waterproofed and ready for loading by early June 1944. To 
achieve this goal, the process of waterproofing vehicles was initiated at the beginning of 
May 1944. 
This timetable created a considerable training challenge for the armoured 
regiments from May onwards since waterproofed vehicles were severely restricted with 
respect to how many miles they could be driven. Whenever possible, infantry companies 
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and tank squadrons combined their training in infantry-cum-tank tactics. Some units, 
such as the Grenadier Guards, decided to move into the training areas to reduce travel 
mileage on the tanks thereby facilitating more training with their tanks.253 With a 
diminishing number of vehicles available for tactical training within the armoured 
regiments, as May progressed, training became confined to maintenance, sports and 
"hardening" exercises."254 
If the OVERLORD plan unfolded as expected, the Allies were to be beyond the 
beaches and on their way to Falaise by D+20. If true, then the requirement to wade 
vehicles ashore through high surf or water conditions, as the invading forces were forced 
to do on D-Day, would have been minimal. Whether one considers the OVERLORD plan 
or the events as they actually unfolded, there was no reason to believe that the vehicles of 
the 4 Cdn Armd Div would have had to wade ashore under D-Day conditions. The reality 
was that practically all of the vehicles of the division landed dry. The entire 
waterproofing effort was largely wasted, along with all of the valuable time that could 
have been used training. 
The immediate impact of the waterproofing directive, viewed in hindsight, was 
that Kitching had only two months (March and April) to train his division, utilizing the 
entire compliment of vehicles and equipment. The decision to waterproof all vehicles 
effectively eliminated any possibility of any large-scale training exercise after May 1944. 
When the incremental exchange of Ram and Sherman tanks was added to this situation, 
253
 War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1-30 May 1944 
254
 Hardening exercises usually involved physical fitness such as route marches, speed marches and sports 
days. 
96 
the division was forced to waterproof the very tanks on which they should have used for 
training almost upon receipt!255 
The second planning decision that must be called into question was the lack of 
consideration for the fight beyond the beaches. The priority in training and on training 
resources was on those units that would be making the original assault. There is no doubt 
that this was viewed as the most critical part of the operation and rightly so. But viewed 
objectively, the fight on the beaches and the immediate vicinity of the beaches was going 
to be won or lost on the skill and determination at the sub-unit level, squad, platoon and 
possibly company level. These skills could have easily been acquired on the smaller 
training areas in Britain. The 4 Cdn Armd Div, as a follow-on force, was designated to 
fight the mobile battle beyond the beaches. This type of warfare required fast-moving, 
combined arms columns that could manoeuvre and fight at speed. To hone these skills 
required large training areas. Consequently, the allocation of training resources when 
compared to assigned roles was questionable. 
The focus on the assault formations appears to have led to a conscious decision on 
the part of higher headquarters to sacrifice the internal cohesion and effectiveness of 4 
Cdn Armd Div. During March there is evidence that there was joint training between the 
two brigades of the division with both the BCRs and Foot Guards recording training 
sessions with the infantry regiments in 10 Cdn Inf Bde. From April onwards, however, 
there is mention of the BCRs working with the Argylls during a week in May but no 
similar entries found in the war diaries of either the Foot Guards or Grenadier Guards. In 
fact, there are more references of the tanks of 4 Cdn Armd Bde working with 2 Cdn Inf 
Div than with 10 Cdn Inf Bde units. The Grenadier Guards, for example, reported 
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working with the 4 Cdn Inf Bde in March and the 6 Cdn Inf Bde in April, May and June, 
with only one entry of a small scale exercise with the Algonquin Regiment during the 
same March-to-June timeframe.256 Based on the evidence, it is clear that the armoured 
resources of 4 Cdn Armd Bde were being used by 2n Cdn Corps to enhance the readiness 
of 2 Cdn Div, at the expense of formation cohesion between the brigades of the 4 Cdn 
Armd Div. 
While the 4 Cdn Armd Div arrived in theatre at almost full wartime establishment 
in both men and equipment, the waterproofing requirement combined with the premature 
declaration of codeword CORNELIUS on 8 June (which meant that from 15 June 
onwards the division was to be ready to move on six hours notice) effectively 
immobilized the division for the entire month of June. The six-hour notice to move was 
not altered until 28 June when it was increased to 36 hours.257 These two factors forced 
the division to concentrate on regimental and battalion training. In the three months prior 
to the division going into battle, little realistic combined arms training between the 
brigades could be done, thereby forcing the training effort into non-optimal activities 
such as TEWTs, map exercises, range firing and hardening exercises. While this training 
regime was effective in improving the readiness state of the individual soldiers and their 
units, it did little to provide realistic training for the command and control elements of the 
War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1-30 May 1944, entry 3 May Attachments were as follows: 
GGFG—Fusilier Mont Royal, CGG—Camerons of Canada, BCR —South Saskatchewan Regt. The 
training was to be progressive and began with lectures by the commanders where each would explain the 
characteristics and mechanisms of their particular service. This would progress to a tank squadron 
operating with a rifle company. The foundation portion of the training was focussed on the communication 
and indication of targets between the two elements. This was considered the key to successful cooperation 
between the two. Tactics would develop the quick drills between the infantry platoon and tank troop in 
support to destroy enemy MG, an anti-tank position. Infantry and tanks in the attack, cooperation in 
defence and tactical move from assembly areas to form up points were also stressed and practiced. 
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division at any level. Most of all, these training methods failed to expose and condition 
officers and key decision makers to the uncertainty and chaos inherent in combat. 
Had the planning consideration for the battle beyond the beaches been reviewed 
in earnest, it would have shown that the 4 Cdn Armd Div needed to be a cohesive 
fighting formation capable of speed, manoeuvrability and the application of firepower on 
a divisional scale. Consider, for example, an alternate scenario where 4 Cdn Armd Div 
vehicles were not waterproofed and the invasion unfolded as it did. Once it was 
recognized that the need for the division in France was delayed and with the bulk of 
available Allied combat units in France, the large training areas and the month of June 
would have been available for the division to carry out large scale divisional level 
exercises to bring it up to the highest possible level of proficiency with all its assigned 
equipment immediately prior to moving into theatre. Had the invasion unfolded as 
planned and the division employed in France in early June, the division would still have 
had all the training time and vehicles to train on that were lost in May because of 
waterproofing. In either case, the overall level of effectiveness would have been greatly 
enhanced. 
The most significant planning mistake was not allowing Kitching to conduct at 
least one large-scale exercise to hone the skills of both the fighting and support elements 
of the division. While the training of the individual units was approaching a very high 
standard by March 1944, Kitching was particularly critical of the level of combined arms 
cooperation that was present in the division. Kitching noted that the brigade and 
divisional staffs had not been tested on exercises of a long enough duration that would 
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have taxed their resources. On taking command Kitching had pleaded with Simonds to 
be permitted to conduct a series of field exercises, similar to BRIDON and GRIZZLY, to 
hone the division's skills, to impart the lessons learned from his previous experience and 
to allow him to get to know the abilities of his subordinate commanders. 
Simonds refused but it is quite unlikely that Simonds, as a corps commander 
would have had the authority to grant such a request. Kitching was told that there would 
be no large movement of troops and that the only exercises viable within the limited 
confines of Britain and its training areas were TEWTS and skeleton exercises. As a 
follow-on formation for the invasion of France, 4th Cdn Armd Div was not high enough 
on the priority list to gain access to the facilities that could accommodate large-scale 
exercises.259 In denying Kitching's request, it would appear that Simonds was forced to 
yield for administrative and political reasons rather than operational reasons. 
Kitching later wrote: 
We were not allowed to hold any divisional exercises with everyone participating 
and I think that was what was needed. Whilst the individual regiments had 
reached a good standard of training, the essential cooperation between the armour, 
infantry and artillery had not been practiced to the extent it should have been. Nor 
had the Brigade and divisional headquarters had enough experience of command 
and control, on exercise of some duration, that would have taxed their resources 
and taught them lessons. We rehearsed our communications on Corps map 
exercises and so improved our battle procedures but it was not possible to create 
the "fog of war; that engulfs a unit in its first actions.260 
The lack of realistic training and the "fog of war" would play significant roles in the 
performance of the division's commanders in August 1944. 
Another obstacle to training was the operational requirement for 4 Cdn Armd Div 
to provide a real time reserve for homeland defence. During April 44, First Cdn Army 
Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 180. 
Graves, South Albertas, 87. 
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was tasked to provide a Mobile Infantry Brigade Group (Inf Bde Gp) which was to 
constitute a real time District Reserve for Sussex. Effective 21 April, 10th Inf Bde was 
tasked to fill this role, coming under operational command of the British 45th Division. 
The Inf Bde Grp was to act as a reserve for the district against any enemy who might land 
by sea or air in the District but would only come under operational command in active 
operations. Liaison, however, was required between the assigned units at all other times. 
The immediate response units were required to be on four hours notice to move in 
daytime and two hours notice to move at night. The infantry battalions of 10th Cdn Inf 
Bde were rotated through this assignment and duty ran from 1200 hrs of one day until 
1200 hrs of the next. Consequently, battalion training had to be scheduled around these 
assignments. 
Given all of the challenges to the training program of the division, what was 
achieved in the training? Kitching implemented a number of changes to address 
shortcomings that he saw within the division. He began by interviewing and assessing the 
capabilities of all of his key staff officers. He initiated an extensive visit program that saw 
him visit all 4th Cdn Armd Div units on a rotational basis where he outlined his thoughts 
on how the division would fight and conveyed the lessons learned from his time in Italy. 
He personally supervised many cloth model exercises and TEWTs where he would walk 
the ground with the soldiers to explain what he expected out of the various scenarios 
being practiced.262 
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Kitching also attempted to provide practical experience to his units by recruiting 
any veteran visiting England from other theatres to talk to his troops about their 
experiences. He cross posted senior officers with battle experience into his armoured 
regiments and moved officers temporarily from the infantry units to the armoured units 
and vice versa, in an attempt to have them better understand the operations of the other 
services. This policy of bringing in officers with previous experience in Italy would prove 
to be a double-edged sword since the lessons learned from Italy were not always relevant 
to the actual fighting in Normandy. 
Kitching set about introducing as much realism into his staff training as he could. 
He ordered his staff out of their offices and into tents to give them a better understanding 
of the working environment they would meet in the field. He instituted a comprehensive 
series of exercises that tested the ability of the rear echelon units and headquarters units 
to move at any time while practicing march and convoy discipline and transitioning from 
convoys to harbour areas.263 They also practiced the proper transmission of information 
through the numerous administrative and operational reports required on a daily basis.264 
These exercises stressed the importance of proper and timely administrative 
returns to higher HQ, having the right mix of personnel at the various divisional 
headquarters and the reporting of proper stocks and commodities through the supply 
The practice in armoured divisions was to call a 20-minute halt at the even clock hour. The units 
experienced problems transitioning from convoys into their harbour areas. The procedures for defence of 
the harbour areas were practiced with fundamental problems appearing there also. Sentries were not 
properly briefed, sentries were talking and smoking, some were not armed and, in other cases, sentries were 
not posted at all. A critical observation overall was that sleep organization was lacking in most participating 
units. Exercise ROLEM I Notes noticed by Umpire. War Diary, 4th Canadian Armoured Division-Assistant 
Adjutant and Quartermaster, 1-30 March 1944, App 4. 
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channels. The division staff learnt a critical lesson in communications during exercise 
LAST, 13-19 April. The division Q Branch could not communicate with Rear HQ 4 Cdn 
Armd Bde because the brigade had taken all of their cipher personnel to Main HQ. This 
meant that messages had to go through a lengthy process of being passed to Bde Main 
HQ for transmission to Bde Rear HQ. At one point in the exercise, the entire holding of 
second line ammunition for 4th Cdn Armd Div had been expended yet, this information 
had not been transmitted to the division's Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (RCASC) 
troops in a timely manner. This created unnecessary delays and forced re-supply to take 
place during the day instead of at night. These mistakes taught valuable lessons. 
Realism was injected into training wherever possible. The Lake Superior 
Regiment began the practice of firing .303 rifles strapped to their anti-tank guns when 
working with armoured squadrons as a means of judging their shooting accuracy while 
providing realism in the training for both the gunners and the tank crews. The tanks were 
fired at on the move with tracer rounds. The war diarist of the BCR stated that the 
number of hits on the side armour of the tanks "proved the accuracy of the gunners," and 
the sound of the bullets hitting the tanks provided the "requisite realism" of combat for 
the tank crews. 
The policy within both brigades was to have the tanks work with the infantry 
battalions as much as possible. Every effort was made to get in as much training as the 
circumstances and availability of equipment and training areas would permit. The SAR 
was the most active of the armoured regiments during March, conducting weekly 
sessions with the battalions of 10th Cdn Inf Bde. Each 10th Cdn Inf Bde battalion was 
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assigned a specific SAR squadron to work with on a regular basis as a means of 
establishing a tighter integration of tank and infantry tactics and familiarity among the 
respective troops. Developing the same level of combined arms proficiency was 
attempted within 4 Cdn Armd Bde by assigning a company of the Lake Superior 
Regiment to each armoured regiment, but the requirement to have the armoured 
regiments train with the assault divisions meant that the armoured regiments were rarely 
available for combined arms training with the motor battalion. 
On 14 May, the senior officers and COs of the division attended a lecture by 
Montgomery. Montgomery talked about the past and the present state of the war, the 
future prospects and tasks immediately confronting the Allies. He stressed the need for 
what he called "offensive eagerness." He believed that, once on the beaches, success 
would depend on the Allied ability to concentrate armour and push strong armoured 
columns rapidly inland to secure important ground or communications centres. These 
columns would form the firm bases in enemy territory from which to develop offensive 
action in all directions.267 The speech foreshadowed the intended role for the division and 
created a sense of anticipation for the upcoming action. 
Once into June, the scope and nature of division activities were restricted by 
waterproofing and the wait for the notice to move into theatre.268 From 6 June (D-Day) 
onward, all felt that it would only be a short time until the division left for France and 
spirits were high. The advance party for Exercise OVERLORD (the move into theatre) 
received word that it would be moving to the marshalling area on Tuesday, 20 June. This 
move was postponed but the advanced parties remained on one-hour notice to move. On 
267War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1-30 June 1944, App 2. 
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vehicles shortly thereafter. 
11 June, the division was placed on six hours notice to move and on 12 June the division 
received its initial order for special duty overseas. Finally, on 23 June Kitching called a 
meeting of all division COs and informed them that the division would remain in its 
present area for at least a week. A new date for the move into theatre was given with the 
advance party moving on 27 June and the main body following on 1 July.270 It would 
take another five days (to 29 June), however, before the movement orders were rescinded 
and a two-week delay finally announced. 
These delays threatened the morale of the troops and Kitching responded by 
ramping up the training cycle again and talking openly with the troops about their role 
and what they could expect once in theatre. He described their role as one in which the 
division would be required to strike deep into enemy territory, seizing an important 
objective behind his lines with all arms coordination as the key. The reaction to these 
gatherings, as recorded in the war diaries, was uniformly positive with comments like: 
never before has the morale been so high and never before had there been greater cause 
for it to be so high. Of note was a meeting Kitching held on 26 June with his senior 
commanders where he laid down the policy for the taking over of command if he 
(Kitching) became a casualty. 
War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1-30 June 1944, entry 11 Jun 
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Unit training focussed on hardening activities for the troops, which included route 
marches, tabloid sports and individual weapons training.272 A new round of maintenance 
was also required for the vehicles since the waterproofing of the vehicles had started to 
dry out. The waterproofing process had to be reapplied on certain parts of every vehicle 
and the rest of the vehicle carefully checked to ensure that the waterproofing was still in 
place. 
The 4th Cdn Armd Bde received its final allotment of Sherman Firefly tanks in 
late June. A conscious decision was made not to waterproof these vehicles right away so 
that they could be used on the ranges, allowing the tank crews to gain more experience 
with the 17 pdr gun. As noted by the war diarist of the Grenadier Guards, "our experience 
with the V Charlies has not been very extensive, every round fired is of tremendous 
benefit to the crews in showing them the power of their weapon and increasing their 
confidence in it."273 On 23 June, 4th Armd Bde received orders to move all of its Sherman 
Fireflies to the Lydd Ranges where the units conducted range practice from 23 to 25 
June. 
In late June, Kitching ordered a combined-arms TEWT be run for all senior 
officers of the division. Exercise IROQUOIS was a three day exercise which began on 4 
July and involved all senior division officers down to and including squadron and 
equivalent commanders. The officers were assigned to mixed (infantry, armour, artillery) 
syndicates and directed to discuss and solve a series of progressive problems associated 
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with an armoured advance against a successful German invasion of England. 274 Exercise 
IROQUOIS ended at 1700 hrs on 6 July and the consensus from the war diary entries was 
that it was an excellent learning experience. 
The general notes of the Exercise Narrative reveal much about what Kitching felt 
it would take to succeed in Normandy. The narrative stated that in operations in Italy and 
in Normandy it was increasingly clear that the Germans were using combined arms 
battlegroups and against these groups the tank has little chance of success on is own. In 
order to combat these battlegroups successfully the Canadians would have to adopt 
similar tactics. Battlegroups would "beat the enemy by superiority in numbers and 
equipment, offensive spirit, initiative and most important of all-the closest possible co-op 
between the varied arms in the group." 
On 11 and 12 July, it was the turn of the junior officers of the division. An 
Exercise IROQUOIS-modeled TEWT was run among the regiments of the brigades for 
troop leaders and platoon commanders. The morning of day one concentrated on the all 
arms capture and defence of a village. This was followed by a session in coordinating and 
sighting all arms for the defence of the village. The second day was concerned with the 
cooperation of infantry and tanks. Again, the learning experience was well received. 
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It is interesting at this point to note the observations of Lt Col Halpenny from this 
exercise. In a debrief to his troops after the second IROQUOIS TEWT, he stressed the 
importance of having a Forward Observer for artillery (FOO) in the vanguard and the 
need to have artillery so positioned beforehand that continuous and immediate artillery 
support would be available throughout the advance. In the defence, he stressed the fact 
that the whole defensive scheme must be based on the anti-tank layout practiced by the 
division with the infantry positioned in such a manner as to protect the artillery and with 
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the tanks arrayed in a supporting role able to conduct any necessary counter-attack. 
There was a concerted effort by Kitching to try and gain as much insight into the 
lessons learned from the battles that had already been fought in Normandy.278 On 13 July 
1944, 4 Cdn Armd Bde received a lessons learned report from the operations of 2 Cdn 
Armd Bde in the Normandy bridgehead.279 Communications, all arms cooperation, the 
tactical employment of tanks and, in particular, the tactical employment of the Sherman 
Firefly and methods to counter German tactics were highlighted and discussed. While the 
memorandum was widely discussed there is no indication from the available records that 
9RO 
any procedures were changed within the brigade, based on this information. 
On 14 July the code word CORNELIUS was received and on 16 July the advance 
party proceeded to their marshalling areas. By 20 July, the advance party had arrived in 
War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1-31 Jul 44, entry 12 Jul 44. 
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theatre and had completed their reconnaissance of the reception area for the division and 
awaited the arrival of the main body. Between 22 and 27 July, the rest of the division 
units were loaded on board ships and moved to France, which, in some cases, took six 
days.281 
The offloading and concentration of division HQ was complete by 1600 hrs 28 
July. Orders were received to move the fighting elements forward through CAEN to the 
south of the River Orne with the rest of the division prepared to move the next day. This 
gave them little time de-waterproof vehicles or perform any additional maintenance 
before being moved into their initial positions. 
Division HQ moved off to set up in its newly-assigned area on the outskirts of 
Vaucelles at 1100 hrs on 29 July, Rear Div HQ was initially established at Thaon but was 
then ordered by 2nd Cdn Corps to a new area at Bitot. Each of these moves involved the 
relocation of over 2,000 vehicles.282 On 29 July, 4 Cdn Armd Div came under command 
of 2nd Cdn Corps and the first division administrative report (ADREP) was submitted to 
2nd Cdn Corps. At 0830 hrs, 30 July, the units of 10 Cdn Inf Bde were ordered to take 
over the positions of 3 Cdn Inf Div and 4 Cdn Armd Div HQ moved into the area 
previously occupied by HQ 3 Cdn Div on 30 July.283 The relief was to commence at 2400 
hrs 30 July and was to be completed by 0400 hrs 31 Jul. 
The first division O Group in theatre occurred at 1330 hrs 28 July within which 
Kitching outlined the Corps plan. The division would relieve the 3 Cdn Inf Div in the line 
south of Caen. These orders, however, were changed that same evening. The 4 Cdn Armd 
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Bde, which had been initially tasked to relieve 8 Cdn Inf Bde, was now tasked to relieve 
the 22 Armd Bde of the British 7 Armd Div. This move was completed on July 29. After 
a couple of days, 4 Cdn Armd Bde reverted to the original plan to relieve the 8 Cdn Inf 
Bde with the takeover designed to be completed by 0500 hrs 31 July. The 7 Cdn Recce 
Regt was to come under command of 4 Cdn Armd Bde at that time.285 These moves 
allowed the division to gain some familiarity with the ground south of Caen. 
Map 1: Caen area, Rollefson, Green Route Up, 38. 
The administrative tail of the division gradually began to sort itself out after the 
rushed move from the beaches to the area below Caen. The initial staff effort was 
focussed in settling supply and administrative problems, setting up in the designated 
285
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areas and becoming more accustomed to the new surroundings in France. The first 10 
Cdn Inf Bde Administrative Instruction was issued on 31 July 44 and outlined the policy 
and procedures for logistical re-supply in the critical areas of ammunition, fuel and 
supplies. The timings for the Q returns, including the ADREP, Daily Tank Statistics and 
the Weekly Armoured Fighting Vehicle (AFV) Return were set with the first two returns 
due at brigade HQ by 1800 hrs daily.287 With the training over, units deployed and the 
administrative and support arrangements clarified, Kitching and the 4 Cdn Armd Div 
units awaited their first action. 
Kitching entered Normandy with a division composed of two brigades of vastly 
differing proficiency in their assigned roles. With the assignment of specific SAR 
armoured squadrons to specific infantry battalions within 10 Cdn Inf Bde combined arms 
effectiveness had been established through the familiarity and trust gained from constant 
sessions of working together. Likewise, in the 4 Cdn Armd Bde, the Lake Superior 
Regiment provided infantry companies to support the armour regiments of the brigade. 
The result was effective infantry/tank cooperation within the organic units of the brigades 
but since there was minimal training across the brigades the tactical proficiency did not 
necessarily translate to effectiveness in combined arms teams composed of units between 
the brigades. 
The truth was that each armoured regiment and infantry battalion had its own 
peculiarities in how it operated. Training together, across brigades, would have made 
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these known to the different units and key players, allowing the critical element of trust to 
be built up before going into battle. The reality was that, once a combined arms mix was 
attempted across the brigades, the effectiveness and familiarity between the arms and the 
people trying to work together was absent. Since 4 Cdn Armd Bde was absent for much 
of the available training period, Kitching was forced to try and build cooperation and 
understanding between the brigades and regiments through TEWTS and map exercises, a 
less than satisfactory solution. 
When the training regime is viewed as a whole, it is clear that the training 
constraints forced onto the division prevented it from attaining peak efficiency before 
entering Normandy.288 The responsibility for these constraints clearly lie with the 
external factors and decisions that shaped the division's training environment, factors 
over which Kitching had no control. Kitching, Ganong and Proctor used ever method 
available to them to impart their knowledge and experiences to prepare the men of the 
division for the upcoming battles. On the eve of their first battle the members of the 
division considered themselves to be highly trained and motivated, ready for any of the 
expected challenges that the Normandy battlefields might bring. Geoffrey Hayes' 
assessment of the Lincoln and Welland Regiment is again illustrative of the mood of the 
entire division when he stated that," Indeed, they had good reason to be enthusiastic: they 
were a well-conditioned, well-practised group of men who felt they had trained hard, 
some for four years. Few would have been aware of any deficiencies in their training and 
it is difficult to find evidence to suggest that they were not as well trained as any other 
Canadian infantry unit."289 The events to follow would test the division to a man. 
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Given the constraints that Kitching was forced to deal with in training his 
division for Normandy, the best that he could have realistically hoped to achieve in his 
training regime was proficiency at the regiment and battalion level with combined arms 
proficiency at the troop/platoon level. The events to come revealed that this level of 
proficiency was indeed achieved and was to prove itself under circumstances that could 
not have been foreseen in any training exercise. The strength of the division was that it 
was manned by competent and effective officers and men who were able to assimilate 
quickly the lessons learned from the battlefield and to make the necessary adjustments to 
their operating procedures. The division and its leadership would be tested in the most 
gruelling of circumstances. Some would falter but the time, effort and sweat invested in 
training the units of the division would pay dividends in the particular conditions of the 
Normandy battlefield. 
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Chapter Five: Normandy 
On June 6 1944, the Allies launched the largest amphibious operation in recorded 
history, codenamed OVERLORD. The invasion plan consisted of two phases: during the 
first phase codenamed Operation NEPTUNE, the Allies made good their assault. In the 
second phase, the Allies were to penetrate inland twelve miles to take Caen, Bayeux, 
Isigny, Carentan and airfields in the vicinity.290 Canadian and British forces were then to 
exploit south to seize Falaise, 20 miles south of Caen. Anchoring their left on Falaise, the 
British and Canadians were to pivot, swing eastward and sweep the ground between 
Falaise and Argentan, 15 miles to the south, and also between Argentan and Alengon, 25 
miles farther south. These actions would put them in position for a drive to the Seine 
River.291 The ultimate objective would not be Berlin, which was deemed too far for the 
Western Allies, but the Ruhr, the industrial heartland of Germany.292 
The German defence was fierce and effective and they had uncommitted reserves 
available from the German Fifteenth Army that could be thrown against the Allies.293 
Allied air superiority and naval gunfire support made the concentration of large German 
forces impossible. German tactics turned to concealment and dispersion where armour was 
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placed in "penny packets" to provide immediate support to the infantry at no more than 
squadron strength.294 
Map 2: Plan for the exploitation of the Normandy Bridgehead. Meyer, The History of the 12' SS Panzer 
Division Hitler-Jugend, D-3. 
The outcome of the Normandy invasion remained in doubt for the first 45 days of 
operations. Progress off the beaches was slower than expected across the entire front. In 
the later half of June operations were directed towards the capture of Caen. By early July, 
St. L6 remained in German hands. The Germans had evacuated Caen on the night of 9 July 
but the Second Br Army had not been able to cross the Orne River. The German Army still 
controlled the eastern suburbs of Caen.295 
By 11 July, the Allied bridgehead was still desperately small and extended roughly 
65 miles from the Cherbourg coast, where the U.S. line reached the sea at the western 
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extremity of the front to just east of Caen. In some places, the bridgehead was less than ten 
miles deep, and nowhere did it extend for more than 20 miles. At this point in time, the 
Allies had expected to control an area ten times the actual size of the bridgehead. The 
lodgement was so small that the few airfields within the bridgehead were still within 
German artillery range and were essentially unusable. 
http://www.dean.usma.edu/history/web03/atlases/ww2%20europe/EuropeanTheaterGIFAVWIIEurope58.gif 
Meanwhile, the Americans found the going extremely difficult through the 
hedgerows and wooded "bocage" country of Normandy. Only the capture of Cherbourg 
was accomplished on schedule. The failure to capture Caen dramatically altered the design 
of the Allied campaign. Instead of provoking the Germans into costly counterattacks as 
Great Britain, Air Ministry, Air Support: The Second World War 1939-1945 Royal Air Force (London: 
The Ministry, 1955), 159.Copp, Maple Leaf Route: Falaise, 9. 
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originally planned, British and Canadians forces were now obliged to go over to the attack 
themselves against well prepared and fortified German defensive zones. Montgomery's 
plan was to contain the bulk of the German forces in the Caen area so that the Americans 
could break out and sweep south and west breaking the stalemate. The Canadians 
played a significant role in the series of operations designed to first take Caen (WINDSOR 
and CHARNWOOD) and then in the drive southwards to Falaise in operation 
ATLANTIC: the Canadian phase of GOODWOOD and in SPRING, the 2nd Cdn Corps 
attack to take Verrieres Ridge. 
The Allies had expected high losses on the beaches but the planners had expected 
the casualty rates to fall, as mobile operations became the norm after the breakout from the 
bridgehead. The opposite, in fact, happened. In June alone, the U.S. suffered 40,000 
casualties, while the British and Canadians suffered 38,000. Progress had been slow, the 
fighting remained difficult and gains became measured in yards and thousands of dead. As 
a result, considerable anguish and dissent developed within the senior Allied leadership. 
The need for a successful breakout became more and more imperative and Falaise, the 
original target of D plus 2, became the symbol for that success.298 
The Germans concentrated their strength, particularly their panzer divisions (Pz 
Div), against the British-Canadian forces, who were trying to take the vital area in and 
around Caen.299 German success was based on two factors: sound defensive tactics and 
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superior weapons. German defensive doctrine was simple but effective. The object was "to 
destroy the enemy by fire" with the available firepower deployed in depth. The terrain 
south of Caen offered the Germans an ideal defensive position with easily concealed 
locations offering good fields of fire.300 Allied air superiority forced the Germans to 
become masters of camouflage. 
An important element of the Normandy battles was the fact that the Heer had used 
France and the Low Counties as a training area where new divisions were formed, brought 
to strength and, when judged battle-ready, shipped to Russia. As a result, German 
commanders were very familiar with the terrain of the Normandy area. Brigadefiihrer Kurt 
Meyer, for example, stated ".. .1 know the terrain [Normandy] in great detail as I was 
stationed here in the autumn of 1943 with my old reconnaissance battalion and carried out 
numerous exercises over it. I know, therefore, that the heights near Potigny control the 
training or manpower shortages. The 21 Pz Div was up to strength and had time to train but it was equipped 
with modified captured, and mainly obsolete French armoured vehicles instead of panther tanks which 
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terrain and that the Laison sector is a natural tank obstacle." The Canadians would 
eventually learn these same lessons but at a terrific cost in casualties. 
The First U.S. Army, in a week of heavy fighting (Operation COBRA), broke 
through the German left wing and began to exploit its success. On 1 August, General 
Omar Bradley took command of the 12th Army Group, handing the First U.S. Army over 
to Lt Gen Courtney H. Hodges. Simultaneously, the Third U.S. Army, under Lt Gen 
George S. Patton, entered the battle on the right of the First U.S. Army and assumed 
responsibility for the main exploitation task.303 
Map 4: American Breakout. Ellis, Victory in the West, 386. 
Kurt Meyer, Grenadiers (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 1994), 157. 
Stacey, Victory Campaign, 203. 
Montgomery was convinced that the Germans would respond rationally to an 
American breakthrough in the west by staging an orderly withdrawal to the east while 
holding the hinge position in front of Caen. In his directive of 27 July (M515), Montgomery 
insisted that anything the Anglo-Canadian did elsewhere had to have the underlying 
objective of facilitating the breakout operations of the American forces to the west of St Lo. 
304
 The goal was the rapid capture of the whole Cherbourg and Brittany peninsulas and 
their vital ports.305 
The American breakout to the east represented a considerable danger to the German 
position in Normandy. If left unchecked, or allowed to gather momentum, the breakout 
could force the withdrawal of German forces from France. With France lost, the Allied 
threat to Germany would become immediate. There were two possible German options to 
deal with the situation, one cautious and one bold. The cautious and expected course of 
action was to terminate the conflict in Normandy and, through a series of delaying actions, 
withdraw, initially to the Seine River, but eventually further east into stronger defensive 
positions established at other natural river lines along the Somme-Marne-Saone River line 
and the Albert Canal-Meuse River Line. This action would entail the withdrawal of Army 
Group G from southern France.306 
The second possible option was much bolder and carried considerable risk: stop the 
Allied breakout and stabilize the front once again in Normandy. Keeping the fight in 
Normandy represented the best option for the Germans, but selecting this course of action 
meant moving German panzer forces, thereby exposing them to the very real threat posed 
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by Allied tactical airpower. Hitler decided to try to recreate the conditions of static warfare 
that favoured German tactics and weapons. He ordered Field Marshal Gunther von Kluge 
to close the gap in the left portion of the German defenses, anchoring the left flank once 
more, this time at Avranches.307 
On 3 August, von Kluge began moving his panzer divisions away from the Caen 
area to counterattack the American forces that had broken out with the intent of cutting 
them off from their supply lines. The plan required seriously weakening the German 
defensive strength around Caen. Von Kluge initially protested that any shift of armour from 
the British and Canadian sector would fatally weaken his defences south of Caen and 
expose his panzers to the waiting Allied air force.308 Hitler remained adamant. 
During the nights of 6/7 August, four German armoured divisions attacked in the 
Mortain area. At first, they made good progress but, forewarned by ULTRA decrypts, the 
Americans had time to prepare for the attack and they eventually stopped it.309 Over a 
period of two days, the Americans destroyed much of the German armour remaining in 
Normandy and with it any hope the Germans had of a coherent, systematic withdrawal out 
of Normandy. 
The 4 Cdn Armd Div relief of the 3 Cdn Inf Div was complete at 0430 hrs on 31 
July.310 The disposition of the units of the division was somewhat scattered, with the 
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infantry of the 10 Inf Bde forward at Cormelles and Bourguebus311 and 4 Cdn Armd Bde 
deployed along the left flank of the Corps. The Lake Superior Regiment was located 
between Four and Soliers and the Grenadier Guards occupied Grentheville. The other 
armoured regiments were deployed in reserve positions: the BCR at Mondeville, and the 
Foot Guards near Grentheville.312 
Moving into their allotted positions, the soldiers of the division traversed the 
battlefield over which GOODWOOD was fought. The battlefield had not changed and the 
carnage in both human life and tank casualties was clearly visible. Many of the entries in 
the various division war diaries comment on burned victims still in the tanks. The 
battlefield was evidence to the vulnerability of the Sherman tank and the killing power of 
the German anti-tank guns. The reaction by the tank crews was to seek added protection. 
This led to the practice of welding spare tank tracks to the side of the tanks in an attempt to 
thicken the armour protection.313 
The more lasting effect, however, was psychological. The images imprinted the 
need for caution vice bravado on the part of a number of key leaders of the division. In 
particular, Major Ned Amy, whose squadron would lead the division in TOTALIZE, stated 
that after viewing the battlefield he made a mental note to never put his squadron in the 
position where the same could happen to it.314 
the 1st SS Division. Rod Keller's 9th Brigade had failed to capture Tilly and his advice to me at the time was 
to leave it alone and try somewhere else." Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 190. 
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Map 5: Disposition of 4 Cdn Armd Div units 31 July 1944. Modified Operation Totalize map, printed by 
14 Field Survey Squadron R.E. Feb 1948. 
During the first seven days of August, the division, for the most part, entered a 
period of static operations. Divisional orders required a state of readiness called a "stand 
to" was ordered from dusk to dawn. A "stand to" represented a state of preparedness by 
the units whereby a proportion, usually two-thirds of each unit was awake to guard against 
infiltration or attack. The corresponding "stand-down" was ordered after sun up, and all 
who did not have duties to perform would be allowed to get a few hours sleep. Listening 
posts and patrols were established and guards and sentries posted. In the armoured units, 
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guard tanks were designated and at least one gunner and one loader was on duty in each 
guard tank. When tanks were in harbour, other than the guard tank, at least one member of 
the crew was to remain in the turret of the tank while the remainder of the crew could sleep 
close to their tank ready to take their post on short notice. 
Kitching's O Group was held at 1100 hrs each day to outline operations for the 
next day. Brigade and regimental O Groups followed with regimental O Groups typically 
being recorded around 1800 hrs each day. If an operation was planned more meetings 
would occur particularly between the CO of the unit conducting the attack, known as the 
supported commander, and the CO providing support in the attack - the supporting 
commander. It was up to the supported commander to develop the concept of operations 
for the attack with the supporting commander providing expertise on how best to employ 
his forces; for example how best to employ tanks in support of a proposed infantry attack. 
During this period the 10th Cdn Inf Bde fought a series of actions designed to keep 
the Germans engaged, prevent them from moving forces to meet the Americans and to 
acquire important ground prior to the forthcoming operation towards Falaise. The first 
target was Tilly la Campagne. Tilly was located on a small rise on Bourguebus Ridge. The 
approach to the village was over flat open grain fields that rose gently to the hamlet which 
provided little to no cover to advancing infantry. Tilly consisted of eight houses, each 
turned into a fortress. The Germans had strengthened the basements of the houses to 
withstand heavy pressure from above and then dynamited the walls so that they collapsed 
inward creating a pyramid over the basements. The basements were prepared with weapon 
slits to cover any and all approaches. The village had the highest tactical importance since 
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the high ground upon which the village was located gave it observation and control over a 
vast area. Two previous attacks to take the village had failed. 
The initial 10th Cdn Inf Bde task was a one company diversionary frontal attack 
from Bourguebus to support a Calgary Highlanders attack on the night of 31 
July/1 August.318 When this attack failed Simonds ordered Kitching to seize the objective 
the following night. The Lincoln and Welland Regiment was tasked with support from A 
Sqn SAR. 
The brigade plan called for a brief barrage after which A and B companies from the 
Lines were to proceed out of Bourguebus and take up positions between La Hogue and 
Tilly where they could intercept any German tanks which might try to counterattack. D 
Coy was to seize Point 63 and C Coy was to pass through D into the town, with D 
following up. The tanks from SAR were to support from northwest of Bourgebus. If the 
infantry attack proceeded according to plan, the tanks were to protect the infantry against 
counter-attacks and to provide a mobile counter-attack force. Conversely, if the attack 
bogged down and did not succeed by first light, the tanks were to provide direct fire to 
help the Lines onto the objective.320 
Jefferson and McQueen listed the German strength as uncertain.321 On the night of 
1/2 August, nine companies of SS panzer grenadiers with six anti-tank guns, twenty tanks 
and twenty-two artillery pieces were located in and around the hamlet. This meant that a 
317
 Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 208. 
318
 CMHQ Report No. 169, para 21. 
319
 War Diary, The Lincoln & Welland Regiment, 1-31 August 1944, entry 1 Aug. 
320
 War Diary, 29 Armoured Reconnaissance Regiment (South Alberta Regiment), 1-31 August 1944, entry 
1 Aug. 
125 
force of over 500 Germans in well-prepared and supported positions opposed the 
assaulting Canadian companies.322 
The attack began at 2345 hrs and came under immediate machine gun and mortar 
fire. The advance became disorganized when the commander of B Coy was killed. An 
attempt was made to reorganize the companies and resume the attack at 0200 hrs. These 
orders were not received by all of the sub-units and only two platoons proceeded to attack. 
They were stopped about 800 yards out of Bourguebus. At 0545 hrs McQueen informed 
Bde HQ that the attack had failed. The attack cost the Lines 58 casualties, with 12 
fatalities.323 
At 1030 hrs 2 August, Kitching visited 10th Cdn Inf Bde HQ. Kitching, Jefferson 
and McQueen conducted an after action review to try and determine what went wrong.324 
A number of shortfalls were recorded in the performance of the troops. McQueen noted 
that he had received his orders late, that the orders were sketchy and this prevented proper 
battle procedure within the regiment. The troops were hesitant about returning fire for fear 
of causing friendly casualties; they became strung out along the line of advance as the 
head of the columns advanced; and those behind slowed down causing the advancing 
formation to disintegrate into a series of small advancing detachments, destroying any 
hope of cohesion or coordination. The men were also over burdened with excess 
equipment. These issues were fundamental mistakes in infantry tactics and battle 
procedure that should have been stressed and addressed in the training of the regiment.325 
322
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The decision was made to withdraw the Lines from the line and replace the unit 
with the Argylls. A harassing fire program was ordered to keep the defenders of Tilly 
occupied during the relief. Jefferson conducted a further after action review with the 
officers of the Lincoln & Welland Regiment on 3 August. His principal criticism was that 
"insufficient determination had been shown in attacking what should have been a two-
company objective."327 Jefferson followed this up with a discussion of the lessons learned 
from the Tilly attack with all of the other brigade units on 4 August.328 
This battle was the first test of the leadership within 10 Cdn Inf Bde and there were 
mixed results. McQueen had been found wanting. Wotherspoon claimed that McQueen 
had cracked under the pressure of combat and recommended to Jefferson that McQueen be 
326
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relieved immediately.329 It is not clear whether Wotherspoon's recommendation went any 
higher than Jefferson. If it did reach Kitching, it would appear that he was not prepared to 
remove McQueen after this engagement.330 
Wotherspoon was also critical of Jefferson's plan for the employment of the SAR 
armour and recommended a number of modifications to Jefferson's plan after the Brigade 
O Group. Wotherspoon stated that he had just completed a forward reconnaissance prior to 
Jefferson's O Group and was cognizant of the German positions in and around Tilly. The 
content of Jefferson's orders lead Wotherspoon to question whether Jefferson had 
personally gone forward to conduct a reconnaissance. Jefferson's initial plan had the 
armour crossing open terrain without the cover of smoke. Wotherspoon argued with 
Jefferson and got the fireplan changed to address his concerns.331 
At the beginning of August, Lt Col Ganong was promoted and moved to command 
the 4th Cdn Inf Bde and Lt Col F Wigle took over the position of GSO 1.332 Kitching 
would have had to weigh the impact of losing Ganong against denying him his promotion 
to Brigadier and the command of 4th Cdn Inf Bde. Accepting this move was a gamble on 
Kitching's part since there is no indication that Kitching knew or had worked previously 
with Wigle. Wigle, however, became a very effective operations officer and as Kitching 
states, brought more life to the general staff. The decision seems to have paid off since 
329Wotherspoon stated that McQueen became unsettled by the death of his soldiers and would not get out of 
his foxhole fearing for his own death. Interview with G.D. Wotherspoon by Bill Wiley on September 25 
1986, n.p. 
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Kitching remarked on how happy he was with the staff work of his division in preparing 
for TOTALIZE.333 
Losing the operations officer that Kitching had trained with for the past five 
months, on the eve of his first major battle must have been disconcerting for Kitching. 
Since the dynamic between a commander and his key staff members was personality-
driven and required a working relationship based on trust, commanders normally selected 
the officers that they wanted to fill the key staff positions within their headquarters, 
particularly a position as important as the GSO I. Consequently, when important moves of 
key staff officers were contemplated there was usually consultation with the affected 
commander. Kitching made no mention of this in his memoirs with respect to the loss of 
Ganong or of having been previously consulted in having Wigle assigned as Ganong's 
replacement. These incidents were the first in a number of key personnel-related issues 
with which Kitching had to contend. 
On 5 August reports began circulating that the Germans were withdrawing from 
the Tilly defensive line. At about 1530 hrs, word was received from 5 Cdn Inf Bde that the 
Germans had withdrawn and they were no longer in contact.334 Kitching ordered the 
Argylls to send out a fighting patrol, in platoon strength, to determine whether the 
Germans were still in Tilly: if so, in what strength? The initial assessment was that the 
Germans may have decided to begin an ordered withdrawal to the Seine. While the Argyll 
patrol was out, a battalion pursuit group was formed consisting of the Algonquin 
Regiment, two squadrons from the SAR with the usual complement of supporting arms. If 
333
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Tilly was found empty, the pursuit group was to pass through to re-establish contact with 
the Germans.335 The Argyll patrol left at 1630 hrs and entered Tilly at approximately 1700 
hrs. The Germans had waited until the patrol was within close range and then pinned them 
down with accurate fire. Stewart ordered artillery fire to help extricate the patrol. The 
patrol returned at 1800 hrs, losing seven men but returned with three prisoners from the 1 
SS Pz Div.336 
Simonds decided that reports from 2nd and 4th divisions were inconclusive with 
resistance coming with a rear guard force that was trying to gain time for the main force to 
withdraw. Kitching ordered Jefferson to capture the village and at 1900 hrs the Argylls 
were ordered to attack Tilly, "not using more than 2 companies" with two troops of tanks, 
a troop of 17 Pdr anti-tank guns and divisional artillery in support.337 Wotherspoon did not 
like the brigade plan and suggested that an armoured feint should be made west of Tilly to 
distract the defenders. He also requested a smoke barrage to cover the main attack.338 The 
armoured feint was to begin at 2145 hrs with the main attack at 2300 hrs. The Argylls 
made a determined effort to take Tilly. The forward elements entered the town but, when it 
became obvious that further progress was not possible, the commanders decided to 
withdraw. There was now no doubt that Tilly was still held in force. This attack cost 
another 24 casualties and four tanks were knocked out.339 
Kitching had ordered Booth to seize La Hogue. At 1400 the Lake Superior 
Regiment received initial orders to take and, if possible, hold the village. The intelligence 
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provided to Kitching and the attacking force from Corps was that the majority of the 
German forces had departed the town leaving only a small force. The attack went in at 
1930 hrs and was halted by heavy fire 150 yards from the town with the loss of six killed 
and 15 wounded.340 It was now clear that the German defensive line was still being held in 
force. Kitching and his brigade commanders had responded to orders from Simonds with 
efficiency as well as loyalty but their confidence in corps intelligence reports was shaken. 
During the 1 to 5 August timeframe, the armoured regiments of 4th Cdn Armd Bde 
were maintained in a counterattack role and saw little action.341 The only significant 
activity on the part of the armoured regiments occurred on 5 August when B Sqn from the 
BCRs went on a "recce in force" in the area of Fours-Soliers. The Sqn passed through the 
positions of the Lake Superior Regiment and pushed forward in an attempt to provoke a 
German counterattack. The intent was to draw the Germans forward onto the remaining 
tanks of the BCRs who were set to ambush the counter attack. The Germans, however, did 
not respond. The same tactic was planned for the following night but Kitching cancelled 
the operation at the last minute.342 
The command decisions for Kitching at this point were rather clear-cut. Choosing 
the 10 Cdn Inf Bde to carry out the attacks on Tilly was a straight forward decision for 
Kitching since the regiments of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde were being employed elsewhere and 
infantry were the logical choice to carry out the assigned attacks. The nature of the 
340
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campaign forced Kitching to divide his attention between the conduct of current 10 Cdn 
Inf Bde operations and in the planning of future division operations. 
The 4th Cdn Armd Div units were placed into the line south of Caen to acclimatize 
the men to the routine and conditions of combat. The key to these actions, as espoused by 
both Montgomery and Simonds, was to ensure that the tasks assigned were of such a 
nature that they would lead to success. Failure could lead to serious issues of morale.343 
The 4 Cdn Armd Div attacks were of limited value beyond confirming the existence of a 
firmly held defensive German. The attacks cost the division a significant number of 
casualties for the intelligence gained and while there may have been an expectation that 
the setbacks may have negatively impacted morale, there is clear indication that the 
opposite effect happened. The war diaries convey an eagerness to take the Germans on 
again. The units felt that the lessons they had learned, and were learning daily, would serve 
them well in their next encounter. 
While the effectiveness of the Tilly and La Hogue attacks as an introduction into 
battle can be debated, the time in this static environment allowed Proctor, Wigle and the 
brigade staffs to iron out their staff procedures. Upon moving into the Normandy 
bridgehead, the maintenance procedures for the division were reorganized. The units were 
divided into four maintenance groups, 10th Cdn Inf Bde Group, 4 Cdn Armd Bde Group, 
Div Tps & Arty Group and Adm Group. Rations and petrol for forward troops would be 
deposited at a point selected by division and notified to units through their respective 
brigade maintenance groups. This new policy went into effect 30 July 44.344 
Montgomery, High Command in War, para 34. 
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The static period proved to be anything but static for the 15th Cdn Artillery Regt 
which was supporting 4 Cdn Armd Div. The unit fired over 25,000 rounds of 25-pdr 
ammunition during this timeframe. This operational tempo challenged the division's 
supply system to keep the guns stocked since the guns were firing in excess of their daily-
allotted rounds. Since transport and ammunition were the main issues Proctor devised a 
system of overloading the available supply vehicles in order to keep the guns supplied.345 
G.L. Cassidy, a member of the Algonquin Regiment, in his book Warpath, best 
summarized this period when he wrote: 
The task of learning the battle noises, and accustoming ourselves to patrols and to 
administration under fire had been successfully carried out. We had learned, as 
well how important a small thing like water becomes ... We had learned too the 
value of discipline, particularly in regard to movement in daylight.346 
The members of the division as a whole were learning the important lessons of actual 
combat and how these differed at times with what had been learned in training. This period 
also provided Kitching with a first look at his commanders under combat conditions but it 
would take the intensity of battle of operation TOTALIZE to answer for Kitching the vital 
question over the suitability of his subordinate commanders. 
345There are numerous other references of making changes to make operations work better such as 
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Chapter Six: TOTALIZE: The Plan 
Conceptually, the idea for TOTALIZE began as early as 29 July, when Crerar 
advised Simonds to commence planning a thrust down the Caen-Falaise road "in about 
ten days time" to break through the German defensive positions with the objective of 
Falaise. The drive was to be carried out in "great strength" and with massive air support. 
The details Crerar left to Simonds.347 Frustrated by the outcome of both ATLANTIC and 
SPRING, Simonds saw this operation as an opportunity to establish his reputation as a 
corps commander.348 
At 1000 hrs 30 July, Simonds briefed his division commanders and their senior 
staff on the strategic picture and his concept for the conduct of operations to carry out 
Crerar's directive. On 31 July, Simonds presented his appreciation and outline plan for 
TOTALIZE verbally to Crerar, asking for another infantry division, another armoured 
division and "total" air support for 48 hours.349 On that basis, he was convinced that the 
problem, though "tough", could be "well tackled."350 
In the design of his plan, Simonds had to resolve three major problems: how to 
achieve surprise; how to neutralize the enemy's defensive fire; and how to effect a deep 
penetration of infantry beyond the enemy's screen of anti-tank guns, and machine-
guns.351 In addition, the terrain in the proposed operation area was a series of gradually 
rising gentle slopes and open grain fields, dotted with walled villages and surrounded by 
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small woods and orchards. It was called good tank country as cross-country movement 
was possible but what was good tank country was also good anti-tank country and the 
Germans were expecting an attack.352 
Colonel-General Sepp Dietrich, Commander of 1 SS Pz Corps, recognized that 
sooner or later the Allies would try to break out towards Falaise. He, therefore, ordered 
the construction of three defensive lines to cover the approaches to Falaise that 
capitalized on the German knowledge of the excellent defensive features of the 
topography. The first line ran from St Andre sur Orne through Tilly la Campagne to La 
Hogue. This line crossed the road Caen-Vimont halfway between Vimont and Cagny. 
The second line was approximately 3,000 meters further south and included Pt 122, the 
dominating feature along the Falaise road, and Vimont. The third line ran from 
Bretteville sur Laize to Cauvicourt, north of St. Sylvain and along the River Muance.353 
Simonds' plan for TOTALIZE required a coordinated and phased attack by three 
infantry and two armoured divisions, two armoured brigades, special armoured vehicles, 
two complete AGRA plus the support of two additional AGRA, and the entire available 
air support of both heavy and tactical bombers.354 The plan would be carried out in three 
phases. The first was designed to break in at night and seize the first line. The 2 Cdn Inf 
Div and 51 Br (H) Div, led by the 2 Cdn Armd Bde and the British 33 Armd Bde 
respectively, with specialized assault armour, engineers and anti-tank artillery, would roll 
352
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forward at night in separate regiment-sized columns. Each column would contain an 
infantry battalion riding in the new armoured personnel carriers.355 The tanks and carrier-
borne infantry of the leading brigades were to advance under cover of a quick medium 
artillery barrage straight for their first objectives. Follow-on formations would deal with 
any bypassed German troops. 
There was to be no preliminary artillery bombardment during the first phase. At 
H-hour 2300 hrs, 1000 RAF Lancaster bombers were to bomb the areas of May sur Orne, 
Fontenay le Marmion on the right and La Hogue - Secqueville and the adjacent woods on 
the left. These bombing attacks were intended to destroy the enemy's main defensive line 
and tank harbours on the high ground. 
The second phase was designed to break through the Hautmesnil - St. Sylvain 
line and would occur twelve hours after the start of the operation. The task of the 4 Cdn 
Armd Div was to capture Hautmesnil itself and the high ground northwest of Bretteville 
le Rabet; thereafter, it was to be prepared to exploit forward west of the Caen-Falaise 
road. The 3 Cdn Inf Div, following up, was to protect the flanks of the armoured attack: 
on the right flank by forming a firm base in the area of Bretteville sur Laize and, on the 
left flank, by taking the woods located near Robertmesnil. The 3 Cdn Inf Div was 
subsequently to exploit from the Robertmesnil area to St Sylvain.357 The first drafts of the 
plan had been based on the assumption that the bulk of the German armour would be in 
position to support their defensive lines when the attack was launched. As a result, 
355
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Simonds had planned to use only 4th Cdn Armd Div in the second phase keeping 1st 
Polish Armd Div in reserve. 
The third phase would be the exploitation phase with the two armoured divisions, 
4 Cdn Armd Div and 1 Polish Armd Div, advancing towards Falaise. The 4 Cdn Armd 
Div was to advance on the axis Hautmesnil Pt 180, Pt 195, Pt 206 and once established 
on these features to patrol and maintain contact with the Germans in an arc with Fontaine 
le Pin on the left and Meslay on the right. The 1 Pol Armd Div was to advance on an axis 
that ran through Quesnay to Pt 165, Pt 159 and position itself on the high ground Pt 170 -
Pt 159 just short of Falaise. The 3 Cdn Inf Div, once relieved by the 2 Cdn Inf Div and 51 
(H) Div in Bretteville sur Laize and St. Sylvain, was to reposition its brigades forward to 
the line Hautmesnil, Bretteville le Rabet and the high ground of Pt 140.359 Each 
armoured division with one medium artillery regiment under command and the support of 
medium and fighter-bombers, on call, would deal with possible threats from armoured 
counterattacks. 
The third phase relied on very heavy air support, including heavy day bombers 
(B-17 Flying Fortresses), all available medium bombers and armed reconnaissance by 
fighter-bombers. From 1235 hrs to 1355 hrs on 8 August the 8th USAAF would bomb St 
Sylvain, Bretteville sur Laize and Gouvix with high explosive (H.E.) and fragmentation 
bombs. Simonds wanted to create a corridor down which his forces would attack and to 
have the air attack concentrate outside of both flanks of the corridor. A "fragmentation 
carpet" would be laid over the area bounded by Cintheaux - Cauvicourt - Hautmesnil. 
The purpose of this attack was to provide a wall of moving bombardment that would 
358
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move southwards which would facilitate the armoured attack. High explosive and 
fragmentation bombs were planned to reduce the possibility of cratering the terrain in 
front of the advancing tanks.361 
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Map 7: Operation TOTALIZE Outline Plan. Reid, No Holding Back, 80. 
Simonds seized upon the employment of heavy bombers as part of the solution to 
his "break in" problem. He reasoned that if all available air support were used for the first 
"break in," there would be little left for the second, which would also suffer from 
diminished artillery support unless a "pause" was incorporated to move artillery and 
ammunition forward. On the other hand, if the initial "break in" could be accomplished 
by "infiltrating through the screen in bad visibility" with limited air support, then the 
361 CMHQ Report No 146, para 47; also CMHQ Report No 169, Amendment No 4, para 21. 
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heavy and medium day bombers would be available to deal with the next zone while 
artillery support was moving forward into the recently captured German territory.362 
This plan contained a number of new concepts and tactical innovation. These 
included: the intervention of heavy bombers in the ground battle during the hours of 
darkness; the use of modified self-propelled guns as armoured personnel carriers; and the 
use of tanks en masse at night.363 In different ways, each of these innovations should have 
been given time for experimentation, preparation and training in order to establish 
common operating techniques. The Phase I units received two days of planning and 
training: 4 Cdn Armd Div units received none. 
The use of tanks en masse at night is commonly viewed as the most radical part of 
the plan. Brigadier Elliot Rodger, the Chief of Staff of 2nd Cdn Corps, stated that "jaws 
dropped noticeably" when Simonds notified the division commanders on 4 August that 
the operation would be conducted at night with armour.364 While using tanks at night as 
part of a set piece and co-ordinated attack plan may have been seen as radical, the 
armoured units of Phase I had time to prepare to mitigate the associated risks. Continuing 
the practice, as part of ongoing and developing operations, without the benefit of time 
and proper deployment procedures was to present serious challenges to 4th Cdn Armd Div 
in Phase II. 
The most criticized part of this complex plan was the fact that the actions of the 
land forces were now locked into the heavy bomber strike timings, which supposedly, 
362
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could not be altered without 24 hours warning. The general consensus is that since the 
First Cdn Army lobbied, against considerable opposition, to get the bomber support in the 
first place, they dared not cancel it at the last minute. To compound the issue, the only 
link with Bomber Command was through First Cdn Army HQ.365 By insisting on 
bomber support for Phase II, Simonds opted for a more staged battle rather than a more 
fluid one where the follow-on forces were used to exploit the success gained in Phase I. 
Many historians believe this decision was to have a significant impact on the outcome of 
Phase II, and in turn, the progression of the whole Canadian Normandy campaign. This 
argument is succinctly expressed by John English's statement, "...its incorporation [the 
bombing] within the second phase, more than any other factor, promoted a degree of 
inflexibility that by allowing the Germans to recover foreordained defeat." 
Montgomery issued his formal order for TOTALIZE on 4 August. The stated 
intent for the operation was to smash the vital pivot of the German Armies in Normandy 
by breaking through the German positions to the south and southeast of Caen and gaining 
ground in the direction of Falaise that would cut off the German forces facing the Second 
British Army rendering their "withdrawal eastward difficult-if not impossible."367 
Additionally, the attack was to destroy enemy equipment and personnel. The attack was 
to begin not later than 8 August and on 7 August if possible. At noon 5 August, 
Headquarters 2nd Cdn Corps issued Operation Instruction No. 4: Operation TOTALIZE, 
describing the operation in the three phases already noted. D-Day was to be Monday 7 
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August and H-Hour for Phase I was set as 2300 hrs. H-Hour for Phase II was set at 1400 
hrs on 8 August.368 
ULTRA decrypts revealed the German intention to launch Panzer Group 
Eberbach in a counterattack aimed at the American exposed left flank around 
Argentan.369 On the morning of 6 August Simonds received information from "various 
sources of intelligence" that indicated that significant changes had occurred within the 
German defensive alignment. Specifically: 
• 272 Inf Div had side-stepped southwestwards to take over the front 
previously held by 12 SS Div, and 12 SS Div had stepped back to the area 
of Valmeray 
• 89 Inf Div370 relieved 1 SS Div on the sector between the left flank of 272 
Inf Div and the LAIZE, and 1 SS stepped back to the BRETTEVILLE 
SUR LAIZE-ST SYLVAIN position.371 
Based on this information Simonds decided that no change was required to the air plan 
because of this new intelligence but that modifications were justified in the ground 
372 
operations. 
368D-Day represents the day the operation is to begin and H-Hour refers to the specific hour on D-Day that 
the operation is to commence. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 211. 
369
 This was General Wade Haislip's XV Corps. D'Este, Decision in Normandy, AA\. 
370The 89th Infantry Division was activated in Norway in March 1944, left Norway on 12 June and arrived 
in the Rouen area around 10 July 1944. It had two regiments, numbered 1055 and 1056. The regiments 
were identified between May sur Orne and Tilly on the night of 5/6 August. Canadian intelligence listed the 
strength of the division as 10,550 men, 2,650 horses, 900 vehicles, 18- 75 mm anti- tank guns, 12-88mm 
anti-tank guns. 4 Cdn Armd Div Int Summary Number 4 Part II, 7 Aug 44, War Diary 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1-
31 August 1944, App 15. 
371
 Letter GOC 8-3, Simonds to Crerar, Operation "TOTALIZE" dated 6 August 1944, Crerar Papers, 
MG30FileE157Vol2. 
372
 The Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS) summary for the week ending 6 August, stated that the 
Germans had managed to withdraw four panzer divisions (12th SS, 1st SS, 10th SS and Panzer Lehr) from 
the line and a fifth (116th Panzer) was due to be withdrawn during the night of 5 to 6 August. Hinsley, 
British Intelligence in the Second World War, 132-134. 
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In the redesign, TOTALIZE went from a three-phased attack to a two-phased 
attack. Simonds believed that the Bretteville-sur-Laize line had been "thickened" with the 
withdrawn SS troops, which necessitated a widening of the frontage and increase in the 
weight of the attack in the second phase. Simonds decided to combine the second and 
third phases by launching 4 Cdn Armd Div and 1 Pol Armd Div "... simultaneously and 
•2*7 -> 
parallel directly through to their final objectives." Both armoured divisions were 
untested but Simonds felt that, with this tactic, at least one of the two would achieve the 
desired breakthrough, which would facilitate the advance of the other.374 Simonds 
believed that the anti-tank guns on the second defensive line were still intact and that the 
Germans still had the 12th SS Pz Div in reserve.375 The redesigned plan was briefed to the 
division commanders at 1000 hrs 6 August. 
If Simonds' operational policy is used as a template, Simonds redesigned plan and 
the rationale he gave for changing the plan are hard to reconcile. If he expected that the 
second break-through might meet stronger resistance particularly through anti-tank guns 
than originally anticipated, infantry divisions should have been designated for this 
breakthrough. The 3 Cdn Inf Div was already part of Phase II and should have been used 
accordingly. Simonds knew that the 1 SS Pz Div was withdrawn from his front and was 
replaced with an infantry division, which represented a weakened second defensive 
line.376 He also wanted the armoured divisions to push directly to their final objectives. 
Armoured divisions, according to his operational policy, were to be used to exploit the 
373Letter GOC 8-3, Simonds to Crerar, Operation "TOTALIZE" dated 6 August 1944. 
374
 Marshall Stearns, Letter [Recollections on time with Montgomery], Dr Reginald Roy Special 
Collections University of Victoria, 23 March 1981. 
375
 The estimated strength of the 1 SS Pz Div was 4 battalions of infantry with 600 per battalion, 20 Panther 
tanks, 45 Mark IVs panzers, 35 assault guns, 40 field artillery guns and 30 anti-tank guns over 50mm. 4 
Cdn Armd Div Int Summary Number 4 Part II, 7 Aug 44, War Diary 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1-31 August 1944, 
App 15. 
376Hinsley, British Intelligence in the Second World War, 200. 
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holes made by the infantry division, not make the holes themselves. Asking the armoured 
divisions to push on directly to their objectives suggests that he was expecting them to 
meet light opposition. A weaker second line would also explain why Quesnay Woods, a 
formidable natural obstacle to tanks and an excellent defensive position for the Germans 
was strangely absent from Simonds' appreciation. In trying to explain Simonds' plan the 
evidence would support two propositions: either Simonds was actually expecting an 
exploitation battle in Phase II or by August of 1944 he had modified his Operational 
Policy published in February 1944.377 
377
 Copp, Guy Simonds and the Art of Command, 10. 
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Map 8: Revised Outline Plan. Reid, No Holding Back, 99. 
It is ironic that in what may have been an attempt to be reactive and spontaneous, 
Simonds changed a plan that might have brought him the ultimate success he and 
Montgomery were craving. Simonds was placing considerable trust in his two new 
armoured divisions to deliver the deep penetration he needed to capture the dominant 
physical features that would help seal off the German forces facing Second British 
Army.378 
Acting on Hitler's orders to counterattack the Americans at Mortain, German 
armoured divisions were withdrawing from the Caen sector in rapid succession. These 
moves dangerously weakened the strength of the German hinge at Caen. Only one panzer 
division remained in the area, the 12 SS Pz Div.379 The German armour was replaced 
with infantry divisions. The defensive line was anchored by the 89 Inf Div in position 
astride the RN 158 with the 272 Inf Div on the right and the 217 Inf Div on the left. The 
89 Inf Div was recently arrived from 15th Army. It was well equipped with material and 
personnel, had a good cadre of experienced officers and NCOs had had the opportunity to 
train its men to an acceptable level of readiness prior to moving into the line south of 
Caen.380 The 272 Inf Div had already been involved in extensive operations in 
Normandy. It would be these two infantry divisions that would provide the majority of 
the opposition to the 2 Cdn Corps attack. 
In support of these forces were two self-propelled (SP) anti-tank battalions of 1 
SS Pz Corps that had been left behind to form a strong concentration of anti-tank guns, 
dug-in tanks and self-propelled guns.381 The 12 SS Pz Div was split with half the division 
watching for a possible British breakthrough about ten miles to its left at Brieux and the 
remainder positioned astride the Caen-Falaise Road. The 12 SS Pz Div was not the same 
division that had first fought the Canadians on 7 June, but it was still a formidable 
378
 English's book The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, examines this change in detail. For 
the most recent examination of the plan see chapter 4 of Brian Reid's book No Holding Back. 
379
 Initially, 9th SS Pz Div, 21st Pz Div and the 503rd Heavy Tank bn left. On the nights of 4/5/6 August the 
1 SS Pz Div slipped out of the German line and joined them. BAOR, British Army of the Rhine Battlefield 
Tour. 
380
 Colonel H. Neitzel, "Activity of the 89 Infantry Division" July 1946, Manuscript B 102. Copy provided 
by Professor Copp. 
381
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force. The 101s SS heavy tank battalion, equipped with ten Tiger I tanks, was attached 
to the division 
The only other formation in the rear area was a Luftwaffe Flak Brigade equipped 
with 29 batteries of heavy dual-purpose (anti-aircraft, anti-tank) 88 mm guns and 40 light 
batteries of 50-mm anti-aircraft guns.383 General Pickard, the Luftwaffe commander, had 
refused army demands to move these guns forward and retained them in their assigned 
defensive roles. These units remained deployed mainly in the Bretteville - St. Sylvain 
line and further south.384 
There are a number of specific issues dealing with the planned employment of the 
4 Cdn Armd Div in TOTALIZE which need to be highlighted and examined in more 
detail. According to the new plan, two armoured divisions were now expected to breach 
by daylight a defensive position in depth that was ostensibly more heavily defended than 
the foremost zone. By forcing the armoured divisions to make their own breech in the 
German defences and then forcing them to hold certain objectives until relieved by 3 Cdn 
Inf Div, Simonds was denying the armoured division commanders the ability to 
Meyer states that the division had 39 Panzer IV's, one company of panzerjager IVs, one panzer 
grenadier battalion, the division and corps escort companies, three artillery battalions and a nebelwerfer 
artillery battalion. Hubert Meyer, The History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, (Winnipeg: J.J. Fedorowicz, 
1992), 171. The estimated strength of the 12 SS Pz Div from Allied intelligence was 3 1/2 battalions at 600 
men each, 35 Panther tanks, 45 Mark IV panzers, 30 assault guns, 30 field artillery guns, and 55 anti-tank 
guns over 50 mm. 4 Cdn Armd Div Int Summary Number 4 Part II, 7 Aug 44, War Diary 4 Cdn Armd Div, 
1-31 August 1944, App 15. 
383
 A common claim in many texts is that the 88 mm anti-tank gun caused most of the Allied tank casualties 
when in fact the 75 mm anti-tank gun was proven to have inflicted more casualties. The 88 mm gun was 
not considered a good anti-tank weapon because its high profile made it hard to hide or dig in, made it 
susceptible to artillery fire and its weight made it difficult to move. Zetterling, Normandy 1944, 152-155. 
See also Terry Copp, "Report No 12-No. 2 Operational Research Section: Analysis of 75 mm Sherman 
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1999), 73-77. 
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 Copp, Maple Leaf Route: Falaise, 89. Kurt Meyer claims that not a single gun from the Flak Corps 
operated against enemy tanks from the beginning of the invasion to the Falaise Pocket. Meyer, Grenadiers, 
165. The assigned roles to the Flak Corps were air defense, indirect fire support to the ground units and anti 
tank but only if enemy tanks had broken through and were threatening the Flak units. Ill Flak Korps 
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concentrate their total combat power to maintain the momentum of the attack into the 
depths of the German defences and beyond. As for exploitation of any breakthrough, 
once 4 Cdn Armd Div reached its objectives it was only required to patrol to maintain 
contact with the Germans. There were no orders for a continued and sustained advance 
towards an assigned objective such as Falaise.385 The capture of Pt 206 itself was not a 
deep enough penetration of the front to cut off the German forces facing Br Second Army 
as stipulated in Montgomery's orders. The capture of Falaise at this juncture would have 
compromised the entire German defensive position in Normandy. 
The employment of the armoured divisions was complicated by the fact that they 
were now restricted to attacking on a very narrow front over terrain that maximized the 
advantage of German tactics and weapons. The issue of neutralizing the German 
advantage in defensive fire through reduced visibility or disguise seems to have been 
either overlooked or ignored in Phase II. There was no defined program or plan for 
example of providing a smoke screen to hide the advance of the two attacking armoured 
divisions. All of the effort and innovation for TOTALIZE went into Phase I, leaving the 
inexperienced armoured divisions on their own for Phase II. 
While in the first plan the 4 Cdn Armd Div had the entire frontage of over 3,000 
yards for manoeuvre, the divisional frontage allotted to Kitching in the revised plan was 
only 1,000 yards and, at one point, between Hautmesnil and a quarry to the west of the 
town, it narrowed to only 800 yards. The right side of the division boundary was 
restricted by an elevated railroad track that restricted any movement west and confined 
the attacking forces within a defined area. This embankment channelled the attacking 
385
 Outline of Instrs Issued By GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div 07 BOOB Aug 44. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div 1-31 
August 1944, App 12. 
147 
forces towards the first major obstacle, the quarry at Hautmesnil, and continued down 
towards the villages of Grainville-Langannerie, Langannerie and Bretteville le Rabet, 
which effectively sealed the channel shut, preventing any rapid unobstructed armoured 
drive. 
The left side of the boundary ran southeast through a church located to the west of 
Cauvicourt, through Bretteville le Rabet to a point northeast of Quesnay Woods before 
heading south towards the Laison River. The division's area for manoeuvre became 
progressively smaller as the division advanced deeper into German territory. Quesnay 
Woods, a significant tank obstacle, was located inside the 4 Cdn Armd Div boundary and 
was largely ignored in Simonds' planning. 
Once past Grainville-Langannerie, the manoeuvre space became greater to the 
southwest towards the Fontaine le Pin feature but the approaches were flanked by 
Quesnay Woods on the left flank and the woods at St Germain le Vasson plus the villages 
of le Londe, le Deffane and le Hamelet Fontaine on the right. The approaches to Fontaine 
le Pin itself were uphill and under complete observation of the German troops deployed 
there. The centreline of the advance was through the towns of Cintheaux, Hautmesnil, 
Langannerie and Grainville-Langannerie on a north-to-south axis. These towns had been 
fortified and were mutually supporting in defensive fire. The left flank was more open 
with Bretteville Le Rabet being the only obstacle before Quesnay Woods. 
Quesnay Woods, as a geographical feature, was a major obstacle that rested 
squarely in the path of the two armoured divisions. It was a formidable feature measuring 
some 1500 yards by 1000 yards and clearly blocked any approach to Falaise. In fact, the 
Route Nationale (RN) ran through the southwest portion of the woods to Falaise. In both 
148 
ah TOTALIZE plans the woods were located within the divisional boundaries of the 4 Cdn 
Armd Div. Both armoured divisions would have to address the potential complications 
represented by the woods on the way to their objectives. Despite the importance of this 
feature, Simonds did not assign Quesnay Woods as an objective 386 
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Map 9: Inter Division Boundary Modified LCMSDS Air Photo 39/30. Copp, The Battlefields in 
Normandy, 99. 
ith , The only viable route for the 4 Cdn Armd Div to the final objectives of Pt 195 
and Pt 206, some 10,000 meters deep in enemy territory, was through a piece of relatively 
open terrain that veered right, crossing in front of Quesnay Woods. This meant that 
Quesnay Woods would either have to be taken or masked off and bypassed. The available 
intelligence at that time was that the woods was not held in strength which may in part 
explain why it did not receive the serious consideration it deserved from either Kitching 
386
 Perhaps this was a conscious decision since Quesnay Woods was an infantry objective and would have 
required a considerable realignment of forces and phases. Simonds' decision to ignore Quesnay Woods 
must be viewed as a significant oversight in his appreciation of the terrain. 
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and Simonds. Kitching appears to have decided not to assign Quesnay Woods as an 
objective but to have Booth deal with it, as need be, according to the unfolding operation. 
The frontage allocated to the 1 Pol Armd Div was roughly the same, though 
heavily wooded areas lay to its front and flanks. Having the two-divisions advancing in 
parallel reduced the room for tactical manoeuvre and for avoiding obstacles and enemy 
positions.388 Movement forward was further complicated by the fact that both axes of 
advance were dotted with small French villages and heavily wooded areas that allowed 
for mutually supporting defensive-fire. While the order was to bypass German resistance, 
this tactic became an unrealistic proposition when attacking in daylight through a 
fortified German defensive system and with the Germans having observation of the entire 
attacking area.389 
During the August 2 to 7 timeframe, Kitching's main focus was operation 
TOTALIZE. He kept an eye on the operations of 10th Cdn Inf Bde to take Tilly and La 
Hogue but left the planning and execution of these attacks to Jefferson. Once the task of 
taking Tilly was assigned, it was up to Jefferson to decide whether he had the appropriate 
resources to undertake the assigned operation. If he decided he did not, then he should 
have asked Kitching for additional resources. There is no evidence to indicate that a 
request of this nature was made. 
At 1500 hrs 3 August, Kitching attended the first of five conferences at HQ 2nd 
Cdn Corps to discuss the outline plan for Operation TOTALIZE.390 During the morning 
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 At 1100 hrs 4 August, Kitching attended Crerar's conference on TOTALIZE. After this conference 
Kitching discussed his division's role in the forthcoming operation with Simonds. At 1800 hrs, Kitching 
held a conference and discussed the outline of TOTALIZE with his brigade commanders, CRA, CRE, OC 
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of 6 August, Kitching, the brigade commanders, Wigle, Proctor and other key staff 
members attended Simonds' conference for TOTALIZE. Kitching held his O Group in 
the late afternoon where he issued his final instructions for TOTALIZE.391 At 1000 hrs 7 
August, another conference was held at Corps HQ with GOC 1 Polish Armd Div (1 Pol 
Armd Div) Maj Gen Stanislaw Maczek, Kitching and Simonds. Kitching and Maczek 
expressed their concerns over the changed plan to Simonds. Both commanders realised 
the very real restrictions that Simonds was placing on their ability to bring the combat 
power of their divisions to bear and asked Simonds to extend the assigned frontages to 
give the armoured divisions more room for manoeuvre. Simonds refused392 The inter-
divisional boundary, particularly in the area of Cintheaux, was therefore agreed upon and 
finalized. 
The two commanders also voiced their apprehension over the planned bombing 
and asked Simonds to call it off. If the first phase proved successful, further bomber 
support would not be required. Simonds disagreed. He stated that the bombers would be 
needed to neutralize the 1 SS Pz Div that was supposed to be supporting the second 
defensive line.393 Kitching stated: "Guy was convinced that we would meet heavy 
opposition ... and would not change his plan" and "there was also some doubt in his mind 
Div Sigs, OC 18 Cdn Armd C Regt, GSO 1 and AA&QMG. Another TOALIZE conference was held at 
1100 hrs 5 August. Kitching had another meeting with Simonds that day after lunch. War Diary, 4 Cdn 
Armd Div, 1-31 August 1944. 
391
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whether he would be able to call off the bombing mission in time." Once Simonds 
decided to stay with his revised plan, the sequencing of Phase I and Phase II could not be 
significantly changed or altered. 
The final written 4 Cdn Armd Div instructions for TOTALIZE were issued at 
071300B August 44.395 The division would advance: with the two brigades attacking side 
by side. The armoured brigade would have about 500 yards in which to manoeuvre. This 
frontage was the normal operating room for a squadron of tanks. The potential combat 
power of an armoured brigade was being reduced to that of a single squadron of about 14 
tanks.396 Given the frontage and terrain restrictions, did he have any other alternative(s)? 
Currently there is no evidence available to indicate how Kitching worked his way 
through all of the factors necessary to arrive at his plan for TOTALIZE. Elements of his 
thinking can be, however, extracted from his final plan. His appreciation would have had 
to start with the following assumptions: 
a. Phase I would be successful 
b. The start line for Phase II would be secure 
c. The division would be able to successfully transit through the rear areas of 
the 2 Cdn Inf Div 
d. The attacking units would be able to deploy on the start line at 1400 hrs 
e. The Phase II bombing would be on time and on target 
f. The divisional artillery would be deployed in its assigned positions 
capable of supporting the Phase II drive 
Unfortunately, only one of these assumptions, point "d" was to prove correct. The rest of 
the assumptions were to prove inaccurate, in whole or in part. 
394The second portion of Kitching's statement is probably closer to the truth. Kitching, Mud and Green 
Fields, 193. 
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Kitching's most important decision would concern the utilization of his two 
brigades over the complex terrain allotted to the division to maximize the division's 
combat power against the requirement for a rapid advance through the second defensive 
line to the Fontaine le Pin feature. Kitching had a number of options to consider. He 
could attack in depth with the 10 Cdn Inf Bde leading and the armour in support; with 4 
Cdn Armd Bde leading and the 10 Cdn Inf Bde in support, launching both brigades side 
by side, or by mixing the infantry and armour regiments of both brigades into new 
combined arms combat formations and assigning these formations specific objectives. 
Each option had its advantages and disadvantages. 
Launching 10 Cdn Inf Bde first would have had infantry battalions each supported 
by a tank squadron of the SAR as the striking power of the division. This arrangement 
would have been in keeping with Canadian doctrine of using infantry formations to attack 
organized enemy defensive positions and villages. The pace of the attack would have 
been considerably slower but more easily supported by the division artillery. Terrain 
would not have been an issue but rate of advance would have been. The armoured 
brigade would have had to wait until the 10 Cdn Inf Bde had advanced beyond the 
barriers represented by the towns of Grainville-Langannerie, Langannerie and Bretteville 
le Rabet before the terrain was suitable for exploitation by the armoured brigade. In this 
scenario, speed and the momentum of the attack would have been sacrificed for a 
methodical approach based in large part on the available mobility of the infantry. Where 
speed of the advance was imperative, Kitching would have had a hard time justifying a 
decision to hold the striking power of the division in check while the infantry cleared out 
successive villages. 
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Launching the armoured brigade first would have forced the armoured regiments, 
each supported by a company of infantry from the Lake Superior Regiment, into the role 
of clearing the series of villages along the division's axis of advance, a role the armour 
was not ideally suited to perform. Alternatively, asking the armour to bypass the fortified 
villages and having the villages dealt with by a trailing 10 Cdn Inf Bde would have 
resulted in the armour regiments being shot to pieces by prepared German anti-tank guns 
and tanks as they passed each successive fortified village. The normal distribution of one 
company of infantry from the Lake Superior Regiment to each armoured regiment would 
not have represented sufficient force to take the villages, much less the large quarry at 
Hautmesnil. All of the advantages of speed, mobility and firepower offered by the tanks 
would have been siphoned off to take the villages. In this scenario, terrain and fortified 
villages on the axis of advance were the complicating critical issues. 
In designing TOTALIZE, Simonds had continually stressed the need for speed 
and momentum in the advance. Neither of the one-brigade up scenarios offered a solution 
to this imperative. Combining the resources of the two brigades into two balanced, 
combined arms formations offered the best possible solution. While this construct had 
been discussed in TEWTs, it had not been practiced and represented a radical departure 
from how the units had been trained and exercised in England. Such a radical change 
would have required a significant reorganization of units, brigade headquarters and 
training but there simply was no time available to make this a viable option.397 The only 
realistic option for Kitching, where speed was a critical element of the plan, was to 
launch the two brigades side-by-side. 
397
 By this time both the 7th and 11th British armoured divisions had reorganized into two balanced 
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Kitching's plan of attack closely mirrored Simonds' concept of Phase II for 
TOTALIZE in form and function. Kitching's plan was to attack "two up" with the two 
brigades attacking on either side of RN 158-the 10 Cdn Inf Bde to the west and 4 Cdn 
Armd Bde to the east. The armoured brigade was to bypass the two towns of Cintheaux 
and Hautmesnil and any other opposition encountered in order to capture Bretteville Le 
Rabet. Once a firm base had been established in Bretteville Le Rabet, the brigade was 
then to advance south to capture the Fontaine le Pin feature. A special force composed of 
the Algonquin Regiment mounted in scout cars and half-tracks was under command of 
the armoured brigade and this force was tasked to help them establish the firm base at 
Bretteville Le Rabet, thus relieving the armoured brigade of the requirement to hold 
Bretteville Le Rabet after its capture. This move retained intact the fighting power of the 
armoured brigade. 
It,was the task of the 10 Cdn Inf Bde to protect the right flank of the armoured 
advance by capturing Cintheaux and Hautmesnil in succession, including the quarry 
adjacent to Hautmesnil. The infantry brigade was then to firm up the division position at 
Bretteville Le Rabet and take over responsibility for the town.398 This plan solved the 
problem of diluting the combat power of the armoured brigade by relieving it of the 
responsibility of taking two key fortified towns and of holding Bretteville le Rabet. The 
armoured brigade could advance quickly over the open ground east of the RN to its 
objectives, knowing that its flanks were protected. This option maximized the possibility 
398Each of the 4th Cdn Armd Div brigades had a squadron from the 18 Manitoba Dragoons trailing the 
brigade columns. Their role was one of liaison between neighbouring formations and of gathering 
information and intelligence for Kitching. They were tasked with passing through the broken German line 
and gathering all available information about the rearward German positions in order to facilitate the drive 
south. Outline of Instrs GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div 071300B Aug 44, War Diary,4 Cdn Armd Div, 1-31 August 
1944,Appl2. 
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for speed, mobility and concentration of the armoured forces. The disadvantage to this 
option was that the armoured brigade did not have enough room to deploy properly, 
restricting the amount of combat power that could be brought to bear at the front of the 
division. Kitching had nonetheless devised a workable compromise. 
Map 10: Kitching's Attack Plan, Modified LCMSDS Air Photo 39/30 
TOTALIZE was a complex plan from a logistical standpoint. The constant flow 
of supplies arriving daily over the beaches ensured that the availability of supplies was 
not an issue. The division administration order for TOTALIZE directed that units were to 
hold supplies up to and including 9 August in addition to two days extra rations.399 An 
In total, units were to carry three days rations, and three days reserve rations with all tanks, armoured 
fighting vehicles and half-tracks carrying extra ammunition loads. The rationale for the extra supplies was 
to ensure that the attacking forces could maintain the momentum of the attack deep into German territory 
without being hampered by having to wait for the rear echelons to provide further supplies. 4 Cdn Armd 
additional ready reserve of 50 miles of fuel and ammunition stocks where loaded on 
trucks for each armoured division and held within the 2 Cdn Corps administration area to 
support the mobile operations expected after the armoured divisions broke through the 
German defences. The expectation was that the units of the division could sustain 
themselves for at least two days without having to call forward additional supplies. 
The true challenge, however, would be traffic control in passing one combat 
formation through another in the middle of a battle. The 4 Cdn Armd Div was required to 
move up through the rear areas of 2 Cdn Inf Div during Phase I. This manoeuvre was a 
practiced procedure but typically only involved the fighting echelons. Passing an entire 
division through another with the potential of combat at any time was creating an 
exponential level of difficulty in coordination and control. In particular, the potential 
traffic congestion should have been recognized and dealt with by the staff at 2nd Cdn 
Corps, but the evidence would suggest that the staff effort in resolving this problem was 
lacking. 
Kitching's credibility has been called into question over two statements that he 
made in his memoirs Mud and Green Fields. The first deals with a statement he made to 
General R Keller GOC of 3rd Cdn Div about how Phase II in the original plan was to play 
out. The second involves his complaint about his allotted division frontage and his 
seemingly incredulous decision to further reduce the frontage of his attacking brigades by 
attacking in parallel (side by side) instead of having them attack in depth (one behind the 
Div Adm Order No.l: Op TOTALIZE dated 7 August 44. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div AA&QMG, 1-31 
August 1944, App 2. 
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other). Together, these statements and the apparent contradictions that they present have 
raised questions about the motive and validity of the statements in Kitching's memoirs. 
Kitching stated that he was content with the original plan (of three phases) and 
told Keller how much he looked forward to working with him. In particular, Kitching 
stated that 3 Cdn Inf Div was to make the hole through which 4 Cdn Armd Div would 
pass.401 Unfortunately, there is no direct evidence to support Kitching's statement. The 
TOTALIZE operation orders of 5 August state that 3 Cdn Inf Div was to "follow up" 4 
Cdn Armd Div. 
The "follow-up" statement is usually interpreted by historians as a tactical 
imperative, i.e., what the 3 Cdn Inf Div was supposed to do. There is, however, another 
interpretation of the phrase as simply a statement of fact. With all of the new armoured 
personnel carriers committed to the Phase I formations, there were few if any available to 
the 3 Cdn Inf Div for Phase II. The 3 Cdn Inf Div soldiers were foot bound so there was 
no way that they could do anything but "follow-up" behind the advancing motorized 
columns of the armoured division. 
Brian Reid, in No Holding Back, is critical of historians to date for not analyzing 
the contradictions in Kitching's arguments.402 Reid bases his assessment on a number of 
specific issues, namely: 
a. Despite the change in the number of phases, essentially there was no 
change in the route, tasks and the final objectives assigned to 4 Cdn Armd 
Div. It would have to control and cross the same piece of ground, no 
matter the number of phases. 
401
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b. For the 3 Div there was no reference in the first plan to this formation 
advancing on the east side of Route Nationale and certainly not at the 
same time that the 4 Cdn Armd Div was attacking south along it. 
c. Nor was there at any time, as Kitching claims in his memoirs, a plan to use 
the 3 Cdn Inf Div to punch a hole in the German lines for Kitching's 
division to pass through. This is further supported by the fact that the 
initial orders stipulate that the 3r Cdn Inf Div would follow in the rear of 
the 4th Cdn Armd Div in the tasks assigned to Keller and 403 
d. Simonds could not have known at 1000 hrs 7 August that the 1st SS Pz Div 
was moving west to join the Mortain offensive.404 
While the fundamental premise of the first statement, at point "a" remains true, the "how" 
was significantly affected since the ground over which the division could operate was 
changed considerably under the revised plan. Kitching had a frontage of over 3000 yards 
within which to manoeuvre in the original plan. Unfortunately, what is not known is how 
Kitching intended to deploy his two brigades with the entire frontage, essentially from 
Bretteville sur Laize to Robertmesnil, at his disposal. 
The statement in point "b" is incorrect. The tasks assigned to 3rd Cdn Inf Div were 
to secure the right flank by taking Bretteville sur Laize and the left flank by taking the 
woods at point 1054 - 1055, with the follow-on task of being prepared to exploit to St. 
Sylvain. Both the woods and St Sylvain lie clearly on the east side of RN 158. Having the 
3rd Cdn Inf Div advance to St. Sylvain was a move designed to cover the left flank of the 
4th Cdn Armd Div as it advanced deeper into German-held territory. The combat power 
of the 3rd Cdn Inf Div was split on both flanks of the 4th Cdn Armd Div and was being 
Reid, No Holding Back, 252. 
Ibid., 254. 
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used to capture, secure and hold open the edges of the axis of advance of 4 Cdn Armd 
Div, in a way maintaining the hole through which the 4th Cdn Armd Div was advancing. 
The last statement in point "d" is again clearly incorrect. The proof lies with the 
orders issued verbally by Kitching on 6 August and confirmed in writing on 7 August. 
The orders state, "There are definite indications that 1st and 12th SS Pz Divs are moving 
WEST, some elements already having crossed the R ORNE."405 If Kitching knew this 
information on 6 August, then Simonds obviously knew. In fact, the information most 
probably came directly from Simonds. 
The main criticism of Kitching's plan is focussed on his decision to have the two 
brigades attacking side-by-side.406 This method was contrary to Simonds' operational 
policy of attacking with one brigade up and further compounded the issue of frontage. It 
is hard, however, to see how Kitching could have attacked any differently. As discussed 
above, attacking in depth, in accordance with Simonds' policy, would not have generated 
enough combat power and operational tempo to allow Kitching to attack deep into the 
German defences towards his objectives. 
There are a number of other crucial command decisions made in the preparation 
of TOTALIZE that have not been adequately analyzed. It is clear from the number of 
meetings that Kitching had with his brigadiers and senior staff that a high level of 
consultation must have occurred between them prior to the operation.407 The fact that the 
405
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Algonquin Regiment was placed under command of 4 Cdn Armd Bde for Phase I is a 
decision that could only have been made by Kitching. The responsibility for other key 
command decisions remains obscure. Who, for example, picked Halpenny and the 
Grenadier Guards to lead the advance? Halpenny had no previous combat experience 
and on the surface appeared the least likely to have been given the assignment. Of the 
other two, Scott had previous combat experience in Italy and Kitching considered 
Worthington from the BCRs as the best of the armoured regimental commanders even 
though Worthington had no previous combat experience. 
The lack of proper reconnaissance has been suggested as one of the reasons why 
the division ran into difficulties in moving forward.408 It is argued that the SAR should 
have been used in its stated role as a reconnaissance asset to explore ahead of the 
combined Brigade columns. Instead, the regiment was used in the role of an armoured 
regiment in support of an infantry attack. Any one of the three armoured regiments in the 
armoured brigade could have provided this support but only the SAR was specially 
trained in the reconnaissance role. In fact, each of the armoured regiments had a recce 
troop, which was used in its designated role. The issue during the Phase II advance was 
not identifying German defensive positions but arranging the means to suppressing 
AA&QMG. Another TOALIZE conference was held at 1100 hrs 5 August. Kitching had another meeting 
with Simonds that day after lunch. On the morning of 6 August, Kitching, the brigade commanders, CRA, 
CRE, OC Signals, Wigle and Proctor attended Simonds' conference for TOTALIZE. Kitching held his O 
Group in the late afternoon where he issued his final instructions for TOTALIZE.407 At 1000 hrs 7 August, 
another conference was held at Corps HQ with GOC 1 Polish Armd Div (1 Pol Armd Div) Maj Gen 
Stanislaw Maczek, Kitching and Simonds. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1-31 August 1944. 
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A criticism of the battle procedure within the 4 Cdn Armd Div and, in particular, 
the 4 Cdn Armd Bde is that the orders were late in being issued on 7 August and in some 
cases were not issued at all.410 These criticisms are generally valid but there were, 
however, a number of complicating circumstances in the preparation of the 4 Cdn Armd 
Div for the attack that have been, up to now, overlooked. The first point is that the 4 Cdn 
Armd Bde was not relieved from its position as the counterattack force for Crocker's 
Corps until late on 6 August. The Foot Guards, for example, did not revert to 4 Cdn 
Armd Div control until 2315 hrs 6 August.411 The transfer of the 4 Cdn Armd Div 
positions to the 51st Br (H) Div was not accomplished until the early hours of 7 August 
with the 10 Cdn Inf Bde reporting the task complete at 0500 hrs 7th August.412 The 
division units then had to move to their concentration areas south of Caen before any 
preparations for the coming battle could be undertaken. The division units had been in the 
line for a week and had less than a day to rest and prepare much less train and plan for 
their role in the upcoming operation. Conversely, the units of Phase I had almost two 
days of training and preparation before the start of the operation. 
A significant and rarely discussed issue in the examination of the TOTALIZE 
plan was the decision to advance the date of the operation from 8 to 7 August 44, a 
decision that had a number of unintended consequences. Despite the severe mauling the 
German armoured forces had been taking in the Mortain offensive, von Kluge had no 
intention of disobeying Hitler's orders of moving all armour against the Americans and 
was preparing to reinforce the attack by committing the 12 SS Pz Div, the last armoured 
formation east of the Orne. At 2215 hrs 7 August, von Kluge told the commander of the 
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Seventh Army that 10 SS Pz Div was moving to join him and that the 12 SS Pz Div was 
to follow suit.41 Maintaining the original launch date of 8 August would have caught the 
12 SS Pz Div on the move away from Caen and in no position to counter a two or three 
phase TOTALIZE plan. Given the available intelligence information, it is clear that 
Montgomery, who pushed for the earlier attack date, did not comprehend the intimate 
sequencing of operations that was unfolding in the Caen sector that would have 
facilitated the breakthrough so desperately sought. The bombing of 7 August alerted the 
12 SS Pz Div to the coming attack. The division held in place and was, therefore, in 
position to reorganize and stiffen the German defenses on 8 August. 
Having one more day of preparation or reverting to the original launch date of 8 
August, may have given the commanders of 4 Cdn Armd Div and, in particular, the 4 
Cdn Armd Bde the time necessary to prepare and brief their men in accordance with the 
procedures they had practiced in training.414 One more day would have also made the 
issues of narrow frontages and waiting for the Phase II bombings irrelevant since there 
would not have been a 12 SS Pz Div in place to counter or obstruct the Phase II attacks. 
One more day would have resulted in very favourable conditions for a Canadian success. 
The issue of late orders, particularly within 4 Cdn Armd Bde on 7 August, is 
viewed as evidence of the inexperience and or incompetence on the part of Booth and 
Halpenny.415 The brigade commanders and key staff members of the division had 
accompanied Kitching to a number of the meetings held by Crerar and Simonds in the 
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days prior to the launch of the operation. The general intent was, therefore, well known 
but the specific details may have been lacking. It is evident that work had started on 
brigade plans based on the initial instructions issued on 5 August. These were altered 
with the revised instructions issued on 6 August and further refined once the inter-
division boundary was settled at the 1000 hrs meeting with Simonds on 7 August. Details 
could not have been finalized prior to then since the two armoured division commanders 
were seeking changes to the plan. 
Booth held an initial O Group at 1100 hrs for all COs and Intelligence Officers 
(IO) within the brigade where the general outline of the Corps attack was explained. 
Booth presented his brigade plan as a three-phased operation. In Phase I, the brigade 
would take Bretteville le Rabet, Phase II would involve the capture of Pt 195, and Phase 
III the capture of Pt 206. Murrell of the Lake Superior Regiment and Halpenny held a 
meeting at 1430 hrs to discuss the composition of Halpenny Force.416 Booth held a final 
O Group at 1800 hrs.417 Halpenny followed with his O Group at 2200 hrs. 
The Orders Group was late for proper battle procedure to be implemented and 
Halpenny tried to give his orders amidst the noise of the bombing and artillery fire in 
support of Phase I. Participants left in utter confusion, with little understanding of their 
roles in Phase II and no time to prepare.418 Maj Ned Amy, as the Officer Commanding 
(OC) No 1 Sqn of the Grenadier Guards, stated that he did not issue orders because of the 
noise of the guns and the need to move almost immediately. He had difficulty finding his 
unit among the rubble and ruins of Caen and none of the supporting arms were able to 
416
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marry up with his group before his force moved forward. Confusion and traffic 
• 419 
congestion reined. 
The issue of maps was another complicating factor in proper battle procedure. 
The 4 Cdn Armd Div was being tasked to fight deep in enemy territory and properly 
detailed maps for the operation were not handed out to the units until the afternoon of 7 
August. Subordinate commanders could not issue orders until they had at least a 
fundamental understanding of the terrain and boundaries within which they would be 
fighting. A formal reconnaissance was obviously impossible and only limited time was 
available for a map reconnaissance, a procedure that involved the study of the proposed 
route from maps and photographs in order to assess the terrain and its features before 
deciding on a course of action. 
The records of the different armoured regiments provide conflicting information 
as to how the three phases of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde attack were to be carried out. The 
orders given by Halpenny as recorded in the Grenadier Guard war diary420 stated that all 
three phases were to be carried out by Halpenny Force-a combined arms unit composed 
of the Grenadier Guards, the Lake Superior Regiment, 96th Anti-Tank Battery and a 
squadron of flail tanks. The "intent" as recorded in the orders stated that an "advance 
Guard composed of 22 C.A.R., and supporting Arms U/C [under command] LCol 
Halpenny will cease [sic] and hold high gr. [ground] West side of PONTIGNY sq.0044 
[sic 1044], Point 206."421 The method of attack was as laid out in Booth's three-phased 
419The regiment was guided forward solely by provosts on duty at key points. Ibid. 
420
 War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1-31 August 1944, App 14. The orders as expressed in the Lake 
Superior Regt war diary are identical. War Diary, The Lake Superior Regiment (Motor) 1-31 August 1944, 
App 6. Also reproduced in Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, App XL 
42
 War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1-31 August 1944, App 14; Duguid, History of the Canadian 
Grenadier Guards, 518. 
165 
attack with the added statement that Bretteville le Rabet would be held until relieved by 
the Algonquin Regiment. The Advance Guard was divided into three groups: the Van 
Guard (Amy Force), the Main Guard (Smith Force) and Advance Guard HQ which 
included Williamson Force, the reserve force. Each group was composed of one 
squadron from the Grenadier Guards and one company Lake Superior Regiment with 
supporting anti-tank troops, flail tanks and artillery observers.423 
The Foot Guards and BCR war diaries, however, have recorded a three-phased 
attack but the details are significantly different. In both of these war diaries, the 
Grenadier Guards are to capture Bretteville le Rabet at which point the BCR pass through 
to Pt 195, followed by the passing through of the Foot Guards.424 The obvious problem 
with this account is that all of the infantry of the Lake Superior Regiment had been 
allotted to the Grenadier Guards squadrons, and the infantry of 10 Cdn Inf Bde was 
committed to other tasks. In addition, neither the Foot Guards nor the BCR war diaries 
for 7 or 8 August 44 record any type of orders for these two regiments other than moving 
south along the accorded line of march in the allotted brigade marching order. If the Foot 
Guards diary was correct, a considerable amount of time and planning would have been 
needed to regroup and realign the Lake Superior Regiment infantry companies with the 
BCR and then the Foot Guards for the follow-on attacks. There is no evidence of any 
such plans or discussions. 
According to Canadian doctrine the tasks of an advanced guard were close reconnaissance, protection of 
the main columns drive back the enemy covering force, when the enemy is encountered in strength the 
formation was to form pivots on which the remainder of the armoured division could manouevre and give 
time to the divisional commander to form and to execute his own plan without interference. War Office, 
MTPNo. 41, Part 1 1943, 29-30. 
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Even though Booth developed the 4 Cdn Armd Bde attack plan, the plan itself 
would have had to have been approved in principle by Kitching because the Algonquin 
Regiment was a 10 Cdn Inf Bde asset that Kitching would have had to allot to Booth. 
Booth's plan was another example of insufficient forces allocated to an attack, especially 
one that was supposed to confront the 12 SS Pz Div. Believing that one armoured 
regiment and one motorized infantry battalion could carry the attack to a depth of over 
7000 yards into German territory even with the supporting attacks from 10 Cdn Inf Bde 
and the Polish Armd Div, does not make any sense; especially after the experience gained 
in the attacks on Tilly la Campagne and La Hogue. The only way that the armoured 
brigade plan could be deemed adequate was if Booth was working on the assumption that 
Halpenny Force would not meet any sizeable opposition in its advance to Bretteville le 
Rabet or to Pt 195. If true, then Kitching and Booth were placing considerable faith in the 
effectiveness of the heavy bombing to disrupt and destroy the German defenses and in 
their intelligence information which stated that Quesnay Woods was lightly held. 
It is striking to contrast the content of the orders given by Kitching and the orders 
given by Halpenny. It is interesting to note how two critical elements of Kitching's orders 
have been substantially altered in the content of Halpenny's orders. The first involves the 
intent of TOTALIZE, and the second issue involved the disposition of German forces 
facing the Canadians.425 
Under the title of "Enemy" in the divisional orders, Kitching stated that the 2 
Cdn Corps front was held by 89 Inf Div and 272 Inf Div, reinforced by one battalion 
from 711 Div. Kitching's orders continue with the statement that "There are definite 
425
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indications that 1 and 12 SS Pz Divs are moving WEST, some elements already having 
crossed the R ORNE." 426 The enemy disposition in Halpenny's orders was considerably 
different and based, inexplicably, on intelligence information from 5 August. The 
German disposition was thus given as right-49th (sic) Inf Div with the 9th and 10th SS Pz 
Divs in the rear; Centre- 89th Inf Div with the 1SS Pz Div in the rear; and on the left 272 
Inf Div with the 12th SS Pz Div in the rear.427 Halpenny's orders portray a substantially 
different and significantly stronger German disposition confronting the Canadian attack 
and, more significantly, the forces that 4 Cdn Armd Bde would have to contend with in 
the coming attack. Given Halpenny's stated enemy disposition, it is hard to reconcile his 
belief that his squadron based combined arms groups could fight their way through this 
defensive network to take Pt 195. 
In Kitching's orders, the task of 2 Cdn Corps was to break through enemy 
positions astride the Caen-Falaise road. In Halpenny's orders, under the topic of "Own 
Troops" the following information is recorded: 2nd British Army is driving east with the 
intention of destroying 9 & 10 SS PZ, 12 Corps on west bank of the ORNE will hold 
present position; Cdn Army is attacking Falaise with the intention of destroying 1 and 12 
SS Pz Divisions.428 The task of breaking through a defensive line was considerably 
different from that of destroying two panzer divisions. 
Halpenny's concept of operations involved three phases as follows: 
a. Phase One. Seize and hold Bretteville-le-Rabet until relieved by Algonquin 
Regiment 
426
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b. Phase Two. Seize and hold high ground area Aisy Point 195 
c. Phase Three. Ref Intention [to seize Pt 206],429 
In his explanation of how Phase I was to occur, Halpenny stated that 4 Cdn Armd Div 
with the armoured brigade leading was to pass through Cintheaux with the intention of 
seizing Bretteville le Rabet in the first phase.430 At no time did Kitching order the 
armoured brigade to move through Cintheaux. In fact he was quite specific in stating that 
the armoured brigade was to bypass both Cintheaux and Hautmesnil on the way to 
Bretteville le Rabet. 
Together, these discrepancies represent fundamentally different concepts between 
what Kitching wanted and what Halpenny was ordering his battlegroup to do. The 
evidence would suggest that there was neither a common situational awareness nor 
common intent between the division commander and the commander of his leading 
forces. Coordinated action may therefore have been impossible. Where the divergence 
between Kitching and Halpenny's orders happened is unclear since copies of the 4 Cdn 
Armd Bde orders were not found. Simply stated, 4 Cdn Armd Bde was going to execute a 
plan with insufficient force to meet the objectives set by Kitching given the size and 
disposition of enemy forces. 
Deployment drills and procedures are an important part of the preparation process 
to ensure that the troops are launched into battle on time, properly briefed and equipped, 
rested to the maximum extent possible and ready and confident for the fight ahead. Such 
procedures are designed to eliminate confusion, minimize the effects of the fog of war 
and ensure the optimum use of the time available between receipt of the warning order 
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and crossing the start line. 4 Cdn Armd Div had such procedures and they had been well 
practiced in England. On the night of 7/8 Aug, there is clear evidence that a serious 
breakdown occurred at more than one level within the division in the application of these 
deployment drills.431 There is no clear explanation as to why important preliminary 
planning information was not made available earlier at the lower levels to help prepare 
the troops adequately for their first battle or how the intent or common operating picture 
became distorted among the various levels of command. Kitching had done everything he 
was supposed to do to properly prepare his division but somehow the correct information 
became distorted as it flowed down through the chain of command. 
Halpenny's plan for the capture of PT 195 and Pt 206 remains highly suspect. It is 
at odds with the direction given by Kitching with respect to bypassing towns and would 
never generate the combat power needed to carry the brigade through to its objectives. 
The plan of continually passing the armoured regiments through each other by phase 
offered the greatest potential for success but this plan would have required the 
reassignment of infantry within the division, adding further complexity to an already 
difficult deployment situation. 
In TOTALIZE, Kitching was tasked with the execution of a plan he found to be 
fundamentally flawed. He did not have the manoeuvre room he felt he needed and felt 
that any level of operational tempo gained in Phase I would be nullified by having to wait 
for the bombing that was to begin Phase II. Kitching had delivered his orders to his 
subordinate commanders in a timely fashion and he had his key staff officers and 
commanders in all of the higher level meetings on the plan. They were well aware of 
what was expected and what was intended. Kitching's plan represented the best course of 
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action given the imperative for a rapid breakthrough of the armoured forces. Kitching, 
however, did not know that the deployment procedures within the division had failed. 
The troops were not properly briefed, did not have time to adequately prepare and were 
about to be launched into their first major operation without understanding the plan or 
their role in it. It would be up to Kitching and his commanders to try and deal with the 
outcome. 
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Chapter Seven: TOTALIZE 
Phase I of the attack started at 2300 hrs with a thousand heavy bombers releasing 
their loads on their assigned targets. The packed armour columns and marching infantry 
assigned to Phase I crossed the start line 30 minutes later and advanced on either side of 
RN 158. As the armoured columns felt their way behind the bombing, seven hundred 
guns sent a continuing storm of shells to give them further support. The tactic of an 
advance at night en masse to overwhelm the enemy by sheer weight, power and novelty 
of the attack held the promise of considerable success for Simonds and 2 Cdn Corps.432 
The hundreds of vehicles raised dense clouds of dust, blinding drivers already 
struggling with the general obscurity and contrast glare from the searchlights. They were 
able to see little more than the taillights ahead of them. At first the weight of the attack 
shocked the Germans but they recovered quickly, compounding the visibility problem by 
laying down a smoke screen 45 minutes after the attack was launched.433 The difficulty in 
moving forward was evident in the fact that three of the four 2 Cdn Inf Div columns went 
astray, passing east of Roquancourt rather than all four columns passing west of the town 
as was planned. 
While 4 Cdn Inf Bde and 2nd Cdn Armd Bde had encountered little resistance on 
their way to their objectives, the other infantry brigades that had followed to clear the by-
passed towns and pockets of resistance, met stiff opposition.435 The shelling and bombing 
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had initially stunned the Germans but they had prepared caves and tunnels to seek shelter 
only to re-emerge at daylight.436 These units became very active at first light in resisting 
the Canadian and British attempts to consolidate their gains. By noon, most of the Phase I 
objectives had been cleared but the western wing of the attack still lagged behind. 2 Cdn 
Inf Div became involved in a lengthy process of clearing out the pockets of by-passed 
Germans and getting the Essex Scottish onto its objective at Caillouet which hindered the 
passage of the 4 Cdn Armd Div through the 2 Cdn Inf Div areas.437 "Bitterly contested" 
and "casualty-causing" mopping-up operations continued until late afternoon.438 
Phase I had been a success and the road to Falaise lay open-at least that was the 
opinion of Lt Col Mel Gordon of the Sherbrooke Fusiliers of 2 Cdn Armd Bde. His 
regiment was on its objective near the hamlet of Cramesnil at first light. Gordon was 
certain that the road to Falaise was open and that an opportunity to exploit the success of 
Phase I was at hand. At 0630 hours, he requested permission to continue the advance 
down RN 158. His superior Brig Wyman refused two separate requests to advance, 
stating that his orders were quite clear and he was to establish a firm base for Phase II.439 
They prepared their firm base west of the RN 158 between Roquancourt and Cintheaux. 
captured by the 152 (H) Bde but the Germans still firmly held Tilly la Campagne." The first attempt to 
take Tilly la Campagne and La Hogue was repulsed. Resistance finally crumbled in Tilly when a squadron 
of tanks from the 148th Regiment Royal Armoured Corps appeared around 0700 hrs. "Section II, Attack on 
Areas By-Passed by Armoured Columns," BAOR, Battlefield Tour: Operation Totalize. 
436
 Spencer. History of The Fifteenth Canadian Field Regiment, 96-8. 
437
 Reid, No Holding Back, 260. 
438Granatstein, Bloody Victory, 170; English, the Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign 21 A. 
439
 Reid, No Holding Back, 221. See also CMHQ Report No. 146 para 56. 
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Map 11: TOTALIZE Phase 1. Marteinson, The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, 261. 
Accounts as to the success of Phase I differed between the Allies and the 
Germans. Based on the accounts of the battle provided by Hubert Meyer of the 12 SS Pz 
Div, the German defenses had cracked but not crumbled. The German 89 and 272 
Infantry Division, which had taken the full weight of the Phase I attacks, were able to put 
up determined resistance including launching local counter-attacks before staging 
withdrawals to their second defensive lines on both sides of St. Aignan for the former and 
to the line Chicheboville-Conteville for the latter.440 After St. Aignan was taken, British 
tanks attacked to the east but were repulsed.441 Stacey however claimed that, 
440
 89 Inf Div was able to launch counterattacks and inflict "hy [heavy] losses" against 51st Div at Tilly la 
Campagne forcing a temporary withdrawal. Ops Log 8 August serial 28, War Diary, Main HQ First Cdn 
Army, 1-31 August 1944. CMHQ Report No 146, para 55. Copp, Fields of Fire, 202. 
441
 Meyer, the History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 171. 
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Phase I of Operation TOTALIZE had been entirely successful. The novel use of 
tanks with infantry in armoured carriers at night had effected a penetration of five miles 
through strong enemy defences, and opened the way for extensive mopping-up and 
further offensive operations... The break-in had caught the enemy unaware. It remained 
to be seen how effectively we could pursue our initial advantage before he should have 
time to recover his balance and strengthen his rear defences.44 
The truth lies in the middle. A penetration had occurred in the German defensive line but 
part of the task of Phase I was to establish successful conditions for the launch of Phase 
II. This included clearing the centre line of the advance of 4 Cdn Armd Div, clearing the 
areas for the division artillery and securing the start line for Phase II. German resistance 
throughout the day prevented the successful attainment of these Phase I objectives. The 
built in delay of eight hours became a necessity to give Halpenny Force the time it 
needed to work its way forward through the forward combat zone to its start line. A 
review of the operation logs has made it clear that an advance by 4 Cdn Armd Div could 
not have started any earlier even if the Phase II bombing had been cancelled. 
The 1400 hrs launch time for Phase II gave the Germans the respite they needed 
to re-establish contact with isolated units, prepare their defenses,443 and gave them the 
opportunity to try and wrestle the initiative away from the Allies by launching local 
counter-attacks in accordance with German doctrine. Kurt Meyer had taken the 
precaution of attaching liaison officers to the divisions holding the front to ensure that he 
received early notification of any attack. As soon as information of the 2 Cdn Corps 
attack arrived, he ordered Kampfgroupe Waldmuller to move north to the west side of the 
RN 158 near the area of Bretteville-le-Rabet, initially to block the highway and then to 
CMHQ Report No. 146, para 56. 
Colonel H. Neitzel, "Activity of the 89 Infantry Division" July 1946, Manuscript B 102. 
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launch a counterattack to recapture the hills south of St. Aignan.444 At 1130 hours, an 
hour before originally planned, Kampfgroupe Waldmuller, reinforced by the 1st Pz Bn 
and ten Tigers tanks counterattacked the heights south of St. Aignan.445 The 
counterattacks succeeded in disrupting the momentum and co-ordination of Phase II by 
stopping the Poles from advancing much beyond their start line.446 
Kampfgroupe Wunsche, which had been detached the night of 7 August to assist 
in wiping out the Second British Army bridgehead north of Thury-Harcourt, was directed 
to disengage and move ten kilometres to occupy the heights west of Potigny. This move 
placed Wunsche's forces in an excellent position to defend the bottleneck between the 
"natural tank obstacles" of the Laison and Laize rivers.447 The flak regiment of the 
division was ordered to establish an anti-tank barrier astride the RN 158, in line with 
Bretteville-le-Rabet.448 
444
 A Kampfgruppe or Battlegroup can be defined as the bringing together of miscellaneous and often 
disparate military units to undertake a specific and local operation. Kampfgroupe Waldmuller consisted of 
two panzergrenadier battalions with about 20 tanks, including 8 - 1 0 Tiger tanks from the 101st SS Heavy 
Tank Bn. This concept was also used to build new formations from the remnants of others that had been 
essentially rendered non-effective. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 221. 
445
 English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 21 A. 
446
 Meyer, Grenadiers, 158. The tasks given to the Poles was to seize the areas of Hill 170 and 159 north 
of Falaise. The attack was to be carried out in 2 phases: Phase I the Armd Bde would seize area south of 
Estrees la Campagne and Hill 140 upon relief by the Inf Bde, the Armd Bde would attack south and seize 
Hills 170 and 159 north of Falaise. Major-General Stanislaw Maczek, "The 1st Polish Armoured Division in 
Normandy," Canadian Military History, Volume 15, No. 2, Spring 2006, 51. 
447
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448
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176 
t 
N 
| 
Gull 
. 
Operation TOTALIZE 
unhurt - - Boutguc-bus T h e G e r m a n C o u n t e r a t t a c k 
: Folic 
% 
'£, •.. -.- " 
•&* - - ' . -_ T ^ - ' " " ' 
\ " • • , • • • ' ™ > - ^ " LaHogue " 7 " " 
^ Oampanne 
~gt - Secqucville-
8 RECCE - 1 4 S R A C ta-Campagne Chicheboivi;i. 
.. REGT^/ - I S * ' " " " • " • - . 
^ *<r-*^ / ^N"—" ' • * *»» 
/ s SASK R E G T \ V „Garcdie,s," \ COUNTERATTACK 
I J «^ ..Secqutvulc » OBJECTIVE 
„ * - J Lorcuichor. v f c ~+ Rocquancourr __^^^- -• - '• * * * * 
Comeville 
144 RAC " " 
i , * » '" — ^ ^^—«v7ASH 
^"X v ^ ^ - ^ ^ - ^ A - ! \ p l "^ 
X ^ — T R R E G T C I 1 1BW I Cunplpn. '""••' 
' v ^ ^ y V i N H Y / 
/ " N H°YTK Robe.tm.snii COUNTERATTACK 
1 RHLI 1 Mr in . OBJECTIVE OF 12. S; 
V J GaumeMiil ^ JBk „ « • - - » . . DIV ESCORT COY 
V » - ^ X 1<"N T ^T * % AND COY OF 
Dutt
 I J . a | * » » _ . * " JAGOPANZERS 
„ ASQN • | KAMPFGRUPPE - • - - . . 
Quar r>
 SFR * Z WALDMULLER . V 
**" J 1 " * * * ^ ^ St. Sylvnin''•'•'' 
Breiteviik-- _ — • • » Mr A % ^ ^.^^ -/" 
^ , . #••'' ^ ^ ^x^ i Cauvicourc j / ' 
* ^ : ~ r %% % , ^ i-r^--- - - -^ • -
f^cy- \ % Haucrr.esnil *' * 
*"% 
»--? 
' A 89FUSBN V / Kilometres 
\ I * * * STRAGGLERS FROM 0 1 
V r;„....... * » - » _ 10SS AND 10S6 i , 
Counterattack 
Objectives 
•V -••'- J •' GRENADIERS ' ' 
" * * — ' » * •.. 0 1 
~ - - - - " * Quarry „„„„ 
Map 12: Operation TOTALIZE, German Counterattacks. Reid, No Holding Back, 224 
During the night and early hours of 7/8 August, 10 Cdn Inf Bde and 4 Cdn Armd 
Bde began their moves forward from Cormelles and Faubourg de Vaucelles to their 
designated concentration areas in the vicinity of Fleury sur Orne and Ifs. The majority of 
the units recorded moving off for their concentration areas between 0030 and 0130 hrs 8 
August. The war diary for the Grenadier Guards recorded the traffic as "considerable" for 
the trip down to the forming up point (FUP) at Troteval Farm and called the trip 
"distressingly slow."449 At 0545 hrs the road was still crowded with tanks from the 1st 
Cdn Hussars, and the traffic situation made further progress impossible. The radio traffic 
recorded in the operations log of 4 Cdn Armd Bde highlighted the frustration and urgency 
449 Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 262. 
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in getting the attacking units forward. By sunrise, Halpenny Force had still not reached 
the FUP. At 0600 hrs traffic congestion forced a halt in the area southeast of Ifs where the 
vehicles dispersed and the soldiers dug in to await the order to begin the advance forward 
to the start-line for Phase II.450 
The divisional artillery had a more constrained timetable in moving forward. The 
4 Cdn Armd Div division artillery plan had the 15 Cdn Field Regiment in support of 10 
Cdn Inf Bde, the 23rd Field S.P. Regiment supporting 4 Cdn Armd Bde with the 19 Army 
Field Regiment S.P., under the control of the C.R.A. Brig H. Lane, to answer calls from 
both brigades as needed. Halpenny Force had priority call on the supporting medium 
regiments supporting the attack.451 
Colonel Coristine of the 15th Cdn Field Regiment issued his final orders for 
TOTALIZE at midnight. While the operation bombardment and barrage finished shortly 
after midnight, the regiment continued to fire concentrations for the next three hours and 
was ordered to ceasefire shortly after 0300 hrs. At 0100 hrs reconnaissance parties had 
moved off to prepare the gun areas in support of Phase II. Meanwhile, the rest of the 
regiment proceeded to its concentration area south of Vaucelles near Ifs. The troops dug 
slit trenches and prepared a hasty breakfast before trying to get some sleep.452 
Unfortunately, the area that had been allotted to the field regiments for Phase II was 
subject to mortar, artillery and small arms fire. "The whole area was being systematically 
shelled from three sides, snipers were everywhere, and anti-tank guns engaged any 
450
 4 Cdn Armd Div Sitrep 20 for period 072400B to 081200B.War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1-31 August 
1944, App 17. 
51
 Nicholson. The Gunners of Canada, 317. 
5
 Spencer. History of The Fifteenth Canadian Field Regiment, 96-8. 
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vehicle that moved over high ground." In spite of the harassing fire, and the resulting 
casualties the gunners succeeded in deploying. 
The traffic problem began to hinder the advance of 4 Cdn Armd Div. In practice, 
moving thousands of tracked and wheeled vehicles south through the incredible 
confusion of a battlefield demanded luck and experience. Kitching's division had neither. 
Traffic jams, dense dust clouds hanging in the hot summer air, sniping and occasionally 
bitter fighting on the slopes of Verrieres Ridge, where the 2 Cdn Inf Div attempted to 
clear the remaining pockets of German resistance, slowed the armoured division's 
advance. Kitching described the situation as chaos resulting from "putting some 50,000 
soldiers into an area approximately 2 miles by 4 miles ... particularly when there was a 
battle going on in the middle of it."454 Repeated commands to keep moving and speed up 
the advance made little difference. 
The units of 4 Cdn Armd Div spent a long, frustrating morning waiting, strung out 
north of Rocquancourt. As a result, the fighting elements of the division remained at a 
high degree of readiness for three-to-four hours, waiting for the clearance to move. At 
0845 hrs, Halpenny Force was ordered to begin its move forward through 2 Cdn Div. 
Booth informed Halpenny at this time that Roquancourt had been taken by 2 Cdn Inf Div 
but determined fighting still continued in May sur Orne and Fontenay le Marmion.455 
At 1255 hrs, nearly five hundred B-17s of the U.S. Eighth Air Force dropped 
1,400 tons of bombs on their assigned target areas. Most aircraft hit their targets, the 
defended villages on either side of RN 158. A number of B-17s mistook their aiming 
453The 15th Fd Reg was to set up near Rocquancourt and the 23 rd S.P. was deployed near Verrieres. Ibid., 
100. CMHQ, "Report No 169 Canadian Participation in the Operations in North-west Europe 1944, Part 
III: Canadian Operations, 1-23 Aug, para 63; Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, 317. 
454
 Granatstein, The Generals, 169. 
455
 War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1-31 August 1944, entry 8 Aug. 
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marks and dropped their bombs among Canadian and Polish troops, causing more 
confusion and many casualties.456 
The Polish advance on Kitching's left was short-lived. They had suffered from the 
Allied bombing and the commander of their liaison unit (a group of British officers who 
helped them to work with English-speaking formations) was killed. This loss hampered 
communications with 2nd Cdn Corps and the other Corps units but, in particular, 4th Cdn 
Armd Div. Shortly after they crossed their start line, the Poles ran into Waldmuller's 
battle group which had been ordered to counterattack towards St. Aignan and St. Sylvain. 
In the space of 90 minutes, the two leading Polish armoured regiments lost 40 tanks and 
informed 2 Cdn Corps HQ that they were regrouping. The Poles would advance no 
further and were done for the day.457 
At this point, it is important to address the issue of the hamlet of Gaumesnil. The 
hamlet was south of the bombline established for Phase II therefore it could not be taken 
until after the Phase II bombing. In the 2 Cdn Corps Op order, Simonds had given the 
task of taking Gaumesnil to 2 Cdn Inf Div as part of its task of taking and clearing the 
area Caillouet-Gaumesnil- woods to the east of RN 158. It was then to reorganize in the 
area St Andre sur Orne-May sur Orne- Fontenay le Marmion-Caillouet -Gaumesnil-
Verrieres to protect the right flank and form a firm base for launching of Phase II. 
Gaumesnil does not however show up as a task in the 2 Cdn Inf Div Op order for 
456
 Over 65 were killed and 250 wounded, including Maj Gen Keller. More than 50 vehicles, five heavy 
guns and many tons of ammunition were destroyed. One of the reasons why there were so many casualties 
was because the Allied troops were moving in vehicles or out in the open while the German troops, being 
on the defensive, were in trenches or in the basements of buildings. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 194. 
The impact on 4 Cdn Armd Div was that the communication vehicles for 9 AGRA which was to support 
the 4 Cdn Armd Bde attack were destroyed leaving Halpenny force without immediate call on this artillery 
support. 
457
 Graves, South Albertas, 112; CMHQ Report No. 169, para 70. Maczek reported that his division was 
held up because of the narrow frontage and the areas left unclear by the Phase I attacks. Ops Log, 8 Aug 
serials 95 & 103, War Diary, 1st Canadian Army- General Staff, 1-31 August 1944. 
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TOTALIZE. In the 2 Cdn Inf Div Op order issued on 7 August, the division is to 
establish a line further north than that set out in the Corps orders. Specifically, Caillouet-
Pt 122- Bretteville sur Laize. Conversely, there is no mention of Gaumesnil as a task for 
4 Cdn Armd Div in either the Corps Op order of 5 or 6 August or in the 4 Cdn Armd Div 
ACQ 
instructions. Which formation was tasked to take the hamlet was therefore not entirely 
clear. The evidence would indicate that the task was that of 4 Cdn Armd Div since at 
1445 hrs the division reported to 2 Cdn Corps that Halpenny Force had cleared the start 
line and that the infantry of 10 Cdn Inf Bde was attacking Gaumesnil. This was later 
substantiated by a further message from Phantom J which reported that "10 Cdn inf bde 
attacking GAUMESNIL at 081430B."459 The first reference involving the Royal 
Regiment and Gaumesnil (codenamed LANDI) occurred at 1245 hrs when the regiment 
was told to "exploit LANDI and area." At 1427 hrs Ganong ordered the regiment to 
"proceed to LANDI now." This was followed by a further order at 1515 hrs to take 
LANDI at 1515 hrs. At some point, the task of taking of the village reverted to 2 Cdn Inf 
Div and the Royal Regiment of Canada was assigned the task.460 
At 1355 hrs Halpenny Force, began moving southwards. Amy crossed the start-
line on time, a considerable achievement given the conditions under which they had to 
advance, and headed towards Cintheaux. He intending to swing left across the Falaise 
4iu 2nd Cdn Corps Operation Instruction No.4 Operation TOTALIZE. BAOR, Battlefield Tour, App D & E. 
4590ps Log 8 August serial 72 & 75. War Diary HQ 2 Cdn Corps Main, 1-31 August 1944. There is no 
mention of 10 Cdn Inf Bde attacking Gaumesnil in any of the 4 Cdn Armd Div war diaries including the 
units of 10 Cdn Inf Bde. Since Kitching spent much of the morning at 2 Cdn Inf Div HQ it is possible that 
something was worked out between Kitching and Foulkes where Kitching would take on the task which 
was subsequently not approved by Simonds. An as of yet unexplained entry in the Corps ops log at 1530hrs 
from 3 Cdn Inf Div states" proposed plan of 9 Cdn Inf Bde and 4 Cdn Armd Div does not meet with 
approval of our sunray or of BIG BIG SUNRAY." See Corps Ops Log 8 August serial 78. the 4 Cdn Inf 
Bde ops log only records a statement that Brig Ganong ordered R Regt C to proceed to Gaumesnil but there 
is no time reference. War Diary, 4 Cdn Inf Bde, 1-31 August 1944 entry, 8 Aug. 
460
 Ops Log 8 August serials 287, 299,305, War Diary 4 Cdn Inf Bde 1-31 August 1944. D.J. Goodspeed. 
Battle Royal: A History of the Royal Regiment of Canada 1862-1962. (Toronto: The Royal Regiment of 
Canada Association, 1962), 443. 
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highway, bypass Gaumesnil and proceed south. The armour was initially held up as the 
Royal Regiment moved forward to capture the position and then by a tactical air strike 
that had been called in to take care of a concentration of German armour. Gaumesnil was 
not taken until 1720 hrs at which point traffic congestion eased and the tanks of 4 Cdn 
Armd Div were able to move forward more freely.461 
As Amy advanced down the eastern side of RN 158, there was no sign of the 
Poles who were supposed to be moving on his left. In fact, there was no sign of anyone, 
friend or foe. With an open flank and no information on enemy locations other than those 
detailed the night before at the orders group, Amy decided that "a bold charge was not an 
option" and proceeded carefully.462 Amy's caution was justified. With the Polish attack 
stopped all available German resources on both sides of the RN 158 were now 
concentrated against Amy's advance along a confined and easily predictable route.463 
According to Simonds' plan, the advance of the two armoured divisions in the 
second phase of TOTALIZE was to be parallel, simultaneous and supported by hundreds 
of guns. Unfortunately, none of the elements of this part of the plan happened. In addition 
to the problems already noted, the artillery units experienced problems with their 
communications, suffered from the mistaken bombing and had difficulty properly 
preparing their positions because the hard and dry ground "made digging extremely 
461
 Ops Log 8 August serials 320, War Diary 4 Cdn Inf Bde 1-31 August 1944. 
462Amy was frustrated by the confusion caused by the regimental O group and the move forward where he 
lost his first tank to a minefield. Amy stated that it "seemed incongruous at that time, that an Armoured 
Division attack was about to be launched on a Squadron-Company group frontage with the entire division 
lined up in full sight behind it." Amy, [Recollections on Normandy], Graves, South Albertas, 112. 
463
 According to one source the Germans brought as many as 60-80 anti-tank guns to bear against the 
narrow frontage of the armoured divisions. Canada. Army, Publication RB/01/P Part 2: Realities of Battle 
Operations in Normandy (Kingston: Government of Canada, National Defence, Canadian Forces Land 
Forces Command and Staff College, 1991), 7. Another source states that the Germans had approximately 
90 88 mm guns in the anti-tank role. Op TOTALIZE AN ACCOUNT OF OPS BY 2CDN ARMD BDE IN 
FRANCE 5 to 8 AUG 44. War Diary, 2 Cdn Armd Bde, 1-31 August 1944, App 5. 
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difficult, a pick or shovel barely making a scratch on the surface."464 The result was that 
Amy initially had no artillery on call. As he moved deeper into German territory and 
began taking casualties from German fire, his caution only increased.465 
It was now 1600 hrs Halpenny Force was attacking Cintheaux but both Kitching 
and Simonds were becoming impatient over what was seen as a prolonged delay in 
moving forward. Halpenny received orders to push on at all costs. He decided that Amy's 
squadron, after losing a number of tanks to anti-tank fire, was now too weak to continue 
against the defences around Cintheaux, and ordered No 3 Sqn to pass through No 1 Sqn 
while the latter provided cover fire. No 3 Sqn immediately ran into a cross-fire from the 
right front and left rear. Progress to the east of the highway was eventually considered 
impossible since it was open ground covered by anti-tank fire from both sides. Major 
Smith, the OC of No 3 Sqn, ordered No 4 troop under Lt Phelan to make an end run on 
the right. In the course of what has been described as a " brief, brilliant and decisive 
action,"466 Phelan's troop knocked out 11 German anti-tank guns in as many minutes, 
tearing open the German defenses along the Cintheaux line. Phelan firmed up his position 
and awaited the passage of No 2 Sqn to complete the first phase by seizing Bretteville-le-
Rabet. The Grenadier Guards had lost 17 tanks since the start of the operation. 
464
 Spencer, History of The Fifteenth Canadian Field Regiment, 102. 
465
 The 23 Sp Regt reported itself ready at 1436 hrs. Ops Log 8 August serial 33, War Diary 4 Cdn Armd 
Bde, 1-31 August 1944, App 5. Two troops of self propelled artillery was required forward at 1255 hrs to 
fire the red smoke to indicate targets for the Phase II bombing. This group reported itself ready at 1240 hrs. 
Ops Log 8 August serial 69, War Diary, Main HQ First Cdn Army, 1-31 August 1944. Also serial 89 
indicates that the 9 AGRA which was to support 4 Cdn Armd Div was not operational until 1553 hrs almost 
2 hours late. This unit suffered from the bombing and had to be reconstituted from the remnants of other 
surviving artillery units. Nicholson, Gunners of Canada, 319. 
466
 Phelan initially tried to work his way through the Gaumesnil woods but found the going too difficult. 
Phelan worked his way along the southwest face of the woods and began engaging the German defenses 
around Cintheaux. Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, 263-264. 
183 
The hazards of advancing over a narrow frontage continued to play out as 
Phelan's attempt to manoeuvre right towards Cintheaux resulted in the Grenadier Guards 
tanks running into the Argyll/SAR battle group trying to take Cintheaux.467 A Sqn from 
the SAR with A and D companies of Argylls successfully executed the attack on 
Cintheaux at 1800 hrs, capturing the village after what was termed an "action lasting but 
a few minutes." B and C companies pressed on to Hautmesnil two miles to the south, 
leaving Cintheaux garrisoned by the other two companies and a troop of tanks. This force 
took Hautmesnil but Stewart felt that the quarry, his next objective, was too large an 
objective for a night attack with the forces he had available. He, therefore, ordered B Coy 
to contain the quarry during the night and capture it at first light, which it did.469 
Kitching ordered Halpenny to push on at once and seize Bretteville le Rabet 
before darkness fell. Halpenny, appraising the situation at 2000 hrs, decided that it would 
soon be too dark to complete an attack on Bretteville le Rabet and that a dawn attack on 
the town offered the best chance of success. He, therefore, decided to withdraw to a 
harbour north of Gaumesnil.470 The occupation of Bretteville le Rabet would be the first 
task for the morning of 9 August. 
467
 CMHQ Report No. 169, para 66. 
468
 War Diary, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada, 1-31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug. 
469
 Ibid. 
470
 H-hour for the advance was set at 0315 hrs. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1-31 August 1944, 
entry 8 Aug. 
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Map 3: Advance of Halpenny Force, Duguid, History of the Canadian Grenadier Guards, Map 23. 
The 4 Cdn Armd Bde war diary recorded the actions of 8 August as going "OK 
but too slowly."471 Kitching, however, was not content with the rate of advance and was 
across the battlefield trying to get 4 Cdn Armd Bde moving. At 1825hrs, Kitching 
ordered the Manitoba Dragoons to make a right flanking attack on Bretteville le Rabet 
Originally the regiment was tasked with providing convoy escort for echelon vehicles 
moving forward to Pt 190 and to be prepared to exploit south and east on the general line 
472 
471
 War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1-31 August 1944, entry 8 Aug. 
472
 Ops Log 2nd Cdn Corps 8 August, serial 97 & 113, War Diary 2 Cdn Corps, 1-31 August 1944. While 
there are two references to this attack in the 2nd Cdn Corps Ops Log there is no corresponding reference to 
this order or attack in the Manitoba Dragoon war diary. The two sitreps for 8 August, numbers 21 & 22 are 
missing from the 4 Cdn Armd Div war diary and could not be found in the war diaries of division units.. 
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Fontaine le Pin- Falaise- Argentan. Now they were being asked to carry the momentum 
of the division attack forward. 
Disappointed with the results of 4 Cdn Armd Div advance, Simonds ordered 
Kitching to continue operations through the night to secure Pt 195, located a further four 
miles south.474 At the same time, the Poles were to feel their way forward and take 
Cauvicourt at first light. The decision by Simonds to continue the attack into the night 
was perhaps correct from an operations point of view but he was asking his inexperienced 
armoured units to do something that they had not been trained to do, conduct an 
improvised armoured advance at night with little or no preparation. To make matters even 
worse, the weather forecast for the evening called for mist and local fog patches, 
especially in the valleys and towards dawn, with visibility less than 1000 yards.475 
Kitching called an O Group at 1830 hrs. His orders for 10 Cdn Inf Bde remained 
unchanged. The orders for 4 Cdn Armd Bde remained the same but the execution 
changed considerably. Booth was ordered to push through the night, to capture the village 
of Bretteville le Rabet and then Pt 195. "Halpenny Force" was to capture and hold 
Bretteville to facilitate the advance of a new combined arms force to Pt 195. The 
Algonquin Regiment, which was originally ordered to relieve Halpenny Force in 
Bretteville, was now ordered to join the BCRs to create Worthington Force. Three 
companies of infantry from the Algonquin Regiment would now advance with the BCRs 
47J
 Outline of Instrs Issued By GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div 07 BOOB OP TOTALIZER [sic] 7 Aug 44. War 
Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div 1-31 August 1944, App 12. 
474
 The 1st Cdn Army Ops log records Simonds intent to continue op TOTALIZE with the original plan 
remaining in force. 4 Cdn and 1 Pol Armd Divs will push straight on tonight. Ops Log: 8 August, serial 
128. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army- General Staff, 1-31 August 1944, 8 Aug. 
475
 Ops Log: 8 August 44, serial 108. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army- General Staff, 1-31 August 1944, 8 
Aug. 
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through the darkness to take Pt 195.476 In a supporting operation, the 18th Cdn Armd C 
Regt, was to occupy the two villages of Langannerie and Grainville astride the Caen-
Falaise Road followed by an advance to Pt 180 477 
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Map 4: 4 Cdn Armd Division disposition early evening 8 August 1944. Reid, No Holding Back, 289. 
The regimental history of the BCRs described the 8 August as a day of waiting 
and slow advance in immensely congested traffic.478 There had been little opportunity for 
476 Ops Log: 8 August serial 135. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army- General Staff, 1-31 August 1944. War 
Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1-31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug. 
477
 It is not clear whether this order replaced the earlier order to attack Bretteville le Rabet. Ops Log: 8 
August 44 serial 135.War Diary, 1st Canadian Army- General Staff ,1-31 August 1944. 
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sleep or eating during the night of 7 August or during the advance on 8 August. Hastily 
snatched dry rations were the only sustenance during the day, even though attempts were 
made to bring hot food forward. The regiment was somewhere in the middle of the 
brigade column with the column halted for most of 8 August in open ground between Ifs 
and Verrieres. At Verrieres the BCRs took over the lead of the column. The regiment 
harboured at last light north of Cintheaux, refuelled and waited for orders. At 2130 hrs, 
Worthington proceeded to Bde HQ for Booth's O Group and, in anticipation of coming 
action, the regiment was placed on "five minutes notice to move."479 The opportunity for 
sustained sleep was again denied. 
The contents of Worthington's subsequent O Group are interesting providing a 
snapshot in time of the perception of how the battle had progressed to that point and a 
measure of the fog of war that had set in. The orders began with the statement that the 
attack had gone well and that the Germans were disorganized.480 2 Cdn Corps intended to 
take advantage of the situation by continuing the advance through the night. It was 
Booth's intention to seize and hold the high ground feature, "spot height 195, map 
reference 089461." Worthington pointed out that the force would be beyond the range of 
friendly artillery support but that air co-operation would be made available. The 
Algonquin Regiment was to be under command. Worthington outlined his plan of action 
as follows: 
My intention is to seize and hold the feature until the rest of our troops can reach 
us. Method: we will move out of this harbour, cross the highway to the eastern 
478
 Douglas Harker, The Dukes (Vancouver: British Columbia Regiment, 1974), 237. 
479
 Ibid., 237-238. 
480
 The likely source of this statement would have been Simonds' O Group at 1630 hrs. Both Kitching and 
Booth in their respective O Groups would have repeated it. The situation between Simonds' O Group and 
Worthington's had changed considerably with Worthington's statement showing much more optimism than 
the actual tactical situation warranted. The rebuilt German defences would have been unknown to the 
attacking 4 Cdn Armd Div forces. 
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side go through the Lake Superiors who are dug in at that point, advance south on 
the east side of the highway, taking advantage of ground until opposite the 
objective, then re-cross the highway and assault the hill from the south-east. 481 
Friendly forces were listed as the Polish division, which was to be moving on 
Worthington's left. 
The new plan was briefed at 2130 hrs. The BCR Sqn O Groups were held at 0230 
hrs 9 August. Worthington Force was assembled at 0400 hrs and preceded south. The 
force received fire from the woods north of Bretteville but Worthington decided to press 
on and not wait for the Grenadier Guards to take Bretteville.482 The force swung to the 
east to avoid the battle going on at Bretteville le Rabet. As Worthington continued to 
swing southeast he must have crossed a road which he believed to be the main Caen-
Falaise highway. He continued on until he saw high ground ahead and assumed it was his 
objective, Pt 195. The force pushed on to the high ground to their front shooting up 
enemy soft-skinned vehicles en route and at 0650 hrs the BCR reported that they were on 
their objective with no evidence of enemy occupation. Worthington reported that he was 
holding until friendly forces could come forward to relieve him. Worthington 
immediately ordered defensive positions prepared.483 
In 24 hours of fighting, the 2 Cdn Corps had driven a wedge 10,000 yards deep 
through both German defensive lines covering the Falaise road pushing the German 
defenses to the brink of defeat.484 Both Phases had been launched more or less as 
planned. The planned wait for the bombing in support of Phase II had allowed the 
481
 Cassidy, Warpath, 98. 
482
 This pairing of the Algonquin Regiment with the BCRs was the first time that these two units had 
worked together since February 1944. 
483
 War Diary, British Columbia Regiment, 1-31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug Stacey has determined that 
Worthington Force ended up at map reference 143490 about one-and a half miles east of Estrees and not on 
Hill 140 as is commonly stated. Note 3 pg 91. CMHQ Report No. 169, note 3, p 91. 
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Germans to recover, improvise further defensive positions and marshal all available 
resources along the very predictable Allied axis of advance. The success or failure of the 
operation would now depend on the ability of the armoured division commanders to 
improvise and innovate as well as the abilities of their subordinate commanders to carry 
out the new plans to push through the last layers of the German defenses. 
The Germans used the evening of 8/9 August to rebuild and augment their 
defensive positions. Battlegroup Wunsche arrived in Potiny at 0300 hrs and was moved 
to Quesnay Woods. It was reported to have 39 Panthers and was awaiting the arrival of 
13 Tiger tanks from 102 SS Heavy Pz Bn from the II SS Panzer Corps. Battlegroup 
Waldmuller was ordered to new positions around Pt 140 and was augmented with 1 SS 
Panzerjager company. Battlegroup Krause was to defend the line from Ouilly to the 
RN158 and Battlegroup Olboeter was to position itself on Pt 195,485 
On the morning of 9 August, Kitching must have been filled with relief and 
optimism. The Grenadier Guards attack on Bretteville le Rabet was going very well and 
Worthington was reporting that his force was on Pt 195. At 0825 hrs, 2nd Cdn Corps was 
notified that 4 Cdn Armd Div had one armoured regiment and one infantry battalion 
disposed on the high ground Pt 180 and Pt 195. This was followed by a further message 
at 0840 hrs stating that the above positions were firmly held and that resistance in 
Bretteville le Rabet was being dealt with. Such was the fog of war. 
Operations for the 18th Cdn Armd C Regt began early on 9 August as the regiment 
487 
sent its squadrons off to provide a clearer picture of the German defensive disposition. 
485
 Michael Reynolds. Steel Inferno:! SS Panzer Corps in Normandy. (New York: Sarpendon, 1997) 238. 
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 Ops Log, 9 Aug serials 21 and 22. War Diary, HQ 2nd Cdn Corps-G Branch Main, 1-31 August 1944. 
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 B Sqn was sent east to gain and maintain contact with the Poles. D Sqn was sent southwest to gain a 
greater awareness of the German disposition in advance of the move of the armoured regiments. C Sqn was 
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4 Cdn Armd Div operations for the day started successfully enough when the Lake 
Superior Regiment, supported by the Grenadier Guards, attacked Bretteville le Rabet. 
The town was captured by 1200 hrs and, during the afternoon, the remainder of the 
battalion moved into the town to firm up the position. Bretteville was cleared by 1500 
hrs.488 
While Bretteville le Rabet was captured, the units of the division were scattered, 
exposed and unsupported by other Corps units. Worthington Force was lost on the 
battlefield deep within the Polish sector. His night advance had taken him almost into the 
assembly area of battle group Wiinsche, the remaining striking power of Meyer's 
available forces. As the morning passed, it became clear to 4 Cdn Armd Div HQ that 
Worthington's force was not where it should be, and desperate attempts began to locate it. 
489 
Kitching's initial action was to send elements of the 18th Cdn Armd C Regt south 
to the area of Pt 195 to determine whether Worthington Force was actually on the feature. 
The patrol reached the objective and ascertained that Worthington Force was not on Pt 
195 and that the high ground was clear. Brig Lane the division CRA, went up in a small 
spotting aircraft to see if he could locate the group but without success. Kitching stated: 
"We heard the thunder of gunfire over to our left, but we assumed it was connected with 
sent south to try and push as far forward as possible but both C and D Sqns were stopped by German anti-
tank positions. War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1-31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug. 
488
 No 2 Sqn moved to a position between the quarry of Hautmesnil and Bretteville le Rabet to assume a 
counter-attack role. War Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1-31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug. 
489Between 0808 hrs and 0841 hrs, the BCR reported to Brigade, "have run into enemy and lost ten tanks" 
and requested artillery support. At 0849, Bde HQ asked for the location of the opposition to which the BCR 
replied, "same as 2 hrs ago, approximately 500 yds southeast." The brigade arranged for fire support on the 
identified location and at 0907 hrs asked if the artillery support was falling on target. No answer came and 
thereafter there was silence from Worthington Force. Stacey, The Victory Campaign, 227. 
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the Polish armoured division who were supposed to be keeping up with our left flank."490 
Typhoons had been supporting the BCRs for hours but this information was never 
conveyed to 2 Cdn Corps or to 4 Cdn Armd Div.491 The first clear indication of what had 
happened came at 1500 hrs when the Liaison Officer (LO) of 4 Pol Armd Bde reported 
that he had spoken with "sunray minor" (the code name for the second-in-command) of 
the BCR who had seven tanks left and was withdrawing.492 
Meanwhile, the 18th Cdn Armd C Regt had carried out a reconnaissance of routes 
from Vielle Langannerie to Pt 180 and found the routes clear of the enemy. Upon hearing 
that Pt 195 was clear, Kitching ordered a new composite force built around the Foot 
Guards and A Sqn of the 18th Cdn Armd C Regt to take St. Hilaire Farm and Pt 195,493 
The Foot Guards had moved little during 8 August and were finally ordered to follow up 
the rest of the brigade at 2300 hrs. The regiment completed an all-night move to reach the 
concentration area at 0700 hrs. At this point, everyone believed that Worthington Force 
was fighting in the vicinity of Pt 195.494 
490
 The tragedy was that 4th Cdn Armd Div did not know Worthington's location. Worthington insisted he 
was on Point 195 but they knew from observation he was not there. They fired artillery smoke shells onto 
the real Pt 195 and asked him to tell them where he was in relation to the smoke but he said he could not 
see it. Kitching then thought that he must have swung behind the enemy's main position towards the town 
of Potigny. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 196. 
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University, 1997), 219. 
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Booth ordered Scott to bypass all opposition and make for Pt 195 with all 
speed.495 Scott decided to approach the target by looping left around Grainville-
Langannerie. The Foot Guards were quickly briefed and hardly had this been completed 
when at 1430 hrs the order was given to move. Scott initiated his attack despite the fact 
that some of the attached forces had not yet been able to reach the forming-up area.496 
Scott was not aware that Pt 195 was empty when he started his advance. The 4 
Armd Bde Ops Log recorded a radio message from Scott to control at 1605 hrs asking 
control to notify BCR of the Foot Guard approach to Pt 195.497 Scott was operating under 
the impression that he was conducting a rescue-relief type mission instead of a deliberate 
attack to take Pt 195. In the former, the objective is held by own forces and you are 
advancing to link up with troops already there. In the latter, you have to take the objective 
on your own. 
The Foot Guards left the RN 158 and advanced cross-country, meeting little 
resistance until No 1 Sqn reached a defile between Bretteville le Rabet and Langannerie 
some 500 yards from Quesnay Woods. The intelligence information available at this 
point still indicated that Quesnay Woods was lightly held but the Foot Guards had, in 
fact, encountered the heart of the German anti-tank defenses.498 As the day wore on, it 
became obvious that they were within easy range of the German defences and Scott 
decided that a further advance would be too costly. All squadrons were ordered into a 
defensive position in the open, facing Quesnay Woods. The baptism of fire for the Foot 
Guards had been bitter: No 1 Squadron was reduced from 19 to seven tanks, while No 2 
495 
Ops Log, 9 Aug 44 serial 66, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1-31 August 1944. 
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and No 3 squadrons had lost a combined total of 14 more tanks. The attitude of the men 
however was described as "one of deep resentment, buoyed by a determination to push 
on."499 
In the early afternoon, Kitching ordered 10 Cdn Inf Bde to clear the adjoining 
areas of Langannerie and Granville-Langannerie. In order to avoid command and control 
confusion, Kitching placed the Lake Superior Regiment, which was still fighting in 
Bretteville le Rabet, under Jefferson's command. 50° Kitching's realignment of forces 
allowed each of his brigade commanders to focus on specific tasks. Jefferson was to 
establish a firm base at Bretteville and Booth was to get forces on Pt 195. 
Shortly after noon, 9 Cdn Inf Bde took over the villages of Cintheaux and 
Hautmesnil, easing the strain on the infantry resources of 4 Cdn Armd Div. Jefferson 
ordered the Argylls to take over Vielle Langannerie and they moved forward at 1700 hrs. 
The Argylls, assisted by a squadron of tanks from the SAR, cleared part of the village 
while the Lines cleared further west. The village was secured by 1800 hrs but minor 
opposition continued until 2300 hrs.501 At 1800 hrs, the Lincoln & Welland Regiment 
took up defensive positions to hold the town for the night. 
Meanwhile, A Squadron of the Manitoba Dragoons had proceeded to the high 
ground near Pt 195 and stayed there to cover the expected advance of Scott's force until 
Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General's Foot Guards, 104. 
500At 1600 hrs, Maj R.A. Keane was ordered to take over command of the Lake Superior Regiment. 
Murrell had reportedly been wounded by a blast from an exploding shell. War Diary, The Lake Superior 
Regiment (Motor) 1-31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug. 
501
 C Sqn SAR spent the morning mopping up the quarry. B Sqn took over the defences of Cintheaux from 
C Sqn. A Sqn spent the morning organizing an attack on Langannerie with the Line & Welld R scheduled 
for later that day. During the afternoon C Sqn and the Argylls launched an attack on Bretteville-le-Rabet 
and succeeded in capturing the town. A Sqn with the Line & Welld R passed through C Sqn and the 
Argylls and attacked Langannerie form the east. CMHQ Report No. 169, para 82; War Diary, 29 Armoured 
Reconnaissance Regiment (South Alberta Regiment), 1-31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug. 
last light when it withdrew.502 When Kitching was informed of the fate of Scott's force 
and that the routes from Granville-Langannerie to Pt 180 were still clear of the enemy he 
decided to take decisive action. Kitching convened a formal O Group and issued orders 
designed to achieve the following by 0300 hrs 10 August: 
• 4 Cdn Armd Bde less the Lake Superior Regiment was to be prepared to attack 
south with objectives Pt 195 (if necessary) and Pt 206. 
• 10 Cdn Inf Bde with under command Lake Superior Regiment was to have the 
Lincoln & Welland Regiment on Pt 180, the Algonquin Regiment in the wooded 
area and buildings of St. Hilaire Farm, the Argylls on Pt 195 and the SAR arrayed 
in support as required by the Bde commander. 
• The 18 Cdn Armd C Regt was to be positioned in the rear and to the north of 4 
Cdn Armd Bde and was to be prepared for two alternate courses of action 
depending on the outcome of operations. If the armoured brigade was required to 
capture Pt 195, the regiment was to exploit south in the direction of Potigny, 
Falaise and the line of the River Ante to the west and east of Falaise. If the Armd 
Bde was only required to capture Pt 206, the regiment was to exploit south to 
Falaise and west to contact elements of the Second British Army advancing from 
the west.503 
The execution of the plan was dependent on the ability of 10 Cdn Inf Bde to capture Pt 
195. If the hill was captured during the operations designed for that evening, then the 
armoured brigade was to attack south at first light and capture Pt 206. If Pt 195 was not 
captured by first light, then 4 Cdn Armd Bde was to attack south and capture in 
succession Pt 195 and Pt 206. 
The war diary of the Manitoba Dragoons stated that Kitching took immediate 
action on receiving the reconnaissance information. A search was conducted to see if any 
502
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conversation or message traffic was recorded in the respective war diaries between 
Kitching and Simonds or 4 Cdn Armd Div or 2nd Cdn Corps where Kitching was given 
orders or requested approval of his plan from Simonds. None was found. The conclusion 
reached was that Kitching issued these orders under his own initiative operating within 
the intent of Simonds orders to take Pt 195. 
At 1900 hrs, Jefferson ordered the Lincoln & Welland Regiment to seize the ridge 
near PT 180 in a night assault. Scouts were sent out to recce the route to the objective 
while the Queen's Own Rifles of Canada relieved the regiment in Langannerie. The move 
began at 2030 hrs and proceeded smoothly until the Lines encountered machine gun fire 
from orchards at Le Hamlet Fontaine. The guide from D Coy took a wrong turn, which 
resulted in the company entering St. Germain le Vasson where it was cut off and had to 
remain for the night. C and A companies were led onto the northern slope of the battalion 
objective where they picked up part of B Coy and, together with the mortars and the anti-
tank platoon, firmed up their position as well as could be expected in the dark.504 A troop 
of 17-pdr guns was added to the defense late into the evening. 
At 2200 hrs 9 August, Jefferson ordered Lt Col Stewart of the Argylls to attack 
and capture Hill 195. As far as Stewart knew, one attack by the combined force of the 
BCR and Algonquin Regiment had been repulsed with heavy casualties. After studying 
the problem, Stewart decided to try a different tactic: a silent attack. Stewart gambled on 
a circuitous route to the east and north-east of the feature, since the area to the west was 
known to be occupied by Germans. He briefed the proposed route to his scout platoon 
and they went out ahead of the battalion to mark the route. The advance began at 0001 
hrs and by 0430 hrs the advance elements of the battalion were within a few hundred 
504
 War Diary, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment 1-31 August 1944, entry 9 Aug. 
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yards of the hill and had not detected any Germans to that point. Pickets had been left 
along the route to guide the troops who marched to the hill in single file with Stewart 
leading.505 The company positions on the feature had been picked out by Stewart prior to 
the advance and briefed to the respective company commanders. Once on the hill, the 
troops were instructed to search the area for Germans and then "dig like hell."506 
Although the Argylls had reached Pt 195 with little time to spare, by sunrise they 
were well dug in and prepared for the expected German reaction. The Argylls had also 
managed to get a troop of 17-pdr guns and a platoon of 6-pdr guns into position and dug 
in before the Germans realized that the hill had been taken.507 Stewart knew that German 
counterattacks would include tanks and he needed to establish an anti-tank gun screen as 
soon as possible. At 0620 hrs,10 Cdn Inf Bde reported that Pt 195 was taken.508 
Kitching's initiative and the ability of the division to successfully execute a number of 
short notice assaults at night are a testament to the quality of unit training, growing skill, 
confidence and professionalism of the division. 
Reports from the eastern side of the Falaise road on 9 August had indicated that 
the Pol Armd Div was meeting strong opposition and was not making much progress. At 
0925 hrs, the Polish Armd Regt reported itself only as far as Robertmensil, fighting 
against stiff opposition.509 Maczek made what he termed a unilateral decision to alter 
course by 90 degrees and attack due east towards St. Sylvain with the intent of looping 
505
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back down towards Soignolles and Estrees la Campagne.510 By noon the Poles were 
reported to have reached Estrees la Campagne and taken Soignolles. At this point, the 
Polish armour ran into the same anti-tank screen that was engaging Worthington Force 
but were unable to come to Worthington's relief. At approximately 1700 hrs, the 
members of Worthington Force saw friendly tanks approaching from Soignolles but the 
Poles pulled back to safer ground. By nightfall the Poles had captured St. Sylvain and the 
village of St. Martin des Bois.511 
By the morning of 10 August, the Lincoln & Welland Regiment held Hill 180 on 
the right, the Argylls occupied Hill 195, and two companies of the Algonquin Regiment 
in St. Hillaire farm provided depth to the defences on the ridge. The position was further 
strengthened at 0500 hrs with the arrival of the SAR which was posted south of 
Langannerie.512 The Foot Guards and the Lake Superior Regiment remained under the 
command of 10th Cdn Inf Bde and the 18th Cdn Armd C Regt continued to conduct 
reconnaissance missions in support of the division.513 
The 4 Cdn Armd Bde units were arrayed in a defensive posture in and around Pt 
195 with the Grenadier Guards on Pt 195 and the Foot Guards immediately to their rear, 
Stanislaw Maczek, Op Podwody do Czolga:Wspomnienia Wojenne 1918-1945. (Waszawa: Ossolineum, 
1990), 132-133. See also Maczek, "The Is' Polish Armoured Division in Normandy," 55. 
511
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ready to push forward if the opportunity presented itself.514 Counterattacks and a heavy 
concentration of fire from self-propelled, anti-tank guns prevented any further advance. 
Kitching ordered the Grenadier Guards to stand fast and hold Pt 195 with the Argylls.515 
Organizing of the defense of PT 195 remained difficult because of the accurate and heavy 
volume of fire that the Germans focussed on the hill. This problem was compounded by a 
general lack of accurate information concerning the disposition of both friendly and 
enemy forces. 
The German defensive line had stiffened with anti-tank guns disposed on an 
arcing front around the forces positioned on Pt 195.516 The initial German response to the 
Canadian presence was heavy mortar fire followed by a series of counter-attacks. Close 
air support and artillery fire helped relieve the pressure on the Argylls throughout the 
day.517 The tables had been turned on the Germans who were now forced out of their 
prepared positions to attack dug-in Canadians properly supported by armour, artillery and 
close air support. At 1930 hrs, the Germans launched a major counter-attack with 
significant force but withdrew under heavy fire.518 
514
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Map 13: Operations 10 Cdn Inf Bde 10 August 1944. Reid, No Holding Back, 336 
The Lincoln & Welland Regiment position around Pt 180 was shelled 
continuously during the day. At 1400 hrs, a forward artillery observer reached the 
regiment, increasing the accuracy of the Canadian defensive artillery fire against the 
German counterattacks. German artillery fire was intense enough to prevent the 
evacuation of casualties and the movement forward of food and ammunition.519 
Eventually, a squadron of tanks from the Grenadier Guards reached the Lines position 
around 2100 hrs and helped reduce the volume of enemy fire with speculative fire of their 
own. 
All efforts by the armoured divisions to exploit to the Laison River had been 
stopped by fire from Quesnay Woods and both Kitching and Maczek appreciated that 
519During 11 August, the regiment's carriers were organized into a convoy to run rations into the forward 
positions and to get casualties out. The North Nova Scotia Highlanders eventually relieved the Lines that 
evening and they began their withdrawal on foot at 2200 hrs. War Diary, The Lincoln and Welland 
Regiment 1-31 August 1944, entries 10-11 Aug. 
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until the woods were taken their divisions could advance no further. At 1000 hrs, 
Simonds held a conference with his division commanders and issued orders that he hoped 
would restore the momentum of the attack. The 3 Cdn Inf Div was given the task of 
clearing Quesnay Woods and pushing towards Soumont St. Quentin, thereby clearing the 
flanks of both armoured divisions and facilitating the attack on Pt 206 by 4 Cdn Armd 
Bde.521 The 3 Cdn Inf Div attack went in at 2000 hrs but by 0300 hrs 11 August, the 
attack had made very little progress and was called off with 3 Cdn Inf Div suffering 
heavy casualties. 
Kitching remained focussed on his objective of striking south towards Falaise and 
developed an ambitious plan which would resort the momentum of the Canadian drive 
and cut off the German forces facing Second Br Army. Kitching's plan for 11 August 
involved an advance by the division south with the 18 Cdn Armd C Regt exploiting 
beyond Falaise. The plan was based on the assumption that the 3 Cdn Inf Div attack 
would be successful. The plan was also dependent on the acquisition of Priests to 
transport the Argylls in the attack. Kitching wanted the following disposition for his 
units for last light 11 August: 
• The 4 Cdn Armd Bde would be in the general area of Ussy and Pt 195 (located 
near Ussy).522 
• The 10 Cdn Inf Bde would be in the general area Pt 180, Pt 195, Pt 206. 
• The 18 Cdn Armd C Regt was to have elements south of Falaise and elements 
protecting the division right flank between Urville and Pt 180.523 
520
 At one point, Maczek proposed a combined attack on the woods using both armoured divisions but 
Simonds had another plan .Maczek, Op Podwody do Czolga, 133. 
52lThe 3 Cdn Inf Div attack was divided into two phases: Phase I, seize Quesnay Woods; Phase II, seize 
general feature La Grange de Mine, Aisy and Soumont St. Quentin. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1-31 
August 1944, entry 10 Aug. 
522
 There are two Pt 195 on the road south to Falaise, one located at grid 0846, St. Hilaire Farm and one 
located at Grid 0840 near Ussy. 
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This plan represented a further drive of some 3,000 yards deeper into the German 
defenses and, if successful, would have opened the way to Falaise.524 At 2110 hrs 4 Cdn 
Inf Bde was placed under Kitching's command to support the operation. The attack was 
called off at 2339 hrs in part because of the lack of progress of the 3 Cdn Inf Div attack 
t i c 
on Quesnay Woods. 
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1
 Summary of GOCs [Kitching] plan up to 102300B.War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1-31 August 1944, 
App IX. 
524
 The execution of the plan was as follows: 4th Cdn Armd Bde less GGFG and Lake Sup R was to remain 
in its current position with the CGG prepared to move forward to hold Ussy with the GGFG once the town 
was captured. 10th Cdn Inf Bde with under command GGFG and Lake Sup R was to capture Pt 206, Ussy 
and Pt 195 (grid 0840). The attack was to be carried out in two phases. In Phase I, the A & SH of C, riding 
in Priests and supported by the GGFG under the cover of artillery smoke, were to capture Pt 206. H-Hour 
for this phase was 0100 hrs on 11 August. In Phase II, the GGFG and Lake Sup Regt were to capture Ussy 
and Pt 195. On completion of this task, the GGFG and Lake Sup R, less one company, were to revert to 4th 
Cdn Armd Bde control. The armoured brigade was then to firm up the Ussy position. The 18th Cdn Armd C 
Regt was to sweep west, south and east on the general line Barbery, Meslay, Martigny and the high ground 
south of Falaise and was to move west to meet up with the Second British Army. Summary of GOCs 
[Kitching] instrs up to 111500B. War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1-31 August 1944, App X. 
525
 Ops Log 10 August serials 4721& 2305, Main HQ 2 Cdn Inf Div, 1-31 August 1944 and Ops Log 11 
August serial 477, War Diary 4 Cdn Inf Bde, 1-31 August 1944. 
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TOTALIZE had succeeded in breaking through the German defensive lines and in 
driving the Germans back nine miles achieving the intent established by Montgomery. It 
failed however to take Falaise as required by Crerar's guidance issued on 7 August. The 
formal part of the operation came to an end at 1100 hours on the morning of 11 August 
when Simonds ordered 3 Cdn Inf Div to take over the positions of the two armoured 
divisions. The 4th Cdn Armd Div was to withdraw north to Robertmesnil to rest and 
prepare for a new attack; The 1 Pol Armd Div was to take over the St. Sylvain sector and 
to patrol aggressively towards Maizieres in an effort to obtain a crossing of the Laison 
River.526 9 Cdn Inf Bde would relieve 10 Cdn Inf Bde.527 
Until the withdrawal could be affected, the 4 Cdn Armd Div had to hold on to its 
positions during 11 August under continuous shelling throughout a long, clear day which 
afforded the Germans excellent visibility. The Germans continued to counterattack the Pt 
195 position and early in the morning they were able to infiltrate into the Canadian 
position. Some German soldiers reached to within 50 yards of Foot Guards tanks before 
being stopped. The position remained precarious because of the lack of sufficient infantry 
to cover the tanks and the ground properly.528 At 1939 hrs 4 Cdn Armd Bde was ordered 
to disengage in preparation for a new attack.529 
Simonds decided to have one more try at salvaging the advance to Falaise. The 
absence of opposition to patrols by 18 Cdn Armd C Regt on 10 and 11 August over the 
526
 Ops Log, 11 Aug 44, Serials 54 and 56. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army- General Staff, 1-31 August 
1944,App50. 
527
 The relief began at last light on 11 August and was completed by 0600 hrs on 12 August War Diary, 10 
Cdn Inf Bde, 1-31 August 1944, entry 11 Aug. 
Baylay, The Regimental History of the Governor General's Foot Guards, 108 
529
 The Grenadier Guards withdrew first through the east flank, losing three tanks in the withdrawal. No 1 
Squadron was given the job of smoking off Quesnay Woods to cover the final withdrawal. The Foot 
Guards reconstituted itself at Gaumesnil and then moved to a concentration area at Cintheaux. The 
Grenadier Guards lost ten tanks pulling back from the area of Point 195, while the Foot Guards had to use a 
heavy smoke screen to avoid similar losses. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1-31 August 1944, entry 11 Aug. 
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Laize River resulted in Simonds ordering 2 Cdn Div to send one brigade and one 
armoured regiment from 2 Cdn Armd Bde across the river at Bretteville sur Laize to 
move immediately south. The 4 Cdn Inf Bde crossed the river on the evening of 11/12 
August in what was initially considered a reconnaissance in force. Before noon on 12 
August, Simonds changed the operation to the main effort of the Corps and allocated all 
available artillery and the 2 Cdn Armd Bde, less one regiment, in support.530 
Even though the 4 Cdn Armd Div was withdrawn to a position in the rear of 3 
Cdn Inf Div for rest and repair, the division was placed on one-hour notice to move after 
1200 hrs 12 August to support the 2 Cdn Inf Div operation. 4 Cdn Armd Div was given 
three tentative courses of action in support, dependent, in large part, on the success of the 
2 Cdn Inf Div drive. The division would follow 2 Cdn Div, pass through in the area of 
Ussy and advance with the objective of Falaise; or would follow the 18 Cdn Armd C 
Regt across the River Laize and advance on the axis of Sassy, Epancy with the objective 
of Falaise. Both of these tasks would commence at first light on 13 August. The third 
option was to participate in the upcoming operation TALLULAH in conjunction with 3 
M l 
Cdn Inf Div. The 2 Cdn Inf Div advanced as far as south as Clair-Tizon and was able 
to get a small bridgehead across the Laize River. Attempts to expand the bridgehead 
failed and the 2 Cdn Inf Div advance on this axis came to a halt on 13 August.532 With all 
obvious courses of action expended, Simonds was forced to concede that a second 
deliberate Canadian thrust towards Falaise would be necessary. 
The axis of advance was Barbery, Moulines and Clair Tizon to capture the high ground Pt 195 and Ussy. 
CMHQ Report No. 169, para 108. 
531
 Summary of GOCs instrs up to 121200B,War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1-31 August 1944, App XL 
532
 CMHQ Report No. 169, para 111. 
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Map 15: Proposed 4 Cdn Armd Div Operations 13 August 1944. Modified Operation Totalize map, 
printed by 14 Field Survey Squadron R.E. Feb 1948. 
The question as to whether TOTALIZE was either a successful or unsuccessful 
operation will probably never be definitively settled and depends very much on one's 
perspective. Since much of the criticisms of those who view the operation as unsuccessful 
are levelled at the two armoured divisions, the key decisions that impacted the outcome 
of Phase II and, in particular, the 4 Cdn Armd Div will be examined. Within this context, 
three points remain dominant in the discussions of Phase II: the inexperience of the two 
armoured divisions and their senior commanders, the narrow frontage allocated to the 
armoured division attacks and the bombing associated with Phase II. 
The typical analysis of TOTALIZE as a failed operation is reflected in the 
following often cited statement; "Despite overwhelming air and artillery superiority, five 
divisions and two armoured brigades comprising upwards of 600 tanks could not defeat 
205 
two depleted German divisions, mustering no more than 60 panzers and tank 
destroyers."533 This statement represents an oversimplification of the execution and 
results of a very complex operation. The reality of combat and warfare is that a 
preponderance of combat power in an operation is useless if it is not applied at the right 
place and time and under the proper conditions. In TOTALIZE, the critical elements were 
time and conditions. Both Maczek and Kitching agreed that their formations were 
inexperienced but both insisted that their difficulties were due mainly to the fact that the 
enemy had ample time to establish a new defensive line on the morning and afternoon of 
8 August. There is little argument over this analysis. 
The debate over the bombing in Phase II revolves around two key issues: whether 
the bombing was actually needed and whether there was time for the bombing to be 
called off, based on the success in Phase I. The argument that the timing for the bombing 
attack was inflexible does not stand. The evidence would suggest that there was more 
flexibility than is commonly acknowledged. The following message is recorded between 
First Cdn Army and 83 Group R.A.F. at 0700B (0800 hrs local) 8 August: 
This msg confirms that bombing for Phase II is acceptable any time that it can be 
done having regard to weather but it is preferred that it should conform to the 
programme based on the revised H hr as 1300 hrs. If this is possible it will be of 
considerable advantage to the ground forces. If however it is necessary for 
weather reasons to bomb earlier or not at all it is of course acceptable to bomb 
earlier and the ground forces will try to take advantage of the situation. That is to 
say there is freedom of action to 8 USAAF.534 
Although obscure in the text, it appears that a cut-off time for a decision was established 
as 0900 hrs local time. By 0900 hrs, the results of Phase I were known, with many of the 
Phase I attacking units reporting that they were on or near their objectives. While the text 
533
 English, The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 289. 
534
 Ops Log, 8 Aug 44, Serial 37.War Diary, 1st Canadian Army- General Staff, 1-31 August 1944, 8 Aug. 
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of the above message makes it clear that the scheduled bombing was preferred, it is also 
evident that there was the flexibility to cancel the bombing. The decision to cancel 
belonged to Simonds. Had he decided to do so, it is unlikely that Crerar would have 
overruled him, regardless of the cost in getting the bombing missions in the first place.535 
The bombing debate revolves around the argument that the fixed timings of the 
bombings neutralized any tactical advantage gained in Phase I by giving the Germans 
time to re-establish their defenses. This fact must have been known to Simonds when he 
decided on the timings of the two phases. Simonds believed that the time was needed to 
move supporting artillery forward to support the Phase II attacks. If anti-tank guns were 
the primary threat to Phase II then the bombing and artillery seemed the logical answer to 
these threats. 
In fact the last opportunity to change the construct of TOTALIZE was at the 1000 
hrs meeting on 7 August between Simonds, Kitching and Maczek. Once Simonds decided 
to stay with his plan and the Phase II bombing any discussion of a continued advance 
from Phase I or an early advance of Phase II is simply speculative. Events showed that 
not only was the time needed to move the artillery forward but the delay was also 
required to get the two armoured divisions forward. Halpenny reached the start line at 
exactly the required time. Given the challenges encountered in moving forward it seems 
doubtful that Phase II could have started any earlier than planned. The only unit from 
Phase I that appeared capable of a continued attack was 2 Cdn Armd Bde. Based on the 
status of the Allied formations in the early morning of 8 August, if the armoured brigade 
had continued, it would have done so with little artillery and infantry support. It is also 
535The Americans were able to call off the bombing in support of COBRA within hours of the attack 
because of bad weather. 
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clear that it would have run into the already prepared anti-tank defensive positions at 
Cintheaux. 
The problem, as Simonds saw it, was not the plan, weapons or machines; but, 
rather, the lack of proper handling of resources within the armoured divisions. Simonds 
had expressly urged his armoured commanders not to wait for infantry divisions to take 
out final objectives or get involved in probing before calling down artillery fire or fighter-
bombers. Simonds felt that leadership and the failure to keep "cracking" when the 
opportunities were there were the reasons why TOTALIZE ground to a halt. In addition, 
Simonds felt that the lack of communication, liaison, wireless, from formation to 
formation and leading units to leading units, had much to do with the failure of the 
armour to get going as planned. Misinformation and the inability to maintain direction 
were, in his mind, crucial.536 
Most of the assessments of the performance of the armoured divisions agree with 
Simonds. The assessment of Carlo D'Este is typical, "Unfortunately, Simonds' 
exploitation divisions, the Canadian 4th Armoured and the Polish 1st Armoured, were 
inexperienced and fell into the usual consequent errors; particularly that of pausing to 
deal with strong-points rather than bypassing them."537 These and other similar 
assessments have been made without a true understanding of the context and conditions 
within which the 4 Cdn Armd Div was forced to advance into its first battle. 
The first issue was the plan. It is questionable whether the 2 Cdn Corps staff 
actually conducted a thorough assessment of the logistical and, in particular, the time and 
distance problems associated with the revised TOTALIZE plan. A poor evaluation of the 
536
 Stearns, Letter [Recollections on Time with Montgomery], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections 
University of Victoria 
D'Este, Decision in Normandy, 426. 
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time and space calculations had two dramatic effects: narrow frontages for the advance 
which compounded the second problem, no room to deploy the rest of the division in 
support or to bypass the defenses. 
The narrow frontage assigned to the armoured divisions had a significant bearing 
on their tactical flexibility in the initial stages of the battle by reducing a division attack 
to a squadron frontage. In its first battle, 4 Cdn Armd Div tried to feel is way around the 
blocking force, looking for a hole. When it found enemy strong points, its regiments 
attacked them. It has been suggested that the inexperience of the division resulted in these 
actions rather than masking them and moving on. In fact, there was no room to do this as 
long as Simonds held them to their boundaries.538 There was no open flank for the units 
to exploit by saturating the enemy with direct or indirect fire, smoking them off and then 
moving around an open flank as prescribed by doctrine.539 When viewed objectively, 4 
Cdn Armd Div was at a numerical disadvantage as long as it had to continue to attack on 
a squadron frontage because the combat power of the division could only be brought to 
bear sequentially, one squadron at a time, instead of through massing numerous 
squadrons at once over a wide frontage. 
In order to understand why the advance of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde attack was 
"slower" than anticipated, it is important to understand the mindset and orders received 
by Amy, who lead the advance.540 Amy stated that the intelligence information he 
received was not updated at any point from the time he received his orders to the time he 
538
 Jarymowycz, The Quest for Operational Maneuvre in the Normandy Campaign, 210. 
539Ibid.210. 
540
 Amy had only taken over command of No 1 Sqn some six weeks before Normandy and, given the 
paucity of armoured training in the division during that time frame, he would have had to rely on the 
training imparted by the squadron's previous commander. Amy reports, however, that he inherited a slate 
of very capable officers and NCOs in charge of well-trained and disciplined tank crews. The squadron was, 
therefore, capable even though Amy had not had the opportunity to actually test it under his command and 
direction. Amy, [Recollections on Normandy]. 
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crossed the start line. His intelligence was over 12 hours old and he felt that the time 
spent waiting during the long, frustrating advance could have been well spent in more 
detailed briefings for the troops and, particularly in providing an up-to-date intelligence 
picture on the 4 Cdn Armd Div front.541 This action, however, did not take place. In 
leading the advance, therefore, Amy believed that he would be encountering the 1st and 
12th SS Pz Divisions along his line of advance. 
The operations logs for the 4 Cdn Armd Div provided a deeper understanding as 
to what was happening with the units as they moved forward. Forced to advance on a 
complex narrow frontage, with the possibility of two German panzer divisions to his 
immediate front, Amy decided that urgency was secondary to an orderly advance in 
which the troop leaders could get a feel for the battle and where the ground and the 
enemy would dictate the course of the advance. Incessant demands to get moving or 
bypass resistance are generously strewn throughout the operation logs for 8 August. The 
telling exchanges however occurred just prior to the launch of Halpenny Force. 
At 1324 hrs, Control issued a warning that 20 Panther tanks were operating in the 
Cintheaux area. Halpenny Force crossed the start line at 1402 hrs. During the advance, 
Amy continued to ask for more information concerning the Panther tanks with one call at 
1447 hrs and another at 1504 hrs. At 1507 hrs, the 10 Cdn Inf Bde reported 15 German 
tanks moving south from Cintheaux. At 1522 hrs Amy received a report that 17 German 
Tiger tanks were located moving south from a position which placed them to the left and 
rear of his advancing formation.542 At 1526 hrs, Amy reported seeing four burning 
The grid reference corresponds with an area between Conteville and St. Aignan de Cramesnil. In 
addition, the advance was delayed from 1530 hrs to 1554 hrs as an air strike was called in to deal with the 
reported tanks. 
German tanks, which reinforced the validity of the reports he had been receiving on the 
Panther tanks. The mental picture in Amy's mind was one of a strong force of Panther 
tanks in front and a more potent force of Tiger tanks in the rear combined with an open 
flank with no obvious signs or support from the 1 Pol Armd Div.543 Amy's reluctance to 
storm the German defence with a rapid advance to Bretteville le Rabet is better 
understood within this context.544 Amy may have irritated Kitching and Booth by his 
slowness but he did keep his troops alive to fight another day. 545 
The records indicate that Kitching was on the move during the morning of 8 
August, trying to gain an appreciation of what was happening on the battlefield. There 
was no point in sitting at a wireless set urging people on when things bogged down so he 
decided to go and see the battle for himself in order to obtain some semblance of 
situational awareness. He visited the tactical headquarters of 2 Cdn Inf Div HQ at 0700 
hrs 8 August to get a better picture of what was happening in Phase I. Then he visited HQ 
10 Cdn Inf Bde and returned to Main Div about 1200 hrs to meet Simonds.546 In the 
543Amy's caution seemed justified in his own mind when he started receiving fire from the Polish front, 
where he expected the 1st SS Pz Div to be located. Amy had little information on the success or failures of 
the Phase I attacks or the disposition of the units from these attacks. In addition, he had little information as 
to what was happening on his flanks and his tank troops were starting to take casualties. Ops Log 8 Aug 
44, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1-31 August 1944, App 5. 
544
 A. B. French, Letter [Comments of draft Chapter VII], Dr Reginald Roy Special Collections University 
of Victoria, 16 January 1981. 
545Amy stated that he took three very important and fundamental military lessons away from this 
experience: first, never commit troops to battle who are not well briefed on all aspects of their part of an 
operation. Second, commanders must ensure that the details involved in facilitating or staging a battle, 
including the deployment, are closely monitored. The last point that stuck with Amy was the requirement 
for the commander to be up front, particularly when the momentum of an attack had slowed. Amy believed 
that more often than not, this action could restore the momentum of the attack. Amy, [Recollections on 
Normandy]. 
546
 It is possible that the Gaumesnil issue was discussed by Kitching. If Foulkes had agreed to Kitching 
taking Gaumesnil then his visit to 10 Cdn Inf Bde makes sense since he would have then passed on the 
task/change of plans to Jefferson. Simonds could have been briefed at 1200 hrs on the change at which 
point he may have cancelled the Kitching plan and ordered 2 Cdn Inf Bde to take on the task. War Diary, 
4th Cdn Armd Div 1-31 April 1944, 8 Aug. 
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afternoon Kitching appears to have concentrated on trying to find out what was going on 
with 4 Cdn Armd Bde. 
The lack of consistent communications from the front played a key role in 
keeping senior officers in the dark. Inexperience in battle and German expertise in 
jamming appear to have been the main factors. Wigle reprimanded the brigade majors for 
not passing back timely information to keep the GOC informed about hourly events 
occurring in their brigades and among the artillery regiments.547 Even though 
communication discipline was thought to have been generally good, the communications 
between the regiments and battalions during 8 August and, particularly in the evening of 
8 August, was difficult. Reports of jamming and heavy interference were reported 
consistently throughout the night of 8/9 August and would continue throughout the 
operation. 
Simonds levelled considerable criticism at Halpenny for withdrawing his tanks 
into a harbour on the night of 8 August. His actions must, therefore, be placed in context. 
Harbouring usually happened about 800 to 1000 yds behind the forward infantry. The 
tanks were close enough to render assistance if needed but far enough away to carry out 
essential work. The reality of armoured warfare was that the lives of the tank crews 
depended on properly working machinery, particularly the guns, radios and engine. The 
cleaning routine was continuous and inspections frequent, especially on optical 
equipment and weapons. Tank tracks also required maintenance every night in harbour. 
Engine maintenance and any other repairs were also done at night in more distant safe 
547
 War Diary, 4th Cdn Armd Div 1-31 April 1944, entry 10 Aug; Roy, 1944: The Canadians in 
Normandy, 230 
548
 At 2200 hrs, Control reported that interference was "very heavy, cannot make out speech of stations" 
and at 0045 hrs Booth reported from his command tank that he could not hear "control." War Diary, 4 Cdn 
Armd Bde, 1-31 August 1944, App 5. 
212 
harbours. Occasionally engines had to be hoisted out of the tank or completely replaced 
and this required heavy lifting gear. Heavy recovery vehicles and maintenance trucks had 
to be brought up at night and kept away from the front line. Recharging tank batteries to 
maintain power for the radio and engine required noisy equipment. Ammunition and fuel 
required daily replenishment, depending on the distance travelled and whether the tanks 
had been in action. Refilling ammunition bins and refuelling was done by hand. In the 
case of fuel, jerricans were used to fill the 300-gallon fuel tank on the Sherman. As long 
as tank ammunition had to be loaded manually into the tank there was no other option 
than to withdraw to a place where all of this activity could be conducted safe from 
German observation.549 Harbouring at night was what the units had been trained to do. 
This procedure had been practiced during exercises in England and no changes had been 
made to armoured doctrine as a consequence of the early fighting in Normandy. 
Halpenny's actions are therefore understandable. 
Closer examination must also be given to the orders Simonds gave to the two 
armoured divisions in continuing the attack into the night of 8/9 August. Simonds ordered 
Kitching to continue operations through the night to secure Pt 195 a further four miles 
south.550 At the same time the Poles were to "feel" their way forward and take Cauvicourt 
at first light. This was a relatively modest objective for the Poles and represents a 
puzzling decision when the relationship between the location of Pt 195 and Cauviourt are 
considered. If all went according to the new plan and the Poles captured Cauvicourt and 
the 4th Cdn Armd Div captured Pt 195, the tactical situation at first light would have 
549
 John Timothy Alfred Claydon, "Green Flash: Tanks and 4th Canadian Armoured Division, Normandy 
1944" (Masters of Arts, Carleton University), 110-112. 
550The 1st Cdn Army Ops log records Simonds intent to continue op TOTALIZE with the original plan 
remaining in force. 4 Cdn and 1 Polish Armd Divs will push straight on tonight. Ops Log, serial 128,War 
Diary, 1st Canadian Army- General Staff ,1-31 August 1944, 8 Aug. 
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found the entire left flank of the 4 Cdn Armd Div unprotected from Cauvicourt to 
Quesnay Woods (a distance of some 5,000 yards) with battle group Wiinsche arrayed in 
Quesnay Woods. Bretteville le Rabet, at that point, was under attack by the Grenadier 
Guards and the Lake Superior Regiment. A counter-attack by the Germans against 
Bretteville by Wiinsche's forces would have cut off Worthington Force on Pt 195. The 
difference between what actually happened to Worthington Force and what might have 
happened had the operations for that evening been executed as planned may have been 
minor. The main difference, however, between the two scenarios is that Kitching would 
have known where Worthington was and the arranged support would have fallen on 
target to support him. The tactical objectives given to Kitching and Maczek by Simonds 
on the evening of 8 August raise serious questions as to Simonds' own situational 
awareness and tactical acumen. 
Given what is now known about the German disposition on the evening of 8 
August, the actions of Worthington Force must be re-assessed. The outcome must be 
examined within the totality of the actions of 9 August. Worthington's mistake presented 
Meyer with a significant problem. Quesnay Woods was the centre of the German 
defensive position and the Germans now had Canadian instead of German forces in the 
middle of their main defensive line. If Worthington Force was reinforced and allowed to 
push forward, the German defensive position would have been compromised, forcing 
them to withdraw. The Germans had to react to this situation decisively and ordered 
battle group Wiinsche with the support of battle group Krause to counter-attack.551 
551
 Wiinsche's battle group was concentrated in Quesnay Woods and had the support of German artillery 
and anti-tank guns. Meyer states that five Tiger tanks and 15 Panther tanks were used to attack the force 
with the Tigers taking up positions on the western flank to shoot in the Panthers attacking from battle group 
Krause's firm base on the ridge north of Assy. Reynolds, Steel Inferno, 240. 
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Map 16: Proposed Disposition morning 9 August 1944, Modified Operation Totalize map, printed by 14 
Field Survey Squadron R.E. Feb 1948. 
The important point in the Worthington Force story is that this Force tied up the 
remaining German mobile striking power for almost the entire day of 9 August making 
them unavailable elsewhere to counter-attack either the renewed 4 Cdn Armd Div attacks 
on Bretteville and Pt 195 or the Polish advance to Estrees la Campagne. The 3rd company 
26th Pz Regt along with stragglers from 89 Inf Div were to occupy and defend themselves 
on Pt 195.552 Leaving the high point of Pt 195 unoccupied was a significant tactical 
mistake on Kurt Meyer's part. It can be argued that the 2 Cdn Corps success of 9 August 
can be directly attributed to Worthington Forces' prolonged and determined fight on Hill 
140. The initiative was taken away from the Germans who were placed in a reactive 
Meyer, History of the 12th SS Panzer Division, 176. 
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status until the Worthington threat had been eliminated. The failure of the Poles to relieve 
and or, more importantly, reinforce Worthington's breakthrough is therefore more 
compelling. 
Kitching expressed his frustration with the Polish effort during the first two days 
of combat: 
I don't know what went wrong with the Poles on those two days, 8 and 9 August, 
but they certainly were no help to us. They hardly moved an inch on the eighth, so 
much so that General Rennie of the 51st Highland Division complained to 
General Simonds about their inactivity and the fact that they continued to pour 
vehicles and men into his area without making any moves forward to ease the 
congestion. They were not much better on the ninth when Worthington captured 
one of their objectives at 7:00 a.m., thinking he was on his objective, Point 195.553 
Kitching formed a very poor opinion of the Poles from this point on. Although never 
overtly stated, Kitching likely held the Poles responsible for the destruction of 
Worthington's force. If the Poles had of been as aggressive as Worthington on 9 August, 
they should have been in a position to come to the relief of Worthington Force. Given the 
terrain, the Poles should have been in a position to identify or at least deduce an attack on 
friendly forces ahead of them, particularly after they had taken Estrees la Campagne.554 
If they could not have physically reached Worthington Force, they should have been in a 
position to supply artillery support and provide 2 Cdn Corps with information regarding 
the possibility of friendly troops in a location ahead of them. No evidence was found to 
indicate that either of these two possibilities occurred until members of the BCR found 
their way into Polish lines. By this time, however, it was too late.555 
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555Crerar's assessment of the Poles mirrored Kitching's. The "bog-down" of the 2 Cdn Corps attack, as 
Crerar saw it, was mainly due to the "dog fight" that developed between the 1st Pol Armd Div and German 
units in Quesnay Woods. Had the Poles smoked off and contained the enemy there and pushed on with the 
bulk of their strength, they would have widened the front and increased the depth for a tactically decisive 
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An important command decision for Kitching on 8 August was what to do about 
Booth. In his book, Kitching discussed his attempts to find Booth and stated that he found 
Booth asleep in his tank two miles from the battlefield. Kitching also stated that he 
"dressed him down" and "got him going."556 Kitching later revealed that Booth was in 
fact drunk. The fact that he was drunk in the face of the enemy was dereliction of duty 
and represented one of a number of offences under which he could have been charged. 
Reid, in No Holding Back, suggests that Kitching felt that it would not be quite "on" to 
subject a senior officer to the public humiliation of a court martial.557 When pressed 
during an interview with Donald Graves in 1998, Kitching replied that Booth had not yet 
done anything to warrant his relief.558 Kitching recounts the incident as follows: 
When his brigade was held up at the beginning of our Phase II, I looked for him to 
hear what was wrong. I had the greatest difficulty locating him and he would not 
answer calls on the radio. When I finally found him he was nearly two miles away 
from the battle and fast asleep in his tank. I personally had to climb up on the tank 
to wake him and tell him to go and see what was happening. I was so angry that I 
ordered him out of the tank and gave him a tongue-lashing for five minutes. He 
was almost in tears when he went forward.559 
Being drunk in the face of the enemy is clear cause for relieving an officer of his 
command. Kitching's action and statements are, therefore, hard to reconcile. The first 
issue that has been assumed but not necessarily proven, is that the event happened during 
the combat portion of Phase II. Most estimates, based in part on the armoured brigade's 
message traffic, place the event in the late afternoon, probably between 1500 and 1800 
advance. As it was, when darkness came, they had advanced "not more than a few hundred yards." English, 
The Canadian Army and the Normandy Campaign, 290. 
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hrs. A liberal translation however of the text "beginning of our phase II" could apply to 
any portion of the 4th Cdn Armd Div advance on 8 August. Had the event occurred before 
the 1400 hr launch of the division in Phase n, then Kitching's statement that Booth had 
not yet done anything to warrant his relief could in part be rationalized. Kitching could 
have argued that he had straightened Booth out and when the brigade launched, Booth 
was, in fact, at the helm commanding the brigade. 
If the traditional time line of late afternoon is accepted, Kitching had a number of 
options with respect to his actions towards Booth. Do nothing and allow him to continue, 
relieve him on the spot or allow him to continue for that day and relieve him at the 
earliest possible opportunity. Kitching decided to allow Booth to continue. 
Each of these options carried a considerable amount of risk and it is difficult in 
hindsight to judge a commander's decision made in the heat of battle. There is value in 
examining Kitching's options since the second and third order effects of the decision he 
made that day would shape the command and leadership circumstances that played out 
over the next two weeks. Relieving Booth on the spot meant finding a replacement. There 
is no way of knowing whether the conversation with Simonds over a replacement for 
Booth would have already taken place and it would have taken time for Moncel to be 
notified and brought forward. An interim commander would have had to come from 
within the division. Worthington, Kitching's first choice, could have been brought 
forward at this point, but there would have been a time lag as Worthington gained 
situational awareness over the battlefield. Keeping Booth in command offered the 
advantage of continuity of command with the promise of maintaining the momentum of 
the attack. The reality of the situation however, was that the tactical battle under the 
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control of Halpenny was not going well and Booth's actions were not having the desired 
effect. A fresh perspective from a new brigade commander may have provided a new 
course of action that could have restored the momentum and speed of the attack. 
If Kitching considered relieving Booth on 9 August, the available candidates from 
within the division were all committed or had vanished. Worthington was lost on the 
battlefield and locked in a desperate battle; Scott had been ordered to Pt 195 to 
Worthington's relief; and Halpenny was locked in a fight for Bretteville. Given 
Halpenny's cautious nature on the 8 August, it is probable that Kitching may not have 
instinctively looked to him. The other options were Wotherspoon of the S AR or Roberts 
of the Manitoba Dragoons. Roberts was not really part of 4th Cdn Armd Div since his unit 
was only on loan to Kitching for the operation. Wotherspoon represented Kitching's only 
real choice. Once it was clear, however, that Worthington Force was not on Pt 195, any 
thoughts of relieving Booth would have been superseded by the requirement to find and 
help the BCR. Changing the brigade commander at this point may have created more 
problems than it solved. 
There is little doubt that, had the true location of Worthington's Force been found 
during 9 August, Kitching would have faced quite the dilemma. Any attempt to send 
relief forces required the approval of Simonds, since 4 Cdn Armd Div forces would have 
had to cross into the Polish sector and any such force would have had to contend with the 
German defenses in Quesnay Woods. The greatest impediment to any relieving action 
with respect to Worthington Force was the fact that radio communication had been lost 
with the group early in the morning. This fact narrowed the possible options available to 
Kitching since coordinated action between the two groups would have been difficult. The 
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conservative course of action would have been a withdrawal, covered by smoke and air 
cover. The more aggressive approach would have been reinforcing Worthington's force 
in an attempt to break through on the east side of Quesnay Woods and not through Pt 
195. 
The length of time that the Foot Guards took to launch their relief operation on 9 
August has also been the subject of scorn. Michael Reynolds states, in Steel Inferno, that 
it took, "an extraordinary seven hours to reach the area of Bretteville le Rabet."560 The 
Foot Guards actions, therefore, must be placed in context. They reached Roquancourt at 
0700 hrs after an all night move. At 1000 hours, the regiment was ordered to move on to 
Gaumesnil, a distance of three miles, which it reached at 1100 hrs. Scott had been called 
to Bde HQ at 1030 hrs and returned to Gaumesnil shortly after 1100 hrs with orders from 
Booth. Four hours later, at 1500 hrs, they were some three miles further down the Falaise 
road at Bretteville-le-Rabet. In that four-hour timeframe, Scott had to await the arrival of 
his attached troops. He then had to brief his squadron and attached commander, make 
final preparations for the move and move the three miles to Bretteville-le-Rabet, the start 
point for their advance.561 As it was, Scott began the attack without elements of his 
supporting force who had failed to marry up with the main attack force. 
While operations had faltered, TOTALIZE demonstrated that the training of the 
echelon troops in England had paid dividends when it came to supporting the fighting 
echelons under the most hazardous conditions. In response to the need to get fuel and 
ammunition forward, elements of the A-l echelon troops left the rear areas and moved 
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their operations closer to the fighting forces. This move facilitated quicker re-supply, 
recovery and repair of vehicles. The Foot Guards, for example, found it necessary to 
detach half a dozen ammunition and fuel lorries to provide more immediate support to the 
tanks. This initiative resulted in a number of disabled tanks being repaired and put back 
into service in short order. This practice became very important since, by 10 August, 
operating tanks were becoming a rare commodity within the division.562 
Improvisation became the new routine for re-supply. At 1100 hrs 10 August, the 
A-l Echelon of the Foot Guards received word that the fighting squadrons were running 
low on fuel and ammunition. It was evident that the supply trucks could not move 
forward to re-supply the formations under the normal practice. In this case, Proctor 
established a supply point in the rear of the regimental position. Three armour recovery 
vehicles were loaded with supplies and moved forward from the rear echelons to the 
supply point. The tanks of No 2 Squadron picked up the supplies from this point and 
brought forward the fuel and ammunition on their back decks to positions in the rear of 
No 3 Squadron's positions on the hill. This activity invariably attracted the attention of 
German artillery and mortar fire resulting in a number of fatal casualties; however, this 
method proved successful in re-supplying the forward positions on Pt 195 and Pt 180. 
The high number of tank casualties sustained by the division put a severe strain 
on the replacement system. The Forward Delivery Squadron delivered its entire holdings 
to the division. This, plus the repair of the tanks in the workshops, provided a stopgap 
562
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solution. RCEME was instructed to try and repair approximately 20 tanks where they 
were. They were told specifically not to try and recover the vehicles because 51st Div 
carrying out recovery work on their vehicles had blocked the roads. A release of three M 
10 and 19 Sherman 17-pdrs was received from 2 Cdn Corps resources but a serious 
shortage of tank crews was making itself felt throughout this period, further restricting 
the tank strength of the regiments.564 
The policy with respect to tank crew replacement came to a head during Proctor's 
daily A/Q conference on 11 August. 4 Cdn Armd Bde wanted to reconstitute tank crews 
from surviving members of a regiment. Kitching's policy was that the armoured 
regiments had to accept replacement crews. In Kitching's view, if salvaged crews were 
used again, the original cadre of the regiments would be used up and the regiments would 
be composed of only reinforcement personnel. By having surviving crew members 
without tanks returned to the reinforcement units, the process of incorporating and 
indoctrinating new replacements into the regiments would be made easier. In this 
conference, 4th Cdn Armd Bde was directed to comply with the GOC policy.565 
Infantry reinforcements became a critical issue within 2 Cdn Corps and had an 
important impact on 4 Cdn Armd Div. A Branch had been working for two days to secure 
an allocation of reinforcements to replace the losses of the Tilly battles. 2 Cdn Corps had 
The other factor that exacerbated the availability of tanks was the sanitization process that a tank had to 
undergo when a crew member was killed within the tank. The process required the cleaning of the internal 
part of the tank. According to the required process, the tank could not be returned to service for 24 hours. 
War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div -AA&QMG, 1-31 August 1944, entry 10 Aug. 
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given 2 Cdn Inf Div the priority in reinforcements and supply demands.566 Getting the 
reinforcements that had been finally secured forward to the echelons was another matter, 
since the roads had been closed to northbound traffic, which prevented Proctor from 
sending transport to get them.567 
The realities of combat challenged the normal administrative routines. Many 
portions of the division "Q" staff complained that ADREPS were late and incomplete due 
in part to faulty communications with the brigades. Despite the frequent moves, traffic 
jams, faulty trucks and the fact that they were in their first major battle, the A & Q 
Branch of the division were able to keep the supply of essential quantities of fuel and 
foodstuffs moving forward within the divisional supply system.569 Critical deficiencies 
however began to register in 6-pdr and 17-pdr sabot anti-tank rounds that continued 
through to the start of the next operation.570 
The first complete ADREP from 2 August recorded the following strength for 4th 
Cdn Armd Div: 333 tanks, 103 armoured cars, 140 scout cars, 868 officers and 15,516 
ORs. According to the division ADREPS, the division entered TOTALIZE on 8 August 
with 328 tanks, 75 armoured cars and 138 scout cars. At 0245 hrs 10 August, the returns 
highlighted the enormous attrition in soldiers and tanks resulting from TOTALIZE. The 
566
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division was reporting 247 battle-worthy tanks, 78 armoured cars and 97 scout cars.571 
The strength of the division on 8 August was 869 officers and 15,383 ORs. Two days 
later, the division strength was recorded at 824 officers and 14,248 ORs.572 
10 Cdn Inf Bde reported 15 officers and 265 other ranks as casualties; 4 Cdn 
Armd Bde listed 56 officers and 472 other ranks as casualties. When these figures are 
added to the casualties suffered by the divisional troops, the total casualties were 83 
officers and 921 other ranks.573 Included in this total was the loss of four regimental 
commanders: Worthington, Murrell, Hay and Monk.574 The fighting strength of the 
infantry battalions were all recorded as less than 85 percent. The Lincoln & Welland 
Regiment was the worst at 72 percent, the Algonquin Regiment and Argylls at 82 percent 
and the Lake Superior Regiment at 85 percent.575 
The assigned "rest area" for the division was described as anything but, since it 
was under German shellfire and some areas were under direct German observation.576 
The two days spent out of the line by the division were put to most profitable use in rest, 
reinforcement and preparation. Lessons learned had to be assimilated. The range and 
hitting power of the German Tiger and Panther tanks in Normandy was a shock and 
threw Canadian tactics into disarray.577 All the tank crews in the division worked at 
getting the vehicles in shape and truckloads of Tiger and Sherman tracks salvaged from 
burnt-out tanks were welded on to thicken the armoured skins for the next attack.578 
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During these days in the reserve positions, shelling was unceasing and severe. Added to 
this nuisance, the twin plagues of Normandy—dysentery and vermin— though not so 
lethal, inflicted miseries on many. 
The general level of physical fatigue experienced by tank crews and front-line 
soldiers was profound. The tanks were often on the move before dawn and, when called 
into action, tanks were often moved out just as soon as the infantry could begin mopping 
up. By the time that the men of Halpenny Force went into battle on 8 August, most had 
had little to no rest for the previous 24-hour period. The rest situation was worse for the 
Foot Guards and BCR's who had left the concentration area at midnight and had had little 
opportunity to acquire any meaningful rest the entire day of the advance south. The 
expectation would have been that the regiments would harbour and rest that evening for 
operations the following day. The Grenadier Guards was the only regiment that was able 
to harbour and rest the first night. Both the Foot Guards and the BCRs carried out night 
moves leading to action the following day, with no appreciable time to rest the troops 
prior to battle or to conduct proper battle procedure. The inexperienced soldiers soon 
learned that sleep had to be managed like any other logistical commodity. 
The division had trained on the premise of limited objectives, thorough 
reconnaissance, careful briefings and some way of identifying the objective.580 
Establishing a "firm base", flank guards, gun lines and sticking to a plan were essential 
elements in the framework of British and Canadian attacks. Battle procedure prescribed 
an ideal concept for preparing troops for battle but this was not how the 4 Cdn Armd Div 
was introduced into its first major battle. Deployment drills and procedures were 
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designed to eliminate confusion, minimize the effects of the fog of war and ensure the 
optimum use of the time available between receipt of the warning order and crossing the 
start line. The division had such procedures and they had been practiced in England. On 
the night of 7/8 August, however, there was a serious breakdown at more than one level 
within the division in the application of this deployment drill.581 There is no clear 
explanation as to why some information was not made available earlier at the lower 
levels to help prepare the troops adequately for their first battle or why essential elements 
of Kitching's plans, such as the enemy situation and the intent of the attack, were altered. 
The result of this breakdown was that the leading elements of the division were launched 
into their first battle with less than 14 hours' notice, not properly briefed and lacking 
proper rest. 
The results of TOTALIZE were less a product of troop inexperience—for 
Canadian soldiers had performed well when correctly employed— than the result of a 
flawed concept. The soldiers were well-trained and responsive to anything that was asked 
of them and the argument that success was lost because of green troops represents an 
attempt to shift the focus from a flawed plan. Kurt Meyer considered TOTALIZE an 
example of "inflexible, time wasting method", whereby staff planning and preparation 
"succeeded in burying the enemy under several thousand tons of explosives."582 Never 
once did speed, which he considered to be the most powerful weapon of armoured 
warfare, appear to have been a paramount concern.583 Meyer is wrong in this assessment 
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since speed was the overriding imperative of Phase II. In order to have speed, however, 
the units and their commanders would have needed training on improvisation, initiative 
and flexibility. This was not the Anglo-British way of war and simply demanding speed 
in the attack did not make it happen. These competencies can only be acquired through 
intensive and realistic training, which challenged the leadership of the division at all 
levels. An effective commander understands the limitations of his troops and uses them 
accordingly until they have developed the expertise and confidence to carry out more 
challenging tasks. Under ideal conditions, this experience can be acquired in training. 
Unfortunately for the leaders and soldiers of the 4 Cdn Armd Div, this knowledge had to 
be acquired in combat. 
The revised Phase II, combined with the continuation of the attack through the 
night, demanded more than either the Polish or 4th Cdn Armd Div could deliver in their 
first battle. Jack English postulated that it might have been better had Simonds 
committed the 3 Cdn Inf Div supported by the 2 Cdn Armd Bde to the "second break in" 
rather than the Poles. This proposal would have at least alleviated communications 
difficulties, due to language, and seen two additional experienced infantry brigades in 
action.584 Better yet Simonds should have kept to his original plan since it had the 
greatest potential for success against the anticipated and the actual German defences 
encountered. 
In its first operation, the 4th Cdn Armd Div made the furthest penetration by 2 
Cdn Corps into the German defenses. While TOTALIZE, as an operation, may have been 
halted by the failure to capture Quesnay Woods, the possibility of getting to Falaise based 
on the tactical situation still existed in Kitching's mind. The operation, however, had 
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taken a heavy toll among the senior leadership ranks of the division. The BCR and the 
Algonquin Regiment had to be reconstituted and new men and lessons learned 
assimilated. There are clear indications, however, that the soldiers of 4th Cdn Armd Div 
had overcome the apprehension of being in their first battle, had survived their baptism of 
fire, had learned some very hard lessons but were ready to take on the Germans again. 
Their opportunity would come a few days later with a new operation codenamed 
TRACTABLE. 
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Chapter Eight: TRACTABLE 
The Americans had executed a successful breakout of the Normandy bridgehead 
through the successful execution of Operation Cobra and in late July their forces were 
swinging south and east into the French countryside. The bulk of the German forces in 
the west were now dangerously overextended as a result of operations against the 
Americans in the Mortain area. This situation presented the Allies with the unique 
opportunity to entrap the remaining forces of the German Fifth Panzer Army, the Seventh 
Army and Panzer Group Eberbach. With the First Cdn Army and the Second Br Army 
pressing down from the north and west, and the First and Third U.S. Armies sweeping in 
from the west and south, the major concentration of German forces in Normandy could 
be encircled. The only potential escape route for the Germans ran through Falaise in the 
north and Argentan in the south. The movement of German troops clearly indicated that 
they were moving east through this gap. It was, therefore, imperative that the Allies close 
off the escape route as quickly as possible. 
Based on this evolving situation, Montgomery issued his directive M 518 on 11 
August in which he stressed the importance of closing what was called the Falaise-
Alengon Gap. He now ordered First Cdn Army to capture Falaise. This action had the 
highest priority and was to be done quickly. Once this was accomplished, strong 
armoured and mobile forces were to secure Argentan. A secure front was to be held 
between Falaise and the sea, facing eastwards. The 12th Army Group would then swing 
its right flank forward from the Le Mans area up to Alengon and then on to the general 
line Sees-Carrouges.585 
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Map 17: Plan for Op TRACTABLE . Roy, 1944, 234. 
To accomplish this task, it was necessary for 2 Cdn Corps to advance across the 
Laison River, and to capture the villages of Olendon, Epancy and Perrieres, which 
dominated the route to the northeast. This move would also seal off the exit towards Jort 
on the Dives River. It was also of the utmost importance to secure the road and bridges 
between Falaise and Damblainville. This action would allow 2 Cdn Corps to either 
capture or dominate Trun and link up with Third U.S. Army. The 1st Br Corps would 
conform on the northern flank and present a firm front as far as the sea, while Second Br 
Army on the right continued to advance towards Falaise from the west.586 The physical 
occupation of Falaise was not to be carried out by First Cdn Army, as originally ordered, 
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but by Second Br Army. This reflected a realistic approach based on the disposition of 
the two armies. 
The Canadian gains in TOTALIZE represented a serious threat to the German 
lines of communications which had to be kept open at all costs in order to allow the six 
German armoured divisions trapped at Mortain to withdraw. Unfortunately for the 
Germans, withdrawal of these forces had been left until the last minute based mainly on 
Hitler's refusal to accept the failure of the Mortain offensive. In an attempt to buy time, 
available German forces were cobbled together and were injected into the line to try and 
shore up the German defences around the northern edge of the pocket around Falaise.588 
The German forces facing 2 Cdn Corps were controlled by I SS Pz Corps and 
consisted of the 85th, 89th, 271st and 272nd Inf Divs, supported by elements of 12 SS Pz 
Div. The enemy disposition as depicted in Canadian orders for TRACTABLE stated: 
It appears that 271 Div is being moved to the east to thicken up def posn on line 
of LE LAISON RIVER EAST of CAEN_FALAISE. 85 Div is also reported in 
this area backed up by three battle gps[groups] of 12 SS Div. These battle gps 
probably consist of a bn of inf and sqn of tks (some Mkl and MKII Tiger). 
Enemy def on this front is made up of a lt[light] inf screen backed up by large 
numbers of 88 mms along gen line of river. Behind these SOUTH of river on 
rev[erse] slope are Nebelwerfers. 
The enemy disposition concluded with the statement "It is Not considered that the enemy 
def posn is in depth."590 The expectation was that, once the initial crust of the defensive 
network was breached, the advance would be lightly opposed. 
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At 1000 hours on 13 August, Simonds held a conference with his division 
commanders on Operation TALLULAH. It was obvious to Simonds that Quesnay Wood 
and the hills south of it represented the shortest route to Falaise. It was also the area 
easiest to defend. In the formulation of his plan Simonds considered the following: 
• Preliminary bombardments warned the Germans of the frontage of an attack 
and enabled him to bring heavy fire onto the follow-on formations thus 
preventing a penetration in depth 
• The infantry rate of advance of 100 yds in 3 minutes in deep attack provided 
the Germans with time to react and concentrate their anti-tank guns and 
heavier weapons on the advancing forces 
• The proper employment of armour was to position it so that the Germans had 
to drive it out in order to regain their freedom of manoeuvre 
• The existing German gun screen had to be penetrated under cover of darkness 
or smoke.591 
Simonds decided to launch a powerful attack that would sweep around Quesnay Woods 
and Potigny with the goal of gaining "command" of the important road network that ran 
through Falaise. The specific intent of the operation was to seize and hold the high 
ground in the area of Versainville followed by an assault on Falaise.592 
Instead of attacking Quesnay Woods and Potigny directly, Simonds decided to 
neutralize these areas with attacks by heavy bombers during the advance towards the 
CQ-5 
Laison River by the ground forces. The intervening ground to the southeast was rolling 
and bare affording only sparse cover to any defenders. On the other hand, the open fields 
baked firm by the August sun, allowed a convenient freedom to deploy. Simonds decided 
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to use the same general technique as in TOTALIZE, but with significant variations. Two 
divisions would attack side by side, the 4 Cdn Armd Div on the left, the 3 Cdn Inf Div on 
the right. TRACTABLE was to be a massive armoured thrust that would take place in 
broad daylight after a short but heavy bombardment by all available artillery, supported at 
strategic moments by medium and heavy bombers.594 
Simonds decided to launch TRACTABLE595 in daylight since he believed that the 
Germans were anticipating another night attack. He felt that this tactic would avoid the 
confusion that occurred on the night of 7/8 August and would help in the crossing of the 
Laison River. To screen the attacking force against German anti-tank and artillery fire, 
Simonds planned to use smoke in front and on either flank of the advancing columns, 
especially during the first phase. The theory was that the enemy anti-tank gunners could 
not hit what they could not see.596 The smoke barrage was another lesson learned from 
TOTALIZE when the armoured divisions were forced to advance without the cover of 
smoke. 
In TOTALIZE, the armoured breakthrough in Phase I had not stopped the by-
passed German positions from hitting the follow-on infantry. The problem in this 
operation was to get the infantry forward and have their clearing operations in progress 
while the tanks were still breaking through. Simonds' solution was a "phalanx type" 
formation, consisting of two divisional columns. The columns would storm across the 
river, each on a front of roughly 800 yards, finally converging on the high ground at 
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Orme des Gresles and Versainville and the low ridge between. An armoured brigade 
would lead each column; a brigade of infantry mounted in "Priests" would follow with 
another infantry brigade bringing up the rear to clear the area of any remaining German 
forces. On the right, 3rd Cdn Inf Div, with 2nd Cdn Armd Bde under its command, would 
strike straight to the river's edge at Montboint, with 9th and 7th Cdn Inf Bdes following in 
that order.598 The left-hand column would include 4th Cdn Armd Bde, with the 8th Cdn Inf 
Bde under command for the first phase of the operation. The 10th Cdn Inf Bde would 
follow.599 On the left, 51st Highland Div of 1st Br Corps was to advance from the St. 
Sylvain sector and capture La Bu-sur-Rouvres, directly to the east, thus protecting the 
flank of the operation. 
Kitching was given command of a sizable force for Phase I of TRACTABLE.600 
In addition to the extra infantry brigade, 4th Cdn Armd Div was given control over the 
18th Cdn Armd C Regt and was also allotted the 19th Army Field Regiment from the 2nd 
AGRA. This regiment, with its own self-propelled artillery regiment together with the 
23rd Field Regiment would provide supporting fire as the armour and infantry pushed 
steadily further into enemy territory. This tactic redressed the problem of lack of artillery 
support encountered by 4th Cdn Armd Div in its advance during Phase II of 
TOTALIZE.601 
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TRACTABLE was to be carried out in three phases. In Phase I the attacking 
forces were to cross the Laison River and seize the high ground area Pt 118 and Pt 103 
southeast of Montboint. Phase II involved a push south and southwest to capture the high 
ground northeast of Falaise with 3rd Cdn Inf Div tasked with capturing Pt 170 and Pt 175 
(a dominating hill roughly mid-way between Potigny and Falaise) and 4th Cdn Armd Div 
tasked with capturing the area ring contour 160 located northwest of Versainville, 
approximately 2.5 km northeast of Falaise.602 Phase III involved the capture of the 
bridges at Eraines and Damblainville preparatory to an advance southward on Trun to 
link up with the 15th U.S. Corps.603 
The method of attack was devised and formally dictated by Simonds. The 
armoured brigades were to lead each division's attack and were to advance at a rate of 12 
mph. On the right, the 2nd Cdn Armd Bde would charge down from Estrees la Campagne 
and cross the Laison River near Montboint. Without pausing, it was to swing south to 
capture its objective Pt 184. The 4th Cdn Armd Bde was to lead the division the two-mile 
distance to the Laison River, crossing between Rouvres and Maizieres. Once across, the 
Brigade would swing past Rouvres, Olendon and Epancy, by-passing all opposition, and 
seize the high ground above Versainville.604 
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Map 18: Operation TRACTABLE, Copp, The Battlefields in Normandy, 108. 
The 8th Cdn Inf Bde with two battalions riding in Priests, half-tracks and carriers 
was to seize the high ground at Pt 103. The remaining battalion, moving on foot, was to 
mop up the Laison valley and take care of any bypassed German units. Once Pt 103 was 
captured, 8th Cdn Inf Bde reverted to control of 3rd Cdn Inf Div and was to move and 
capture the town of Sassy. 5 
605lbid. 
The 10 Cdn Inf Bde was to pass through 8 Cdn Inf Bde, capture the village of 
Olendon, take over Perrieres from the Lake Superior Regiment, then press on to Epancy. 
If required, 10th Cdn Inf Bde was to be prepared to push forward to link up with the 
armour moving to the final objective at Versainville. The 18th Cdn Armd C Regt was 
ordered to reconnoitre in force, protect the divisional left flank between St. Sylvain and 
Maizieres and act as flank liaison with 51st Highland Div.606 Once across the Laison 
River, the regiment was to provide flank security on the left for the division and was to be 
prepared to conduct a reconnaissance in force of the wooded area south of Epancy and 
Perrieres while holding one squadron in reserve for the exploitation south and east of 
Eraines on orders from Kitching.607 Bombers would be used once again to support the 
ground attack. Between H-20 and H-5, medium and fighter-bombers were to engage 
enemy tank, gun and mortar positions up to the Laison valley along the line Montboint-
Rouvres-Maiziers. Two hours after the start of the operation, heavy bombers were slated 
to strike Quesnay Wood, Potigny and German defences astride the Falaise road. 
Kitching had little input into the tactical disposition or utilization of his division 
in TRACTABLE. His division orders mirrored the corps orders since Simonds had 
already dictated the brigade tasks. Kitching did however provide his assessment of the 
tactical situation and stated that he expected the main opposition to be an anti-tank screen 
along the line of the Laison River held by elements of the German 85th Div and 12 SS Pz 
The Regiment was to follow 8 Cdn Inf Bde across the Laison and extend its flank protection to Sassy, 
and after reconnoitring the wooded areas between Epancy and Damblainville, exploit to both those places, 
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Div. While Kitching's flexibility was limited he was careful to only assigned tasks to 
his brigades allowing his brigade commander the latitude they needed in deciding who 
would accomplish which objectives within those tasks. 
The phalanx formation forced Kitching to abandon the battle group formations he 
had used in TOTALIZE. Once the armour and infantry became separated in the drive 
forward, as was inevitable with the number of obstacles that had to be overcome, the 
tanks would be on their own without the support of either artillery or infantry.610 The net 
result of the operational plan was that Kitching was once again forced to enter into a 
major operation without having much input as to how his brigades were to be employed 
and with little flexibility to influence the tactical battle once the armoured phalanxes 
crossed the start line.611 
The plan itself has received considerable review from historians and has been 
called everything from a sound plan, imaginative, well-thought-out and one that carried a 
powerful blow, to a plan few coffee table strategists would use, even in desperation. 
Jack English has called TRACTABLE, "TOTALIZE in smoke" since the two operations 
bore an astounding resemblance to each other in concept. Foster, the commander of 
the 7th Cdn Inf Bde, described TRACTABLE as "certainly one of the strangest attack 
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formations anyone ever dreamed up and without a hope in hell of succeeding as 
planned." In his judgment, what "looked good to Guy's precise engineering mind on 
paper seldom worked in practice once the human element was added."614 Among the 
units of the armoured brigade, it was referred to as an "unusual tactical concept" by the 
BCR's, "slightly unorthodox" by the Grenadier Guards while the Grenadier Guards 
recorded it as an "impressive sight" of "parade ground order."615 
Massing the units solved the staff problem of getting hundreds of armoured 
vehicles to the start line in good order but did little to facilitate the combat effectiveness 
of the formations once they rolled forward and particularly when they had to fight. Not 
anticipating the huge amounts of dust that would be generated by massing the vehicles 
and the associated control and movement problems over the projected terrain was an 
extraordinary oversight on the part of 2nd Cdn Corps, especially when one considers the 
problems with visibility created by dust in the execution of TOTALIZE. A smoke screen 
as a tactical weapon could be designed and executed to blind the enemy. Dust however 
blinded all equally and added another level of complexity to the execution of the plan. 
Other opinions state that Simonds was learning from his past experience, 
especially the complaints of narrow frontages since he now gave the 4th Cdn Armd Div a 
divisional front that ran over a mile from Estrees la Campagne to Soignolles. While the 
frontage may have been greater, the phalanx type formation compacted the formations, 
which negated any possible advantage gained from a wider front and eliminated any 
thought of tactical manoeuvre. The rationale for the phalanx formation was based on the 
premise that speed equalled success. The use of smoke would help achieve surprise and 
614
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hide the advancing formations from anti-tank fire. Since smoke would only be provided 
for 30 minutes it was essential to advance in close intervals to get the fighting formations 
forward as fast as possible. Simonds even went as far as to stipulate an advance of 300 
yards per minute and 15-yard marshalling intervals between tanks, which was a level of 
detail appropriate for a squadron commander to ponder and certainly not the level of 
detail that Simonds, as a Corps commander, should have even contemplated.616 
On 13 August, Simonds summoned every senior officer to his headquarters and 
issued verbal orders for the upcoming operation. No written orders were issued. 
Following his Orders Group at 1000 hours, Simonds spoke to the assembled commanding 
officers of every armoured regiment. He made known his extreme displeasure with their 
performance in TOTALIZE. He stressed his belief that armour must be prepared to go 
forward during night or day and that any thought of armour requiring infantry protection 
for harbouring at night or not being able to move at night was to be dismissed 
immediately. He also stated that with the tremendous importance of the operation there 
would be cases where armour would be misemployed but this was to be no excuse for a 
lack of success in the upcoming operation. Kitching was appalled by Simonds' 
comments and told him so afterward. Simonds probably paid little heed to Kitching's 
criticisms. The implications of what Simonds was asking and the fact that the armoured 
regiments of 4th Cdn Armd Div had only been in action for less than a week were lost on 
Simonds. He was interested in results, not explanations. 
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On the evening of 13 August, a Canadian officer of 8 Cdn Recce Regt lost his 
way and was captured by the Germans along with Copy No. 8 of a 2 Cdn Inf Div 
Instruction which outlined the entire Corps plan. The Germans initiated a number of 
moves during the night of 13 August but these were focussed on eliminating the 2nd Cdn 
Inf Div position near Clair-Tizon. It is important to note that these moves weakened the 
defensive lines along the projected axis of TRACTABLE and that the units assigned to 
attack 2 Cdn Inf Div were not recalled after the Germans gained access to the 
TRACTABLE information.619 
The apparent German inaction in response to the TRACTABLE information can 
be understood given the fact that German units could only travel at night and that there 
were no additional units or formations available to ISS Pz Corps.620 One could conclude 
that it was too late to recall the attacking units which had already begun to move to their 
new positions. This left the Germans with one course of action which was to focus the 
619
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available resources along the expected axis of advance. The German disposition was 
listed as 85th Inf Div holding the right sector of the 1 SS Pz Corps front along the line of 
the Laison valley from Ernes to east of the Falaise road, 89th Inf Div in the central sector 
and 271 Inf Div holding the left portion of the front.622 It was also reported that the 
Germans had deployed between the main Caen-Falaise road on the west and the town of 
Mezieres on the east as many as 90 88mm guns in anti-tank positions.623 The battlegroups 
of the 12 SS Pz Div were held in reserve as a counterattack force. The 4 Cdn Armd Div 
Intelligence Summary based on information up to 2200 hrs 13 August listed the 
following German disposition: 
At least 3 divs are in part on our immediate front. In Quesnay Wood 1047 is 
HI/1054 GR [grenadier] of 85 Inf Div, sp by tks believed to be 12 SS Pz Div. In 
the area 1549 isl/1053 GR of 85 Div. PW statements have located elements of a 
battle gp of 12 SS in this area. Further left in LA BU SUR ROUVRES 1651 are 
two unknown bns of 980 GR of 272 Inf Div. A def line extends NE from there. 
Away on the RIGHT are the remnants of 89 and 271 Inf Divs, with again tk sp 
thought to be 12 SS.624 
The missing information was the depth of the German defensive line. The report stated, 
"Should the screen be linear, our job will be easy and inexpensive. If it is deeply 
echeloned, the fight may be costly." 625The stage was set for the next Canadian offensive. 
On the morning of 14 August Kurt Meyer, together with Max Wunsche, scouted the terrain north of 
Falaise to determine where to set up rear positions to meet the expected Canadian attack. They concentrated 
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The battle procedure within 4m Cdn Armd Div for TRACTABLE was deliberate 
and in concert with what had been practiced in England. Kitching held his final orders 
group for TRACTABLE at 1230 hrs on 13 August. New maps and aerial photographs 
were issued to all units, providing subordinate commanders the crucial information they 
needed to do their own estimates and reconnaissance. Orders groups were given early 
enough to allow plenty of time for preparation at subordinate levels. At 1800 hrs, Wigle 
held a conference for the brigade majors and adjutants to discuss the final details for the 
assembly and forming up of the division and its attached units.626 In less than 24 hours, 
Kitching and his staff officers had once again been called upon to change their operations 
plans. They did an outstanding job of refocusing and preparing the division from a 
possible advance in support of the drive of 2 Cdn Div in the area of Ussy on the extreme 
right of the 2 Cdn Corps boundary to its new role in TRACTABLE on the extreme left of 
the 2 Cdn Corps attack.627 
Booth held his orders group at 1600 hrs 13 August and the commanders of the 
armoured regiments held their orders groups between 2000 and 2200 hrs. The troops 
were then given plenty of time to rest. The 4th Cdn Armd Bde advance would happen in 
three phases; 
• Phase I, crossing the Laison River 
• Phase II, firming up and regrouping 
• Phase III, advancing to the high ground northeast of Falaise 
War Diary, 4th Cdn Armd Div, 1-31 August 1944, entry 14 Aug. 
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The German situation, as detailed in the Brigade orders group noted that the 12l SS Pz 
Div was "probably split up into battle groups covering the entire front." The major 
opposition was expected to come from the 85th and 272nd Inf Div and flak units used in 
the anti-tank role.629 
Jefferson held his O Group for 10th Cdn Inf Bde at 2200 hrs. Battalion orders 
groups occurred generally one hour later. The SAR was to lead the 10th Cdn Inf Bde 
advance in extended line, followed by the infantry battalions in lorries. The advance for 
10th Cdn Inf Bde was to begin at 1300 hrs, one hour after the 2nd Cdn Corps H-Hour.630 
The division would go into battle with a number of new Commanding Officers. 
Maj R. A. Keane was promoted to Lt Col and was given command of the Lake Superior 
Regiment. Maj W.T. Cromb, formerly second in command (2 I/C) of the Argylls, took 
over command of the Lincoln & Welland Regiment and Maj R. A. Bradburn from the 
SAR was promoted and given command of the Algonquin Regiment. Major Parish 
remained in command of the BCR.631 
Monday, 14 August, was another hot, sunny day. Visibility was good. Booth held 
a final conference at 0900 hrs 14 August to clear up any last details of the operation. 
Simonds visited Kitching at 1000 hrs to ascertain if there were any last minute problems. 
At 1100 hrs Kitching left for his command post in the area of Cintheaux with both 
brigade commanders and Brig Lane, to await the start of the operation.632 
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The 4 Cdn Armd Div was lined up on the left of the Corps. Kitching had almost 
a division and a half under his command but his objectives lay deeper in German territory 
than those of the 3rd Cdn Inf Div. In front were the flail tanks of 1st Lothians from 79th 
Armd Div, whose task it was to clear the way of mines. Behind were the tanks of 
Grenadier Guards and Foot Guards who were leading 4th Cdn Armd Bde. Each regiment 
was formed up in four lines. In the rear were the BCRs and Lake Superior Regiment 
filling in the rear of the column. In all, about 150 tanks were drawn up in three ranks of 
about 50 in each rank and only 15 yards between tanks. Each of the two blocks of 150 
tanks (4th Cdn Armd Bde and 2nd Cdn Armd Bde) represented a solid phalanx of armour 
1000 yards wide and 200 yards deep.633 
As the tanks entered into the smokescreen and the tremendous dust cloud created 
by explosions and the tracks of hundreds of heavy vehicles, unit cohesion began to break 
down and drivers were forced to navigate by the sun. The smoke screen that was put 
down was not as effective as had been hoped. In some sectors the tanks were completely 
blinded by the smoke while in others the phalanx advanced over open ground with little 
concealment.634 In less than an hour, the almost ceremonial array of the forenoon had 
degenerated into a mass of vehicles pouring down the smoke-filled valley against a 
current of prisoners streaming to the rear. Most of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde vehicles 
gravitated towards the left or east as drivers could only navigate by looking to the 
sun.635Despite the confusion the reports from Wigle to 2nd Cdn Corps as recorded in the 
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Corps operations log indicate a steady move forward as start lines and report lines were 
continually crossed on the drive to the Laison River. 
The forward German positions were located approximately 1500 yards in front of 
the Laison River. The Germans response to the Canadian attack was immediate with 
artillery and anti-tank fire but it was not long before the forward German positions were 
overwhelmed by the mass of the advancing formation. Once past the initial infantry 
outposts, the advancing formations began to encounter German strong points composed 
of anti-tank guns, tanks and dug in infantry arrayed behind minefields. These strong 
points began to take their toll on the armoured formations. Once into the Laison valley, 
the formations began taking fire from the heights beyond the river.637 The leading units of 
4th Cdn Armd Bde reached the river around 1430 hrs to find all of the bridges blown. 
Some units, such as No 3 Sqn Grenadier Guards, utilized their position on the extreme 
left of the formation to move unhindered to Ernes where they crossed against light 
opposition and, once across, provided flank cover for the crossing regiments. Others 
waited for their attached engineering units to erect bridges over the river before 
proceeding. 
Confusion reigned on the banks of the river as units tried to get their vehicles 
across. Some of the armoured units became impatient and split up, moving along the river 
to find a viable crossing. By 1530 hrs, the leading armour had reorganized itself as best it 
could on the south bank beyond Rouvres and begun the advance towards Olendon.639 
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Many troops and individual tanks had become detached from their squadrons but 
ingenuity and determination resulted in the creation of improvised battlegroups, which 
fought their way forward to their assigned objectives.640 
The BCR and Lake Superior Regiment arrived at the Laison River while the other 
regiments were crossing and, rather than wait their turn, they improvised their own bridge 
made from rubble. Despite being heavily shelled and mortared, they finished the work 
and continued with the advance. The Lake Superior Regiment pressed on to the high 
ground north of Perrieres.641 In what was called a "show of how effectively mechanized 
infantry can act," the Lake Superior Regiment sped past the milling tanks dismounted 
from their carriers, deployed at the double and, moving with "swift assurance," swept 
into the attack against a large column of Germans near Sassy, effectively neutralizing the 
anti-tank and mortar positions and taking 250 prisoners.642 
The 8th Cdn Inf Bde reached the river at 1520 hrs and cleared Rouvres, Maizieres 
and both banks of the river while the armoured forces were crossing. The brigade then 
pushed on to the wooded hill, Pt 103 halfway to Olendon. The North Shore Regt 
continued the advance on Sassy, which fell at 2000 hrs. In accordance with the plan, 8th 
Cdn Inf Bde now reverted to 3rd Cdn Inf Div control.643 
Meanwhile 10th Cdn Inf Bde, moving in soft-skinned vehicles and led by the 
tanks of the SAR, arrived at the river at 1600 hrs. The troops dismounted, crossed the 
river and advanced to Olendon on foot. The Lines and Argylls passed through Olendon to 
640
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enter and consolidate in Perrieres. The Algonquin Regiment, supported by elements of 
10th Indep M.G. Coy, concentrated in the fields south of Rouvres. The SAR, which had 
become disorganized in crossing the Laison River, regrouped prior to sending its tanks in 
support of the leading infantry. Meanwhile, one company of the Lake Superior Regiment 
penetrated to the high ground directly east of Epancy and took up a position overlooking 
the road running from Falaise to St. Pierre sur Dives, where it was able to engage 
retreating German troops.644 Kitching's firm base was now established. It was now up to 
the 4 Cdn Armd Bde to drive to the division's final objective, Pt 159. 
The planned air strike on selected targets in the area of Potigny and Quesnay 
Wood, scheduled for 1400 hrs, proved to be another catastrophic attempt at air-to-ground 
support using heavy bombers. Out of 811 heavy bombers that took off to take part in the 
attack, 77 aircraft dropped their bombs short, including 44 aircraft from No.6 (R.C.A.F.) 
Bomber Group. Bombs meant for the Aisy-Ussy-Potigny area crashed down on Canadian 
troops around St. Aignan and the Hautmesnil quarry. The bombs landed from two to five 
miles inside the Canadian lines cutting a path of destruction among Canadian and Polish 
forces.645 
At Main Headquarters of the 4th Cdn Armd Div, "all Hell seemed to break loose" 
when the bombing started. Looking south from their location, it appeared to the staff 
"that the command post had been in the centre of the bombing and fears were expressed 
that it had been hit."646 Bombs landed all through the area occupied by Kitching's Tac 
HQ. The division artillery and 10th Cdn Inf Bde immediately reported that their troops 
were being bombed and frantic calls went back to Corps to stop the bombing. The 4th Cdn 
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Armd Div HQ area was overrun with troops from 1st Pol Armd Div and 51st (H) Div A 
echelons rushing north from the bombed areas. Kitching noted that, although there were 
no casualties among his Tac HQ staff, the radios in the tanks and on the jeeps were badly 
affected, knocking out communications between Kitching and his brigades. All line 
communication to the command post had also been cut.647 
The bombing was part of a series of events that now combined to destroy the 
cohesion of the command and control structure within the division. The cumbersome 
attack formation, combined with the reduced visibility, marginalized brigade control over 
the forward armoured formations in the mad dash to get to the Laison River. This 
situation was compounded by the fact that the Foot Guards reported that two command 
tanks were "out" with one in a minefield. A mine had disabled Scott's tank and he had 
broken his ankle. Despite his injury, Scott continued to command his regiment from a 
scout car.648 The bombing further complicated the situation by disrupting the 
communication between Kitching and his brigade commanders at a crucial moment— 
approximately 1400 hours when the regiments of the 4th Cdn Armd Bde were crossing 
the Laison River. The worst, however, was yet to come! 
While his forward units were fighting their way through and over the defences of 
the Laison River, Booth and the small group of armoured vehicles which constituted his 
Tac HQ had travelled forward and were not far behind the leading formation. While 
conducting a forward reconnaissance, Booth's group came under accurate German fire 
from a self -propelled anti-tank gun.649 Most of the HQ tanks, including Booth's tank, 
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were destroyed. Booth was mortally wounded and evacuated and his intelligence officer 
was killed leaving the Brigade Major, Maj A.G. Chubb, essentially in command with no 
way of communicating the fate of Booth to Kitching or of coordinating any of the 
activities of the Brigade or its units.650 
At 1430 hrs a message was broadcast over the 4th Brigade net that "sunray" 
(Booth) was hit but there was no clarification as to what that meant. The next recorded 
transmission over the Brigade net was at 1615 hrs where Chubb reported that Booth had 
been hit and taken away by ambulance. Temporarily out of contact, but for the moment 
acting as senior officer of the remnants of the brigade's tactical headquarters, Chubb sent 
liaison officers out to the regiments and set about trying to rebuild the tactical 
headquarters. The calls for Scott to report to the Bde Tac HQ began at 1622 hrs. At 1623 
hrs the Brigade operations officer Capt James tried to re-establish the brigade command 
link. He was eventually able to report that all stations were on net, with each reporting 
their positions as either at Rouvres or on the Laison River.651 Meanwhile a liaison officer 
from division HQ arrived with orders for Chubb to report to Div HQ.652 
At approximately 1415 hrs, Kitching left his Tac Hq in an attempt to contact 4th 
Bde HQ. At 1530 hrs Simonds arrived at Kitching's headquarters looking for Kitching 
Bde became separated and headed towards Estrees la Campagne and Hill 111. En route they passed the 
destroyed tanks of the BCR. Booth led the way down Hill 111 in a south south-westerly direction when the 
formation was engaged by anti-tank and machine gun fire. W. O. Rollefson, ed., Green Route Up: 4 
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but instead found Proctor. Proctor briefed Simonds on the tactical situation and Simonds 
/
 th 
chastised him for losing contact with 4 Cdn Armd Bde. By 1530 hrs, the Div Hq had re-
established contact with Scott and the Foot Guards but still had no contact with Halpenny 
and was unaware that Booth was a casualty. When Kitching heard what had happened to 
Booth, he immediately ordered Chubb to take command of the brigade until further 
notice.653 
Between 1600-1630 hrs, Chubb arrived at Main Div Hq and, since Kitching had 
not yet returned, reported what had happened to Booth and the Bde Hq to Proctor. 
Proctor reoriented Chubb, gave his operator all the necessary frequencies and the location 
for Scott and Chubb took off to find him.654 Unfortunately, reconstituting the Tac Hq was 
a significant challenge. There were no spare command tanks and getting what they did 
have into operation would take time. Scott was on the other side of the Laison River in 
the midst of a raging battle, attempting to reorganize his own regiment which 
compounded the problem.655 Chubb had to find Scott, which did not happen until the next 
morning, and Scott now had to reorient himself to the larger task of commanding the 
brigade. 
At 1732 hrs there was another call to the Foot Guards informing them that Scott 
was to take over command of the brigade. For the next several hours messages flew back 
Ibid. Foster claims that Montgomery was with Simonds but this is not recorded in the Div war diary. In 
Foster's book, Montgomery is quoted as saying ," Get rid of him. He's obviously lost control of the 
situation. Why, he isn't even at his own headquarters," even though Proctor had explained to Simonds and 
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and forth but it was not until late in the evening before Scott was contacted directly and 
told to communicate with Kitching at his command post near Estrees la Campagne at 
2100 hrs. There is no evidence, however, that this personal meeting took place. 
According to the Ops Log, the Bde Tac Hq was still trying to ascertain the location of 
Scott as late as 2129 hrs.656 
Sometime late in the afternoon, Major A.G.V. Smith was summoned to Bde HQ , 
and was told to take three LOB tanks and go and find the regiments and re-establish 
communications with the Bde HQ. Smith found the brigade early the next morning which 
he recalls consisted of a total of 14 tanks from both the Foot Guards and Grenadier 
Guards and Scott in his tank. After providing Scott with the proper radio frequencies for 
the brigade net, Smith proceeded to try and re-establish the brigade headquarters.657 
In a hand written note to Scott, Kitching expressed his confidence in Scott's 
ability to "fight the brigade." Kitching ordered Scott to continue the advance during the 
evening until dark, and regroup the armour for a big effort the following morning. 
Kitching stated that Jefferson was to capture Olendon, high ground at grid 182438 (Pt 
115), unless already taken by the Lake Superior Regtiment on the way to Perrieres and 
Epancy. Kitching stressed the point that Falaise had to be captured on 15 August.658 
There is no indication however as to when Scott actually received these orders. 
With the thoughts of the fate of Worthington Force still fresh in their minds it is 
likely that neither Kitching nor Scott relished another armoured advance through the 
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night. Scott held a conference with the commanding officers of the BCR and Grenadier 
Guards at 1945 hrs during which they decided to advance a further 1000 yds to the high 
ground west of Sassy between the villages of Olendon and Pt 115. Scott then ordered the 
Brigade to harbour for the night.659 Scott did not have control of the brigade and 
considered it too late to push the armour the additional three miles to the high ground 
overlooking Falaise. Scott sensibly concluded that a coordinated attack at daybreak 
offered the best odds for success on following day.660 
For six critical hours on 14 August there was no effective control of 4th Cdn Armd 
Bde either from the Brigade or division level. Regardless, the brigade attack continued 
with three different regiments fighting three separate battles toward their assigned 
objectives. This is where the training and skill of the officers and men of the division was 
tested and where the countless hours of investment in training, education and lectures 
paid off. Despite the loss of its senior leadership, the regiments were able to achieve all of 
the Phase II objectives before they ran out of daylight which effectively prohibited any 
further advance by the armoured regiments. 
The 10th Cdn Inf Bde fought a more cohesive battle towards its objectives. At 
1600 hrs the Lines and Argylls crossed the Laison River and began their advance on 
Olendon, which they succeeded in capturing by last light. The Algonquin Regiment, 
which had firmed up on Pt 103, was ordered to patrol to Epancy and, if possible, seize the 
village and firm up there by first light. The Argylls sent their scout platoon to investigate 
Perrieres and reported the town free of the enemy. C and D companies were sent ahead to 
War Diary, Governor General's Foot Guards, 1-31 August 1944, entry 14 Aug. 
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occupy the town and the high ground immediately to the northwest of the town. At 0600 
hrs 15 August, the rest of the battalion moved in and the position was firmed up.661 
The first-day operations of TRACTABLE had ripped a five km gap in the 
German line with deep penetrations into their defensive zone forcing them to withdraw to 
their rearward defensive positions where possible.662 The SITREP from 4th Cdn Armd 
Div for the period ending midnight 14 August recorded the following disposition for the 
units of the division: 4th Cdn Armd Bde had the Foot Guards south of Olendon; the 
Grenadier Guards was in the area of Pt 103; the BCR, north of Olendon; and the Lake 
Superior Regiment, east of Olendon with one company southeast of Olendon. The 10th 
Cdn Inf Bde had the Lincoln & Welland Regiment the Argylls and two squadrons of the 
SAR firmed up in Olendon, with one squadron SAR still in Rouvres. The Algonquin 
Regiment had made the deepest penetration of all 4th Armd Div units and was advancing 
towards Epancy.663 The division experienced a very successful day given the significant 
challenges it had to overcome. 
The Canadian attack had taken its toll on the German forces around Falaise. Most 
of the German defensive positions could only be manned as a series of strong points 
rather than a continuous defensive line. The combat strength of the four divisions (85th, 
89th, 271st and 272nd) may have been reduced to 50 percent of their established strength 
but "their respective headquarters still exercised effective control over their divisions."664 
This situation facilitated the coordination of a new line of resistance across the Canadian 
front. On the left, the positions of the 272nd Inf Div ran from the western edge of Vieux-
661
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Fume via Magny la Campagne- Favieres, Hill 79, western edge of the forest northwest of 
Vendeuvre. Contact with the right wing of the 85th Inf Div was near Hill 80, one km 
southwest of Vendeuvre.665 
The 271st Inf Div was able to set up a fairly cohesive main line of resistance from 
Leffard via Pierrepont to Trepreland and to man it with three battle groups. The artillery 
went into position with three Abteilungen in the area Noron-St Martin de Mieux-
Fourneau le Val and with one Abteilung around Rapilly. An anti-tank front was set up in 
the Noron area along the road from Falaise to Pont d'Ouilly, using the remaining anti-
tank guns. A tigerkompanie of Schwere SS Pz Abteilung 102 with several panzers was 
also designated for action in this sector.666 
The 12th SS Pz Div had pulled back its panzergruppe to previously explored 
positions north and northeast of Falaise. The two companies of Panzer]agerabteilung 12 
were split into several small units, on the northwest slopes of Monts d'Eraines and in the 
woods southeast of Epaney. They formed the anti-tank element in support of 85th Inf Div, 
which had established a line of strong points. The panzers of Panzerregiment 12 set up 
ambush positions on Hill 159. The Germans had deployed their artillery and mortars in 
the woods of Mont d'Eraines. This tactic ensured that their main anti-tank weapons could 
be brought to bear on the flank of any Canadian advance southwards towards Falaise and 
would be particularly effective in the open country below Epaney. 
While TRACTABLE was in progress, Crerar received new instructions from 
Montgomery. First Cdn Army and not Second Br Army was to capture Falaise with the 
665
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least possible delay. According to Montgomery's direction, this new task was not to 
interfere with the larger and more important plan of driving southeast to capture Trun and 
to link up with the Americans who were now turning north.669 Simonds assigned the 
additional task of taking Falaise to Kitching. This new requirement forced Kitching to 
modify the intent of his operations for 15 August. The general outline of his plan was to 
clear the Olendon-Epancy-Perrieres area by first light, followed by an advance by 4th Cdn 
Armd Bde to Pt 159. These actions were to be followed by a thrust through to Falaise by 
the Lake Superior Regiment. The SAR was to secure bridges at Eraines and 
Damblainville.670 These orders were again modified at 1200 hrs to have one squadron of 
18th Cdn Armd C Regt lead the attack on Falaise while the other two squadrons of the 
regiment were to capture the bridges at Eraines and Damblainville instead of the SAR.671 
At 0655 hrs Scott received orders to get the brigade moving. He was to press on 
to the final objective and was told that fuel and ammunition would follow. The Lake 
Superior Regiment moved off immediately to support the Algonquin Regiment attack at 
Epancy. An hour later the Foot Guards had still not moved, stating that they were waiting 
for fuel and ammunition, which were in route. Kitching at this point intervened directly, 
ordering Scott to get moving. Just as Scott was about to resume the advance, the 
supply vehicles from the Grenadier Guards A-echelon arrived. Scott decided to distribute 
these supplies among the regiments and, as a result, the brigade did not start to advance 
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towards Versainville until approximately 0930 hrs. This two and a half hour delay 
would have a ripple on effect on the events of the day. Scott decided to try and control 
the battle from his tank which was moving in close proximity with the Foot Guards.674 
Maj Chubb, as control, received his orders from Scott over the command net and then 
relayed them to the appropriate units.675 
In a move designed to ensure the information flow back to Div HQ, liaison 
officers were now assigned to accompany each regimental headquarters of the armoured 
regiments. These officers were given the task of reporting information directly back to 
Div Hq providing a second source of tactical information to Kitching and his command 
team.676 This represents another example of the learning and improvisation that was 
happening consistently within the command team as operations progressed. 
In advancing south, the Grenadier Guards and BCR battle groups encountered a 
German anti-tank gun screen north of Epancy. The battle group successfully smoked the 
area off before continuing the advance without incurring any casualties. D Company of 
the Algonquin Regiment was assigned the task of taking Epancy which they did early in 
the morning after hand-to-hand fighting. Half of the town was taken but snipers kept the 
Company from occupying the rest of the town.677 While the Algonquin attack was in 
progress, the 4th Cdn Armd Bde was advancing to the west of Epancy. Scott left A 
Company of Lake Superior Regiment and one squadron of the Foot Guards to assist in 
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the capture of Epancy in a move designed to secure his left flank as the remainder of his 
force moved on to Versainville. 
Initially, the Lake Superior company only managed to secure a foothold on the 
western edge of Epancy but, with the aid of the Foot Guards, they helped clear out the 
few remaining pockets of resistance before taking up a position in the orchard nearby. 
The 4th Cdn Armd Bde reported that they were firm on "Toad" (Epancy) at 1014 hrs. The 
town, however, was not firmly in Canadian hands. The Algonquin Regiment was twice 
forced out before finally taking and clearing the village with a battalion attack during the 
afternoon. The Algonquin Regiment remained in the town during the night while the 
company from Lake Superior Regiment was withdrawn to Olendon in preparation for 
their planned advance to Falaise.678 
At 0900 hrs, the Lincoln & Welland Regiment with A and B squadrons SAR 
placed under command were ordered to follow the armoured brigade and be prepared to 
seize the bridges at Versainville for an advance on Falaise.679 This battle group fought 
several brisk actions on their way to join the armour, especially at the woods directly 
west of Epancy where two companies of infantry had to be left behind to deal with the 
enemy. The Germans held strong positions southwest of the village and, as the column 
tried to pass Le Val Mauger, another fire-fight ensued before the column could move 
on.680 
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Map 19: Operation TRACTABLE 14-16 August 1944. Marteinson, The Royal Canadian Armoured 
Corps, 275. 
At 1207 hrs, Halpenny conducted a forward reconnaissance for the continued 
advance south and at 1234 hrs he initiated an all-out attack on the high ground designated 
Hudson Bay (area between Pt 117 and Pt 129) with the main thrust right of the centre line 
which was the road leading south from Epancy. The attack was initially held up pending 
confirmation of whether Canadian troops were on the high ground. Halpenny was told 
that Canadians were indeed in the area and was also told that they needed support 
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quickly. An immediate advance was ordered and the BCRs advanced over the feature 
moving down the right side with the Grenadier Guards providing covering fire.681 
Operating on the left flank of 4th Cdn Armd Bde were the squadrons of 18th Cdn 
Armd C Regt. A troop was reporting Eraines clear of Germans and not yet occupied by 
Canadian troops. Another squadron was operating south of Eraines. Kitching held one 
squadron in reserve for exploitation towards Falaise if the opportunity presented itself. 
At approximately 1321 hrs, the armour regiments began calling for the re-supply 
of fuel and ammunition. In another example of battlefield innovation, Kitching and 
Proctor made the decision not to withdraw the regiments but to move the re-supply 
columns forward. A guide from the BCRs was sent back to bring the echelon forces 
forward. The re-supply was conducted from Priests, which proved their worth in this 
function and would now become the primary tool for battlefield re-supply.683 
Unfortunately, the process was hurried since the re-supply point was on a bomb line of an 
incoming tactical air strike. Once re-supplied, the armoured regiments had to withdraw 
from their forward positions until the air strike was completed. The successful 
completion of this action is indicative of effective command and control of the division's 
actions during the day. 
At 1455 hrs, 4th Cdn Armd Bde was reported regrouping south of Epancy.685 The 
4th Cdn Armd Bde units continued to fight their way slowly up to IDAHO.686 The 
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armoured brigade progressed as far as the northern slope of Pt 159 before it ran into a 
German anti-tank screen. After suffering severe losses, the BCRs and Grenadier Guards 
were forced back and waited for the arrival of the Lincs-S AR battle group.687 
Halpenny held an impromptu orders group on the battlefield at 1624 hrs with the 
commanders of the three armoured regiments (BCR, CGG and S AR) and the squadron 
commander of the 18th Cdn Armd Car Regt. Observation of the objective revealed that 
the approach would be over open and flat terrain with no cover and it was felt that an 
approach without infantry and artillery support would be disastrous. A plan was worked 
out between the commanders whereby they would advance after an artillery 
concentration on the woods to their front and left. The artillery support failed to arrive 
and the attack was not executed.688 When the Lines & SAR arrived, the decision was 
made to consolidate the gains to that point and the Lines dug in among the tanks at the 
foot of the slope. 
On the right flank of the 4th Cdn Armd Bde attack, 3rd Cdn Inf Div was advancing 
towards the same general objectives as 4th Cdn Armd Bde. At 1000 hrs, an attack was 
launched by Canadian Scottish Regiment with the 2nd Cdn Armd Bde in support against 
PT 168.689 At 1515 hrs, 4th Cdn Armd Div was informed that the 2nd Cdn Armd Bde had 
reached Pt 168 and that the Canadian Scottish Regiment had joined them and was digging 
in.690 At 1600 hrs a new plan of attack was initiated by 7th Cdn Inf Bde down the Caen-
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Falaise highway with the objective of Falaise. The 7th Cdn Recce Regt, followed by the 
Royal Winnipeg Rifles on the right, would attack down the highway while the 2nd Cdn 
Armd Bde with the Regina Rifles on the left would attack through the Canadian Scottish 
Regiment to take Pt 159.691 H-hour for the 7th Cdn Inf Bde attack was 2015 hrs. In 
planning the attack, a reduced artillery barrage had to be planned since elements of 4 Cdn 
Armd Div were reported on Hill 159. The armour and infantry had trouble marrying up 
for the attack and, once across the start line at St. Pierre Canivet, heavy anti-tank fire cost 
the attacking regiments ten tanks, causing the attack to stall. The attacking units withdrew 
to the area of Pt 175,692 
A successful second day turned sour for Kitching, who had his Tac HQ at Pt 103 
north of Olendon. As his armoured brigade battled its way to IDAHO in the late 
afternoon, he was at Jefferson's headquarters. Standing on a jeep, the two officers tried to 
see what was going on ahead and it appeared to them that the tanks of the armoured 
regiments were almost on IDAHO. Kitching returned to his headquarters and was, in 
turn, elated when he received news that IDAHO had been taken.693 
At some point late in the day, Scott had decided that he could no longer carry on 
in command of the brigade. He disappeared off the brigade net around 1600 hrs without 
seemingly establishing contact with Halpenny. It was on the way back to his headquarters 
that Kitching met Scott and was surprised at the severity of his injury. Kitching had no 
691
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idea that Scott's injury was so serious and, indeed, when he reported to Kitching's 
command post, he thought Scott's injury was very recent.694 Kitching was once again 
forced to call upon the next senior officer, Halpenny, to take over as acting brigade 
commander. Halpenny took over command of the Brigade at 1800 hrs. 
At 1800 hrs Kitching left for Simonds' headquarters firmly convinced that his 
units could hold IDAHO. Simonds was delighted to hear that 4th Cdn Armd Div had 
captured its objective and, based on this information, Simonds tasked Kitching to get the 
Lincoln & Welland Regiment into Falaise.695 After he had issued his orders for the next 
day's operations, Simonds invited Kitching to stay for dinner. Kitching continued to press 
Simonds to appoint Moncel to assume command of the armoured brigade as they had 
agreed. Kitching stated that he now had to appoint Halpenny to command and that this 
was the Brigade's third commander in two days.696 
When he returned to his headquarters later that evening, Kitching learned that 4th 
Cdn Armd Bde had not captured the ridge at all but "had turned back to wait for 
additional support."697 He immediately telephoned the news to Simonds, who did not take 
it at all well. Simonds was extremely disappointed over another example of faulty 
694Scott was in considerable discomfort and until early afternoon he had tried to direct the battle from his 
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painful foot. He was determined to carry on but his injury became so aggravating that by that afternoon he 
had to be driven to Kitching's headquarters where he asked to be relieved of his temporary command. Roy, 
1944: The Canadians In Normandy, 275. 
695
 War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1-31 August 1944, entry 15 Aug. 
696
 Unfortunately for Kitching, Moncel would not arrive until 19 August. The, as of yet unexplained, five 
day delay in his arrival was to play a critical role in the events to follow and is a crucial element in 
Kitching's dismissal. Reflecting on the situation in his book Kitching stated that he had a capable officer in 
his commander of artillery, Brigadier Lane and he should have sent him forward to command the brigade 
on a permanent basis. Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 206. 
697
 Ibid., 200. 
263 
communication and misinformation. Kitching assured Simonds that the division was 
preparing to attack again the next morning. 
Kitching called an O Group to prepare for the capture of IDAHO the following 
morning. Plans for the renewed attack were developed that night. Under the cover of 
smoke, the armoured brigade would rush the hill and plunge among the anti-tank guns 
while they were still "blind". The Argylls, mounted in Priests, would follow immediately 
behind the tanks while the Algonquin Regiment mopped up on the right and the Line & 
Welld Regt mopped up on the left. The brigade O Groups for the attack were carried out 
at 0500 hrs 16 August.699 
Kitching's plan would be carried out only with the approval of Simonds. During 
the evening of 15 August events changed. The 9th Cdn Inf Bde was assigned to relieve 
10th Cdn Inf Bde. The 2nd and 3rd Cdn Inf Divs began a slow advance towards Falaise 
from the west and north.700 The 7th Cdn Inf Bde assumed the task of taking Pt 159 and the 
2nd Cdn Inf Division was given the task of taking Falaise. TRACTABLE was at an end. 
The final SITREP for August 15 from 4th Cdn Armd Div for the period noon to 
midnight reported that the BCR and Grenadier Guards had reached the objective but were 
driven out by heavy anti-tank fire. The final disposition of the division units, according to 
this report, had the Foot Guards, Grenadier Guards and BCR located on the high ground 
at Pt 175. The Lincoln & Welland Regiment was dug in near le Val Mauger with one 
squadron of SAR under command. The Algonquin Regiment was firmed up in Epancy 
News from the 3 Cdn Inf Div was also bad. They had advanced to Point 168 in a costly action that 
afternoon but the assaulting 7th Brigade troops were thrown out of Soulangy before dark. Meyer, History of 
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and the Argylls were firmed up in Perrieres with one squadron of SAR under command. 
The remainder of the SAR and the Lake Superior Regt were in Olendon.701 
There were plenty of mistakes made in the development and execution of 
TRACTABLE. Simonds' dismissive attitude towards the potential threat posed by the 
topography and the Laison River to the conduct of the operation was to prove the most 
costly. The river ran across the front of both divisions about two miles beyond the start 
line. It was narrow and comparatively shallow. In his briefings on the operation, Simonds 
had assured his subordinate commanders that the Laison River was "fordable by tanks at 
all points." In fact, the river's muddy bottom and steep banks formed a major anti-tank 
obstacle and even Dominik Graham, Simonds' sympathetic biographer, referred to this 
assessment as an error of "major consequence" which delayed the advance for two hours 
and cost the 2nd Cdn Corps "a decisive battle."702 The delay and disorganization resulting 
from the river crossing robbed the attacking formation of valuable daylight hours within 
which to prosecute the attack deeper into German territory. 
Since the intelligence assessment had stated that the Laison could be forded at all 
points, engineering units were not part of Simonds construct for the armoured phalanxes. 
In a normal armoured attack, the engineering units would have accompanied the forward 
units to clear obstacles and provide other necessary tasks, such as facilitating river 
crossings. In a very shrewd move, Kitching decided to insert engineering units into the 
forward elements of the 4th Cdn Armd Bde phalanx from 8th Field Squadron.703 These 
units were credited with erecting two scissor crossings, two fascine crossings and 
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locating a useable ford over the river. Had these engineering units not been with the 
forward units the 4 Cdn Armd Bde advance would have ground to a standstill at the river. 
The execution of the TRACTABLE plan was difficult since it directed units of the 
2nd Cdn Armd Bde, 3rd Cdn Inf Div and 4th Cdn Armd Div all towards the same area—the 
commanding ridge of ground just north of Falaise—with the 3rd Cdn Inf Div tasked to 
capture the northwest portion while the 4th Cdn Armd Div was to capture the northeast 
portion. The continued advance south to Falaise by all of these forces brought them into 
closer proximity to each other and at the same time into the strongest parts of the German 
defences. Montgomery's continued insistence on the capture of Falaise by the Canadians 
at this point once again allowed the German defenders to concentrate their reduced 
resources against a mass of Canadian forces attacking over ground that was very 
favourable to the defender. This lack of manoeuvre room became a significant problem at 
approximately 1300 hrs, on 15 August in the region of Pt 168 as units from 3rd Cdn Inf 
Div and 2nd Cdn Armd Bde began converging on the same area as the two 4th Cdn Armd 
Div battle groups.705 
A planning mistake that is rarely discussed, however, is the choice of H-Hour. 
Waiting until 1200 hours denied the attacking formations a considerable number of 
daylight hours on 14 August for their advance. Russian and German attacks were usually 
timed to start at dawn allowing the attacking formations the maximum number of 
daylight hours possible to exploit the success of the attack. While, on the one hand 
Simonds was ordering the armoured formations to exhibit more aggressiveness, on the 
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other he had significantly reduced the available time they had to accomplish their 
mission. 
A notable feature of the day was the constant bombing and strafing of Allied 
troops by Allied tactical aircraft. After the planned heavy bombers attacks had been 
completed, tactical airpower took over and the ops logs of all the attacking units are filled 
with entries of being attacked by Allied air power. The echelon forces of 4th Cdn Armd 
Div were attacked on numerous occasions with American P-47 Thunderbolts named as 
the primary culprits.706 
On the afternoon 14 August 4th Cdn Armd Div achieved a complete breakthrough. 
However, because of the loss of Booth, the brigade tactical HQ and the communication 
link back to division HQ, Kitching was unaware of the extent of the breakthrough, the 
exact location of his units and, consequently, was unable to exploit the success. He took it 
upon himself to find out and left his Tac HQ to try and determine the true nature of the 
tactical situation. During the latter part of the afternoon, 4th Div HQ received word that 
Booth was a casualty but no definite word on the seriousness of his wounds, his location 
or whether he was still trying to exercise command of the brigade.707 These questions 
would not be answered until Chubb reported back to Div HQ. When Kitching did find 
out, he took immediate action by appointing Chubb as acting brigade commander until 
such time as Scott could be contacted and could take over the brigade. He then contacted 
Simonds and asked for Moncel.708 
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There are a number of differing opinions as to the impact Booth's death had on 
the success or lack thereof of the division on 14 August. One opinion states that Booth's 
fatal injury was a major setback which prevented the 4th Cdn Armd Div from achieving 
complete success on 14 August709 while another states that it was actually the loss of the 
brigade tactical headquarters and not necessarily the loss of Booth himself that prevented 
710 
success. While the impact of these combined circumstances was devastating, the 
resulting situation was not insurmountable since military training is based on the premise 
that leadership at all levels may become casualties and training is designed to ensure that 
junior leaders can fill the vacant ranks to ensure that the organization continues to 
function as if nothing happened. The positive actions of the regimental commanders in 
continuing their advances towards their assigned objectives is indicative of the 
effectiveness of the training that had been executed within 4 Cdn Armd Div.71' 
It was the third circumstance of this incident that proved to be the most 
devastating and more critical to the outcome of that day. The third circumstance was the 
fact that Kitching and the 4th Div HQ were unaware that Booth was even a casualty. The 
lack of communication traffic between the brigade and the division should have been an 
indication to 4th Div HQ that something was amiss; but, given the confusion that existed 
that afternoon and the disrupted communication caused by the bombing, their ignorance 
of the situation can be understood. Kitching simply did not know that there was no one in 
command or control of the armoured brigade. Had the fate of Booth been conveyed 
709
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promptly, then Scott may have been in a position to take over before he actually crossed 
the Laison River; in which case brigade control could have been re-established earlier. 
Having the vehicles to effectively command the brigade would have been problematic. 
The fact remains that Kitching didn't know that there was a problem to solve. 
Both Booth and Scott made the critical choice of taking their headquarters 
forward. Usually the headquarters was located in a spot where it would be relatively safe 
and where good communications would be possible. The commander was then free to 
roam the battlefield knowing that the integration of information from both superior and 
subordinate headquarters and units was secure. The integration and passing of this 
information was crucial for situational awareness throughout the chain of command. By 
moving forward as they did both commanders risked becoming casualties or getting 
involved in actions that were secondary to the main effort.712 This lack of higher direction 
and coordination was unfortunate because the German defence was stretched to the 
breaking point on 15 August. At 1200 hrs that day, I SS Pz Corps reported to 5 Pz Army 
that the 85 In Div was "almost annihilated and only had one-and one half battalions and 
two 8.8 cm guns available."713 In addition, it was reported that 12 SS Pz Div had only 15 
tanks left. 
Knowing that Scott was commanding the armoured brigade on 15 August, an 
obvious question is why Kitching failed to provide more direct control over the armoured 
brigade on that day. On the surface, Kitching had no reason to believe that Scott could 
not command the brigade and he was unaware that Scott was injured. Scott could have 
been criticized for a late start but, after that, events at a macro level went well with the 
712
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BCR and Grenadier Guards advancing over three miles in a few hours of hard fighting. 
At around 1630 hrs, the division had elements of three armoured regiments (BCR, 
Grenadier Guards and S AR), elements of the Lincoln &Welland Regiment and the Lake 
Superior Regiment and a squadron from the 18th Cdn Armd Car Regt in a position for a 
combined arms assault on Pt 159. All they needed was artillery support, which was 
requested but never materialized. Arranging that support was the job of the brigade 
commander but Scott was on his way to Kitching's Tac HQ to ask to be relieved. 
Initiative and drive on the part of the regimental commander had gotten them to the point 
where success was in their grasp. The coordinating function of the Brigade HQ was 
needed to complete the task and it was at this point in the day where the true lack of 
brigade command and control failed, to the detriment of the operation. 
The command of the 4 Cdn Armd Brigade was now a significant leadership issue 
for Kitching. Kitching at one point told Simonds that if Moncel could not be made 
available, he was going to take direct control of the armoured brigade himself. Simonds 
rightly discouraged Kitching. Kitching's suggestion was not a wise one since it would 
have denied the division the oversight and control function required from the division 
commander. Kitching's request, however, is indicative of the sense of frustration he felt 
towards Simonds who was aloof to the very real command and control difficulties that 
Kitching was experiencing. According to Kitching, the combination of so many 
casualties among his senior commanders, the frequent changes of command of the 
regiments, squadrons and troops, the loss of so many tanks and crews, the breakdown in 
communications and the inexperience in battle greatly impacted the division's 
270 
performance in action. Kitching believed that Simonds did not sufficiently appreciate 
these factors.714 
The command and control framework within the armoured brigade was breaking 
down because of the excessive number of casualties in senior officers (majors and above) 
among the armoured regiments. More junior officers were promoted into senior positions 
but they did not necessarily have the experience and training necessary to replace those 
who had become casualties.715 With Halpenny now the acting Brigade commander, 
lieutenant-colonels commanded none of the armoured regiments. The armoured brigade 
was now short one brigadier, and two lieutenant-colonels. 
What of the division's success on 15 August? There seems to be a general 
acceptance in the current literature of Kitching's statement that the armoured brigade 
forces "had turned back to wait for additional support" with the added assumption that 
there was no further advance that day. The evidence would suggest that this is not 
entirely correct. A series of entries in the war diaries suggests that the division advanced 
further than has been commonly believed. At 1713 hrs the words "Idaho has been taken" 
were broadcast over the 4th Cdn Armd Bde radio net.716 At 1740 hrs, the ops log for 1st 
Cdn Army recorded that Foot Guards and Grenadier Guards were reported on the 
objective with the Line & Welld Regt passing through and that Kitching was ordered to 
get patrols and the Line & Welld Regt into Falaise.717 Simonds was advised at 1740 hrs 
714
 Kitching, Mud and Green Fields, 200. 
715
 Corps commander was usually thinking a number of days in the future with respect to operations but the 
dire circumstances with respect to the command of the armoured brigade should have been visible to him 
immediately. Ibid. 
The 15 August entry in the narrative portion of the war diary states that the GGFG declared Idaho taken 
at 1650 hrs and that the claim was reported false at 1730 hrs. There are no entries in the 4 Bde Ops Log that 
support these timings even if the normal time/bravo time factor is taken into consideration. 4 Cdn Armd 
Bde War Diary, HQ 4 Cdn Armd Bde 1-31 August 1944, App 5, Ops Log serials 126. 
717 
War Diary HQ First Cdn Army Main, 1-31 August, Ops Log 15 August serial 117. 
271 
that two armoured regiments were on the objective. Kitching left for Simonds HQ at 
1800 hrs with the belief that his tanks had taken and were on the objective. 
At 1826 hrs the BCR asked whether infantry were on IDAHO and at 1900 hrs, the 
Grenadier Guards reported that they could not proceed further. Unable to advance on 
their own front, the general impression is that the regiments remained about 1500 yards 
north of IDAHO during the night and provided fire support to 3rd Cdn Inf Div.719 There is 
evidence however that the division continued to push south during the evening. 
The BCR war diary states that after being re-supplied at 1500 hrs the BCR began 
a new advance towards the objective that took them on a route through Pt 170, Pt 168 to 
Pt 159. According to the BCR war diary, A and B squadrons with C squadron covering, 
reached Pt 168 at 2100 hrs. Meanwhile, reconnaissance tanks had gone forward to the 
objective where they identified a Panther tank, which was impeding the advance. 
Unfortunately, due to the terrain, the tanks equipped with 17-pdr guns could not get an 
effective angle to engage the German tank.720 An entry in the GGFG regimental history 
suggests that there may have been other tanks with the BCRs. The entry states that when 
the GGFG was assisting the 3rd Div attack they spotted tanks to their front, which were 
later identified as belonging to the SAR. Evidence of an attack later in the evening also 
exists in the book A Short History of the Tenth Canadian Infantry BDE written 
immediately after the war by members of the brigade. The book states that at last light the 
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Lincolns had gone forward with one squadron of the SARs and captured a section of high 
ground overlooking Falaise.721 
An account of the operation by 2 Cdn Armd Bde, provides further detail. When 
planning the evening attack on Pt 159 scheduled for 2015 hrs the volume of artillery fire 
for the attack had to be reduced because both of the flanks were reported secured by 
flanking formations (4 Cdn Armd Bde was on the eastern flank.). At 1800 hrs it was 
learned that two armoured regiments of 4 Cdn Armd Div were in possession of Pt 159 
which meant that the artillery fire plan had to be reduced further since targets could now 
not be engaged on either flank or on the proposed target area. The aim of the attack was 
changed to a mopping up operation between Pts 168 and 159 and to reinforce the troops 
already on Pt 159. On approaching the start line both the 1st Cdn Hussars and Fort Gary 
Horse Armd Regt reported that on moving up they had passed through the two armoured 
regiments that were supposed to be on Pt 159. This now meant that their attack would 
proceed with inadequate artillery support. The tanks encountered immediate anti-tank fire 
from the front and both flanks and began taking casualties.722 
There is evidence, therefore, to support a conclusion that a combined attack was 
attempted by 4 Cdn Armd Bde late in the evening, which, as a minimum, advanced 
beyond Pt 168 and reached the forward slopes of Pt 159. Recce tanks were sent forward 
and overran southern portions of the feature before retiring.723 A continued advance into 
the evening of 15 August that captured portions of Pt 159 would then correlate with 
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reports filed in the operations log of 2 Cdn Corps which stated that "two armd regts 
reached high feature 1438[Pt 159] but encountered enemy A tk guns and dug in, but then 
they were "forced to withdraw."724 
One theme remains consistent in the war diaries of the BCR and Grenadier 
Guards: little to no direction was received from Scott on 15 August. Chubb is very 
critical of Scott's actions while acting as the Brigade commander stating that he [Scott] 
never physically appeared at Brigade HQ to take over command, leaving the headquarters 
in a vacuum as to his intentions for 15 August.725 In addition, Scott further complicated 
the situation by netting the brigade net to his scout car, which effectively took the 
Brigade HQ out of the game.726 This move meant that he had minimal contact with his 
regiments and no contact whatsoever with Div HQ. A commander could only fight a 
brigade from a scout car when an operating headquarters backed him with good 
communications to front and rear.727 This would represent the second day in a row and 
the third time in the span of a week when the brigade units fought in a major operation 
without effective brigade oversight and control. 
The echelon forces of 4th Cdn Armd Div had spent a large portion of the two days 
of TRACTABLE dodging Allied air attacks. The heavy bomber attack was the first to 
take its toll. A court of inquiry, on which Proctor was a member, into the bombing of 
friendly troops latter found that the likely cause of the bombing mistake was the road and 
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railway crossing that was used as the target indicator. A two-second margin of error 
proved costly for the division since it lost 30 ammunition vehicles that were loaded and 
ready to move forward with the advancing formations. 
In addition, on the evening of 14 August, the division B-echelon troops, crowded 
nose to tail in anticipation of moving forward to re-supply the fighting echelons, were hit 
by an infrequent but nonetheless effective air strike from the Luftwaffe. At approximately 
2300 hrs, the loaded vehicles of the division's ammunition company were hit, causing a 
chain reaction of exploding and destroyed vehicles. For the next several hours the 
provision of normal maintenance was disrupted as everyone avoided the exploding 
ammunition. This incident, in part, explains why only one of the armoured brigade 
maintenance columns was able to get through to the fighting echelon the following 
morning and why it was so late getting there. 
The Laison River continued to wreak havoc with the division as the lack of 
bridges tied up traffic and hampered the movement forward of the rear echelon 
vehicles.730 TRACTABLE represented the first significant challenge for the division's 
engineering units as they worked to build bridges and open up maintenance routes. Along 
with facilitating the advance by the building of bridges, the engineers also began 
construction of seven miles of road from St. Sylvain to Rouvres to help alleviate the 
problems with the maintenance traffic.731 
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The one event that seems to have taken the Canadians off guard as a whole was 
the large number of prisoners of war (PW) that had to be processed. At one point in the 
advance, prisoners were disarmed and ordered to walk to the rear without formal escort. 
Transporting them became a serious drain on transportation resources within the division 
to the point where supplies were offloaded in order to transport prisoners to the rear.732 
The problem of dealing with prisoners of war would continue to tax rear echelon 
planning and resources during the next phase of operations. 
A vital lesson learned from an echelon perspective was that of re-supply on the 
battlefield. As the battles in Normandy became more fluid, topping up fuel and re-arming 
was done during lulls in the battle. This process forced the echelon vehicles to advance 
much further forward into the battle zone than was usual. The emphasis on keeping 
continuous pressure on the retreating Germans forced a greater integration and 
cooperation between the fighting and rear echelons of the division. The result was a 
marked improvement in overall combat efficiency. On the battlefield, top-ups rather than 
fill-ups were more common as it was dangerous for crews to remain exposed outside the 
tank for long.733 It was in this role that the Priests were to prove invaluable. 
The status of the division at the end of TRACTABLE was not good. An ADREP 
was not found for 15 August but the one submitted for 0420 hrs 16 August provides an 
adequate reference point. The division POL state was, not surprisingly, down to 160 
miles from 175 miles at the start of the operation and the division had recorded the 
capture of 680 PW. The division began the operation with 259 tanks, 133 armoured cars 
and 133 scout cars and finished with 194 tanks, 71 armoured cars and 128 scout cars. The 
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fighting strength of the Foot Guards was eight tanks while the Grenadier Guards were left 
with 18 tanks.734 The division strength at the beginning of TRACTABLE was recorded as 
871 officers and 15111 other ranks and on the morning of 16 August the division strength 
was recorded as 821 officers and 14489 other ranks—a difference of 50 officers and 622 
other ranks. A crucial supply note was that 17-pdr sabot ammunition for anti-tank use 
was still in short supply. 
In a post operation report filed on 16 Aug 1944, J.G. Sprague, the acting brigade 
commander of 8th Cdn Inf Bde, made a number of important observations on the 
operation. In general he claimed that the general tactics and results of the operation were 
"excellent." He attributed the delays that occurred to driving difficulties and the bombing 
and made a number of specific recommendations for future operations. Interestingly, he 
highlighted the confusion that occurred when the name of the operation was changed at 
the last moment. When operating under 4th Cdn Armd Div the operation was called 
TRACTABLE but 3rd Cdn Inf Div continued to call the operation TALLULAH.736 
Confusion was also created when code words of flanking formations were different or 
known only to that particular formation. For example IDAHO was a 4th Cdn Armd Div 
code word for Pt 159, which did not show up in the formal list of code words for the 
operation. It was common practice to allot a number of specific code words for use by 
each formation but how they were used was not necessarily conveyed to flanking 
The status of the tank strength in the SAR is unknown. Ops Log 16 August 44 serial 42. War Diary, 1st 
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formations. This practice impeded mutual cooperation among flanking formations and 
clouded the situational awareness at higher levels in the command chain. 
TRACTABLE is commonly viewed as a failure because the Germans were able to 
once again deny the Allies the planned objectives they sought.738 The operation 
succeeded in breaking through the "best-organized defensive position left to the Germans 
in Normandy."739 In addition, the operation proved that Kitching and the division, its 
staff and formations could operate and innovate on and succeed under the most complex 
and challenging conditions warfare could offer up. This was the second major operation 
for the division in the span of a week yet despite all of the challenges and setbacks that 
were thrown at the division's leadership, they adapted, refocused and continued on. 
The key question is not whether TRACTABLE was a successful operation 
because it was. The more important question concerning TRACTABLE is: What was the 
cost to the true operational level requirement of capturing Trun and closing the gap by the 
continued drive to Falaise by the 4 Cdn Armd Div on 15 August? Montgomery's orders 
to take Falaise first before exploiting to Trun cost the Canadians and the division two 
crucial days (15 and 16 August) that could have been used to seal and secure the gap. 
The actions of 14 August were necessary to launch the operation but once over 
the Laison River and once Perrieres was taken on the morning of 15 August, 4th Cdn 
Armd Div should have be sent straight to Trun alongside the Polish Armd Div, leaving 
the 2nd and 3rd Infantry divisions and the 2nd Cdn Armd Bde to deal with Falaise. Such a 
737
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move would have sidestepped the strength of the German defences and would have 
unhinged the northern portion of the German defences. The capture of Falaise may have 
been delayed but the trade off was having a strong force barring the escape routes out of 
the pocket before the formal German order for retreat had been given. This course of 
action would have still achieved the desired result for TRACTABLE by severing the 
lines of communication through Falaise but at a point further east. 
The command decisions made by Montgomery and Simonds during 
TRACTABLE have not received the critical analysis that they deserve since they are 
directly responsible for the desperate fighting that would happen in the days to come. On 
14 August, Montgomery directed First Cdn Army, and by extension, 2nd Cdn Corps to 
take Falaise. According to Montgomery, this new task was not to interfere with the larger 
and more important task of driving southeast to capture Trun and the link up with the 
Americans.740 The imperative of the two tasks: take Falaise as soon as possible and not 
impede the capture of Trun and link up with the Americans as the primary task were, 
however, mutually exclusive. Capturing Falaise as soon as possible implied a maximum 
effort by 2nd Cdn Corps against Falaise. The accomplishment of this task meant that the 
depth of the Canadian attack had to be extended southwest to take the city. This action 
would take the 2nd Cdn Corps forces in the complete opposite direction of their main task, 
which was the link up with the Americans at Trun. 
Montgomery compounded the issue by not reinforcing 2nd Cdn Corps. Despite 
giving Crerar a major new responsibility and shifting the direction of the Canadian opera-
tions, Montgomery did not reinforce Crerar with one of the three armoured divisions of 
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Second Br Army, which in the course of events, were in danger of being pinched out of 
battle.741 Saddling 2nd Cdn Corps with the two tasks with no additional resources meant 
that Simonds now had to choose where his main effort would be. 
Simonds had a number of options: tackle the tasks sequentially by sending 
everything he had against Falaise in the hopes of a swift victory and then shifting the 
effort to Trun or tackle them concurrently by dividing his forces. If he chose the 
concurrent approach, Simonds had to decide the weight assigned to each effort. He could 
divide the forces equally against both targets or he could send a majority of troops against 
one and a reduced force against the other. Simonds had to weigh the tactical values of an 
early capture of Falaise and a delayed link-up with the Americans against an early link-up 
with the Americans and a delayed capture of Falaise. 
Simonds chose parallel lines of operation with a weighted effort against Falaise 
which was, in fact, contrary to the stated primary task which was the link-up with the 
Americans at Trun. The majority of his forces carried the attack towards Falaise while the 
Polish Armd Div was sent southeast to try and seal the gap. By choosing this option, 
Simonds gave the Germans in the pocket the one commodity they were quickly running 
out of—time. 
Simonds compounded the problem by assigning the task of taking Falaise to 
Kitching and 4th Cdn Armd Div. This decision was fundamentally wrong on two fronts. 
An armoured division, because of its weaker complement of infantry and because of the 
increased vulnerability of tanks in confined spaces, was the wrong asset to use to take a 
town. Capturing a town usually involved infantry-intensive house-to-house fighting and 
Graves, South Albertas, 133. 
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this task was traditionally given to an infantry division. The second and more important 
reason was because 4th Cdn Armd Div was one of only two formations that Simonds had 
that could get to Trun quickly with enough combat power to seal the gap and cause havoc 
in the German rear areas. Forcing the division to fight on towards Falaise and into the 
strength of the German anti-tank defences resulted in the serious degradation of the 
combat power of the division and, had the division captured the heights and then the city 
itself, its ability to advance to Trun would have been seriously delayed and, more 
importantly, the division may not have even had the combat strength to be a factor in the 
next battles.742 Simonds' decisions on 15 August must be seriously questioned. 
The actions of 15 August represented a wasted day of conflict that resulted in far 
too many needless tank and personnel casualties in 4th Cdn Armd Div. 16 August would 
become a wasted day to recover and reorient the division after the actions of 15 August. 
Falaise was a distraction: one could even say an obsession for Montgomery. This 
distraction delayed the movement of the division into the gap and gave the Germans two 
more days of respite to utilize the open path to the east. 
TRACTABLE, as a plan, did not survive its initial contact with either the 
enemy or the elements, consequently it tested the training, resolve and initiative of the 
men at all levels within the division. The casualties among the senior leadership within 
the armoured brigade forced the leadership role down to the regimental commanders who 
proved up to the challenge by continuing the advance with leadership and initiative on the 
battlefield. They were able to successfully continue the advance using new tactics-smoke 
and new re-supply innovations-top ups on the battlefield, to keep their battlegroups 
Copp, Fields of Fire, 232. 
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moving towards their objectives. The advance to Pt 159 was achieved by the personal 
initiative of the commanders of BCR (Maj Parish) and Grenadier Guards (Lt Col 
Halpenny) who not only had to deal with effective German defences but had to operate 
with little or no brigade support and a total lack of situational awareness. Certainly all of 
the leaders of both the fighting and rear echelons displayed a drive and energy which 
demonstrated their ability to implement the lessons learned in previous engagements into 
a winning formula on the battlefield. 
At all levels the soldiers of the division were tempering the lessons and drills of 
their training with their actual combat experiences to garner real lessons learned.743 The 
division was learning how to operate in combat. The mix-ups and separation in 
TRACTABLE caused by the smokescreen and the Laison River demanded some 
reorganization south of the River valley. The action had to be completed while combating 
the Germans in an area that they strongly defended. Considering the fact that the 4th Cdn 
Armd Div was conducting its second major operation in less than a week and that it was 
having to overcome significant unit reorganization and command issues because of 
casualties and losses, the units had acquitted themselves well but, more importantly, they 
were learning. A statistic that seems to be lost on most who judge the performance of the 
division as poor was that 15 August 1944 was only day seven of combat operations for 
4th Cdn Armd Div. 
One of the interesting footnotes to this operation is that the armoured regiments had learned the value of 
using smoke as a tactic. The Grenadier Guards and BCR successfully used this tactic to bypass German 
strong points around Epancy and there are numerous other reports of the use of smoke by the other 
regiments/battalions. In fact, Proctor recorded that he had to ask Corps for an additional allotment of 3300 
rounds of smoke as "the program today used up most of ours. War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, AA&QMG, 1-
31 August 1944, entry 15 Aug. 
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Chapter Nine: Closing the Falaise Gap 
On the morning of 16 August, the area known as the Falaise Pocket was 35 miles 
deep and approximately 12 miles wide. Elements of 21 German divisions, comprising 
approximately 200,000 men, were in danger of encirclement but Field Marshal von Kluge 
had finally given the approval for a formal retreat to the Seine.744 The Germans 
concluded that they needed three nights to get the western-most forces across the Orne 
River and one more night to complete the withdrawal behind the Dives River. The 
outcome of the operation to rescue the remaining German forces in Normandy depended, 
therefore, on their ability to keep the shoulders of the Gap open for four days.745 
Despite the late order to withdraw, many German troops had already left the area. 
Senior German officers had seen what was coming and had been quietly evacuating 
troops to the east for some time. Earlier, von Kluge had authorized the withdrawal of 
"administrative troops and motorized transport." German commanders stretched the 
interpretation of this directive to include complete formations or units. The 12th SS Pz 
Div, for example, retained only its headquarters and a battle group of 500 men inside the 
pocket. Echelon personnel and non-combat worthy troops (gunners without guns, tankers 
without tanks)—a total according to Hubert Meyer of nearly 12,000 men—were sent to 
safety well before permission to retreat was granted. Other German formations did the 
same.746 Despite the terrible pounding by Allied aircraft, nearly 55,000 Germans, many 
without their transport, managed to escape from the pocket in the first three days of the 
withdrawal.747 
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Map 20: The Falaise Pocket. Ellis, Victory in the West, 489. 
Kluge directed Fifth Panzer Army and Seventh Army to withdraw without delay 
to the sector of the Dives and the line Morteaux-Trun-Gace-Laigle. The withdrawal was 
to be carried out under the overall command of Seventh Army. Pz Grp Eberbach was to 
cover the withdrawal to Argentan and Gace and, after the fulfilment of these orders, was 
to disband. Once extracted from the pocket, Seventh Army was to take over control of the 
sector from the sea to Laigle inclusive and Eberbach was to assume command of Fifth 
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Panzer Army and control the sector from Laigle to Paris. All troops in these areas were to 
be brought under command of the Army in their respective zone.748 
On the morning of 16 August, Simonds changed the tasks of his divisions. There 
was to be no set-piece plan of attack; in fact, there were to be no further "formal" or 
detailed plans issued during the battle. Instead, he stated that he would now operate by 
telling his divisional commanders what he intended to do and what action he wanted 
them to take. Simonds' intent for 2nd Cdn Corps on 16 August was as follows: 
• With two infantry divisions, form a firm base enclosing Falaise until 
relieved by Second Army. 
• With two armoured divisions, exploit to capture Trun and the high ground 
dominating it in the southwest and northeast. 
• Prepare to advance in a northeast direction on Lisieux.749 
•>nd The2naCdnInfDiv was given the assignment of taking Falaise. It would then hold it and 
thrust further down the road to Argentan or move east behind the armour. The 3rd Cdn Inf 
Div was to widen its front to take over the area currently held by the 4th Cdn Armd Div 
and was to be prepared to advance on the axis Sassy-St Pierre-sur-Dives-Lisieux when 
ordered. The 2nd Cdn Armd Bde was to go into Corps reserve.750 
The 4th Cdn Armd Div was to advance on the axis Eraines-Pt 250 -Pt 252 and was 
to position itself to dominate the high ground at Moutabard. The division was to recce in 
the direction of Trun and make contact with the Polish Armd Div in Trun. The division 
was to be prepared to advance northeast from Moutabard when ordered. The Polish Armd 
Div was to advance on the axis Maizieres -Jort-Pt 259 and was to position itself to 
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dominate the area from Pt 226-Pt 258 and Trim. This move would establish a blocking 
position for any possible German escape.751 This strategy by Simonds was designed to set 
up a double-layered defensive line along the Dives River with the 4th Cdn Armd Div to 
the west of the river and the 1st Polish Armd Div to the east of the River. 
Falaise Operations to Moutibard 
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Map 21: Operations to Moutabard, Google maps capture. 
These new orders revised the intentions outlined by Simonds the previous evening 
as well as the more recent plans by Kitching later that same evening to seize Versainville 
and Falaise. The 4th Cdn Armd Div was still oriented physically and mentally to take 
Falaise and much planning had been undertaken during the evening and early hours of 16 
August towards the anticipated attack on the town. The new orders were now directing 
the two armoured divisions away from Falaise and south, into the center of the Gap, to 
751Discussion of this 4 Cdn Armd Div operation has not been found in any previous secondary source. 
Memo GOC "Operations Following the Capture of Falaise" dated 15 August 1944.1bid., App 11. 
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close the German escape route and to deny them the bridges, river crossings and road 
junctions necessary for their escape. Once this task was accomplished, the Germans 
would be forced to move in small groups and their ability to conduct a controlled and 
fighting withdrawal would be severely hampered.752 
The day of 16 August was used to rebuild the division. Halpenny concentrated on 
organizing his brigade headquarters before the next attack. Proctor ordered all repaired, 
LOB tanks and tanks in the 25th Armd Delivery Regt to report to the armoured brigade in 
an attempt to rebuild the armour strength of the regiments. The Grenadier Guards, whose 
tank strength had been reduced to 23 Sherman tanks, were grateful for the chance to 
obtain replacements but only ten were available. The Foot Guards could obtain only 
enough tanks and crews to operate with two squadrons of 12 tanks each.754 The 4 Cdn 
Armd Bde had a fighting strength of just 72 tanks to begin the next series of operations: 
one-third the tank strength it should have had.755 
Now that the area north of the Laison River was in Allied hands, Rear HQ had to 
cope with the inevitable job of dealing with the division's dead. The B Echelon troops 
were tasked to provide work parties to clear the bodies from the tanks and to bury the 
dead of Worthington Force. Late in the evening of 16 August, the echelons crossed the 
Laison River and harboured near Rouvres. In the early hours of 17 August, the A echelon 
moved forward to provide an immediate delivery of the day's rations prior to the advance 
south.756 
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At 1700 hrs 16 August the orders changed again! Kitching issued new orders for 
OP "SMASH." OP SMASH was the one operation where Kitching had a modicum of 
latitude to plan and execute how he wanted to achieve his objective, yet details of the 
operation have been poorly described and understood. The intention of OP SMASH was 
for 4th Cdn Armd Bde to capture Trun and firm up on the high ground north and northeast 
of the town. The ops logs of the 4th Cdn Armd Bde refer to the objective, as Antarctic, 
which according to the map traces found in the war diaries, was Pt 147 near Louvieres en 
Auge.757 
The 10th Cdn Inf Bde would seize a bridgehead over the Ante and Train Rivers. 
The 4th Cdn Armd Bde would pass through and advance on the main divisional 
objective—Trun. Kitching specified two routes for the advance: Route I (codenamed 
Irish) through Damblainville and Route II (codenamed Japan) through Morteaux 
Couliboeuf.759 There would be three phases to the attack. The first phase was the capture 
of the dominating, partly-wooded hill overlooking Damblainville; the second was the 
seizure of the village itself; and the third was the securing of yet another dominating 
feature 1,800 metres south of the river. A reconnaissance of the Dives River for crossings 
by 9th Field Sqn engineers resulted in a recommendation that the Damblainville crossing 
757This objective was at odds with information in the First Cdn Army war diary which identified the high 
ground immediately southwest of the town of Trun as the objective of the Division's advance. The specific 
grid reference given was (grid 309297) which is south of Trun. A message from the First Cdn Army 
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Damblainville to Mourteaux-Couliboeuf and south. Ops Log 17 August serial 57, War Diary, 1st Canadian 
Army- General Staff, 1-31 August 1944. 
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be used since a bridge was found intact and a reconnaissance beyond the town found no 
Germans for at least another mile. The decision was made to go with Route I. The 
division would advance straight south to cut the main Falaise-Trun Road and then 
southeast to Trun 760 
Map 22: Proposed Plan Op Smash. Google Maps capture. 
The axis of advance to Antarctic for the Advance Guard was through 
Damblainville to Ners then southeast along the Falaise-Trun road to Fontaine les Bassets 
where the Advance Guard would cross the Dives River above Trun and advance to Pt 
147.761 No specific axis of advance was identified for Route II beyond Coulibouef. The 
760
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orders stipulated that the route would either be cross-country or through Trun to the final 
objectives. The route was to be picked by the Advance Guard.762 
The final objectives for the three armoured regiments lay northeast of Trun along 
the Trun-Vimoutiers road. The BCR was assigned Pt 147 on the south side of the 
highway and the Foot Guards and Grenadier Guards were assigned the high ground 
between Louvieres-en-Auge and Hordouseaux on the north side of the highway. The 
infantry of 10th Cdn Inf Bde were tasked to follow behind the armoured regiments but no 
specific objectives were found in the available sources.763 
Waiting for the outcome of the 2nd Cdn Inf Div attack on Falaise delayed the 
deployment of 4th Cdn Armd Div in preparation for OP SMASH. The only units that 
were authorized to move were those tasked with securing the river crossing for the two 
proposed routes. The Argylls were directed to move at once from Perrieres to the high 
wooded hill north of Damblainville and to be ready to press on into the village and cross 
the Ante.764 Mounted in armoured half-tracks and accompanied by C Sqn SAR, the 
battalion moved southeast from Perrieres at 1800 hours and reached their hill without 
being opposed. Patrols reported Damblainville to be undefended, although enemy tanks 
were passing through it. Jefferson had also sent a small mobile force from the Algonquin 
Regiment from Tassily to capture the single-track bridge across the Dives at Couliboeuf, 
in accordance with Kitching's plan, with a view to using it should the attack to the south 
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of Damblainville fail.765 The Algonquins found the bridge intact and seized it 
unopposed.766 Once it was clear that the Falaise route was not possible, the division 
began to move towards Route I. 
The current narratives of the Normandy campaign fail to appreciate the significant 
amount of change that the senior leadership of 4th Cdn Armd Div had to deal with on 16 
and 17 August. The number of O Groups as recorded in the Lake Superior Regiment War 
Diary highlights this fact. The first brigade O Group occurred at 0030 hrs 16 August with 
orders for the renewed attack to take Falaise. Keane conducted his own O Group and the 
companies of the battalion reported themselves ready in position for the anticipated attack 
by early morning. The next Brigade O Group was at 1400 hrs and detailed Simonds' new 
intent, which was the move south and the link up with the Americans. The objective for 
the division was now to dominate the high ground from Pt 241 to Pt 252 at Moutabard 
along the Falaise-Argentan road. Associated with these orders was the task of linking up 
with the Poles at Trun. Kitching held his third division O Group in less than 20 hours at 
1700 hrs where the details of OP SMASH were briefed and the task of capturing the 
bridgehead at Damblainville and the alternate bridge at Couliboeuf were outlined.'0' At 
2000 hrs, Keane was once again called to a Brigade O Group where OP SMASH was 
briefed. Keane's O Group for this third change in orders took place at 0330 hrs 17 
August.768 
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Advanced units of 10 Cdn Inf Bde started moving at 0100 hrs with the rest of the 
brigade moving at 0600 hrs. The armoured brigade began its move at 0900 hrs. Difficulty 
in moving forward developed early as elements of 3rd Cdn Inf Div and other formations 
cut into the route designated exclusively for the armoured division.769 This situation 
backed up the division columns and provided easy targets for German artillery and the 
Luftwaffe which made a rare daylight attack. 
At 0730 hours, the combined force of Argylls and SAR descended quickly on 
Damblainville and captured the town without much trouble. The town, riverbank and 
bridge over the Ante River were all seized and consolidated within an hour. Around 
noon, A and C Squadrons of the SAR and the Algonquins moved through the town 
toward the next objective. The leading infantry managed to advance about 1,000 yards 
south of the bridge before they were pinned down by accurate German machine gun, 
artillery and anti-tank fire. Accurate mortar and artillery also fell on the town. Elements 
in the column behind the town tried to deploy off the road and disperse but the town 
provided little room for manoeuvre and casualties mounted. The Algonquin Regiment 
was ordered to firm up in Damblainville alongside the Argylls.770 
The advanced guard of the armoured brigade passed through and tried several 
times to push on to the heights.771 The Germans let the personnel carriers move freely but 
as soon as the tanks moved they came under immediate German fire.772 It was now clear 
to Kitching that the Germans were determined to resist any attempt to move on Trun 
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from the Damblainville bridgehead and that any advance in that direction would require a 
major attack. 
At 1130 hrs Kitching issued a warning order to change the route to Route II and at 
1203 hrs the Grenadier Guards were ordered to move to "Japan and proceed to 
Antarctic."773 The 4th Cdn Armd Bde would lead the attack. Changing the direction of an 
armoured division's attack while part of the division is engaged in battle is a formidable 
assignment. This task was made even harder by the lack of good roads in the area. The 
change in orders involved an extraordinary manoeuvre on the part of Wigle, Proctor and 
the division's transport in the shortest of time.774 
Fortunately, the armoured regiments had not been committed at Damblainville but 
were grouped behind the hill north of the city. The tactical situation meant that the 
Grenadier Guards and Foot Guards would have to proceed without their normal 
complement of supporting infantry from the Lake Superior Regiment, since the latter had 
already been committed at Damblainville. There was a large risk to the armoured 
regiments, particularly with the approach of night, but Kitching was prepared to accept 
the risk.775 
The division unscrambled itself and moved to the new bridge, "if not in an orderly 
fashion, at least in control."776 Wigle passed new instructions to the armoured brigade 
and then proceeded to the bridge at Couliboeuf where he personally briefed the regiment 
commanders on the general situation as they passed through. Maj M.R. Ware (GSO II) 
773
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and Capt J.A. Berthiaume (GSO III Ops) controlled the disengagement at Damblainville 
and the re-routing of the armoured brigade to Couliboeuf. The vanguard was ordered to 
keep the Germans engaged at Damblainville while the remainder of the forces were 
withdrawn and re-routed through Couliboeuf to Pt 118 above Trun.777 The Damblainville 
position would be taken over by9 t h CdnMBde. 
The 10th CdnlnfBde was ordered to disengage at Damblainville, follow the 
armour across the river and protect the division's right flank (i.e. the northern bank of the 
Dives River) from Morteaux Couliboeuf to the area Fontaine Les Bassels. The infantry 
brigade was able to disengage under cover of artillery fire from the 15th Field 
Regiment.778 The proposed disposition of the infantry brigade had the Lines on Pt 65, 
Argylls on Pt 64 and Algonquins Pt 78, which placed the infantry brigade astride the high 
ground to Trun along the route of the Dives River.779 The Lincoln & Welland Regiment 
was subsequently ordered to Pt 104, located approximately 4.5 miles northwest of Trun. 
By 1600 hours the Grenadier Guards were across the bridge, followed closely by 
the Foot Guards. Once across the river, the tanks fanned out to the south and southeast. 
By early evening, the Grenadier Guards had captured Pt 118 on the outskirts of Trun but, 
having no infantry, the regiment arranged their tanks in an all-round defense with all 
possible personnel in front on foot patrols. The remainder of the brigade made good 
progress. The Foot Guards consolidated on the hill a mile and a half northwest of Le 
Marais-la-Chapelle, while the BCR harboured in Les Moutiers-en-Auge for the night.780 
Another regimental commander was lost when the commanding officer of the Foot 
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Guards, Maj H.F. Baker, who had just taken over command the previous day, was 
seriously wounded when conducting a forward reconnaissance. Command of the 
regiment went to Capt G.T. Baylay.781 The tactical gamble to send the armoured 
regiments without infantry support had, however, succeeded. The 4th Cdn Armd Bde was 
in the German rear area without their knowledge and the divisions' echelon forces were 
able to retain contact with the regiments and were able to come forward on demand to re-
supply the tanks. 
Once Kitching made the decision to switch from Route I to Route II, the issue of 
the axis of advance had to be decided upon. Using Route II meant that the division would 
be on the opposite side of the Dives River from that originally planned and in the area of 
operations allocated to the Poles. The 4th Cdn Armd Div war diary records a "hasty" 
conference with Simonds at this point. Most of the current narratives state that the 
conference was to seek Simonds' approval for the switch to Couliboeuf. Since this 
route was already part of the approved OP SMASH plan, the more likely scenario is that 
Kitching was trying to establish the new boundaries between the two divisions and to 
decide whether new objectives had to be identified for his armoured regiments. The Poles 
had been ordered to take Norry-en-Auge and Hills 159 and 259. The two divisions would 
now be travelling beside each other with no physical boundaries between them as before. 
In addition the 4th Cdn Armd Div objectives were initially deeper in enemy territory. This 
changed at 1750 hrs, however, when Simonds ordered the Poles to capture Chambois. 783 
Major Ed Smith from the Grenadier Guards was ordered to take command of the Foot Guards the 
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The 4th Cdn Armd Div would no longer have the benefit of travelling over a main 
highway. The axis of advance had the Dives River on the right and the Poles on the left. 
The frontage provided about 2,000 yards of manoeuvre room but the Canadian armour 
would now have to travel over secondary roads through terrain that had plenty of woods, 
rolling hills and hamlets which provided excellent concealment for the Germans along 
the line of advance. Flanking the advance route were the hills on the western side of the 
Dives, which were still in German hands. In addition, the tanks would have to traverse 
two additional water obstacles that bisected the line of advance. 
By the afternoon of 17 August, Montgomery was quite unhappy with the rate of 
the advance and at 1445 hrs new orders were issued to First Cdn Army. 
By direction C-in-C [Montgomery] 1 Pol Armd Div has been ordered to thrust on 
Chambois. Essential to push on greatest possible speed regardless of losses in 
order to close the gap. 4 Cdn Armd Div continuing thrust on Trun.784 
This is the first reference to any move of 2nd Cdn Corps units to Chambois. As late as 
1837 hrs, 4th Cdn Armd Div was reporting that it intended to establish a firm base in the 
area Norrey-en-Auge to Mandeville.785 At 1945 hrs, Simonds issued specific orders for 
4th Cdn Armd Div to capture Trun that night.786 In order to facilitate the task, 3rd Div was 
ordered to relieve the units of 10th Cdn Inf Bde, still in the Morteaux Couliboeuf area. 
This move would allow 4th Cdn Armd Div to concentrate and re-form itself. 
784
 Ops Log 17 August, serial 27, War Diary, 1st Canadian Army- General Staff, 1-31 August 1944. 
7850ps Log 17 August, serial 141, Ibid. 
786 , 
' Ops Log 17 August, serial 144, Ibid. 
296 
Map 23: Disposition of 4 Cdn Armd Division units morning 18 August 1944. 
The 4th Cdn Armd Bde Operations Log for 17 August revealed a much firmer 
control of the brigade by Halpenny. The rapid advance, however, had carried the 
armoured regiments beyond radio range of the armoured brigade headquarters.787 
Communications were further hampered by the hills and valley of the Trun area. The 
division had been ordered to capture Trun and was also ordered to send one armoured 
regiment to cut the Trun-Vimoutiers Road.788 Kitching ordered Trun captured during the 
night and ordered 4th Cdn Armd Bde to execute the attack.789 Without infantry, however, 
the attack could not proceed so the armoured regiments waited for the arrival of the Lake 
Superior Regiment. 
787
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On the German side, 277th and 271st Inf Div and elements of 12th SS Pz Div were 
quickly disintegrating. The 85th Inf Div was being pushed out of the pocket by the Allied 
advance, which meant that the remaining elements of 12th SS Pz Div had to withstand the 
brunt of the Canadian and Polish advance. The fate of the German armies depended on 
their ability to hold open the seven-km stretch between Trun and Chambois. Elements of 
21st Pz Div, battle groups Luck and Rauch were subordinated to 12th SS Pz Div and had 
orders to launch counterattacks with the aim of holding open an east-west passage 
through the road crossing at Trun. Battle group Luck would bear the brunt of the 4th Cdn 
Armd Div attack against Trun.790 
On 18 August, Field Marshal Model relieved von Kluge and took over command 
of the German forces in the West.791 Model formulated a plan for the extraction of the 
remaining Germans forces. His first task was to re-establish a coherent front. The 2nd SS 
Pz Corps with the remnants of 2nd, 9th, 21st Pz Div along with 12th SS Pz Div was to hold 
the northern portion of the escape corridor in an attempt to prevent the 2nd Cdn Corps 
from advancing over the Dives River and was ordered to recapture the ground already 
lost in the Morteaux-Couliboeuf area. The southern wall of the corridor was to be held by 
the 47th Pz Corps with the 2nd and 116th Pz Div.792 The 2nd SS Pz Corps was ordered to 
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position itself near Vimoutiers as soon as possible. The orders were for the armoured 
formations to get away first, leaving the infantry divisions to the last.793 
Inside the Pocket, the remnants of the once powerful Fifth Panzer Army and 
Seventh Army, were trying to extricate themselves as best they could.794 The major road 
along the valley of the Dives led through Trun, St. Lambert sur Dives and Chambois. To 
the south, the highway leading from Falaise southeastward to Argentan was under 
shellfire.795 In between were numerous smaller roads. German tanks and half-tracked 
vehicles were not road-bound and could use the open fields to escape. Model's problem 
was compounded by the fact that the skies were clear, the Allied air forces were on the 
prowl and he had run out of time. 
Simonds intent for operations on 18 August was to link up with the Americans 
and hold the Dives River line.797 At first light, No 1 and No 3 Squadrons of the Grenadier 
Guards moved southeast to occupy the area around Pt 147 and reported themselves on 
ANTARCTIC, their objective, at 0741 hrs.798 They made their presence known to the 
unsuspecting retreating German columns by engaging targets. At 1000 hrs, radio contact 
was re-established with brigade HQ. The BCR reported gaining contact with the 
793
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Grenadier Guards at 1019 hrs but they arrived short of fuel, ammunition and water and at 
1045 hrs an immediate request was sent for re-supply. Their A echelon came forward and 
re-supplied the regiment.799 
The Lake Superior Regiment's C Coy and the BCR reached ANTARCTIC with 
little opposition and then pushed boldly into Trun but were forced to withdraw 
temporarily when American aircraft bombed the town. Trun remained lightly held until 
the arrival of elements of 10th Cdn Inf Bde.800 In the meantime, the remaining armour 
swept eastwards and by 1200 hrs occupied the dominating feature northwest of Le Mesnil 
Girard. On arrival, the Foot Guards found the objective occupied by a motor battalion of 
the 1st Pol Armd Div. Liaison was established with the Poles and the regiment deployed 
in fire positions commanding the Falaise-Trun and Trun-Vimoutieres roads.801 
The 10th Cdn Inf Bde had made slow progress through the wooded hills southeast 
of Morteaux the previous evening. The Algonquin Regiment, with the support of B Sqn 
SAR, took their initial objective of La Marais la Chapelle at 0700 hrs against light 
opposition. By 1000 hours the remainder of the brigade had established positions on the 
east side of the Dives River from Morteaux-Couliboeuf to Le Marais la Chapelle.802 In 
less than twelve hours the division had executed an improvised advance over complex 
terrain into the heart of the gap. By early morning the infantry of the Lake Superior 
Regiment had married up with their respective armoured regiments.803 The stage was 
now set for Kitching to solidify the division's gains. 
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At 1000 hrs, 18 August Kitching held his O Group outlining his plan to firm up 
the occupation of the east bank of the Dives River from Morteaux Couliboeuf to Trun. 
Late in the evening of 17 August he received instructions ordering him to get into 
position in the area Trun -Lemarais la Chapelle- Louvieres en Auge.804 The three infantry 
battalions of the 10 Cdn Inf Bde would hold the east bank of the river while the armoured 
regiments of 4th Cdn Armd Bde arrayed themselves in depth behind the infantry on the 
high ground to the east in a counter-attack role. Trun was to be occupied by the Lake 
Superior Regiment and one armoured regiment. The artillery was to concentrate in the 
area Montreuil la Combe-Louviers-en-Auge.805 
At 1400 hrs, a combined force from the Grenadier Guards and Lake Superior 
Regiment attacked south from their position on Pt 147 to cut off the approach to Trun 
from the southeast. The attack succeeded and the infantry went to ground while the tanks 
advanced to Trun from the south where they met members of the Argylls who informed 
them that they were in Trun. The Grenadier Guard tanks repositioned themselves on the 
rising ground 1,000 yds from the Trun crossroads and began to engage targets of 
opportunity across and up the valley.806 The BCR consolidated a strong position south of 
Hordouseaux. 
The Lincoln & Welland Regiment advanced to relieve the Grenadier Guards in 
Trun with under command A Sqn SAR and supporting troops. The main column moved 
off at 1300 hrs and proceeded through Montreuil la Cambe, Louvieres-en-Ange and into 
Trun. By 1500 hrs, the battalion, with the support of tanks and anti-tank guns, had turned 
804
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the town into a Canadian strong point. German columns continued to head to the town, 
unaware that it was in Canadian hands and by evening more than 500 prisoners had been 
captured. 
The 4th Cdn Armd Bde had now established itself in Trun astride the main road to 
Vimoutiers as directed by Simonds. This disposition strategically placed the brigade in a 
position to deal with any Germans who might attempt to escape northeast through Trun 
and any of the secondary roads to Vimoutiers.808 The 4th Cdn Armd Div was now arrayed 
in accordance with the disposition identified in OP SMASH. 
The operations on 17 and 18 August demonstrated the flexibility, professional 
competence and growing maturity of Kitching, his staff and the formations within 4 Cdn 
Armd Div. The professional manner in which the division switched to Route 2 once 
Kitching realized that further attempts to advance through Damblainville would be costly 
is a testament to the training of the staff members who were able to orchestrate the switch 
in such a manner that the armoured brigade could still continue the attack late into the 
day. The 4 Cdn Armd Bde attack was not simply a made dash for ground but a coherent 
advance where the echelon forces where able to advance and conduct re-supply when 
called upon. The success of the advance is even more impressive when one considers that 
the armoured brigade and all three armoured regiments were commanded by people 
whose time in command was measured in days at best! This successful advance is 
indicative of a division that was being effectively commanded and controlled at all levels. 
A Company was deployed on the road to Falaise, B Company on the road to Argentan, C Company on 
the road to St. Lambert-sur-Dives and D Company covered the road to Vimoutiers. Tanks and anti-tank 
guns were disposed to make strong points within the town and to cover the approaches to the Dives River 
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While the division was executing Kitching's plans for the occupation of the 
Morteaux Couliboeuf to Trun area Simonds summoned his four division commanders to 
an O Group at Kitching's headquarters. Earlier in the day, Crerar had ordered Simonds to 
seal off the front from Trun to Chambois and, anticipating that the German forces in the 
pocket would soon be destroyed, Simonds was also to carry out active reconnaissance to 
the northeast in the direction of Vimoutiers. Simonds' plan was for 2nd Cdn Div to mop 
up Falaise, for 3rd Cdn Inf Div to take over the east bank of the Dives River from 
Morteaux-Couliboeuf to Trun, while 4th Cdn Armd Div advanced southeast from Trun on 
Chambois. The 1st Pol Armd Div was to advance southwest from the area of Les 
Champeaux to Chambois and link up with the U.S. forces.809 
Kitching was to carry out his part of this operation the next day, 19 August, as 
soon as the division had cleared the enemy from the area north and northwest of Trun. To 
undertake this clearing task, Simonds ordered that 4th Cdn Armd Bde and the Algonquin 
Regiment, which were moving in accordance with Kitching's plan, "to deploy in an area 
about two miles north of it," on the axis Trun-Vimoutiers and away from the Trun-St. 
Lambert line.810 Simonds' orders entailed, as Kitching later recalled, changes to the or-
ders he had already issued to the two brigades that morning and a significant 
redeployment of his forces.811 
This constant change in plans was frustrating Kitching and he knew this situation 
was having a detrimental effect on his division. Two days earlier, the division plan was 
changed three times in the span of 24 hours. Once again, he had to countermand orders 
809
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that he had already issued. He wrote in his memoirs that changes in a plan become more 
exhausting as they go down the chain of command and, as a result, his men must have 
wondered why he couldn't make up his mind.812 
Opinions vary as to whether the splitting of the division was to counter an 
anticipated German attack from outside the Trun-Vimoutiers area or whether this was 
Simonds' attempt to pre-position the division for the drive to Lisieux as per the direction 
he issued on 16 August.813 These new moves on the part of the units of the armoured 
brigade were achieved with little enemy opposition but the disposition of the division's 
units was of great concern to Kitching. The greater part of his division, including the 
three armoured regiments of the armoured brigade, the Lake Superior Regiment and 
Algonquin Regiment were sent off to the northeast away from the Trun-St. Lambert-
Moissy line. This left the three remaining units of 10th Cdn Inf Bde (the Lines, Argylls 
and SAR) to carry out Simonds' orders to occupy the line of the Dives River south of 
Trun, a distance of some four and a half miles.814 
Moving 4th Cdn Armd Bde away from the Trun-Chambois line was accepting a 
considerable amount of operational risk. Simonds would have had to make significant 
assumptions about the combat capability of the German forces left in the Pocket in 
accepting this risk. Simonds must have felt confident, given his assessment of the tactical 
812
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situation, in the risk involved in having the Dives River line held by minimum forces. 
The role of clearing the area north of the Trun-Vimoutiers road could have been assigned 
to 3rd Cdn Inf Div and 2nd Cdn Armd Bde which would have allowed Kitching to use the 
entire resources of his division to seal the Dives River line. Given the evolving tactical 
situation and the requirement to close all possible escape routes, it is odd that Simonds 
seemed to have placed a higher priority on clearing the Trun-Vimoutiers area over firmly 
sealing the Dives River line on 18 August. A coordinated thrust by the entire division to 
Chambois on 18 August represented a course of action with a high probability of success 
in taking the town and cutting off the main roads and bridges along the Dives River. 
Simonds orders of 18 August caused many routes to remain open and available to the 
Germans. 
Simonds actions suggest two possible conclusions: he thought that the majority of 
the German units had escaped and those left in the pocket presented a marginal threat; or 
he felt that he had more time to accomplish the two tasks of clearing the area around Trun 
before he had to seal off the Dives River line. Simonds intent for operations on 19 August 
issued at 2140 hrs on 18 August would suggest the first conclusion is more probable. 
On 17 Aug 2 Pz, 2 SS Pz, Pz Lehr, 26 Pz and 116 Pz divisions were reported east 
of the Dives. 9 and 10 SS Pz were still in the gap and 1 SS Pz and 12 SS Pz were reported 
as "no evidence" as to their location.815 The 17 August report concluded that, "The 
enemy clearly intends to get out. He knows he is almost encircled and is trying to save 
what he can and take it over the SEINE." The intelligence picture for 18 August is 
indicative of the uncertainty of the German strength in the pocket. 
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The mystery of the bag continues today. Is he out? Is he in? If he is in, why is the 
bag so small in size? What has been passing NORTH of the BOIS DE 
GOUFFERN? If he is out, why is there a bag at all or why a gap? 
The Germans were described as "beaten troops fleeing the field." A captured soldier from 
9 SS Pz Div provided a detailed report of the escape plan and order of march for the 
escaping formations which proved to be completely accurate. His information allowed 
Canadian intelligence to identify all of the known German panzer divisions. A detailed 
review of the evidence surrounding 12 SS Pz Div concluded that the division as a 
fighting formation -"no longer exists." The minutes of the Daily Joint Conference for 
19 August indicated that 3 panzer divisions (1 SS, 9SS, and 10 SS Pz Divs) were "still in 
the bag."817 
Insight into the mood at that time is provided by the 4 Cdn Armd Div Intelligence 
Summary for 2200 hrs 18 August which stated: 
On both sides the pace has accelerated greatly during the past few days. As the 
enemy cone more and more on getting his armour out through the narrowing gap, 
so it becomes more difficult for him to maintain a steady withdrawal. As our 
pressure increased, time became the all important factor, and speed the enemy to 
order of the day. Today the speed has turned to haste, frantic haste, and the picture 
is one of disorganization.818 
Simonds ordered 2nd Cdn Corps to hold its present position and reorganize for the 
advance northeast.819 
The intelligence report for 19 August was very dismissive of the combat 
capability of the forces remaining in the pocket. It stated that for the Germans the battle 
for Normandy was lost and concluded that German intentions after "this decisive defeat" 
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were more political than military. Desperate food, ammunition and fuel shortages were 
highlighted. Even though panzer divisions were noted in the area of Vimoutiers it was 
concluded that even if they had fuel or the spirit to attack it was doubtful that they 
would. This intelligence poorly serve the Canadian commanders by establishing a false 
sense of security; dismissing the potential danger that still existed within the pocket. 
Since Simonds had specifically tasked 4 Cdn Armd Bde to move northeast in the 
direction of Vimoutiers, Kitching only had the units of the depleted 10th Cdn Inf Bde to 
advance southeast towards Chambois. This new task placed an additional burden on his 
already stretched resources.822 The SAR, less one squadron and plus one company from 
the Argylls, was given the task of taking Chambois. Wotherspoon assigned the lead to 
Maj D.V. Currie of C Squadron. At 1500hrs, a depleted B Coy Argylls of approximately 
55 men came under command of Currie. Rather than waiting for the next day, the 
combined group was ordered to seize and hold Chambois before last light.823 Currie's 
squadron at this point was down to 15 tanks. The battle group got underway at 1800 hrs 
and reached St. Lambert-sur-Dives at dusk. Reports indicated that the town was strongly 
held by anti-tank guns and infantry. Currie was told, therefore, to wait until first light 
before clearing it. Wotherspoon decided to support Currie by moving down to Currie's 
position on Hill 117 with the remaining assets of the regiment.824 
First Cdn Army Intelligence Summary Number 51, Part II dated 19 August 1944, War Diary First Cdn 
Army, 1-31 August 1944. 
821
 First Cdn Army Intelligence Summary Number 51, Part II dated 19 August 1944, War Diary First Cdn 
Army, 1-31 August 1944. 
822
 The 10 Cdn Inf Bde war diary states that the brigade was to seize and hold Chambois. War Diary, 10 
Cdn Inf Bde, 1-31 August 1944, entry 18 Aug. 
823
 War Diary, Argyll & Sutherland Highlander's of Canada, 1-31 August 1944, entry 18 Aug. 
824
 This included his Regimental HQ of four tanks, recce troop, B Sqn and 4 M-10 self propelled anti-tank 
guns Copp, Fields of Fire, 240. 
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By mid-afternoon of 18 August, Trun was secure and the units of 4 Cdn Armd 
Div were on or approaching all of their new objectives, but the Poles had not yet captured 
Chambois. When Simonds met his division commanders for the second time that day at 
1500 hrs, Maczek reported that the Koszutski battle group had gone astray and ended up 
at Les Champeaux, 10 km north of Chambois. It was short of ammunition and fuel and 
Maczek had sent one of his infantry battalions to assist it. The Polish Div recce regiment 
had reached the edge of Chambois but could not enter the town, which was under 
constant Allied air attack.825 
By the end of the day, a strong blocking position had been established at Trun but 
the Argentan-Chambois-Vimoutiers highway (Dl 13-D 16) was still open, as were the 
secondary roads and lanes through St. Lambert and Moissy. German units continued to 
pour through this gap in the Allied line but not without consequence. The weather was 
clear and, during the daylight hours, these roads were ravaged by the Allied tactical air 
force.826 
The 4th Cdn Armd Div engineers were charged with opening up the long lines of 
communications and were specifically tasked with opening up three routes: two 
maintenance routes into the area along the line Les Moutiers en Auge across to Menil 
Girard and one return route.827 The engineers were kept busy trying to clear the death and 
The 2" Tactical Air Force claimed 124 tanks destroyed and 96 damaged and 1,159 transport vehicles 
destroyed with a further 1,724 damaged. Stacey, Victory Campaign, 257. A detailed examination of the 
impact of fighter and fighter bomber attacks on German vehicles during the Falaise gap timeframe was 
conducted by No 2 Operational Research Section of 21st Army Group. Their report is available in Chapter 
3 of Montgomery's Scientist. Terry Copp, ed. Montgomery's Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest 
Europe, The Work of No 2 Operational Research Section with 21 Army Group June 1944 to July 1945. 
Waterloo: Laurier Centre for Military Strategic and Disarmament studies, 2000. 
827
 In 2nd Cdn Corps each division was responsible for developing and the control of one two way traffic 
circuit between its administration and forward elements. Corps was responsible for the development and 
control of an additional route to be used primarily for operational moves. Memorandum, Control and 
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destruction along the many paths and roads to facilitate the movement of vehicles and 
maintenance columns.828 Despite the confused and scattered nature of the forces, the 
echelon forces were able to meet the calls of re-supply from the division's fighting units. 
Re-supplying St. Lambert became a difficult problem, given the nature of the fighting in 
and around the area but a system of back roads was found to keep the supplies moving 
into the town.829 
The heaviest fighting on 19 August occurred in 10th Cdn Inf Bde's sector where 
the Germans were attempting to break out en masse. By early morning, it was evident 
that the main German escape effort would be along the Dives River line Trun-St. 
Lambert-Chambois. At 0635 hrs the 10th Cdn Inf Bde ops log reported a message from 
the SAR stating "attacking ROOSTER now" as Currie's composite force attacked the 
village of St. Lambert. The force was able to clear one half of the town but was unable to 
go further because of the Germans' superior numbers. Currie decided to consolidate his 
gains and establish his lines near the centre of town.830 
At noon, the SAR was ordered to push on to Chambois. At 1300 hrs, the SAR 
contacted the Polish forces to their left and coordinated a plan in which the Poles would 
continue to Chambois while the SAR conducted a left flank attack to cut the road to 
Chambois by taking Pt 124. Wotherspoon sent B Sqn SAR to accomplish this task. The 
squadron would then be in a position to either support the Poles at Chambois or interdict 
Naming of Routes 13 Aug 44 Main Headquarters 2nd Canadian Corps. War Diary, HQ 2nd Cdn Corps-G 
Branch Main, 1-31 August 1944, App 18. 
828
 Rollefson, Green Route Up, 34. 
829A shuttle system, similar to the one used on Hill 195, was again employed to bring the supplies into St. 
Lambert. The A-l Echelon brought the supplies to Hill 117. The supplies were then configured into smaller 
loads, transferred to the decks of the crusader tanks of the SAR anti-aircraft troop and taken to the forward 
positions. A back route was found into St. Lambert through farm lanes to Currie's headquarters where, one 
by one, each of Currie's tanks could pull back to refuel and re-ammunition Graves, South Albertas, 146. 
830
 Rooster was the codename fore St. Lambert. Ops Log 19 August, serial 7. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 
1-31 August 1944, War Diary, South Alberta Regiment, 1-31 August 1944, entry 19 Aug. 
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the Chambois- Mont Ormel road.831 An order from division to 10th Cdn Inf Bde stated 
that the SAR had to complete the attack today and, if necessary, another company was to 
be sent to help out in the attack. A subsequent message at 1500 hrs ordered the SAR to 
remain firm in St. Lambert and let the Poles deal with Chambois.832 
Throughout the day, German infantry kept surging forward between Trun and 
Chambois. Currie asked for infantry reinforcements to help cope with the large number of 
prisoners that were coming into his PW cages. At 1400 hrs, a composite force of two 
companies of soldiers was sent from Trun to St. Lambert sur Dives to reinforce Currie's 
force.833 The detachment reached St. Lambert on foot and was integrated into the 
defences by 2200 hrs. Even with the additional reinforcements, Currie was forced to give 
up part of the village to tighten his defences. 
A telling indication of how the Canadian leadership was controlling the tactical 
battle exists in a summary of conversations between Simonds and the Chief of Staff, First 
Cdn Army, Brig C.C. Mann. The summary records the discussions between Mann and 
Simonds between 1040 and 1140 hrs 19 August. During the course of these 
831
 Graves, South Albertas, 146. 
832
 Wotherspoon claims that he sent the Poles on to Chambois when he realized that any advance beyond 
St. Lambert would result in his forces being cut off by the tide of advancing Germans. There are a couple 
of messages recorded in the 10 Cdn Inf Bde ops log for 19 August which could be interpreted to support 
this claim. Serial 12 at 1230 hrs orders the SAR to push on to Chambois, Serial 14 at 1300 hrs Friends on 
left [Poles] going straight to Cock. 29 Recce making left flank attack to cut road at cock and a message 
recorded at 1500 hrs which states "Liaise with friends and have friends take care of COCK [Chambois]. 
Remain firm at Rooster [St. Lambert]." Wotherspoon, Gordon Dorwood de Salaberry, "Interview for Black 
Yesterday's by Bill Wiley," (interview, Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders of Canada Museum, Hamilton, 25 
September 1986). 
833
 The detachment came from the Line & Welld Regt, consisting of C Coy plus one platoon from D Coy 
and C Coy from the A & SH of C. See the war diaries for the Line & Welld R and A & S H of C entries for 
19 August 1944. 
834
 The fighting in St. Lambert sur Dives would last three days. The commander of the Canadian forces in 
the town was Major David Currie. Currie would win the Victoria Cross the first award of its kind to be won 
by a Canadian in North-West for leadership and actions. The citation for the award was written by Lt Col 
John Proctor who states that he had to write the narrative a number of times before it was finally accepted. 
War Diary, the Lincoln and Welland Regiment 1-31 August 1944, entry 19 Aug. Hayes, The Lines, 38. 
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conversations, Simonds stated that he was about to leave for a meeting with his divisional 
commanders but he did not have a clear idea as to how he should operate "during today 
and in the immediate future." Mann endeavoured to obtain direction from Crerar or 
Montgomery. Mann stated that he had not been in touch with Montgomery but that, in his 
opinion, the instructions would direct 2nd Cdn Corps to continue to close the Gap and 
Q I C 
keep it closed until Second Br Army was able to take over the task. This evidence 
would suggest that Simonds was having difficulty deciding whether he would tackle his 
two tasks (closing the gap and pursuit) sequentially and concentrate his forces 
accordingly or whether he would deal with them concurrently and divide his forces 
according to the traits of the divisions (i.e., armoured division for the pursuit and the 
infantry divisions for the defence of the Dives River line). 
Simonds conferred with his four divisional commanders at Kitching's main 
headquarters east of Morteaux-Couliboeuf at 1100 hrs on 19 August. His orders stated 
that the encirclement must be complete—no Germans were to escape. Once this was 
complete, the Corps would face east and pursue the retreating Germans. These orders 
would suggest that Simonds was planning to deal with his two tasks sequentially. In order 
to complete the encirclement, 2nd Cdn Inf Div was to take over the north portion of the 3rd 
Cdn Div area along the line of the Dives River. This would allow the 3rd Cdn Inf Div to 
strengthen its line and close all escape routes. The 4th Cdn Armd Div was to concentrate 
upon the area between Trun and Moissy on the Dives while the Poles would be 
The timings of these conversations conflict with the O group timings. It is possible that the telephone 
conversations were recorded in actual time while the war diary timings are recorded as B time. As already 
noted there is a one hour difference between the two. Memorandum, Summary of Conversations with 
Comd 2 Cdn Corps and Chief of Staff 21 Army Grp, dated 19 Aug 44. War Diary, 1st Canadian Army-
General Staff, 1-31 August 1944, App 74. 
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responsible for the area from Moissy to Chambois and Hill 262, a commanding height 
northeast of Chambois.836 
The details of the 4 Cdn Armd Div orders demand closer scrutiny. 9 Cdn Inf Bde 
was to relieve 10 Cdn Inf Bde in Trun during the night 19/20 August and in St Lambert 
sur Dives on 20 August. 8 Cdn Inf Bde was to relieve 4 Cdn Armd Bde and 10 Cdn Inf 
Bde at Pt 258, Hordouseaux and Pt 259 during 20 August. 4 Cdn Armd Bde was to 
remain in its current area until relieved by 8 Cdn Inf Bde which was to occur during 
daylight 20 August. Simonds ordered the armoured brigade to "stand-down," it would not 
be required for further operations before first light 21 August.837 
Simonds' orders for 10 Cdn Inf Bde are more interesting. The brigade units in St 
Lambert and Chambois were to concentrate in the area of Hordouseaux. The brigade was 
to provide two scout platoons mounted in carriers under command of A Sqn Manitoba 
Dragoons for a reconnaissance in force during 20 August along the projected division 
centreline Hordouseaux- Le Champeaux-Le [blank] La Fauvetiere- Vimoutiers. 10 Cdn 
Armd Bde was to have one battalion on wheels at "Instant readiness from 201000B hrs to 
take over corps localities when captured by 18 Cdn Armd Car R." The remaining two 
battalions were placed on two hours notice to move to take over the captured areas along 
the centre line to Vimoutiers. The SAR once withdrawn from the Dives River line was to 
concentrate and stand down until first light 21 August.838 Based on Simonds orders for 
20 August, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, on relief, was to stand down and 10 Cdn Inf Bde, on relief 
and concentration, was to support a reconnaissance in force by the Manitoba Dragoons 
836
 War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1-31 August 1944, entry 19 Aug; Stacey, Victory Campaign, 260. 
837
 Hand written orders, Summary GOC's O Grp subsequent intrs received from Comd 2 Cdn Corps, War 
Diary, Canadian Grenadier Guards, 1-31 August 1944, App 23. 
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and if required launch an advance to take over captured positions without the support of 
any of the division's armour regiments since they had all been stood down. 
These orders can only lead to one conclusion: Simonds believed that the threat 
from the German forces left in the gap was minimal. Otherwise his orders for standing 
down the armoured regiments of the division on 20 August do not make sense! The 
apparent intent was to extract the units of 4th Cdn Armd Div from their battles and reform 
the division for the drive to the Seine. Unfortunately, Simonds' plan was derailed by the 
slow execution of the planned reliefs, and the German intent to rescue as many of their 
trapped forces as possible. Kitching and his men were forced to improvise once again to 
meet the demands of a changed and complex tactical situation. 
At 1130 hrs 19 August, 9th Cdn Inf Bde was informed that it was to relieve 10th 
Cdn Inf Bde in Trun on the night of 19-20 August and St. Lambert on 20 August.839 The 
5th Cdn Inf Bde would relieve the 8th Cdn Inf Bde, who would then relieve 4th Cdn Armd 
Bde on 20 August. The delay in getting more infantry into the critical area of the 
defensive line along the Dives River meant that Jefferson's meagre forces would have to 
withstand the onslaught of the remaining Germans trying to escape. 
839
 This move was dependent on 6th Cdn Inf Bde relieving 9th Cdn Inf Bde, which was located around 
Beaumais. War Diary, 9 Cdn Inf Bde, 1-31 August 1944, entry 19 Aug. 
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capture. 
As the intensity of the German breakout became apparent, Simonds finally 
realized the seriousness of the 10th Cdn Inf Bde position and began placing formations 
under Kitching's command to thicken up the defences along the Trun-St. Lambert-
Chambois corridor. The 2nd Cdn Armd Bde was placed under command 4th Cdn Armd 
Div at 1300 hrs and two regiments were ordered to thicken up 10th Cdn Inf Bde defences 
in the Chambois-Trun area.840 In addition, A Sqn 18th Cdn Armd C Regt was detached 
and placed under Kitching's command. While this squadron was under command of 
Kitching, it came with an assigned mission to recce the area from Trun to Vimoutiers. 
War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div, 1-31 August 1944, entry 19 Aug. 
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Kitching was left to deal with the unfolding tactical situation with armour units when 
what he actually needed was infantry to fill gaps in his lines. 
As the Poles pushed east and south to cut the road running northeast from 
Chambois and to seize Chambois itself, it quickly became apparent that the series of hills 
that dominated the highway would also have to be captured if the line that blocked the 
German retreat was to be made secure. By 1030 hrs, the Koszutski battle group in the Les 
Champeaux area had been re-supplied and soon after midday it set out for Pt 262 north. 
The Zgorzelski battle group secured Point 137 near Coudehard by midday, and the 24 
Lancers then moved south towards Frenee. At about the same time, the 1st Pol Armd Regt 
with the 9th Inf battalion and a company of anti-tank guns advanced towards the main 
Chambois-Vimoutiers road at Pt 262 north and Pt 252 located five km northeast of 
Chambois. By 1700 hrs, it had established itself on the north and east sides of the feature. 
While Pt 262 north and Coudehard became Polish strongholds, no one occupied Pt 262 
south. It was through this Coudehard-Pt 137 corridor on the west side of Mont Ormel that 
many of the Germans (particularly 1st & 12th SS Pz Div personnel) who emerged from the 
St. Lambert and Moissy crossings would inevitably pass. The Polish position on Mont 
Ormel controlled its immediate environment but little else. Nonetheless, this position 
became a major impediment to the German breakout.841 
At 1930 hrs, the Polish 10th Dragoons, a motorized infantry battalion, moved off 
Pt 137, entered Chambois and shortly thereafter linked up with the American 2nd 
Battalion 359th Infantry Regiment. Despite the link-up, the defensive ring was far from 
closed. There were no Allied troops physically blocking the five-km stretch along the 
Dives River between Magny and Moissy. The vehicle crossings at Magny, St. Lambert 
841
 Reynolds, Steel Inferno, 273-27'4. 
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and Moissy, although heavily shelled, were still open. This situation was further 
exacerbated when part of the French 2n Armd Division, which had advanced to Frenee 
and the Chambois-Vimoutiers road by early evening, withdrew south of the Dives as 
darkness fell.842 
Moncel finally arrived around noon 19 August to take over the armoured brigade, 
five days after Kitching initially asked for him.843 When he arrived at Bde HQ, he found 
that Chubb, (the brigade major) had the headquarters organized and after discussing the 
tactical situation with Halpenny, Moncel took over the brigade. Halpenny returned to his 
regiment and Moncel set out to visit the units.844 
Kitching held an O Group at 1800 hrs to outline the operations for the following 
day. Based on Simonds' direction, Kitching was to orchestrate and control two entirely 
different types of battles in diverging directions: a defensive battle conducted by 
Jefferson and his reduced 10th Cdn Inf Bde along the Trun-Chambois road and an 
offensive battle on the part of Moncel and 4th Cdn Armd Bde in a north-easterly 
direction. Neither action supported the other. The armoured brigade was to advance to a 
Its commander seemed more interested in the liberation of Paris and did not want to get embroiled in a 
battle around Chambois from which he could not extricate himself. Ops Log 19 August, serial 109, War 
Diary, HQ 8 Cdn Inf Bde, 1-31 August 1944. 
843
 The five-day delay in Moncel arriving at 4 Cdn Armd Bde had not been satisfactorily explained. Moncel 
claimed that he was not aware that he had been pre-selected to take over the brigade if it required a new 
commander. Moncel also stated that he was told in the morning and by noon he was at the brigade and in 
his letter to Dr Roy states that the date was 17 August but this is incorrect. Letter Lieutenant General R 
Moncel to Reg Roy dated 18 May 1981. All references to his taking command state that it happened on 19 
August. See W.D. 22 Cdn Armd Reg, 1-31 August 1944, entry 19 August. A message dated 16 1320 B 
from Main HQ First Cdn Army stated that Moncel was to be appointed acting Brigadier with effective date 
15 Aug. The appointment was recommended by Kitching and approved by Simonds. 1st Canadian Army, 
Message [Appointment of Lt Col Moncel to acting Brig], 16 Aug 44. Crerar Papers MG 30, E 157Vol 3, 
File 958C .009 (D178) GOC-in-C File 5-0-3 Vol I &II, Higher Command-Canadian Army Period 29 May 
44 to 22 Dec 44. The war diary entry for 2 Cdn Corps for 17 August stated that Moncel was to take over 
command of 4 Cdn Armd Bde and that he was to be replaced by Lt Col Rothschild the BM of 2 Cdn Armd 
Bde. War Diary, General Staff- 2 Cdn Corps, 1-31 August 1944, entry 17 Aug. 
844
 Moncel was not happy with the deployment of the Lake Superior Regt and began by moving a company 
out to each armoured regiment. He also made sure that each armoured regiment had an anti-tank troop and 
that communications were in good order within the brigade. Moncel, Letter [Comments on Draft 
Chapter].Reginald Roy Special Collection , University of Victoria. 
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position on the high ground overlooking Vimoutiers. The operation was to be done in two 
phases. In Phase I, the Foot Guards with under command A Coy Lake Superior Regiment 
were to advance to Pt 261 and be there by first light. They were then to capture the high 
ground astride the main road east of les Champeaux. On completion of this task, the BCR 
battle group, with its complement of infantry and anti-tank battery, would pass through 
and capture Pt 240. The Grenadier Guards would join the BCR on Pt 240 and firm up 
area. The Brigade would then start Phase II.845 
On order, the Foot Guards would then pass through the firm base established in 
Phase I to capture Pt 227. The 10th Cdn Inf Bde would then pass through and establish a 
bridgehead over the Vie River. The Foot Guards and BCR were to move at 0600 hrs 20 
August with the Grenadier Guards on one hour's notice from 0600 hrs. The operation, 
however, was dependent on the timely relief of both regiments.846 
The 4th Cdn Armd Div sitrep for the period ending at midnight 19 August 
reported that, while reconnaissance elements had reached within 300 meters northwest of 
Chambois by 1930 hrs, the formal advance to Chambois by the SAR battle group was 
delayed by the heavy fighting for control of St. Lambert sur Dives. The Lincoln and 
Welland Regiment remained firmed up at Trun and the Algonquin Regiment was in the 
area of Horduseaux with one company in the village. The A & SH of C was in St. 
Lambert with C Sqn SAR. The regiments of the armoured brigade, each with one 
845
 War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1-31 August 1944, entry 19 Aug. 
846
 Since the SAR/Argyll battlegroup was not scheduled to be relieved until 20 August the 10 Cdn Inf Bde 
portion of this plan would have had to be carried out by the Alq R and those elements of the Line & Welld 
R that had been relieved at Trun. This could explain in part why these infantry battalions were not 
committed to the fight at St. Lambert. Ibid. 
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company of the Lake Superior Regiment in support, were firmed up in the area of Pt 259 
and were refitting.847 
Kitching was faced with a growing problem. First and foremost, the division had 
to seal the existing gap between Trun and Chambois. This task had been given to the 
SAR-Argyll battle group but the fighting was extremely heavy in and around St. Lambert 
and German infiltration continued. The expected reinforcements would not be arriving in 
time and, given the requirement to launch the advance towards Vimoutiers the following 
morning; Kitching had no more resources within his division to commit to the Dives 
Line. In addition, he now had to prepare for the expected attempts by the Germans to 
break through to the trapped forces inside the pocket from the east. 
The second task assigned to the division was the re-establishment of 
communications with the Poles so that they could be supplied with ammunition, fuel and 
food. Hanging over all of this was the need to prepare for the pursuit of the Germans once 
the current battle was over.848 Attempting to accomplish these tasks simultaneously with 
the forces at hand was almost impossible. The situation for Kitching was made worse by 
the fact that Simonds was not only telling him what he wanted done but also which units 
were to execute his orders which, at times, was at odds with what Kitching was 
attempting to do. Kitching was trying to win the immediate fight and stop the remaining 
German forces from getting out of the Gap while Simonds was orchestrating the future 
battle space by trying to pre-position the division for the drive to the Seine. The two goals 
were incompatible and one had to suffer. What was needed was more infantry but the 
infantry brigades would not arrive for another day. 
8474 Cdn Armd Div Sitrep 44 for period 191200 B to 192400B. Ops Log 19 August, serial 14, War Diary, 
HQ 2nd Cdn Corps-G Branch Main, 1-31 August 1944. 
848
 Cassidy, Warpath, 136. 
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Map 25: German Breakout 19-20 August 1944. Copp, The Canadians Battlefields in Normandy, 114. 
In the early morning hours of 19-20 August, the remnants of Seventh German 
Army, with the 2nd Parachute Corps and Panzer Group Eberbach leading, began the 
breakout attempt.849 The internal attack would begin with two columns of paratroopers 
attacking across the Dives Rivers at Magny and St. Lambert, supported by the remaining 
elements of the 12th SS Pz Div. The 1st SS and 116th Pz Div would break through near 
Chambois while the rest of the German forces, 10th SS and 2nd SS Pz Div and elements of 
three infantry divisions were to form a third wave, securing the flanks and the rear as they 
withdrew. If all went well, the concentric attack would open the Chambois-Vimoutiers 
road so that both vehicles and men could escape.850 The breakout bid started at 2230 
hours on 19 August. 
German commanders had gained considerable experience on the Russian Front with breaking out of 
encirclements. They had developed an effective technique for this complex operation in Russia. The 
weakest point of the encirclement was selected. The point was then attacked from inside the pocket by the 
trapped troops and from outside the pocket by relief formations. Once a gap was opened, strong forces were 
used to hold the gap open to allow the trapped forces to escape. Graves, South Albertas, 151. 
850
 Copp, Fields of Fire, 247. 
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Waves of German infantry began moving against the Allied defensive line 
focussed on St. Lambert, Trim and Chambois at 0800 hrs 20 August. At first, the attacks 
made little headway. Eventually, the sheer volume of troops fighting to escape 
overwhelmed the defensive positions near St. Lambert enlarging the gaps in the interior 
ring enough to allow the extrication of portions of the 74l and 94th Corps. Heavy 
concentrations of Allied artillery fire and lack of fuel on the part of the Germans ensured 
that the escape would be carried out mainly on foot but the door had now been forced 
open.851 
At approximately 0400 hrs, 2nd SS Pz Corps began the second part of the breakout 
bid by attacking back into the Trun-Chambois area. The attack began from the area south 
of Vimoutiers and proceeded in the direction of Trun. The 9th SS Pz Div, advancing on 
the right, encountered parts of the 1st Pol Armd Div near St. Gervais and les Champeaux. 
On the left, the 2nd SS Pz Div attacked along the line Fresnay le Samson-Champosoult-
Coudehard. At first the 2nd SS Pz Corps advance made good progress but it came to a 
stop in front of the range of hills, Hill 258 south of les Champeaux, Hill 240 at Ecouches 
and Hill 262 north of Coudehard.852 
Along the Dives, the German advances were not coordinated attacks with proper 
fire support and deliberate tactics, but rather a mass of individually armed soldiers 
working in small groups trying to escape. The pressure was taxing on the fragile 
defensive disposition of 10th Cdn Inf Bde and considerable German infiltration occurred 
east and northeast of Trun and through St. Lambert. At 0845 hrs, Wotherspoon informed 
Brigade that, unless support arrived, he could be pushed out of his positions. As the 
851
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morning wore on, Currie was forced back from the southern and central parts of town and 
concentrated his infantry and remaining tanks at the northern end. Currie's force was 
saved in part by the fact that the Germans did not want to re-take the town but wanted to 
hold open a crossing of the Dives that would allow them to move east. Any German 
attempt to move up the D13 was effectively countered by Currie's force and massive 
concentrations of Canadian artillery fire. There were simply not enough infantry on the 
ground between 10th Cdn Inf Bde and the Poles to stop the German exodus or to seal the 
gaps in the Allied defensive line. The only Canadian counter was massive amounts of 
artillery and cannon fire on the avenues of German movement.853 
Meanwhile, the desperately needed Canadian infantry reinforcements were still 
not available. Wotherspoon, who had expected the arrival of the needed infantry 
reinforcements the night before, sent a stream of messages asking for the promised 
reinforcements. Rockingham's 9th Cdn Inf Bde had not moved forward the previous 
night. The relief of his forces by 2nd Cdn Inf Div had been completed after dark and 
Rockingham decided to wait until morning. The brigade was formed up on the road ready 
to go at 0800 hrs when information started coming in of the German attacks. The Brigade 
had still not moved at 0945 hrs when the SAR request for assistance was passed on to 9th 
Bde.854 The Brigade's movement was slow, exacerbated by a lack of effective 
communication between the two brigades and conflicting reports as to the location of the 
Graves, South Albertas, 154-158. Donald Graves provides a detailed account and analysis of the 
fighting in and around St. Lambert and in particular the actions of the SAR in South Albertas. See pages 
128-176. 
8540ps Log 20 August, serial 7, War Diary, 9 Cdn Inf Bde, 1-31 August 1944. 
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various 10th Cdn Inf Bde units. Consequently, 18th Cdn Armd C Regt was tasked to 
provide a liaison officer to facilitate the relief process.855 
The 9th Cdn Inf Bde's relief of 10th Cdn Inf Bde troops began with the Lines in 
Trun which was complete by 1000 hrs.856 Rockingham, instead of moving down the D 13 
to St. Lambert, moved the remainder of the brigade to Neauphe sur Dives. The North 
Nova Scotia Highlanders assigned to take over St. Lambert were ordered instead to 
Neauphe sur Dives, two km north of St. Lambert. "They did not attempt to relieve the 
SAR until the fighting had died down that evening."857 The Highland Light Infantry of 
Canada who were waiting to link up with the 1st Hussars "were equally hesitant to get 
involved in this confused situation" and did not move forward until the next day.858 The 
10 Cdn Inf Bde was on its own. 
Meanwhile, in accordance with orders received the previous evening, the Foot 
Guards pushed off at 0530 hrs to capture the high ground at Pt 261. The objective was 
occupied without opposition and the remainder of the regiment moved forward to 
Camembert. Elements from the 18 Cdn Armd C Regt had reached out even further, 
closing in on Vimoutiers itself. Initially 4th Cdn Armd Bde was told that they were to be 
stood down and would not be required for operations before first light 21 August, when 
the plan for the advance briefed the previous evening would be executed. Information 
that the Germans were now trying to break through the Canadian-Polish lines, however, 
855
 War Diary, Manitoba Dragoons, 1-31 August 1944, entry 20 Aug. 
856
 War Diary, The Lincoln and Welland Regiment 1-31 August 1944, entry 20 Aug. 
857
 Copp, Fields of Fire, 249. 
858
 Ibid. 
322 
resulted in all 4th Cdn Armd Bde units being recalled and returned to their original 
* • 8 5 9 
positions. 
Elements of the German 353rd Inf Div managed to cross the Dives River at 
Moissy early in the morning of 20 August and reached Hill 262 south. The Poles had not 
occupied this feature and at 1530 hrs 1st SS Pz Div and 116th Pz Div succeeded in 
capturing the road fork 1,000 meters northwest of Coudehard, opening up the 
Champosoult-Boisjos and Chambois-Vimoutiers roads.8 ° This action opened up the first 
clear escape route to the outside for the trapped German troops. The route ran through St. 
Lambert-Moissy, then by back roads and tracks to the high ground at Mont Ormel and on 
to Vimoutiers. By the time the Poles closed this route, the Germans had opened another 
route around Hill 262 north. By 1500 hrs, the Polish situation was steadily deteriorating. 
Attacked from all sides and cut off from the rest of 2nd Corps, the Poles were unable to 
evacuate wounded and were running low on food, ammunition, fuel and medicine. By 
1700 hrs, the Germans broke into the northern part of the Hill 262 perimeter and were not 
expelled until 1900 hrs. The toll on the Germans was enormous but they continued to 
keep the escape corridor open.862 
The Poles reported that the Germans had broken through the area around St. 
Lambert-sur-Dives and Moissy and had reached Pt 240. In response, at 1115 hrs the 
Grenadier Guards, who were being held in reserve on Pt 259 for the advance north, were 
now ordered into the centre of the gap to Pt 240, two km east of the Polish position at Pt 
859
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262. In addition, the BCR were ordered to leave their supporting infantry in their old 
location pending the arrival of the 2nd Cdn Armd Bde who would take over the old 
positions and were ordered to Pt 261.865 These moves resulted in the Foot Guards firmed 
up on Pt 258; the BCR astride the road from Trun near the village of Les Champeaux; 
while the Grenadier Guards occupied Pt 240, located above the village of Ecorches, 
which was situated between the two highways. This tactical disposition allowed the 
regiments to dominate the maze of dirt roads, which the enemy was trying to use north of 
Trun and Chambois.866 
At 1637 hrs, 4th Cdn Armd Bde Control reported that 100 German tanks were 
moving east towards the St. Lambert-Moissy line and that this concentration was being 
engaged by artillery. It also reported that German tanks and infantry were headed towards 
the position of B Sqn SAR on Hill 124. In anticipation of more efforts to break out, 
LCol D. S. Harkness of the 5' Anti-Tank Regiment was given the task of coordinating 
the anti-tank defence across the whole divisional front. To give added strength to the 
screen, the 1st Hussars, and the Highland Light Infantry were ordered to relieve B Sqn 
SAR on Pt 124.868 This battlegroup was slow to move and would not reach Pt 124 until 
0730 hrs the next day: far too late to be of any assistance to B Sqn SAR.869 
854
 War Diary, Governor-General Foot Guards, 1-31 August 1944, entry 20 Aug; Duguid, History of the 
Canadian Grenadier Guards, 280-281. 
865Ops Log 20 August, serial 65.War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1-31 August 1944. 
866
 Ops Log 20 August serial 40, War Diary, HQ 2nd Cdn Corps-G Branch Main, 1-31 August 1944. 
867
 Ops Log 20 August, serial 80, War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1-31 August 1944. 
868
 War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1-31 August 1944, entry 20 Aug. 
869
 Their inaction left the remnants of B Sqn SAR to fight it out alone for another night. During the course 
of that fighting, the Germans infiltrated their position. Lacking infantry support, the squadron commander 
decided to withdraw by any means possible with his few remaining tanks. This vital position was 
abandoned until the Hussars and Highland Light Infantry arrived the next morning. Graves, South Albertas, 
169. 
324 
Maczek and his officers were openly critical of 4 Cdn Armd Div's failure to 
cooperate with them during 20 August when the fighting was at its peak. According to 
Maczek, repeated requests for assistance were ignored until Simonds arrived at his 
divisional headquarters and was briefed on the Polish situation in Chambois and at Pt 
262. Simonds ordered an immediate counterattack by 4th Cdn Armd Bde to relieve the 
situation. Simonds then went to 4th Cdn Armd Div headquarters to make sure the orders 
were obeyed. Kitching protested the order and told Simonds, "to hell with them. They 
have run out of food and ammunition because of the inefficiency of their organization; 
our people have been fighting just as hard but we have managed to keep up our supply 
system."870 Simonds silenced Kitching and ordered immediate action. 
At 1900 hrs, Simonds ordered 4th Cdn Armd Bde to attack southeast from the 
Hordouseaux-les Champeaux area towards Champosoult-Coudehard to seal the escape 
route and assist the hard-pressed Polish troops. Simonds placed 9th Cdn Inf Bde from 3rd 
Div under Kitching's command.871 At 1931 hrs, the Grenadier Guards received orders to 
advance south immediately to the area north of Coudehard and give all possible 
assistance to the Poles. They were directed to leave without their supporting infantry, 
which was to remain in place. The Foot Guards and the BCR were ordered to Pt 240 and 
arrived on the objective at 2200 hrs.872 At 2000 hrs, the Foot Guards with under 
command one company Lake Superior Regiment was tasked to move to Pt 239 
immediately opposite Pt 240 and dominate the roads radiating from both St. Lambert and 
Chambois. Two companies of the Lake Superior Regiment were subsequently ordered to 
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join the Foot Guards at their position.873 At last light, the Foot Guards moved off and 
arrived on their objective without opposition.874 The BCR was ordered to move to Pt 240. 
On 19 August and 20 August, the movements of the various units of the 4th Cdn 
Armd Div, both armour and infantry, made it almost impossible to define the divisions' 
"front." The division war diary stated that the Germans were attacking from the east and 
west and that many calls were received to seal off the numerous German escape routes. 
The units were mixed up and it was difficult to define any particular brigade areas.875 The 
fighting during the day was confused in part because the position of the Poles was not 
known for certain. The division sitrep reported the main escape route to the northeast in 
the area of St. Lambert was closed with extremely high casualties for the Germans, either 
killed or captured. For the period of 1400 hrs on 19 August to 1800 hrs 20 August, the 
division reported capturing 47 officers and 2,118 enlisted men.876 
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Map 26: The Falaise Gap, 17-21 August. Marteinson, The Royal Canadian Armoured Corps, 281. 
Early on the morning of 21 August in pouring rain, the Grenadier Guards, with a 
company from the Lake Superior Regiment under command, moved off to break through 
the line the Germans had thrown around the two Polish regiments on Pt 262. Each 
squadron of the Grenadier Guards was at less than half strength and, from the beginning, 
the combined force met with opposition.877 The progress, however, was slow with roads 
blocked and lined with destroyed German vehicles, dead horses and men.878 
The BCR was originally tasked with leading the attack to relieve the Poles at Pt 262. However, their 
commanding officer Lt Col Parish became lost returning from the brigade orders group. No 1 Sqn was the 
lead squadron for the CGG for any possible action received at the orders group. The standard operating 
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Arriving at Pt 239 and finding the Foot Guards in secure possession of the 
position,879 Halpenny decided to add weight to the assault on Pt 262 by adding No 3 Sqn 
of nine tanks to the battlegroup leaving only No 2 Sqn to guard the line of 
communications. After a number of short actions, the force contacted the Poles and 
advanced to Hill 262. The advance ran into a ring of self-propelled guns and tanks, 
resulting in a difficult and bloody fight. Amy's squadron broke through to the Poles at 
1420 hrs but his squadron was now down to five working tanks.880 
The echelon forces of the division now swung into action to resupply the Poles. 
Five Priests from the Grenadier Guards battle lorry group made ten trips that night, 
bringing in supplies and taking out casualties. The Grenadier Guards and the BCR kept 
the lines of communications open against Germans who were still attempting to infiltrate 
through the Canadian-Polish positions.881 
The 10th Cdn InfBde was tasked with getting supplies through to the Polish units 
that had been cut off in Chambois. A recce in force was conducted by SAR who 
procedure within the regiment was to have the OC of the lead squadron at the regimental Hq halftrack 
when the regimental CO was away at a brigade orders group. On his return Smith explained that the BCR 
were to attack at first light to relieve the Poles. Since Parish could not be found the task of leading the 
advance was given to the CGG. At 0633 hrs the CGG were issued a warning order to be prepared to take 
over the task of leading the advance to relieve the Poles. At 0335 hrs the initial queries for sunray 28CAR 
were sent. Parish reported on the net at 0707 hrs and was notified of the switch in tasks between the two 
regiments. Ops Log 21 Aug serials 4-9.War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1-31 August 1944. 
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succeeded in getting through to Chambois and back early in the afternoon. At the same 
time, Highland Light Infantry, supported by elements of 2nd Cdn Armd Bde, managed to 
get through to Chambois from the northwest. The first convoy of food, carried in half-
tracks and carriers, got through at about 1700 hrs with three more convoys dispatched 
during the night.882 
As a result of the day's operations, firm contact was made with the Poles and the 
gaps in the Allied lines were closed at Pt 262 and along the Dives River. The Allies 
had finally succeeded in closing the Falaise Gap effectively, stopping the flow of German 
forces out of Normandy. Individual and small groups of German soldiers continued to 
infiltrate eastward through the Canadian lines but the vast majority were caught, swept 
into the prisoner-of-war cages and added to the thousands who had been taken earlier. 
There were still incidents, however, of Germans infiltrating through the valleys and 
woods during the night, sometimes bumping into Canadian artillery and Service Corps 
units who normally operated several miles behind the front lines. Headquarter security 
units had to be brought in on a number of cases to take care of these stragglers. 
It had taken 2nd Cdn Corps from 17 August to 22 August to close the Falaise Gap. 
First Cdn Army and, in particular, 2nd Cdn Corps was judged to have not achieved their 
objectives quickly enough, provoking profound disappointment among senior Allied 
commanders.885 Closing the Falaise Pocket had taken far longer than expected and had 
come at a greater cost than anticipated. Someone had to be held accountable. As the 
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commander of the division spearheading the Canadian drive, the focus of attention landed 
on Kitching. Kitching was assessed as ineffective by Simonds. Simonds felt compelled to 
act and relieved Kitching of his command at noon 21 August informing him that he was 
to be replaced by Brig H. Foster. Foster arrived to take over command of the division at 
1800 hrs. 
The main issues facing the support echelons during the Falaise Gap actions were 
the opening of the maintenance routes and the processing of prisoners. In the 24-hour 
period ending 1600 hrs 21 August, the division processed over 2,255 prisoners of war.886 
Also, 25 more echelon vehicles had to be off loaded and were pressed into service 
moving them. Clerks from the rear echelons had to be used as escorts since no front line 
troops could be spared. The total number of PWs taken by the division will never be 
known accurately since many of them were processed through the cages of 3rd Cdn Inf 
Div because the armoured division cages could not handle the volume. 
The physical state of the division with respect to vehicles is not clear since the 
ADREPs for the period 17 to 29 August are missing from the AA &QMG war diary. The 
personnel state of the division's regiments is, however, known through graphs kept by 
Proctor. On 21 August, the BCR, SAR and Lake Superior Regiment were reporting 
strengths above 85 percent. The Grenadier Guards and Foot Guards were reporting 81 
percent; the Algonquin and Lincoln & Welland Regiment were at 75 percent strength; 
and the Argylls were the worst of the infantry battalions at less than 65 percent.887 The 
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highest number of battle casualties incurred by the division was reported between 18 and 
20 August at over 90 casualties. The division reported that it needed 11 officers and 814 
ORs as reinforcements to replace the gaps in its ranks but received only six officers and 
40 ORs.888 
The fighting in Normandy, which concluded with the battles to close the Falaise 
Gap, gave the Allies a great, if incomplete, victory. This battle could be called the 
German equivalent of the British evacuation of their troops from the continent at Dunkirk 
in May 1940 where a large number of troops escaped to fight another day but most of 
their equipment was lost in the evacuation. In theory, the Pocket could have been sealed 
OQQ 
off more quickly. The controversy continues over the question of who was responsible 
for leaving the door open for so long, allowing the tens of thousands of Germans to 
escape. 
The command decisions made by the senior Allied generals to close the Falaise 
Gap remain a hotly debated topic. Martin Blumenson, in The Battle of the Generals, 
argues that the senior Allied leadership (Eisenhower, Montgomery and Bradley), 
"anticipated reality and set about laying future plans."890 They felt that immediate 
operations to seal the Pocket around the German troops in the Falaise area would be 
successful and that the German armies in Normandy would be trapped and eliminated. 
This attitude, combined with a rising tide of optimism that the Germans could not 
withstand a defeat of this magnitude and still remain in the war, spawned a belief that the 
war would be over by Christmas. The senior Allied military leadership simply took for 
Unit Strength When under 85%"War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Div-AA&QMG, 1-31 August 1944. See 
Appendix 15. 
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granted what would happen at Falaise before the tactical situation evolved to a state in 
which the desired outcome was assured. The result was operational carelessness and a 
misreading of what was required to finish the Germans in Normandy. The ultimate 
mistake, according to Blumenson, was to "dismiss" the fate of the German troops inside 
the closing Pocket. 
The nature of the battle was quite different from those that had been fought by the 
Anglo-Canadian forces in Normandy to that time. It was dynamic and fluid where the 
location and nature of the combat was constantly changing. Situational awareness was 
crucial and consequential decisions had to be made in real time. There was no time to 
seek higher authority. The most problematic issue, however, was that it was not a tidy 
battlefield. Montgomery and Simonds were most comfortable with a well-planned, set-
piece battle in which all the participants, including the enemy, did exactly what had been 
scripted for them.892 There were no defined boundaries for fronts or rear areas. Canadians 
were engaging Germans on all sides and sometimes in the rear. The nature of the 
battlefield, therefore, challenged the command paradigm of the senior Canadian 
leadership. 
The closing of the Falaise Gap highlighted the competing obligations inherent in 
the role of the Corps commander between his need to plan ahead of current operations so 
that he can shape the future battlefield while simultaneously ensuring that current 
operations are won. While the division commander was responsible for winning the 
immediate battle, it was the responsibility of the higher-level commander to ensure that 
lower-level commanders had the means and resources to win. 
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Simonds issued daily orders that outlined his intent for operations on the 
following day and, unfortunately, not all of them were found for examination. The intent 
signed by Simonds on 16 August requires closer examination since it establishes the start 
point in Simonds' thinking as to how he was going to solve his part of the military 
problem of closing the escape route of the German Seventh Army by linking up with U.S. 
forces moving north towards the Falaise area. 
Simonds' orders had two implied tasks: to capture Trun and the high ground 
dominating it from the southwest and northeast and to be prepared to advance in a 
northeasterly direction on Lisieux. Two key points must be made at this juncture. The 
direction to use armoured divisions to close the Gap came directly from Montgomery. 
While the selection of armoured divisions could be rationalized based on the need to 
travel fast to close the Gap, the terrain in the Falaise-to-Vimoutiers region was totally 
unsuited for armour warfare or tactics. The terrain, because of the numerous hedges, hills, 
forests and rivers, was best suited for the employment of infantry divisions which, with 
their greater complement of infantry, could better cover the ground. The only way to 
mitigate the risk inherent in these orders to the armoured regiments was to ensure that 
infantry always accompanied the tanks. 
Kitching was initially ordered to establish a blocking position by setting up on a 
number of key terrain features to dominate the area between Falaise and Trun along the 
Falaise-Argentan highway and to establish contact with the Polish Armd Div in the Trun 
area. This changed to establishing a blocking position to dominate the area north of the 
Trun-Vimoutiers highway. The mission expanded to include the capture of Trun (17 
August) and the cutting of the Trun-Vimoutiers road, then the capture of the area St. 
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Lambert-Moissy (18 August) and finally to move to Chambois (19 August). The taking 
of Trun required a small modification to the initial deployment. Taking over the 
responsibility for establishing a defensive line along the Dives River was a significantly 
more complex task altogether. 
In military operations and, in particular, land operations, there is a constant 
friction between two variables—the requirement to defeat enemy forces and the 
requirement to take ground. Examining the military actions and command decisions in 
and around 18-21 August through this lens allows an important perspective on what 
happened in this timeframe. In the early part of the Normandy campaign, ground was the 
primary focus in order to expand the bridgehead. On 17-18 August, the emphasis was still 
on ground as the Canadians and Poles tried to close the Falaise gap. The timeframe 19-21 
August represented the cusp of the two variables in which Simonds as the higher level 
commander had to make crucial decisions as to where his main effort would be—sealing 
the fate of German Seventh Army or launching the pursuit after the escaped German 
forces. 
The requirement to be prepared to move northeast significantly shaped how 
Simonds orchestrated the movement of his forces from 18 August onwards and shaped 
the disposition of 4th Cdn Armd Division. The record of conversation between Simonds 
and Brig Mann at First Army HQ on 19 August reflected Simonds dilemma and 
uncertainty. Using this construct, Simonds' orders to split 4th Cdn Armd Div as he did 
must lead to the conclusion that by 19 August Simonds believed that pursuing the 
escaped German forces was more important than destroying the remnants of the German 
forces in the Pocket. Even with the desperate fighting that had begun on the evening of 
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19/20 August the Minutes of the First Cdn Army Joint Conference held at 0830 hrs 20 
August stated that the ground plan for 20 August was for 2nd Cdn Corps to regroup in 
preparation for the advance east. 2nd Cdn Corps was to be relieved by 12 Br Corps. Once 
the relief was accomplished the corps would advance on the axis ORBEC-BERNAY-
ELBEUF.893 
When the tactical situation began to change drastically on the evening 18-19 
August, Simonds' initial solution was not to redeploy 4th Cdn Armd Bde along the Dives 
line but to commit the 2nd Cdn Corps reserve, the 2nd Cdn Armd Bde, to this line but these 
units arrived too late to help Kitching or his division.894 Simonds' second move to help 
Kitching was placing 9th Cdn Inf Bde under command on the evening of 19 August but, 
as mentioned above, Rockingham's battalions were also late in starting the move to St. 
Lambert leaving Kitching and Jefferson to battle on with only the resources of the 
division and with a tactical disposition neither wanted. 
The scattered disposition of 4th Cdn Armd Div was the direct result of orders by 
Simonds and not based on a concept of operations designed by Kitching. Simonds was 
not only identifying what he wanted done but also the formations that should execute his 
orders, which at times was contrary to orders recently given by Kitching. Kitching would 
have been in a better position to decide which units were best able to meet the intent of 
Simonds' orders while lessening the confusion and frustration of the units at the changing 
orders. Instead, Kitching was left to try and maintain control over a division with 
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components of two brigades moving off in different directions, which were not mutually 
supporting and without any discernible fronts but forced to engage in combat in all 
directions. 
Simonds' management of the command arrangements with the Trun-Chambois 
area complicated and constrained any freedom of action Kitching had in responding to 
the tactical situation. Two terms are important to the understanding within this context: 
"under command" and "relief." When one unit relieves another, the control of the area of 
the unit that has been relieved shifts to the commander of the relieving unit. In the case of 
9th Cdn Inf Bde, when the Stormont Dundas and Glengary Highlanders relieved the Lines 
in Trun, command over the area of Trun shifted from Kitching to Maj Gen D. Spry the 
GOC of 3rd Cdn Inf Div. The assigned plan for the relief of 10th Cdn Inf Bde by 3rd Cdn 
Inf Div meant that the defence of the line of the River Dives should have been the 
responsibility of Spry by the evening of 20 August, had the relief plan been executed as 
directed. This would have meant that Kitching would have had only one task and that was 
the drive to Vimoutiers as directed in the plan briefed on the evening of 19 August. 
Instead, both 9th Cdn Inf Bde and 2nd Cdn Armd Bde were late, meaning that 10th Cdn Inf 
Bde had to hold the line much longer than expected and Kitching had to divide his 
attention between holding the Dives line and launching the drive to Vimoutiers on the 
morning of 21 August. 
The second term is "under command." When a unit is placed under command of 
another organization, it means that the new commander now has control over the unit and 
can assign that unit missions and tasks without consulting with the previous commander. 
Units would shift under command of another unit on a temporary basis, typically to 
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accomplish a specific mission. In this case, 2n Cdn Armd Bde, 9 Cdn Inf Bde and one 
squadron 18l Cdn Armd C Regt were placed under Kitching's command, but Kitching 
was not free to use these formations as he saw fit. 
There are three points that need to be highlighted within this discussion: the units 
were assigned too late to make any meaningful contribution to the battle; they were only 
assigned to Kitching until 0800 hrs 21 August; and two units came with assigned 
missions, which Kitching was not allowed to change. Had the 2nd Cdn Armd Bde and the 
9th Cdn Inf Bde come under Kitching's command on 19 August, it would have allowed 
Kitching much more flexibility in fighting the tactical battle. Both the 2nd Cdn Armd Bde 
and the 9th Cdn Inf Bde had to move south from the Falaise-Damblainville area to reach 
the Trun-Chambois area. Kitching's units were much closer to the German escape routes 
and could have moved more quickly into the battle. Understanding that time was the 
critical factor, a better course of action would have had the 2nd Cdn Armd Bde and the 9th 
Cdn Inf Bde relieve the 4th Cdn Armd Div units along the Trun-Vimoutiers axis with 2nd 
Cdn Armd Bde assigned the task of executing the requirement to advance to Vimoutiers. 
These two units could have reached the Trun-Vimoutiers areas more quickly relieving the 
4 Cdn Armd Bde for use by Kitching earlier on 20 August. 
Releasing 4th Cdn Armd Bde from the Trun-Vimoutiers axis would have allowed 
Kitching to concentrate the entire strength of his armoured division against the German 
escape routes between Trun and Chambois and would have greatly simplified the 
command arrangements within the area. Spry would have controlled the area north of the 
Trun-Vimoutiers highway; Kitching would have controlled the area from the highway 
south to Chambois; and the Poles could have been retained their position at Pt 262 as a 
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blocking force against any attack from the outside. Instead, Simonds was late in 
committing required forces; the forces that were committed were late in arriving; and the 
concept of operations for the relief complicated the command and control structure within 
the area. Spry, Kitching and Maczek were now trying to control the tactical battle with no 
one in overall control to ensure a coordinated effort. The tactical situation cried out for 
one commander to oversee all aspects of the closing battle; yet Simonds seemed content 
to have three separate division commanders involved in the fight, each with his own 
objectives and no one commander with the requisite authority to orchestrate the Allied 
forces to meet the unfolding situation when the Germans attacked or when the relief 
brigades failed to meet required timelines. 
Complicating the operations on 20 August even further was Simonds' intent for 
operations that day. His intent stated that 2nd Cdn Corps would assist 12th Corps in a 
sweep-up of the area to the front and then commence the advance northeast. Some 
argue that Jefferson and Kitching appeared "unwilling" to change their plan by 
committing the recently relieved Lines from Trun or the last two companies of Argylls to 
the St. Lambert battle instead of waiting for the planned infantry battalions from 9th Cdn 
Inf Bde but it is not clear that Kitching actually had the latitude to make those changes.897 
Simonds was fixated on moving northeast using 4th Cdn Armd Bde and this imperative 
constrained the options available to Kitching to close the gap along the Dives. The fact 
that orders were given for the advance northeast despite the fact that the gap had not been 
closed and German forces were known to still be on the western side of the river raises 
serious questions as to Simonds situational awareness at this critical juncture. 
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The decision to commit 4 Cdn Armd Bde to closing the escape routes happened 
at 1915 hrs on 20 August when Kitching ordered the Grenadier Guards to launch an 
immediate attack to Coudehard.898 Their mission was to relive the Poles and open the 
lines of communications to them. Kitching's opposition to being ordered to help the Poles 
can be understood in part by the fact that he was denied the opportunity to use his 
armoured brigade to aid his own troops who were in dire straits along the Dives; yet, 
when the armoured brigade was finally committed, it was to help the Poles and not his 
own men. His frustration may have been already heightened by the fact that neither 9th 
Cdn Inf Bde nor the 2nd Cdn Armd Bde was going to arrive in time to influence the battle 
or help out his own units. While he may have felt his assessment of the Poles was correct, 
in the end, his outburst and possible insubordinate reaction to Simonds' order to help the 
Poles must now be viewed as the main factor in his dismissal despite the successful series 
of combat operations that Kitching had lead the division through since TOTALIZE. 
Naturally Kitching was shocked and upset at the decision to relieve him and made 
a number of points in his defence. The first involved the long delay in sending Moncel to 
command the armoured brigade. He also complained that the division had had too many 
changes in orders over a period of ten days and had taken very heavy casualties in 
commanders, soldiers and tanks in its first battles. According to Kitching, Simonds had 
no rebuttal for any of these very valid points.899 
The arrival of Moncel to command 4th Cdn Armd Bde on 15 August would have 
alleviated some of the command and leadership problems caused by casualties 
throughout the armoured brigade and probably would have helped the division capture its 
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objectives on 15 August. There is no evidence, however, to suggest that the armoured 
brigade would have been more effective than it was in the 16-21 August timeframe under 
Moncel. Once Halpenny was given command, the brigade operated quite well and 
accomplished all of its assigned tasks during this period. 
Kitching's comment about casualties among the officers in the armoured 
regiments was valid. Simply stated they were high. The robbing of the regimental 
commanders to command the armoured brigade combined with the casualties among the 
rest of the officers had a ripple down effect on leadership within the armoured brigade. A 
typical armoured regiment had 38 officers. By 26 August the Foot Guards had 19, the 
Grenadier Guards 23, the BCR 16 and the SAR had 23 officers remaining from the 
original cadre that began the month. On average, 45 percent of the original officer 
complements were casualties by 26 August. What is even more compelling is the loss of 
senior officers (major and lieutenant colonels) in 4th Cdn Armd Bde. Their casualty rate 
was 56 percent with the brigadier and two of three regimental COs as casualties.900 
Notwithstanding, this casualty rate the junior leadership cadre stepped up and the 
regiments performed well, which is a testament to the quality of the men, their leadership 
and their training before entering Normandy. 
Kitching's complaint over changing orders has already been highlighted. Viewed 
in hindsight Kitching was subjected to changing orders on each day from 7 August until 
his relief on 21 August. Some were by design as in TOTALIZE and many as a result of 
the fluid battle conditions being encountered. What is clear however is that the command 
Numbers were taken from the war diary strength returns on 5,12,19 and 26 Aug for both officer and OR 
strengths from the respective war diaries. 
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team of Kitching, Wigle and Proctor and the division as a whole were up to the challenge 
of each new task. 
The war diary of 4th Cdn Armd Div summed up their experience as follows: 
The tremendous feats performed by the infantry and armoured brigades during the 
past two days in completing the destruction of the enemy in Normandy and its full 
importance has not yet been realized by any of the personnel in the div. No one 
yet realizes that the heavy fighting south from Caen to the Trun Chambois area 
has sealed the fate of the German 7th Army. Perhaps it is because everyone has 
been so busy killing Germans or planning to kill Germans or doing their job in the 
best way they know in confusing circumstances, that the full importance of this 
victory is not yet apparent to them.901 
The story of defeat, rout, confusion, disorganization and disaster of the German Seventh 
Army in Normandy was clearly written along the route from Falaise to Vimoutiers.902 
The examination and conclusions drawn from the complex set of operations from 
the initial landings in Normandy to the closing of the Falaise Gap will be debated for 
some time to come. Arguments as to whether the Normandy campaign succeeded or 
failed will never be answered to everyone's satisfaction. In the end, it was Kitching's and 
Maczek's armoured divisions that carried the burden of plugging the First Cdn Army side 
of the gap. 
During the 16-22 August phase of the Normandy campaign, the Canadians were 
to find themselves simultaneously fighting offensive and defensive battles. Instead of the 
armoured divisions being employed in their role as exploitation forces, units were 
gathered in battle groups and sent off to seize towns, dominant hills or crossroads. What 
resulted was a series of clashes and battles varying in time and intensity, depending on 
the degree to which the Germans could organize a response. Maintaining control and 
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keeping communications open became challenging, especially in the hilly terrain of the 
Falaise-Trun-Vimoutiers area. The situation was confusing and difficult to control and 
placed an enormous strain on all formations, but an even greater strain on those charged 
with commanding those formations.903 
Due to the nature of the fighting, the squadron and regimental officers became the 
on-scene commanders who had to make independent decisions, weighing their mission 
against the situation they were facing on the ground. The only way Kitching could 
influence this type of battle was by ensuring that his subordinate commanders understood 
the intent of his orders and through the interjection of reserves and supporting forces, 
such as artillery and tactical aircraft, at decisive points. Unfortunately for Kitching, when 
additional forces were eventually made available, they arrived too late to be of assistance. 
The battles waged to close the Falaise Gap became the ultimate testing ground for 
Kitching and the men of the 4 Cdn Armd Div. The desperate combat conditions 
combined with the physical state of the leadership, men and equipment of the division 
ensured that the fighting would test every aspect of their training, professional 
competence and maturity as a fighting formation. The record of the division and its 
accomplishments speak for themselves. They penetrated the furthest of any Canadian unit 
during TOTALIZE and, despite many setbacks, they achieved their objectives in 
TRACATBLE. They were the first to the Dives River and succeeded in gaining and 
holding St. Lambert-sur-Dives and their portion of the Gap. In the words of Cpl Stu 
Johns of the Grenadier Guards "By the time we closed the gap we had figured out how to 
fight the regiment."904 The same could be said of the entire division. 
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The 4 Cdn Armd Div entered Normandy as an untried, inexperienced formation 
and in the span of 14 days of continuous conflict became a mature fighting formation. 
Given the significant challenges the division had to overcome during the unfolding 
battles of August 1944, Kitching and the 4th Cdn Armd Div performed much better than 
history has recorded. In the end, Kitching was an able commander in an almost 
impossible situation. His lasting contribution to the division, however, was that he trained 
and mentored his senior staff officers, Wigle and Proctor, who would now shine in the 
next phase of the campaign in northwest Europe- the pursuit. 
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Chapter Ten: The Pursuit 
The period from the closing of the Falaise Gap on August 22 to the capture of 
Antwerp on September 4 has been traditionally labelled the pursuit phase of the 
campaign of northwest Europe. The exploitation of the opportunities that evolved from 
this phase of the campaign offered the promise of enormous opportunity, including the 
collapse of the entire German Army in the west and the potential for an early end to the 
war. By early September, this great strategic opportunity had been lost. Decisions by 
senior Allied commanders caused the advance of the Allied armies to stall. This respite 
delayed the assault on the Ruhr, giving German commanders the opportunity to rebuild 
and reorganize—an opportunity they were intent on not squandering.905 
In the strategic realignment of the Allied armies for the pursuit, Montgomery, as 
one of his final acts as the Allied ground force commander, tasked the Third U.S. Army 
to pass south of Paris and move eastwards through Reims to the Meuse above Sedan. He 
directed the First U.S. Army and the British Second Army to finish clearing the 
Argentan-Falaise area and to advance on the Seine between Paris and Rouen. The former 
headed up the Oise and down the Meuse to Liege; the latter moved by Amiens, Arras, 
and Tournai towards Antwerp. His orders to the First Cdn Army involved three important 
tasks: to cover the left of the advancing British and American armies; to overrun the 
launch sites along the Channel coast for the German V-l flying bombs which were being 
905
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launched against London and other British cities; and to capture the ports of Le Havre 
and Dieppe, upon whose capacity for re-supply depended future operations along the 
entire front.9 
The senior Allied command decisions made during the pursuit would shape the 
course of the rest of the war. The opportunity for victory was at hand but would depend 
in part on the Allied ability to sustain pressure on the retreating Germans and not give 
them the opportunity to regroup. This would require the application of the military art of 
pursuit. Carl von Clauswitz observed that the conditions for successful pursuit were 
fleeting and that only a bold and resolute commander was able to exploit battlefield 
success beyond its immediate aftermath.907 The Germans realized that Allied victory 
could be denied through rigorous rear-guard actions and counter-attacks and employed 
just such a strategy in their retreat. Patton and his Third U.S. Army had been involved in 
a pursuit since operation COBRA. It was now Montgomery's turn but 21st Army Group 
had a poor record in Normandy of translating tactical success into operational level 
success.908 
The aim of a pursuit operation is to maintain pressure on a retreating enemy and 
to gain ground. According to Canadian doctrine, "By vigorous relentless, and sustained 
pursuit the battle will be kept fluid, and favourable opportunities will be created for the 
higher commander to complete his victory by the combined action of all his force."909 A 
successful pursuit had to find the correct balance between maintaining the impetus of the 
pursuit versus stopping to deal with rear guards, pockets of resistance or seizing 
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important cities, ports or terrain features. Deciding the balance was the realm of the 
commander. Montgomery expressed his thoughts in a directive he sent out on 26 August, 
"the proper tactics now are for strong armoured and mobile columns to by-pass enemy 
centres of resistance and to push boldly ahead, creating alarm and despondency in enemy 
rear areas."910 
Operational tempo was another key consideration for the commander as he 
balanced the rate of advance against the capacity of his administration to support the 
operational tempo desired. Generating the capacity for the pursuit and the resulting 
operational tempo was entirely dependent on the ability of echelon forces to keep the 
critical supplies flowing to the fighting units. Montgomery settled the critical higher level 
command question of ports versus pursuit in favour of pursuit. Given the overwhelming 
Allied superiority in materiel, this should not have been a problem and yet this decision 
would cause a growing shortage of critical supplies and transport beginning in early 
September that would impact operations and would not be resolved until the opening of 
Antwerp in November 1944. 
The task of the A and Q organization of 21st Army Group was to develop an 
administrative organization on the continent that would allow Montgomery to carry out 
any operation he deemed necessary. The narrow confines of the bridgehead in June and 
July restricted the number of administrative units that could be accommodated on the 
continent but the proximity of the supply dumps to the fighting units marginalized the 
extent of this problem. While the expansion battles were being fought, preparations had 
been made to support the expected breakthrough and pursuit operations. Mobile warfare 
required a robust administrative organization, well stocked with transport, to support the 
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operations; unfortunately, administrative units had a low priority for movement into 
theatre because of the size of the bridgehead. Consequently, in late August the necessary 
resources to support a theatre wide strategy of pursuit were missing. 1 ' 
With the victory at Falaise and the Germans in full retreat, a few optimists on the 
Allied side were predicting the war would be over by the New Year. The troops were 
enjoying the adulation of the French citizenry and, for the first time in many weeks, the 
air was fresh; the landscape unmarked by war; and there were days when advancing 
Canadian troops were not in contact with German forces. While the Allied columns 
pursued the stream of shattered German units across France, cracks began to appear in 
the Allied administrative structure due to the strain caused by the rapid Allied advance. 
On the afternoon of 20 August, Model received his orders from Hitler. He was to 
hold the bridgehead west of Paris to prevent an enemy breakthrough between the Seine 
and Loire rivers towards Dijon and to re-form the battered armies behind the Touches 
sector with the armour at the southern flank. If the area forward of the Seine could not be 
held, he was to fall back and defend the line Seine-Yonne-Canal de Bourgogne - Dijon-
Dol-Swiss Border.912 
The Army Group B sitrep to OKW on 23 August revealed the severity of the 
destruction in Normandy. There were only 67 tanks remaining among the eight armour 
divisions. Most had no artillery and they were supported by weak infantry elements. The 
9th SS Pz Div was the strongest at 460 men, 20-25 tanks and 20 artillery pieces.913 The 
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German armoured forces were ordered to concentrate near Evreux and to re-establish 
contact on the south shore of the Seine River with the forces in Paris. New forces were 
being marshalled for subsequent fighting in France but there would be no reinforcements 
before 1 September.914 Model knew however that there were no strategic reserves. 
On 25 August, Fifth Panzer Army recorded its fighting strength as 17,980 
infantry, 314 pieces of artillery and 42 tanks and assault guns.915 These troops, added to 
the expected replacements, did not represent a force that would be capable of creating a 
new front or a coherent defence of France. The Germans needed time to regroup and 
rearm: a commodity that was totally dependent on the Allied ability to sustain their 
pursuit.916 
Model sent his estimate of the situation to Hitler and believed that the Allies 
would deliver one or several thrusts along the following lines: 
• to the Somme by advancing northwards between Rouen and Mantes, with the 
objective of capturing the V-l sites and the Belgium industrial basin 
• via Paris to Rheims along the traditional invasion route to Germany 
• to Dijon with the intent of cutting off Army Group G and reaching Alsace via 
Belfort 
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Model was quite aware that the Allied Airborne army of five or six divisions might be 
917 
used to facilitate any of these options. 
Model's problem, however, was that the Somme-Marne line was not ready. The 
line of the Seine below Paris was manned by the remnants of 12 divisions and between 
the Seine and the Somme the remnants of six Panzer divisions would form a mobile 
reserve while being rehabilitated. To hold the Seine-Yonne-Dijon line would require 15 
additional divisions. These divisions were to be assembled in the Troyes-Dijon-Lake 
Geneva area by 10 September. The only viable option for the Germans was to trade space 
for time in an attempt to gain the time they needed to prepare successive rear positions up 
to and including the West Wall and for reinforcements to reach the theatre.918 
Allied operations during this phase can be divided into four stages: 
• the combined operations in the area of Falaise leading to the crossing of the Seine 
River 
• the pursuit of the enemy through France and Belgium 
• the operations by First Cdn Army up the coast of France and Belgium 
• the operations to extend east and north in Belgium and Holland, culminating in the 
combined U.S. and British airborne operation in the neighbourhood of Nijmegen 
and Arnhem. 
Two of these operations—the Second Br Army operations up to Brussels and Antwerp 
and the First Cdn Army operations along the French coast—would take place 
i 919 
concurrently. 
Crerar gave his two corps commanders their preliminary orders for the advance 
on 19 August. The 1st Br Corps was to continue its movements along the axis Liseaux-
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Pont Audemer. The 2" Cdn Corps was to follow the general line Trun-Vimoutiers-
Orbec-Bernay- Elbeuf. The advance would not begin until ordered by Crerar but Simonds 
was allowed to carry out active reconnaissance on his axis of advance.920 Simonds 
responded by dispatching his reconnaissance units toward the Seine River on 21 August, 
and followed these units with the entire 2nd Cdn Inf Div.921 
Map 27: Pursuit To The Seine. Copp, The Canadian Battlefields in Normandy, 130. 
Prior to launching into an examination of 4 Cdn Armd Div actions in the pursuit, 
it is instructive to paint a picture of Kitching's successor Maj Gen Harry Foster and 
examine his career to this point. Like Kitching, Foster also experienced a rapid rise 
through the ranks of the wartime army. In his book, Meeting of the Generals, Tony Foster 
stated that his father, Harry Foster, graduated from RMC in 1924.922 In fact, Harry Foster 
left RMC, having failed his third academic year, but with a Certificate of Military 
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Qualification, which all cadets earned when they finished two full years at RMC. With 
this certificate in hand, cadets could cut short their time at RMC by applying for a 
Queen's commission in the Permanent Force (PF). Foster did so in 1924. This was an 
option which many RMC cadets with good military marks, but mediocre to bad academic 
results, did during the interwar years. Foster withdrew from RMC in July 1924 to receive 
the Queen's Commission and a posting to Lord Strathcona's Horse (Royal Canadians) on 
2 July 1924.923 
Foster was promoted to brevet captain in May 1929 and to captain in July 1934.924 
Foster wrote the qualifying exams for Staff College every year from 1929 onwards until 
he was finally selected as the Canadian candidate to attend the two-year English Staff 
College at Camberley in July 1937. In November 1939 he was appointed Brigade Major 
(BM) of the 1st Cdn Inf Bde. Foster was selected to numerous commands in short order. 
In 1941 he appointed CO, 4th Princess Louis Dragoons; in 1942, CO, Highland Infantry 
of Canada; and in 1943, he was promoted Brigadier and became the CO, 7th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade. Included in this timeframe was a short stint as GSO 1, 1st Cdn Div in 
England and CO, Canadian Forces Aleutian Islands Pacific, in 1943. It was Kitching who 
replaced Foster as the GSO 1 of 1st Cdn Div on 14 Dec 1942.925 
Foster's success as a Brigadier is difficult to evaluate. His brigade, the 7th Cdn Inf 
Bde, fought a series of battalion-level engagements in Normandy which required little 
oversight from the brigade commander. Foster's major intervention in the bridgehead 
battle occurred on 7 June 44 during the fighting around Norrey en Bessin. In response to 
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a German counterattack Foster deploy one armoured squadrons and a company of his 
reserve battalion to the high ground west of Mue and advised the Regina Rifles to 
withdraw from their key defensive position at Norrey en Bessin. Lt Col Foster Matheson, 
the CO of the Regina Rifles was confident that his men could fight from their positions 
and after checking with his company commanders told Foster that he wished to maintain 
his positions. Foster agreed.926 
Foster's hatred of paperwork and staff duties is mentioned in Kitching's book 
when the two began their handover as GSO 1 of 1st Cdn Div and again in Meeting of the 
927 
Generals. The definitive statement in this matter comes from Foster himself where, in 
his initial meeting with Proctor Foster stated, "I hate paperwork and administration. I'm 
not worth a shit at it. It's up to you to run it. I won't interfere-I'll keep you in the picture 
but you run it. Understood?"928 Foster was lucky since he inherited from Kitching a well 
trained battle -hardened staff manned by exceptional staff officers that could take care of 
the paperwork and administration allowing him to concentrate on operations. The staffs 
competence facilitated Foster's hands off leadership approach to commanding the 
division. 
The first order of business for Foster when he took over command of the division 
was the handover with Kitching. Kitching was in tears and distraught over his dismissal. 
He gave Foster a briefing on the tactical situation and provided his assessment on the key 
division staff officers. Foster talked to both Wigle and Proctor to better understand how 
they worked and to explain how he wanted the division to operate. Proctor explained his 
process for handling the supply echelons. During the day he was up front. Whenever the 
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tanks began shooting, the ammunition trucks dropped their loads and went back to the 
rear for more supplies. If the unit was breaking out, then they dropped their ammunition 
and went back for more fuel. Foster leadership style was to issue his intent for operations 
leaving the details and administration to Wigle and Proctor.929 
At 2100 hrs 21 August, Foster outlined his plan for the following day. During 22 
August the division and its attached units would regroup. The 9th Cdn Inf Bde and 2nd 
Cdn Armd Bde were to hold the Chambois-Trun area. The 4th Cdn Armd Bde was to 
concentrate in the area Champosoult and 10th Cdn Inf Bde in the area Coudehard with 
one battalion assigned to sweep the valley of Foulbec to clear out any Germans remaining 
in that area.930 
During 22 August the regiments of the four brigades sorted themselves out so that 
by 1800 hrs the regrouping was complete. The 2nd Cdn Corps plan involved an advance 
to the northeast with right 4th Cdn Armd Div moving on an axis Le Sap-Broglie, center 
3rd Cdn Inf Div advancing on the axis Vimoutiers-Orbec and left 2nd Cdn Inf Div 
advancing on the axis Orbec-Thiberville. The 1st Polish Armd Div was placed in Corps 
reserve. If 2nd or 3rd Div ran into opposition, 4th Cdn Armd Div was to be prepared to 
carry out a right flanking attack to dislodge the enemy. The 4th Cdn Armd Div was to 
advance to the area of Broglie, "one up" with 4th Cdn Armd Bde leading, preceded by 
18th Cdn Armd C Regt. The reconnaissance regiment was to travel over a broad front to 
obtain the strength and disposition of the enemy forces and to provide information on the 
ground over which the division was to travel. 
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At 1800 hrs, Foster gave his orders for the pursuit to the Seine with the objective 
the town of Rouen. In his orders Foster provided an overview of the German situation 
and stated that the Germans were conducting continuous withdrawals from Normandy. 
Reconnaissance had shown that there were no fortifications or defensive lines on the 
Seine River but there was evidence of construction of fortifications on the line of the 
Marne and Somme Rivers. Intelligence reports indicated that the Germans were trying to 
regroup their panzer divisions south and southeast of the area Orbec-Broglie.932 
The division had only been given one route for the advance; therefore, the 
armoured brigade was assigned to lead, followed by the infantry brigade. The armoured 
brigade would advance until reaching Le Sap and then Zap. Once past Le Sap, the 
brigade would advance two up with the BCR on the right and the Grenadier Guards on 
the left. The pursuit was to start at 0700 hrs on the 23rd August.933 
Foster also issued new orders for the echelons. In an effort to increase the range 
and self- reliance of the regiments, F echelon would now be comprised of the fighting 
vehicles plus necessary command vehicles as well as 11 soft-skin vehicles per armoured 
regiment for fuel, ammunition and rations. The commanding officers were warned to 
keep their regimental headquarters out of the fight so that they would be in a better 
position to observe and control.934 
The drive to the Seine began on 23 August led by the BCR and the Lake Superior 
Regiment. The armour made better time after the River Tougues was crossed and road 
surfaces became firmer and free of destroyed enemy equipment and vehicles. The 
columns rolled down the road at "convoy speed" through Le Sap and Monnai without 
932
 Ibid. 
933
 War Diary, 4th Cdn Armd Div, 1-31 August 1944, entry 22 Aug. 
934
 War Diary, 4 Cdn Armd Bde, 1-31 August 1944, entry 22 Aug. 
opposition. Once past Le Sap, tanks raced on over hard surfaced highways and at Monnai 
turned northeast. Halfway to Broglies, armoured cars moving ahead of the tanks 
discovered a pocket of German anti-tank guns protected by infantry. Attempts to bypass 
failed and the armoured brigade deployed to attack.935 The BCR lost nine tanks in the 
encounter. While this engagement was in progress, the Foot Guards were ordered to 
return to Le Sap and carry out a flanking movement against this pocket while the Lake 
Superior Regiment cleared the woods.936 
Foster's plan for 24 August had two alternatives, depending on the success of the 
attack against the German rearguard. If the German rearguard had not withdrawn, the 
infantry brigade would attack and the armoured brigade would pass through. If the 
rearguard had been withdrawn, the advance would be continued with the armoured 
brigade leading. As it turned out, enemy fire succeeded in pinning down the armour for 
most of the day and the Foot Guards lost two more tanks. The Germans withdrew during 
the night, blocking key crossroads with mines, booby traps and trees. 
Fuel consumption rates within the division were aggravated by the initial moves 
out of the Trun/Vimoutiers area, which were either cross-country or over bad and 
sometimes washed-out roads. The reserve fuel cans normally carried by the vehicles had 
long since been removed for fear of fire. Maintenance columns had not been able to get 
forward the night of 23 August and, even though the units had been topped up on 22 
August, there was a shortage of rations and a more serious shortage of fuel. In addition, 
there were no maps of the area beyond Bernay. In order to keep the advance moving, 
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every drop of fuel was transferred to the recce vehicles so that they could set off. Maps 
arrived just as the recce units were about to leave. 
On August 24, a special self-contained combat group was ordered to spearhead 
the advance. Keane Force was based on the Lake Superior Regiment, two squadrons from 
18th Cdn Armd C Regt, the BCR, and the Argylls. The force composition of Keane Force 
was sufficient enough to allow its commander to deal with immediate problems without 
having to engage brigade headquarters. Should the force encounter opposition that could 
not be brushed aside by the tanks and the Lake Superior Regiment, then the Argylls 
would be available to add the necessary weight to the attack. In order to facilitate the 
command and control arrangements, Stewart, the commanding officer of the Argylls, 
travelled with the tactical HQ of the Lake Superiors.939 
Keane Force continued the advance at 0830 hrs 24 August and by 1530 hrs had 
reached the line of the River Risle at Serguingy and Fontaine to find both bridges blown. 
It was decided that the only logical place to build a bridge was at Fontaine and that the 
engineers would construct it during the night after the infantry brigade had formed a 
bridgehead on the other side. The Lincoln & Welland Regiment and Algonquin Regiment 
made a crossing and seized the high ground Pt 152 on the other side.940 
At 0900 hrs on 25 August, the bridge at Fontaine was completed and the column 
began moving again. Once across the river, the column made good speed, so much so that 
it became strung out and communication between the armoured brigade and division HQ 
became difficult. Heavy traffic and confused routes between 4th Cdn Armd Div and 3rd 
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Cdn Inf Div caused their columns to be mixed. In the early part of the afternoon 4th Cdn 
Armd Bde reported running into troops from the 29th U.S. Inf Div and 2nd U.S. Armd Div 
in the area of Le Neuborg. There was some confusion as to exactly whom this part of the 
Seine belonged and, until the matter could be settled, Foster decided to concentrate the 
division in the general area Criqueboeuf la Campagne. 4th Cdn Armd Div was eventually 
assigned responsibility for the area and the U.S. troops withdrew to the south.941 
On 26 August, orders were issued for 21st Army Group to advance north with the 
intention of eventually capturing Antwerp.942 The 4 Cdn Armd Div was ordered to clear 
the Foret Dominale de Bord and recce crossing sites over the Seine River between 
Criquebeuf sur Seine and Pont de L'Arche. The general outline of Foster's plan was for 
the division to advance two up with the 4th Cdn Armd Bde moving on the right and 10th 
Cdn Inf Bde on the left. The armoured brigade had the Argylls under command and was 
given the objective of Pont de L'Arche. The infantry brigade was to advance to 
Criquebeuf. The leading troops reached the Seine at approximately 1115 hrs and, by 1600 
hrs, the division was concentrated south of the river between the area Pont de L'Arche 
and Criquebeuf. No opposition had been met in the advance but it was clear that the 
Germans were defending the north bank of the river.943 
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Map 28: Seine River Crossing. Copp, Maple Leaf Route: Antwerp, 32. 
At 1700 hrs, however, the CO of the Lines Lt Col Cromb seized the initiative and 
sent his scout platoon and D Company of the Lines crossed the Seine River and occupied 
houses opposite Criquebeuf. They became the first Canadians to cross the Seine and 
reported that no sign of the enemy existed. Cromb decided that such an opportunity was 
too good to pass up and quickly ordered a larger force to cross and occupy the village of 
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Freneuse. By dark, D Company was dug in on the opposite bank. Cromb then reported 
what he had done to brigade. Proctor had located a few rafts and DUKWs945 to ferry 
some light armour across to support Cromb's force which, by this time, had grown to 
three companies. Foster decided to continue to put the rest of the brigade across at 
Criquebeuf but, because of the increasing resistance by the 17th Luftwaffe Field Div in 
the immediate area, decided to have the armoured brigade cross at Elbeuf, the original 
crossing point since opposition there was lighter.946 
The approaches to the Seine crossing were quite open with only the buildings 
affording cover. The land on the Allied side sloped gently down to the water, while on 
the enemy side it rose sharply to form an escarpment with the two villages Sotteville and 
Igoville directly beneath the heights. Hill 88 and Hill 95 above each town respectively. 
Any movements on the Allied side of the river were in plain view of the enemy. The 
bridgehead had to be expanded to include the two heights and the Argylls and 
Algonquins were allotted the tasks of taking the two towns and the respective heights.947 
At 0530 hrs the next morning, six storm-boats and two class-nine ferries had 
arrived to begin moving the two battalions across. The Algonquins were across by 0715 
hrs and the Argylls by 0900 hrs. The Argyll objective was Igoville and the high ground 
beyond. Just prior to this action, the battalion HQ group, lost direction and travelled 
down the main road of Igoville while it was still in German hands and was captured. 
945
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Stewart ordered an immediate attack to try and get his people back. The attack on the 
town began at 1500 hrs and met heavy opposition but the objective was taken and 
consolidated by 1800 hrs. The battalion suffered 75 casualties in the action to take the 
town but failed to get their captured comrades back.948 The Algonquins met stiff 
opposition and heavy fire in trying to take Sotteville. The battalion was finally able to 
secure the town by evening but an attack to reach the high ground beyond the town was 
turned back. The battalion remained in place during the evening under constant sniper 
and mortar fire.949 
While these actions were taking place, the remainder of 10th Cdn Inf Bde was 
ferried across the Seine on rafts. At the same time, 3rd Cdn Inf Div succeeded in 
establishing a bridgehead at Elbeuf and started construction of a class-40 bridge. The 4th 
Cdn Armd Div was to have priority on this bridge, while 10th Cdn Inf Bde was to 
continue to use the ferry site.950 It was not expected that the echelon forces would cross 
for several days. Extra supplies, therefore, were carried in all vehicles to enable the 
regiments to move and fight without the daily maintenance process.951 
Most of 28 August was spent in regrouping under constant German shelling. At 
1400 hrs the Lincoln & Welland Regiment launched an attacked to take Hill 88 and by 
1700 hrs the hill was taken. The Lines then moved to Igoville to provide a firm base for 
the Argylls' attack on Hill 95. At 1930 hrs, the Argylls, with the support of the C Sqn 
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SAR, attacked and captured Hill 95. These two attacks ended the source of much of the 
harassment fire against the bridgehead. 
On 28 August, Simonds ordered 4th Cdn Armd Bde to capture and hold the 
triangular area formed by the towns of Boos, Le Hammel and Pt 164. Foster decided that 
the Brigade would cross the class-40 bridge which was being built at Elbeuf. It would 
then move through 3rd Cdn Inf Div to the objectives. The BCR was to capture and hold 
Le Hamel aux Batiers, at which point it would be joined by an infantry battalion from 
10th Cdn Inf Bde. The Foot Guards were to capture and hold Boos and the Grenadier 
Guards were to capture Pt 164.953 
The Brigade moved to the marshalling area within 3rd Cdn Inf Div and started 
coming under heavy shellfire. The infantry of 3rd Div and 10th Cdn Inf Bde were tasked 
with creating an alley through which the armoured brigade could travel. The 7th Cdn Inf 
Bde was to capture St. Aubin Celloville; 9th Cdn Inf Bde was to pass through to St. Pierre 
and then strike out along the road to Rouen. The 10th Cdn Inf Bde was to secure Pt 135 at 
first light and work up to the woods at Boos.954 On 29 August, A Sqn SAR supported the 
Lincoln & Welland attack on Pt 135 which was taken by 1800 hrs. C Sqn SAR was then 
tasked with supporting the Argylls in an attack on Boos which was completed by 1930 
hrs. The 4th Cdn Armd Bde was firmed up on their objectives by 1900 hrs. 
The issue of infantry strength was becoming acute among the division's infantry 
battalions. The Argylls were now operating with three companies of 40 men, the 
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Algonquin Regiment with three companies of 60 men and the Lines with three companies 
of 70 men.955 There was little hope at this point that the deficiencies could be made good. 
Simonds ordered the division to bypass whatever opposition remained in Rouen 
and make with all speed for the high ground near Buchy, 13 miles to the north. The 4th 
Cdn Armd Bde was ordered to capture the general area of Pt 224-Pt 223 near Buchy with 
one regiment in Buchy, one regiment in the area Bos Roger sur Buchy and one on Pt 233. 
The 10th Cdn Inf Bde was to seize Pt 233 and to establish a firm base for the division. 
Once the firm base had been established, 10th Cdn Inf Bde was to send a detachment to 
take Forges les Eaux. Once this task was completed, the division would become the corps 
reserve and have a five-day rest period.956 
At 0800 hrs, the advance continued with Buchy as the objective. The Germans 
had withdrawn from their positions during the night and 4th Cdn Armd Bde encountered 
no opposition during the advance, arriving on the objective at 1500 hrs. The 10th Cdn Inf 
Bde advanced during the afternoon and firmed up in Bois Guilbert. The special force 
assigned to capture Forges les Eaux was under the command of Major D. Currie from the 
SAR and included one company from the Argylls and supporting troops. Currie's force 
was dispatched at 1700 hrs and occupied the town at last light.957 Jefferson was evacuated 
during the afternoon with malaria and Lt Col Stewart took over command of the brigade. 
The maintenance train brought forward much-needed supplies of rations, fuel and mail as 
the division settled in for the anticipated rest period. 
955
 War Diary, 4th Cdn Armd Div-AA& QMG, 1-31 August 1944, entry 29 Aug. 
956
 Confirmatory Notes GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div O GP 301100B Aug. War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1-31 
August 1944, App 7. 
957
 War Diary, 10 Cdn Inf Bde, 1-31 August 1944, entry 31 Aug. 
362 
In the 11-day timeframe from 22 August to 1 September, the First Cdn Army as a 
whole advanced approximately 137 miles from Trun to Dieppe. Excluding the days 
dedicated to the crossing of the Seine River (26-29 August), the Canadian Army 
advanced an average of 17 miles a day with the shortest advance at 12 miles and the 
longest at 32 miles. The rate of the advance was even more impressive because the Army 
had to cross two major river obstacles, the Tougues and Risle Rivers, in addition to the 
more formidable Seine crossing.958 
The Allied administrative organization however was not prepared for the rate of 
Allied advance after 22 August. Planners had not anticipated the complete disintegration 
of the entire German front. The administrative plan was based on a staged German 
withdrawal that would have allowed the Allies to build up essential supplies during a 
more deliberate advance. The plan included an operational pause at the Seine for this 
specific purpose.959 Actual operations forced the AA & QMG organizations at all levels 
to improvise in order to meet the demands of the rapid advance. 
Allied supply dumps remained in the Rear Maintenance Area (RMA) and the 
problem of supplying a two-corps advance, moving at a rate of 40 miles at times, had to 
be resolved. Operationally, it was necessary to maintain contact with the retreating 
German forces to exploit their disorganization and vulnerability. The issue was not so 
much the amount of supplies needed but, rather, how to get the supplies forward to the 
fighting formations. The critical element was transport. 
The capacity to support all Allied armies did not exist; therefore, decisions had to 
be made with respect to the sequencing of operations—who would conduct the operations 
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and what level of administrative support each of the armies would receive. As a result, 8 
Corps was "grounded" by 2nd Br Army and all its second line and 50 percent of its first 
line transport was temporarily removed in order to provide transport to supply the 
Army's other two corps.960 The transport problem became more acute when a major fault 
was found in the engines of the British K-5,4X4, three-ton Austin trucks, of which 1,400 
of them and all of their replacement engines were defective because of piston trouble.961 
In First Cdn Army, for the first time, the availability of transport was less than the 
demand. It became necessary for Q Branch at First Cdn Army to lay down priorities 
according to the needs of the situation on a day to day basis. Within a matter of days after 
the breakout, daily turn around supply availability became a thing of the past. With the 
congestion at the depots and crowded roads, it was now necessary to allow an average of 
a three-day turn around from supply bases to the Seine.962 
The daily maintenance requirements for First Cdn Army on 24 August 
highlighted the problem. The following requirements were reported for First Cdn 
Army organizations: Army troops 459 tons, 1st British Corps 1,293 tons, and 2nd Cdn 
Corps 1,469 tons respectively. These demands required 3221 tons of lift but only 1170 
tons of lift was available representing a deficit of 2,051 tons of daily transport lift 
capability. The only way that this deficiency could be made up was if all of the first line 
transport companies were withdrawn from the corps and divisions. These resources 
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represented another 2,190 tons of capability but implementing this plan would have left 
the divisions with little in the way of capability to support the fighting echelons or 
maintain the pursuit.964 This was not a viable solution and so improvisation and 
compromise became the norm. 
One approach employed at 21st Army Group was to ground a number of divisions 
and remove their transport.965 Another was improving efficiency with strict traffic control 
to ensure that bottlenecks did not occur at the improvised bridges over the Seine or the 
numerous other bridges and rivers along the maintenance routes. Tank transporters which 
were originally confined to specific hours of movement each day were now pressed into 
service in large numbers to transport essential ammunition and ordnance stores.966 All 
third line transport was pooled and placed directly under Army control and approval was 
even granted for trucks to travel at night in rear areas with full headlights rather than the 
restricted headlights, known as cat's eyes, in the forward areas.967 Even with all of these 
measures, at no time during the pursuit phase did the daily vehicle tonnage available 
exceed 2,000 tons for all of 2nd Cdn Corps. 
On 26 August, corps staff formed a new plan to try to deal with traffic control 
problems. One section of provost corps was taken away from each division to augment 
the Corps Provost Company and the corps traffic boundary was moved up to a position in 
the rear of divisional headquarters. The divisions would control traffic in their areas and 
corps would handle everything else. It was felt that reducing the area of responsibilities 
of the divisions would reduce traffic tie-ups. Experience had shown that, in the rush of 
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operations, divisions simply did not discuss moves with each other, which resulted in 
roads being tied up and time wasted. In the rear areas controlled by Corps, traffic usually 
moved in controlled convoys over well-defined and well-marked roads. This was not the 
case in the forward areas where echelons were using roads, usually within hours of them 
being taken by the fighting troops.968 
The pursuit for the 4 Cdn Armd Div echelon formations started on 24 August.969 
The impact of limited supplies and transport was felt at every level, yet Proctor and 
Wigle revealed themselves to be masters of innovation which allowed them to provide 
Foster with the needed resources to maintain the operational tempo he demanded. On 29 
August, Proctor moved 29 lorries full of supplies, ammunition and fuel to the north shore 
of the Seine, despite enemy shelling. The division established the first dump on the north 
shore of the Seine River and Proctor had it built up to 180 tons of fuel, ammunition and 
supplies by the time the rest of the corps reached the bank. Proctor had all of his supply 
dumps moved across the river and was providing the Polish armoured division with 
ammunition, fuel and spares until their own supplies arrived.970 This supply dump 
remained the only one on the north side of the river for some time and had other units 
drawing from it almost immediately.971 
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On 31 August, Proctor proposed a plan for the maintenance of the division in the 
event that Royal Canadian Army Service Corps (RCASC) transport was withdrawn to 
support Corps or Army operations. The plan was designed to maintain the division with 
its own resources for a maximum of 100 miles. His plan was based on the assumption 
that ammunition requirements would not exceed the average daily demand of the last 
month and that the daily demand for fuel would not exceed 72,072 gallons or the normal 
second line of the division. A key factor in the plan was that Proctor was going to 
"ground" the division's Main HQ and administrative units and divert their transport 
resources to the fighting echelons.972 
The plan called for 43 vehicles for stores, 102 vehicles for fuel and 105 vehicles 
for the movement of ammunition or 250 vehicles in total. An additional 24 vehicles were 
needed if the two days' reserve rations normally carried by RCASC were still required. A 
and B echelons were disbanded, leaving only F echelon and the battle lorries which were 
tasked to move the commodities between F echelon and the forward supply points. The 
supply points would be placed as far forward as possible and would remain static. The 
maximum distance between the forward supply points and F echelon was to be 25 miles. 
All other available vehicles would be assigned to restocking the supply points.973 
On 30 August, the decision was made to rely on the early capture of a Channel 
port, such as Dieppe or Boulogne, and to cease bringing in large quantities of stores and 
vehicles through RMA. It was felt that the RMAs were adequately stocked with supplies 
so that stores that were once considered essential were now phased back until such time 
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as a port or ports nearer the battle area became available. Imports were reduced from an 
average of 16,000 tons a day to only 7,000 tons per day. This decision released critical 
transport for the direct support of the armies.974 
When it became obvious to the German High Command that at best only a 
delaying action could be fought on the Seine, they ordered Model to prepare a stop line 
along the River Somme. Their immediate problem was to save their forces south of the 
River from encirclement and destruction. On 28 August, General von Zangen, 
commanding the Fifteenth Army, ordered his two divisions holding the coast south of the 
river to withdraw to it and prepare it for defence. This they did, blowing all the bridges 
over which the First Cdn Army would have to advance.975 In the early morning of 31 
August, the 11th British Armd Div caused consternation among the Germans by 
overrunning the headquarters of the Fifth Panzer Army southwest of Amiens, capturing 
the commander of the Seventh Army. The British then pushed across the Somme on a 
still intact bridge at Amiens. This unexpected situation caused the orders to 4th Cdn Armd 
Div to be changed. There would be no rest period: the pursuit would continue. 
Simonds issued new orders on 31 August. The 7th Br Armd Div had crossed the 
Seine and, after a rapid unopposed advance to Amiens, was headed northwest to 
Abbeville and it was necessary to protect their flank. The Poles, who were behind 4th Cdn 
Armd Div, had been slated for this role but it was decided not to wait for them to pass 
through. Instead, 4th Cdn Armd Div moved at once either to capture Abbeville or to take 
control of the city depending on the rate of advance of the 7th Br Armd Div.976 
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Map 29: Advance to the Somme. Ellis, Victory in the West, 471. 
Orders had already been given to stand the units down for rest and maintenance 
routines had been organized. Wigle and Proctor now had to immediately organize a night 
move to a new objective over 30 miles away. The move was to be conducted over a 
single road on a pitch-black night through unreconnoitred country and without proper 
maps.977 Despite all these challenges and as a testament to the work of the division staffs, 
the division would only be two hours late off the mark. The lead units of 10th Cdn Inf Bde 
Foster, Meeting of Generals, 389. 
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crossed the start line at Forges les Eaux at 0200 hrs and by 0700 hrs the leading units 
were in Orival, after what was described as a "smooth advance."978 
The Grenadier Guards led off the 4th Cdn Armd Bde advance at 0445 hrs and 
passed through 10th Cdn Inf Bde at 1000 hrs to continue the advance. The armoured 
regiments at this point were fighting with two squadrons of 14 tanks each. On reaching 
the town of Hornoy around midday, the column became entangled with elements of the 
British 7th and 11th Armd Divisions and 53rd Infantry division. All the columns were 
headed towards Abbeville and it appeared the same centre line had been allocated to the 
four divisions.979 
The Germans added to the confusion by deciding to make a stand near the town of 
Airaines. It was not known if the British or the 4th Cdn Armd Div should deal with the 
situation. After a long delay, 4th Cdn Armd Bde bypassed Airaines via Allery and 
harboured northeast of the city. Foster was forced to visit Simonds in order to sort out the 
problem of the centre line of the division. The 2nd Cdn Corps staff had allocated the 
division a centre line that was south of the inter-army boundary. While the fighting 
echelons continued towards Abbeville, all of the rear echelon formations conducted 
another short notice, yet expertly executed, move north into First Cdn Army area before 
following the fighting formations.980 Again, the expertise and professionalism of the staff 
was demonstrated in conducting the shift without impacting the fighting ability of the 
combat formations. 
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The 10th Cdn Inf Bde harboured near Hallencourt. While firming up its position, 
10th Cdn Inf Bde was tasked to send one infantry battalion to Airaines to help clear up the 
situation after a failed 4th Br Armd Bde attack.981 The Lincoln & Welland Regiment was 
given this task and encountered little opposition as the Germans withdrew again during 
the evening. The task of clearing the city was completed at first light on 2 September. 
The Lines were relieved by infantry from 53rd Div (Br) and moved to Sorel.982 The 4th 
Cdn Armd Div reached the river at Abbeville in the early hours of 2 September. 
The division was assigned two tasks for 2 September. The first task was the 
shifting of the division to the left of the new inter-army boundary and the second task was 
to seize a crossing of the River Somme in the area of Pont Remy. In order to accomplish 
the first task, the whole division representing the movement of thousands of vehicles and 
men had to sidestep five miles north. This move started at 0800 hrs and was completed 
by 1200 hrs.983 
In order to accomplish the second task, all three regiments of 4th Cdn Armd Bde 
carried out patrols along the Somme River in an attempt to find a bridge still standing. 
The Lake Superior Regiment companies were under command of their respective 
armoured regiments and patrolled with their respective recce troops. If a suitable crossing 
was found, the respective Lake Superior Regiment company was to be used to seize the 
initial bridgehead.984 
The 10th Cdn Inf Bde was tasked with concentrating the brigade in the area of 
Grandsart-Hallencourt. If the armoured brigade was successful in seizing a bridge or 
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bridgehead, the infantry brigade was to be prepared to take over and exploit the position. 
In this event, the armoured brigade was to be ready to move to the area Erondelle so that 
they could provide cover fire for the crossing.985 The four bridges in Pont Remy were all 
reported as blown and the patrols all reported heavy fire from German artillery and 
mortars. By last light no crossing had been made but, within 12 hour, the division 
engineers in another display of initiative and professionalism were able to repair all four 
bridges.986 
The confirmatory notes to Foster's O Group of 2100 hrs, 2 September, outlined 
the general German situation as withdrawing after blowing bridges over the River 
Somme. Foster's intent was to seize a bridgehead across the Somme in the vicinity of 
Pont Remy, followed by an advance in the general area St Mauguille le Haut Clocher. 
The 10th Cdn Inf Bde was to secure the bridgehead across the Somme by a silent attack 
and the armour brigade would then pass through on completion of a bridge across the 
river.987 
Patrols from the Lines and Algonquins were the first to cross the river and met no 
opposition. Three battalions were across and firmed up by 0430 hrs. The 53rd Div (Br) 
had also crossed and was on the right of the infantry brigade. With the division's artillery 
in close proximity to the bridgehead, the division bridgehead was secure. The armour 
could wait until a bridge had been constructed.988 
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A class-40 bridge was expected to be ready by 1200 hrs 3 September but, by that 
time, the division's engineers were able to construct three class-40 and one class-30 type 
bridge over the river. 89 The 4th Cdn Armd Bde began crossing the Somme River at 1330 
hrs and was firmed up on the objective of the day, Bugny L'Abbe at 1610 hrs. The 1st Pol 
Armd Div was to pass through the division to continue the advance. Orders were issued 
that the 4th Cdn Armd Div would stand down for two days and both A and B echelons 
were ordered forward to rejoin their regiments.990 
The evening of 3 September was used to consolidate the different elements of the 
division and all units were established in their allotted positions in the concentration area 
by 2330 hrs. At 0030 hrs, Main division HQ was warned to move in one hour when it 
was discovered that the HQ was the furthest forward of all troops and there was no one 
between them and the Germans. The Polish Armd Div was supposed to have passed 
through earlier but had failed to do so. Both Main and Rear HQs were ordered to pull 
back three miles to new locations.991 This was the first time since landing in France that 
all elements of the regiments and division were together. Although there was some 
movement of harbours, the division spent 4 and 5 September in maintenance and 
reorganization. 
On 3 September, Montgomery issued his orders for operations to continue. 21st 
Army Group was to the advance eastwards and destroy all enemy forces encountered. In 
addition, it was to occupy the Ruhr and get astride the communications leading from it 
989 
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into Germany and the sea ports. First Cdn Army was assigned the task of clearing the 
coastal belt and remaining in the general area Bruges-Calais until the maintenance 
situation allowed its employment further forward.992 
Map 30: Allied Advance 5 September 1944. Copp, Maple Leaf Route: Antwerp, 47. 
On 4 September, Dempsey's Second Army made a 60-mile dash from Brussels to 
capture Antwerp. Aided by the Belgium resistance, the huge docks and warehouse 
facilities were captured intact.993 On the same day Simonds gave orders to his divisional 
commanders. They were to continue the pursuit to the Scheldt destroying or capturing all 
enemy south of that River. The Canadians had the additional task of opening the channel 
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ports to shorten the lines of communications for the Allied armies. The 2n Cdn Inf Div 
was to clear the coast from Dunkirk to the Dutch Border; 3rd Cdn Inf Div was to ensure 
that the 2nd Div's route was "clear;" and, thereafter, to "reorganize around Calais."994 
The 1st Pol Armd Div was to advance to Ghent while the 4th Cdn Armd Div was directed 
towards Bruges. 
The Allies had not expected the Germans to fight for the channel ports but on 4 
September, Hitler issued orders that designated Le Havre, Boulogne and Dunkirk as 
fortresses that were to be defended to the last man.995 These ports were part of the 
defensive zone of the German Fifteenth Army. Within this zone, the Calais defense area, 
Walcheren Island, Flushing Harbor, the bridgehead at Antwerp and the Albert Canal 
positions were also designated as fortresses. Many of the units of the Fifteenth Army had 
not been engaged in the Normandy fighting and were well equipped and up-to-strength. 
Immediately inland were the VI launching sites which had been designated as a security 
area, and swept clean of the French Resistance (known as Maquis). Advancing through 
this zone meant crossing every river of western France at its widest point and, since there 
were no Maquis to help capture the bridges, the Germans impeded the Canadian advance 
by destroying every bridge. This action placed engineers and bridging equipment at the 
top of the list of needed resources.996 
On 4 September, Simonds issued his directive for the move forward of 4th Cdn 
Armd Div to the area Ostend-Bruges-Ghent. Once this advance was completed, it was 
Simonds' intent to withdraw and centralize division artillery and transport under corps 
Stacey, Victory Campaign, 326 
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command to be used in operations against the ports. At 1000 hrs 5 September, Foster 
held a conference during which he outlined his concept for the reorganization of the 
division into two balanced battle groups. The battle groups would be called Moncel and 
Stewart after the brigade commanders. The Grenadier Guards were now placed under 
command of the Stewart battle group and the Algonquin Regiment was moved under the 
command of Moncel battle group. This placed two armoured regiments and two infantry 
battalions in each battle group. Within each battle group, the infantry battalions were 
married up with an armoured regiment.998 The new advance would take the division to 
Eeklo in Belgium via St. Omer. The advance was to begin at 0630 hrs on 6 September. 
Keane Force from the Moncel battle group would lead the advance.999 
In order to support the renewed advance, Proctor once again resorted to 
innovation. He decided to drop 50 percent of the 75-mm and 17-pdr ammunition being 
carried by his supply units into a field and used the freed-up space to transport fuel. 
Ammunition expenditure since crossing the Seine had been light and fuel was deemed to 
be the more necessary commodity.1000 
The first large scale demand on division echelon resources also came on 5 
September as five platoons of RCASC trucks were loaned from the division to 2nd Cdn 
Corps to help in the build up of a forward supply base. Fully one-third of the entire stock 
was to be moved by 4th Cdn Armd Div resources while corps and army transport were 
tasked with moving the rest.1001 As a result of this tasking, Proctor decided to move the 
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division Adm Group and the brigade workshops up with the brigade A echelon vehicles 
in order to reduce the "tail" of the division and have the workshops available for the early 
repair of tanks and vehicles. This practice proved to be unsatisfactory and was ceased on 
7 September.1002 
The 4 Cdn Armd Div advance was again held up by traffic, as elements of 1st Pol 
Armd Div began using the 4th Cdn Armd Div centre line. After the confusion was 
cleared, the advance went well. The Moncel battle group collided with determined 
German resistance at Bergues near the Dunkirk perimeter. When the garrison refused to 
surrender, Foster ordered Moncel to bypass it and head into Belgium. By 1107 hrs, the 
advance elements of Keane Force reached the line of the canal at St. Omer. A recce of the 
area revealed that all three main bridges had been destroyed but the town was clear of 
Germans.1003 
The Lake Superior Regiment found a partially destroyed bridge which was 
immediately repaired sufficiently enough to take light vehicles, scout cars and carriers. 
The Algonquin Regiment was able to cross the river and established a bridgehead which 
allowed the engineers to construct a class-40 bridge. The BCRs were placed on standby 
to push across the bridge, when it was completed, to expand the bridgehead. The bridge 
was completed at 2215 hrs and the infantry elements of both brigades were pushed across 
to establish a bridgehead.1004 
On 7 September, Simonds outlined the immediate tasks for his divisions: 1st Pol 
Armd Div was to continue the pursuit to Aeltre; 4th Cdn Armd Div was to continue the 
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pursuit to the vicinity of Eekloo and then position itself northward to cover the Leopold 
Canal in order to prevent further move of the trapped German forces along the coast. 
Bruges was to be bypassed and dealt with later. The 2nd Cdn Inf Div was to advance 
along the coast as quickly as possible, sealing off Dunkirk and other ports which would 
be dealt with later. The 3rd Cdn Inf Div was to carry out active patrolling to acquire 
information for future planned attacks against Calais and Boulonge.1005 
The 4th Cdn Armd Div advance continued at 0530 hrs on 7 September along two 
parallel routes under heavy rain. The columns advanced without meeting opposition and 
crossed the Belgium border at approximately 1340 hrs. There was no stopping for meals 
but just a steady push. The battle group advanced until they were held up by blown 
bridges near the town of Loo. Foster ordered the brigade to firm up along the canal line 
west of Loo.1006 
Keane Force once again led the armoured brigade advance along the "left route," 
also known as Green route. The incessant rain and heavy traffic made road conditions 
quite poor. As the Force moved closer to Bruges the vanguard came under heavy shell 
fire. A patrol from the Lake Superior Regiment found that Bruges was held in some 
strength. A German officer PW was sent into the town with a statement advising the 
garrison commander to surrender. No answer was received and in the afternoon Foster 
ordered Moncel to continue the advance1007 south and east of Bruges which had been 
previously surveyed and signed by the division provost. The bridge across the 
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Moerbrugge canal was blown and the engineers stated that it would not be ready until 
0800 hrs the next day. The brigade, therefore, harboured for the night.1008 
Map 31: Advance to Bruges, Moerbrugge attack. Copp, Maple Leaf Route: Antwerp, 71. 
The infantry battle group began the advance at 0800 hrs, crossing at Dixmude and 
advancing without opposition. Reconnaissance along both routes of advance revealed that 
the bridges over the Canal de Ghent were blown and that the Germans were on the east 
side of the canal in some strength. The Argylls were ordered to seize a bridgehead over 
the Canal in the area of Moerbrugge. They were able to get across against light 
opposition, using boats and rafting equipment found along the shores of the Canal. The 
Lines followed the Argylls across the Canal. Around midnight, shelling and mortar fire 
1008
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increased and German activity along the Canal increased to the point where the engineers 
were not able to put a bridge across the Canal.1009 
The commander of 15th Army Gustove von Zangen had ordered the Canal line 
held during the army's evacuation across the Scheldt from Terneuzen and Breskens. The 
Germans were able to put down a truly effective concentration of fire for the first time 
since Falaise that prevented the engineers from getting a bridge across. At first light, no 
bridges were across the canal. The Argylls and Lines were caught between two German 
divisions and subjected to intense artillery and mortar fire. Cut off from the main force, 
they held their precarious toehold along the northern bank against repeated German 
attacks. By late afternoon, the bridgehead remained small and the proposed bridge site 
remained under German fire.1010 
Brig Jefferson returned from hospital to take command of the brigade. After 
surveying the situation, Jefferson placed Stewart, who returned to the command of the 
Argylls, in charge of all forces inside the bridgehead and directed that the area of the 
bridgehead be consolidated so that a bridge could be built during the night. Stewart made 
the Lines responsible for the right half of the bridgehead and the Argylls, the left. Stewart 
was able to clear the bridgehead as ordered and a class-30 bridge was completed over the 
canal by 0630 hrs the next morning. This allowed the bridgehead to be reinforced with a 
squadron of tanks from the SAR at 0700 hrs.1011 By the end of the day, the bridgehead 
had been reinforced with two battalions, one additional company of infantry and the three 
SAR squadrons. Progress within the bridgehead was slow, but the Germans were starting 
to give way slowly to consistent Canadian pressure. It was now clear that the nature of 
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the tactical battle had once again changed. Canadians were now facing organized German 
defensive positions under effective tactical command and control. The pursuit phase was 
over. 
Foster admitted to his first tactical mistake of the war in trying to rush the 
crossing at Moerbrugge without proper planning or artillery support. Since Falaise, he 
admitted that he had allowed himself to be "lulled into a dangerous sense of 
invincibility." 1012 He had anticipated the same short, sharp fights of the previous two 
weeks. Up to this time, Wigle and Proctor had been instrumental in dictating the 
operational tempo of 4 Cdn Armd Div's advance with little input from Foster. This suited 
Foster's hands off leadership style. The days of easy advances were now over, however, 
and Foster's true skills as a leader and tactician would be put to the test. 
By the time the 4 Cdn Armd Div reached Moerbrugge serious cracks were 
starting to show in the theatre wide administrative system. French ports began to fall to 
the advancing Allies but they did not provide the immediate relief to the supply problem 
that was being experienced and, in most cases, the impact of additional port capacity was 
not felt until well after the pursuit phase was completed. Dieppe was captured on 1st 
September and the first ship arrived two days later. The port was used to bring in vital 
stores but the majority of the transport and supplies were allocated to Second Br Army. 
Ostend was captured on 9 September and became operational on 28 September, with 
Boulogne and Calais captured on 22 and 30 September respectively. While Antwerp was 
in Allied hands, the approaches were still controlled by the Germans rendering the port 
unusable as a supply entry point.1013 
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The supply situation in theatre was becoming critical. There were no stocks 
between the main depots in the RMA and the forward areas. The 21st Army Group lines 
of communications had lengthened to almost double the distance on which the allotment 
of transport had been calculated.1014 The original sustainment plan had been designed 
with road heads at distances of 50 and 100 miles apart. These were to be stocked with a 
maximum of five days' holdings of all stores but this system had to be modified because 
of the rapid advance. There was an expectation that the rapid advance would net captured 
German wartime stocks from German dumps abandoned during the retreat but this did 
not happen. The movement of supplies was further complicated by the effectiveness of 
the Allied air interdiction campaign, which had caused extensive damage to the major rail 
centres and transportation routes that the Allies were now trying to use. The Allies were 
now victims of their own success as transportation units were not able to move with the 
complete flexibility they needed.1015 
The vital supply commodity during a pursuit was fuel. There is a truism in 
military operations that the expenditure of ammunition is almost always inversely 
proportional to the amount of fuel needed. At the beginning of the campaign, POL 
imports averaged 4,500 tons per day with an average daily consumption of 2,000 tons per 
day. The initial restricted size of the bridgehead reduced petrol consumption to a 
minimum and, by 5 August, 66,000 tons or 33 days' supply had been built up. This 
surplus quickly evaporated as consumption for the second half of August doubled and 
stabilized at 4,000 tons per day.1016 
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A reality of the long lines of communications was the use of POL by the very 
vehicles bringing it forward to the fighting units. Doctrinally, vehicles carrying 
maintenance loads of POL were not to use their loads for their own use but were to refuel 
from their own dedicated logistics units. During the pursuit across France, adherence to 
this principle was difficult because of the great distances that had to be covered. During 
the period in early September, the POL group supporting the army troops recorded an 
increase in daily POL issue from 30,000 to 90,000 gallons. This meant that as much as 
60,000 gallons a day was being siphoned away from the combat formations to keep the 
transport rolling between the Forward Maintenance Centres (FMCs) and the combat 
units.1017 
On 7 September, First Cdn Army introduced revised fuel allotment rates. The new 
allotment allowed first line to be supplied to its full allotment, (although what "full" 
meant was never clearly defined), with three jerricans per vehicle, 50 miles in 2nd line and 
50 miles in corps reserve. The problem was that the 2nd Cdn Corps did not have the 
specified corps reserve of 50 miles for each formation, which represented a shortage of 
250,000 gallons of fuel. Simonds was made aware of the problem and notified that the 
corps had enough fuel to get the fighting formations to the Dutch border. Simonds was 
prepared to accept the operational risk associated with the situation and to stand the 
formations down until the fuel situation could be rectified. In the meantime, he would 
An FMC was to hold a reserve of all commodities provide a refilling point for second line transport, 
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apprise Crerar of the situation and place the responsibility for getting more gas for 
operations beyond that point with First Cdn Army.1018 
The fuel issue was further complicated on 9 September when a misunderstanding 
ensued between First Cdn Army and 2nd Cdn Corps as to how much fuel the corps 
actually had. The First Cdn Army felt that 2nd Cdn Corps was carrying more than they 
should in first line. Until the dispute could be resolved, the 2nd Cdn Corps solution was to 
withdraw all 2nd line fuel from 2nd and 3rd Cdn Inf Divs and the 2nd Armd Bde less fuel 
for 10th Cdn Armd Regt. The withdrawn fuel was held at the St. Omer dump and was to 
be issued in the following order of priority: 4th Cdn Armd Div and 1st Polish Armd Div— 
first priority; 2nd Cdn Inf Div, 3rd Cdn Inf Div and 2nd Cdn Armd Bde—second 
priority.1019 The misunderstanding was resolved in part on 10 September when First Cdn 
Army informed 2nd Cdn Corps that 113,000 gallons per day was being made available for 
maintenance and that additional quantities would be furnished from 21st Army Group 
resources as quickly as possible to refill corps echelons.1020 By 15 September, however, 
the fuel situation had still not been resolved. 
The physical distribution of fuel to the Allied armies became a critical issue after 
the crossing of the Seine. The First Cdn Army solution to the transport problem was to 
modify tank transporters by welding on each trailer a base and sides of airfield track, 
converting 40-ton tank transporters into load carriers. These modified transporters could 
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carry 16.5 tons of supplies, 36 tons of ammunition, and ten tons of POL (or 500 
jerricans), which provided considerable flexibility.1021 
Jerricans, the primary means of transporting fuel, were a particular problem. A 
serious shortage of jerricans resulted from units abandoning them in their speedy advance 
after tops ups. Jerricans were a highly attractive item for the civilian population who 
made away with them en masse. The sudden dearth of jerricans in the supply system 
became so critical that the salvage of these containers was made a matter of top 
priority.1022 
Solving one problem, however, invariably led to others. Using tank transporters to 
haul fuel and commodities meant that they were not available to move tanks. The period 
between the cessation of imports into the RMA and the opening of Antwerp was a critical 
one for the shipment of replacement vehicles, as the movement of stores was taking up 
almost all of the transport capacity of the freed Channel ports. The heavy vehicle 
situation became serious, as many tanks damaged during the advance or left behind 
because of mechanical breakdown could not be replaced. A large number of repairable 
tanks lay between Rouen and Brussels but, owing to the strain on recovery facilities and 
recovery vehicles, they were left behind. 
The optimum theatre position for holdings of Sherman 75 mm gun tanks was for 
the units to be at 100 per cent with a further 25 percent behind in the Armoured 
Replacement Group (ARG) and a further 25 per cent in base vehicle parks. The optimum 
theatre holding was 150 per cent of the required number of Sherman tanks.1024 Up to the 
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end of August, no appreciable base stocks had been built up. No sooner had tanks arrived 
in the theatre than they were issued to ARG and from there to units. In the latter half of 
August, issues to the ARG continued and stocks increased in the ARG because there was 
a lack of capacity to get tanks forward to the units advancing across the Seine. A peak 
holding was reached on 5 September when shipping of tanks was turned off until 25 
September. Thereafter throughout September, the losses by units could not be wholly 
replaced. The stocks in the ARG were run down and the base stocks in theatre were 
rapidly depleted. Compounding the recovery problem was the fact that 50 recovery units 
were committed to the unpleasant task of cleaning up the destruction left behind in the 
Falaise Gap. By mid September tank regiments had less than 75 per cent of the tanks they 
needed. It was not until the shipment of tanks was resumed on 26 September through 
Ostend and Boulogne that the theatre position in Sherman tanks began to improve.1025 
The maximum range of the Sherman tank with a full fuel load over reasonable 
terrain was approximately 100 miles. As soon as the distances and speed of the advance 
increased the wear and tear on the engines of the M4 and M4A1 Sherman tanks required 
that most had to be replaced after as few as 600 to 700 miles.1026 The rapid advance 
forced the AA & QMG of the respective divisions to make critical decisions with respect 
to the utilization of organic recovery and repair units within the division. For example, if 
the armoured brigade workshops were kept with formations, little work could be done 
since they were always on the move. If they were left behind, the distance between 
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recovery and repair and sending the repaired vehicles back to the fighting formations 
became problematic.1027 
Artillery ammunition was another commodity in short supply in the forward 
areas. The formations within 21st Army Group were restricted to drawing half of their 
normal allotment rates per day. At one point, the artillery ammunition situation became 
so acute that it became necessary to despatch 112,000 rounds of 25-pdr ammunition by 
air from Britain to the forward areas. The ammunition situation improved with the 
discovery of 80,000 rounds of 25-pdr ammunition at Louvin, which had been brought 
over by the British in 1940 and excellently maintained by the Germans since that 
time.1028 
Operations to clear the channel ports could not start until the artillery stocks had 
been built up. The ammunition was available in Normandy but 2nd Cdn Corps had to get 
it with its own transport. A plan was devised which withdrew transport from the corps 
divisions on a rotating basis to help stockpile the needed ammunition. The trip 
represented a 650-mile round trip journey with an estimated six-day turn around time. 
The plan was initiated on 8 September and the first ammunition from this plan was 
expected to arrive at the ammunition dump at Colombert on 15 September. The 4th Cdn 
Armd Div was expected to commit transport and TCVs to this dumping operation on 10 
September 1029 
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A common complaint registered in regiment, brigade and division war diaries was 
the lack of maps during the pursuit. In some cases, the formations were advancing 
beyond the boundaries of the maps they had before the next issue was received. On 2 
September, the infantry units of 4th Armd Div were fighting with one map per 
company.1030 By 10 September, the map situation was critical with only 500 copies of the 
1/100,000 and 500 copies of the 1/250,000 maps for distribution to the entire 2nd Cdn 
Corps!1031 
On the morning of 7 September, 4 Cdn Armd Div echelon troops started their 
longest single move of the war. The echelon moved to Gryverinchove (a move of 21 
hours and 130 km), arriving on 8 September at 0500 hrs. The centerline of the advance on 
7 September ran through the town of Bergues south of Dunkerque. The town was 
strongly held by the Germans and a decision was made to bypass the town. This meant 
that an alternate route had to be found and properly signed. As the division was now 
passing a known German position, the flank of the division column was exposed to 
possible German attack. Proctor had to improvise a flank guard of LOB tanks from the 
armoured brigade to protect the echelon forces from a possible German attack. Despite 
the best efforts of the Provost corps, a number of Main HQ vehicles took a wrong turn 
and entered Bergues but were able to extract themselves after a brief exchange of fire.1032 
Ammunition and fuel points were set up alongside the centre line of advance and 
operated on a 24-hour basis. These points were continually moved forward behind the 
advancing echelons. Normal paperwork was in some cases sacrificed for the exigencies 
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of the advance. Units could pick up ammunition at any time without paperwork but, 
interestingly, rations could only be obtained with the proper paperwork and 
signatures. 
The traffic plan for the move on 8 September was complicated since the division 
would be advancing over two parallel routes—Blue and Green, which came together for a 
three-km stretch of road stretch at the town of Diximude. There was, however, little 
confusion over the stretch used by both groups, as the division staff and MPs coordinated 
the process. The fighting echelons were fed into the one road on the basis of one Green 
vehicle and one Blue vehicle, so that vehicles from each route alternated down the main 
road. When the echelons arrived, they were alternated as a group rather than in single 
vehicles.1034 The process was completed without incident and the advance continued to 
the area of St. Andre near Bruges.1035 
The problem of a liberated populace reared itself during the long drive to the 
Belgium border, which included many long halts in newly liberated villages. The troops 
were showered with many gifts, including alcohol. Overwhelmed by the generosity, 
many troops ended up drunk, which had a serious effect on convoy discipline and on 
progress as a whole. Wigle was forced to parade all ranks of the Main HQ the following 
day and he drew attention to the poor convoy discipline and laid down strict orders for all 
French, Some Reminiscences, 84. 
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future moves, including abstaining from accepting any gifts and the severity of the 
punishment for anyone found to have disobeyed his instructions.1036 
The advance to the Seine and beyond by 2nd Cdn Corps was impeded, not by any 
serious German resistance, but by the Allied inability to sustain the advance of its combat 
forces. There were a number of reasons for the sustainment problem. First, and most 
importantly, there was a complete change in the type of warfare being conducted, 
requiring new methods of replenishment. The maintenance practices that had developed 
and matured during the time in the bridgehead were no longer capable of supporting the 
rapid advance that was taking place across France. The demand for replenishment of 
units began to occur over ever increasing lines of communications and there was a 
shortage of transport and drivers to move the needed supplies forward from Caen to the 
combat elements of the corps.1037 The corps solution was to demand resources from the 
very combat forces they were tasked with supporting, which impacted the operational 
effectiveness of the divisions. 
The 4th Cdn Armd Div adopted a more radical approach to the problem of 
lengthening lines of communication by taking the majority of first line transport away 
from its combat units in order to augment second line resources. Critical supply items for 
an armoured division included food, water, fuel, oil, lubricants, ammunition and spare 
parts. The need for these items varied. Some, such as food and water, were easily 
calculated: a function of the daily allocation per man multiplied by the number of 
When the column was stopped, one man only would exit the vehicle. That man would be for traffic 
control and would not leave his post. Absolutely no gifts were to be accepted from civilians and any man 
found drunk on the moves in the future would be deemed incapable of properly performing their duty and 
charged accordingly with the maximum penalty given. War Diary, 4th Cdn Armd Div-AA & QMG, 1-30 
September 1944, entry 8 Sep. 
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personnel in the force. Other requirements such as fuel and ammunition were scaled for 
different operations and tended to be inversely proportional.1038 It was not uncommon for 
the commodities to be left on the ground in order to free up second line vehicles for 
carrying supplies over the expanding lines of communications.1039 The key was 
understanding what commodities could be sacrificed when in order to keep the combat 
formations moving. The success of the 4th Cdn Armd Div drive across France and into 
Belgium was a function of the collaboration, effectiveness and innovation of the echelon 
troops under Proctor and the operations staff under Wigle. 
The fighting since the landing in late July had taken its toll on the fighting 
formations of 4 Cdn Armd Div. Only two of the eight major units of the division, the 
Lake Superior Regiment and the SAR, never dropped below an effective combat strength 
of 85% during the timeframe examined. The infantry battalions suffered the most with 
the Argylls and the Algonquins dropping below 70 percent during the pursuit with the 
Lines close behind at 73 percent. The combat strength of the infantry battalions would 
not recover until late September.1040 
The Grenadier Guards were the worst of the armoured regiments dropping to a 
combat effective strength which hovered around 77 percent during this period. The 
regiment would not exceed 85 percent combat effectiveness until 24 October. Both the 
Foot Guards and BCR were recorded at 80 percent until 6 September at which point they 
Camsell, From Normandy to the Scheldt, 36. 
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climbed above 85 percent effective.1041 Battle casualties spiked at 108 in crossing the 
Seine and then dropped to almost zero prior to the operations at Moerbrugge.1042 
The transition in command from Kitching to Foster was seamless due to the 
professionalism and resilience of the division staff and its leaders. Foster had no previous 
experience in commanding an armoured division but he had capable officers in command 
of his regiments, battalions and both brigades. 
Foster's direct influence in the pursuit phase was limited. His decision to divide 
the division into two balanced battlegroups was the most significant change to division 
operations. This move had been contemplated since July when Kitching talked of 
balanced all arms battlegroups in the July TEWT but no real opportunity presented itself 
to adopt this configuration prior to the pursuit. During the pursuit, Foster was called upon 
to settle a number of command and control issues with 2nd Cdn Corps. His potentially 
significant operational challenge, the crossing of the Seine was pre-empted by Cromb's 
excellent leadership and initiative in getting his troops across the river early. Otherwise 
there was no significant battle or challenge to test Foster until Moerbrugge. Foster 
demonstrated complete confidence in the professional capabilities of Proctor and Wigle 
and seemed generally content to allow them to plan and execute the pursuit. 
Despite all the problems and challenges involved in theatre administration and in 
all the demands made by 2nd Cdn Corps on 4th Cdn Armd Div resources, Proctor and his 
Q branch never failed to meet the supply or transport requirements of an operation 
requested by either Kitching or Foster. In fact, there were numerous times through 
August and early September where the effectiveness of 4 Cdn Armd Div's administration 
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resulted in the division supporting other divisions of 2 Cdn Corps whose echelons could 
not cope. There were days when the combat troops never engaged the enemy but were 
simply passengers on the express to Belgium. Much of the credit for the success of the 
division in the pursuit phase lies with the ingenuity of Proctor and Wigle but just as much 
credited must be given to Kitching who recognized the importance of the staff function in 
supporting operations and made sure that he trained them as well as he did his combat 
troops. The legacy that Kitching left his division was a well-trained and well lead staff 
that rose to every challenge. 
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Conclusion 
Commanders cannot reasonably be assessed as either success or failures without 
an understanding of the military context within which they fought or the nature of the 
forces that they commanded.1043 Dr Richard Gabriel, in his examination of the great 
commanders of antiquity found that great leaders appear to be the consequence of two 
sets of factors coming together at an appropriate time: the "traits of personality and 
character whose presence and exercise permit the development of a mind that 
understands its environment and can deal with it without paralysing apprehension" and " 
the historical circumstances in which the potential leader must live out his life."1044 He 
concluded, "Great men are only possible when there are challenging times that provide 
opportunities for their greatness to manifest itself."1045 Maj Gen George Kitching had the 
requisite traits of personality and character and led his division in challenging times that 
provided opportunities for greatness yet his reputation as a commander has been defined 
by his dismissal rather than what he accomplished. This suggests a third factor that Dr 
Gabriel did not mention or consider: when history and historians have gathered enough 
relevant information to provide a balanced assessment of the leader including a 
comprehensive understanding of the true context of his leadership challenge and how he 
overcame it. The latter has not existed until now for either Maj Gen George Kitching or 
the men of the 4 Cdn Armd Div. 
When most people think of an armoured division they visualize a group of tanks 
moving across a battlefield to capture a piece of ground or vital objective. The reason 
why the force is there and the fact that it is supported by a complex administrative system 
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of machines, material and people whose mission it is to keep the fighting echelons 
operational, is often forgotten or ignored.1046 The fighting and the support echelons 
together represent a cohesive system capable of fighting, supporting, fuelling, servicing, 
repairing, evacuating, and moving the people and equipment that are vital to the fighting 
capacity of the division under all kinds of conditions. Without the support of the echelon 
troops, the fighting elements cannot operate, shoot, communicate or provide sustenance 
to the soldiers who fight. It is with these ingredients that hills are taken, rivers crossed 
and enemies killed or captured.1047 Likewise, understanding the leadership, training, 
equipment and unit cohesiveness are crucial to assessing the fighting efficiency of the 
combat formations of the division. An understanding of the entire complex system is vital 
before any assessment can be made of success on the battlefield. 
A detailed examination of Kitching's role in the training of his division revealed 
significant hurdles over which he had no control severely tested his resources as both a 
leader and teacher. The evidence has made it clear that Kitching faced significant 
challenges in the training of his division that prevented him from attaining the level of 
expertise he knew was required for the mobile operations that he was expected to conduct 
in Normandy. The reasons can be directly attributed to command decisions made at the 
Corps and Army Group level. Some decisions were operationally focused, such as 
deliberately using 4 Cdn Armd Bde in April and May 1944 to bring up the readiness of 
the assault divisions for the Normandy invasion. Others were administrative such as the 
order to waterproof all of the divisions' vehicles. Combined, these decisions severely 
constrained Kitching's ability to facilitate the interoperability of his infantry battalions 
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and tank regiments indeed some would be tasked to work together for the first time in 
combat. 
This dissertation has also examined the effectiveness of the leadership of the 4th 
Cdn Armd Div during two specific types of operations - "the breakout" exemplified by 
operations TOTALIZE, TRACTABLE and closing of the Falaise Gap, and "the pursuit" 
exemplified by the actions to pursue the retreating German armies across France and 
Belgium ending on 8 September 1944. One focus of this investigation has been the 
effectiveness of the interaction between the GOC, his subordinate commanders, and the 
two key division staff members, the GSO 1 and the AA&QMG. The goal was to 
determine how well the leadership, working together within the construct known as the 
commander-staff dynamic facilitated successful combat operations. The dissertation has 
also examined the experience of brigade, battalion, armoured regiments and ad hoc 
battlegroups in specific operations to assess the abilities of subordinate commanders in 
the division. 
4 Cdn Armd Div operations were examined through the lenses of common 
situational awareness, common intent, and coordinated action. The evidence strongly 
supported the conclusion that during the timeframe examined the command team 
composed of Kitching, Wigle and Proctor worked well, overcoming significant 
challenges and obstacles in facilitating and coordinating the combat operations of the 
division. The actions and successes of the division when placed in proper context 
revealed initiative, improvisation and battlefield successes where none was seen to 
previously exist. 
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One of Simonds' dictates to his commanding officers was to ensure that their 
subordinate formations were lead by competent officers. Realistic exercises represented 
the only valid vehicle through which senior officers could be reasonably judges. Kitching 
asked to exercise his division as a division so that he could expose his soldiers and 
commanders to more realistic scenarios gained from his experience and knowledge on the 
battlefields of Sicily and Italy. He also wanted to evaluate his subordinate commanders 
and staff under realistic training conditions. His request was denied in part because there 
weren't adequate training areas and the division did not have a high enough priority to 
get access to the large training areas. These decisions again reflected the emphasis on the 
assault phase of the OVERLORD without a clear appreciation of the actual training 
required for the roles assigned to the different divisions for the different phases of the 
invasion. Instead, Kitching was left to improvise as best he could and utilized skeleton 
communication exercises and TEWTs whenever possible as a training method. 
The commanding officer attrition rate within 4 Cdn Armd Div is striking. One of 
the two brigade commanders was lost as a casualty. Of the four armoured regiments that 
landed in late July, only the SAR retained its original commanding officer (Wotherspoon) 
by 21 August. Within the three infantry and one motor battalion, only the Argylls 
retained their original commanding officer (Stewart). Even within his senior staff 
Kitching lost one of his two key staff officers during this period (Ganong). Dealing with 
this extraordinary level of change in his senior leadership represented a considerable 
challenge for Kitching. It is a testament to the quality and training of the officers within 
the division that the tier of officer who succeeded the original commanding officers all 
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came from within the division and fought successful major battles within hours of taking 
command. Most stayed with their units throughout the rest of the war. 
Kitching's own battle experience, his research, debriefs from officers returning 
from theatre and mining of after action reports lead him to the conclusion that the 
doctrine that was being imparted in the training was not what was needed in theatre. He 
realized that combined arms battlegroups were needed in Normandy and created such 
groups when possible. Infantry-tank combined arms training at the unit level and sub-
unit level was conducted but what he really needed was the opportunity to school his 
senior commanders in the command and control of combined arms battlegroups. His 
decision to conduct EX IROQUOIS at the beginning of July reveals a desire to expose his 
senior officers to the concepts and challenges of battlegroups in an attempt to get them 
thinking about the issues involved in coordinating the different arms. 
The evidence of Kitching's comprehensive insight into combat effectiveness lies 
with the amount of effort that went into the training of the division staffs. As a former 
GSO 1, Kitching knew the importance of a properly trained and educated staff to the 
conduct of successful operations. Staff training was one area where he did have the 
resources and the means to properly train his people and the evidence indicates that he 
trained them just as hard under realistic conditions as the combat troops. The fact that one 
of his first directives was to get the staff working under field conditions was indicative of 
the level of importance he placed on staff training. The payback for this effort came 
during the pursuit when, despite all of the administrative and logistical challenges that 
were present theatre wide in northwest Europe, the division staff and echelon forces were 
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able to maintain both the combat power of the division and the operational tempo 
required by the division commander. 
Helmuth von Moltke, a famous German military commander of the 19th century 
wrote, ".. .no plan of operations will ever extend, with any sort of certainty, beyond the 
first encounter with the hostile main force." Success in battle was gained through the 
commander's ability to recognize the changed situation and react accordingly. These and 
similar dicta stressed that victory is won by the flexibly minded leader capable of 
adapting to the rapidly changing circumstances on the battlefield.1048 Unfortunately for 
Kitching, flexibility was not a feature of Simonds' plans for TOTALIZE: a plan Kitching 
found fundamentally flawed. Yet Kitching displayed flexibility, initiative and leadership 
in bouncing back from losing the loss of two regiments during his first night of combat 
by getting his forces on Pt 180 and Pt 195 the next evening. 
The events of June and July, combined with the British doctrinal preference for 
set-piece attacks, shaped the operational tempo for the August breakout battles. Inherent 
in this paradigm was an environment where flexibility and initiative were limited. What 
did this paradigm mean for the divisional commanders? From the perspective of 
operational tempo their hands were tied. Phasing operations placed constraints on what 
could be done with respect to operational tempo and momentum. The tactic that killed 
momentum altogether was not the tying of the ground campaign to a bombing plan, as is 
commonly stated, but the narrow frontage allotted to the armoured divisions in Phase II. 
The evidence has clearly shown that the Phase II could not have started any earlier. 
Allowing the two armoured divisions more space in Phase II could have allowed more 
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combat power from the armoured brigades put up front. This may have been enough to 
overpower the hastily reconstructed German defenses on the afternoon of 8 August 1944. 
It is not clear however whether a different division attack plan for Phase II would have 
addressed the breakdown in the deployment procedures within 4 Cdn Armd Bde in the 
rush to launch TOTALIZE. 
The loss of Worthington Force was a tragic event and a clear example of the fog 
of war. While the attack has often been view as a tragedy; the fact remains that a 
battlegroup had broken through and penetrated into Meyer's rear area and because of this 
action, Meyer had to respond to this immediate threat. The actions of Worthington Force, 
it has been argued, facilitated the operations of 9 August by tying up Meyer's armoured 
reserve for the entire day denying him the initiative. The possibility for a brigade 
breakthrough was real had Worthington been reinforced. The inability of the Poles to 
provide any support to Worthington or exploit the tactical situation he had created 
remains as one of those historical "might have beens" that may have changed the entire 
outcome of TOTALIZE. 
Kitching is often blamed for not finding the BCRs but his assets were all engaged 
by the time it was realized that the BCRs were not on Hill 195. Simonds could have 
provided additional assets but he seems to have considered it a division problem since no 
additional resources from 2nd Cdn Corps were offered or committed to find the BCRs. 
Simonds inaction on this issue is hard to reconcile. The failure of the typhoon aircraft to 
communicate with 2nd Corps is a glaring indication that 21 Army Group had much to 
learn with respect to interoperability between the army and the allied tactical air forces. 
Jarymowycz, The Quest for Operational Maneuvre in the Normandy Campaign, 219 
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In TRACTABLE, operational tempo was disrupted by a corps mistake in not 
considering the Laison River as a tank obstacle and by the degradation of the command 
and control capability of the armoured brigade through the death of Booth, the wounding 
of Scott and the destruction of the brigade Tac HQ. Despite the successful attack of the 
armoured brigade on 14 August, the loss of the coordination function of the brigade HQ, 
late on 15 August, denied the division its objective for the day. Yet the division units in 
both TOTALIZE and TRACTABLE generated opportunity and achieved successes that 
boosted the confidence of the soldiers. Kitching and the division may have suffered 
setbacks and casualties but their determination to "get to grips with the Germans" never 
waned. 
Other historical accounts have recorded what happened as opposed to what was 
intended and in a number of cases these were not the same thing. A case in point is the 
changing orders received by the division on 15/16 August. Most of the current narratives 
simply state that the operation to capture Falaise was cancelled that the division spent 16 
August regrouping followed by an advance on 17 August that was to take them to Trun. 
The actually level of complexity and activity generated by the changing orders to the 
division in that twenty-four hour period has largely been ignored or simply 
misunderstood. The impact on the commanders and staffs of the division for example, of 
having three divisional orders group in less than 24 hours, with each O Group sending the 
division in a different direction is difficult to fathom. The fact that the division was 
actually able to launch operations essentially on time in the early morning of 17 August is 
a testament to the effectiveness of the commander-staff dynamic within the division. 
401 
The commander-staff dynamic was a representational model used to illustrate the 
complex intellectual interaction between a commander and his staff with three outcomes 
key to the achievement of operational tempo: common situational awareness, common 
intent and coordinated action. The examination revealed that while all three outcomes 
had to be present a unique characteristic of the model was that primacy between 
commander and staff in generating operational tempo was a function of the type of 
operation being undertaken. In deliberate operations such as TOTALIZE and 
TRACTABLE the commander dominated but in the pursuit operational tempo was more 
a function of the staff ability rather than commander influence. 
The effectiveness of the commander-staff dynamic was a function of the 
leadership ability of the key members of the command team, senior staff and the 
command environment. There is no doubt that Kitching, Wigle and Proctor were 
effective leaders. The level of trust between them was evident and Kitching remarked on 
their individual and combined effectiveness a number of times in his memoirs. Kitching 
created a command environment in which he gave his intent and the expected outcome 
for coming operations and left the details to his staff. Kitching trusted both Wigle and 
Proctor and their abilities to generate what was required from the staff and the echelon 
forces to meet the intent of his operations. As a former GSO 1 it would have been natural 
for Kitching to have a command style that was more intrusive when it came to what the 
staff was doing and telling them how he wanted things done. The leadership team was 
effective, responsive to the changing nature of the operations and was able and willing to 
improvise. At no point during the timeframe examined did the leadership at the division 
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level fail to provide the guidance or resources necessary for the purpose of coordinated 
action on the part of the division. 
The same cannot be said of the subordinate commanders within the division. The 
reality of human nature and combat is that you cannot determine, even with the most 
realistic training, how various people are going to react when under fire. Some of the 
apparently promising people were complete failures, and by the same token some of the 
most unlikely people turned into superb leaders. Even those who had survived and had 
gained experience in previous combat were not immune to the hazards of renewed 
combat. In the case of Booth and Murrell it is clear that they were promoted beyond their 
level of capability. Booth was a liability to Kitching as were some of his regimental 
commanders. TOTALIZE exposed McQueen and Murrell as a weak regimental 
commanders and Booth as a marginal Brigade commander. The two regimental 
commanders were dealt with in quick order but the options with respect to Booth became 
limited very quickly. Viewed in hindsight, Booth should have been relieved right away 
but it is difficult to second guess Kitching on a decision he made in the middle of his first 
major battle. After all, Booth had commanded tanks in battle before, Kitching had not! 
The focus must then turn to one question: knowing that Booth had been killed, 
that Scott had been sent to hospital and with repeated requests by Kitching for Moncel 
why did Simonds allow the 4th Cdn Armd Bde to remain without a permanent leader for 
four crucial days? His inaction can only viewed as a conscious decision on his part. As 
such, he failed in his responsibility as a commander to provide his subordinate 
commander with all of the resources necessary to complete his assigned mission. In this 
respect, Simonds failed Kitching. Reflecting on the situation afterwards Kitching realized 
403 
that he had an effective replacement in Brig Lane his CRA, but this solution meant 
robbing his artillery units of effective leadership. 
While the command environment within the division was based on trust this was 
not the case within the Corps command environment. The Simonds command paradigm 
focused on controlling the command initiative of his divisional commanders. Kitching 
was forced to command in an environment in which higher headquarters produced 
detailed plans for lower formations and units to implement. Dr Bill McAndrew aptly 
called Simonds subordinates "unconsulted employees."1050 
Simonds' ideas resulted in centralized planning, control at the highest level, staff 
management of the battlefield, reliance on indirect fire support, little consideration to the 
concept of manouevre, and cautious exploitation. There was little room for flexibility, 
initiative, originality or the modification of the plan to meet the emerging demands of the 
battlefield.1051 If the plan failed, the blame was pushed downwards to the units and 
commanders involved. Stacey summarized the command crisis as follows: 
Thus by the end of August 1944, among the nine infantry or armoured brigades in 
the 2nd Canadian Corps there had been eight changes in command, and only three 
brigades retained their original commanders. Four changes were due to battle 
casualties, a fact which reflects the extreme fierceness of the fighting. Two were 
the result of what higher authority considered unsuitability. Among the 
commanding officers of armoured regiments, two were changed as consequences 
of death or injury, and two for other reasons; seven commands remained 
unchanged. In the infantry and machine gun battalions (24 in number) only seven 
commands had not changed by the end of August. No less than 14 battalion 
commanders had been changed as the result of battle casualty of sickness. Five 
commanding officers and been promoted, and five removed because considered 
unsuitable. 1052 
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Stacey concluded his study by stating that a "great deal had been done" prior to D-Day 
to weed out the officers who were deemed not effective in command but the final arbiter 
despite the best training conditions was the "test of battle."1053 
The story of Kitching contains an interesting footnote and further controversy. 
After his relief Kitching was reduced in rank to brigadier and was placed in command of 
the 13 Cdn Brigade in Helmsley Yorkshire where his main task was to retrain volunteers 
from other parts of the army, technicians for the most part, into infantry soldiers.1054 
Shortly after word of his relief was known and unbeknownst to Kitching, heavy lobbying 
was taking place on the part of Lt Gen Burns to have Kitching take over command of the 
1 Cdn Inf Bde. A formal request in the form of an immediate message was sent to Lt Gen 
Stuart on 2 Sep asking for Kitching. " If you consider Kitching should have another 
chance in command Vokes and I would be glad to have him."1055 Crerar weighed in on 
the debate in a memorandum to Stuart on 4 Oct 44 decidedly against the request. 
I do not consider the Kitching- Calder "swap" would do other than to suggest 
"horse trading." It gives no promotion to either-just an indication that what is 
acceptable to one Corps Comd is not liked by the other. I am opposed to such 
business. 1056 
In his message to Stuart explaining Kitching's dismissal, Crerar had stated that 
Kitching could not be usefully employed in the field in the immediate future.1057 This 
recommendation was almost certainly based on information provided by Simonds. It 
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should also be noted that on 29 August 1944, Crerar had written a personal letter to 
Simonds warning of the "most deleterious general effect on the morale and cohesion of 
Canadian formations and units," brought about by the "these frequent changes of 
command."1058 This particular letter was prompted in part by Simonds' decision to 
relieve Ganong with less than a month in command. Simonds' inclination to relieve 
senior officers, in this case two in the span of a week, in addition to those that had been 
relieved in the previous three months, was obviously starting to weigh on Crerar's mind. 
Simonds typically believed that his plans were never the problem. Rather, it was 
the execution of his plans by his subordinates that resulted in failure. In fact, the plans 
were a significant part of the problem. The command authority within which Kitching 
was able to operate diminished as Simonds exerted greater control over his subordinate 
units and their commanders. While Kitching was given some latitude in the opening 
operations by 4th Cdn Armd Div against Tilly la Campagne, this latitude decreased in 
TOTALIZE and TRACTABLE. OP SMASH represents the only true operation that was 
planned and executed by Kitching and his division with little apparent oversight by 
Simonds or 2nd Cdn Corps. Examined objectively, the operation revealed flexibility in 
thought on the part of Kitching in selecting, two possible routes depending on 
intelligence, reconnaissance and German defences. It suggested flexibility and 
adaptability on the part of Kitching, in not trying to force a bad situation at Damblainville 
but switching to his alternate route at Morteaux-Couliboeuf. The remarkable leadership 
and flexibility of the division staff in fixing the defending German forces in place at 
Damblainville, switching the axis of advance for the armoured regiments over a 
1058Letter GOC-in-C 5-0-3 Tac Hq First Cdn Army, 29 Aug 44, Crerar to Simonds, El57 Vol 3, file 
958.009 (D 178) GOC-in-C File 5-0-3 Vol I & II Higher Command- Canadian Army Overseas Period 29 
May 55 to 22 Dec 44. 
significant water obstacle and arranging the subsequent advance with the Poles who were 
already operating in the same area. Effective, adapted and flexible leadership was 
displayed at all levels within the division during this operation. 
This dissertation has argued that Simonds' management of the Canadian actions 
to close the Falaise Gap were flawed in part because of his dual responsibility to win the 
current battle while positioning his forces for future operations. The evidence has 
suggested that the latter took precedence in Simonds' mind, which resulted in his 
questionable order to split 4 Cdn Armd Div placing the under-strength 10 Cdn Inf Bde 
squarely in the path of a still dangerous German army. Had it not been for the fighting 
ability and determination of the SAR/Argyll battlegroup the 4 Cdn Armd Div positions 
along the Dives line may have been overrun and lost. 
Even after it became apparent that he, and Allied intelligence, had misjudged the 
potential threat posed by the Germans trapped in the pocket, Simonds' response reflected 
his focus on the pursuit. Instead of reinforcing 10 Cdn Inf Bde with 4 Cdn Armd Bde 
which could have happened relatively quickly and maintained unity of command along 
the Dives River line, Simonds ordered 2nd Cdn Armd Bde and 9 Cdn Inf Bde who were 
outside of the area of the immediate battle into the fray. This decision not only delayed 
the relief of the 10 Cdn Inf Bde but also created a further level of command complexity 
whereby three division commanders (Kitching, Spry and Maczek)were now trying to 
control the battle in the confined and confused battlespace in and around the Dives River 
line. One is again left wondering what might have happened had Kitching been allowed 
to implement his plan for a defences in depth along the Dives River with the 10 Cdn Inf 
Bde along the river and the tanks of the 4 Cdn Armd Bde arrayed behind in support. 
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There has also been a tendency to judge success and or failure in operations 
without a proper understanding of the context within which the operations were 
conducted. Through an examination of commander's intent, the effectiveness of the 
commander-staff dynamic at the division level and the results in operations this 
dissertation has determined that the 4th Cdn Armd Div was a well led organization at the 
division level under both Kitching and Foster. The key elements of the dynamic common 
intent, common situational awareness and coordinated action were consistently achieved 
at the divisional level which meant that the combat power of the division was 
synchronized for the achievement of the commander's intent. 
The evidence examined revealed a clear correlation between mission success, 
defined as achievement of the stated intent of an operation, and the leadership of 4 Cdn 
Armd Bde. On the days where Booth was exercising proper control the armoured 
regiments performed well as exemplified by the actions on 9 and 10 August. Through a 
combination of circumstances, leadership was missing on the critical days of 8, 14 & 15 
August. As for the remainder of the period, leadership was good from 16-19 August 
under Halpenny and from 19 August forward effective leadership was established and 
retained for the rest of the war under Moncel. 
Little has been said about 10 Cdn Inf Bde due mainly to the fact that it had a solid 
record of success in the August battles particularly in the Pt 180, Pt 195 and St Lambert 
sur Dives battles. Jefferson provided adequate and consistent leadership as the brigade 
commander and he had the definite advantage of having two of the best regimental 
commanders, Wotherspoon and Stewart, to provide advice. When Jefferson became ill 
during the pursuit Stewart assumed the brigade commander role with great effectiveness 
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and ease. During the pursuit phase, Foster provided the necessary oversight for division 
operations but it is clear that both Wigle and Proctor provided the necessary coordination 
that resulted in the division's successes up to Moerbrugge. Theirs was a formidable 
combination forged and proven in the crucible of the August battles. It was their skill and 
professionalism that facilitated the command style of Foster. 
The 4th Cdn Armd Div led the way in the August battles but as a new division it 
had to learn how to fight while it fought. The division gained valuable experience in its 
first actions and so did its commanders.1059 The tenets of doctrine had to be tempered by 
combat experience to provide new concepts in the planning and execution of operations. 
The members of the division learned quickly at all levels leading to innovation in tactics, 
combat support, battlefield replenishment, resupply and in sustainment exemplified in 
particular by the action of the echelon forces to support the pursuit across France into 
Belgium. The evidence has revealed that during the timeframe in question the division 
and its leadership was placed under significant stresses and yet they proved resilient to 
these stresses, allowing them to function effectively in very difficult circumstances. In 
doing so, this dissertation has shown that the history of the 4 Cdn Armd Div is much 
more complex than previously recorded and that the men who commanded and lead the 
formations and who travelled the green centre line deserve much more credit for their 
professionalism, expertise, leadership and ingenuity. Knowing that further primary 
evidence exists in the still concealed Foster and Kitching papers one hopes that this is but 
the first chapter in a more comprehensive study of the 4 Cdn Armd Div and these two 
commanders. 
Roy, 1944: The Canadians in Normandy, 316 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1. Glossary 
Administration 
AFV 
ARG-
Armd 
Army Group 
Army roadhead-
Arty 
ATI 
ATP 
Axis 
Axis of Advance 
Bailey Bridge 
BGS 
Bound 
Boundary 
Brigade Group 
Administrative 
area 
Centre Line 
GLOSSARY 
Administration was defined as that function of command which 
deals with the maintenance of the forces in the field divided into 
general administration-controlled by the headquarters of the forces in 
the field local administration-controlled by the local commander. 
Armoured Fighting Vehicle 
Armoured replacement group 
Armoured 
Several field armies under a designated commander 
an advanced depot area under control of an army to give it the 
necessary administrative flexibility and to provide the source of 
supplies for FMCs. 
Artillery 
Army Training Instruction 
Army Training Pamphlet 
The line giving the general direction of movement, astride which a 
higher formation will move. 
A line of advance assigned for purposes of control: often a road or a 
group ofroads or a designated series of locations , extending in the 
direction of the enemy 
British-designed portable pre-fabricated truss bridge, designed for 
use by military engineering units to bridge gaps up to 200 feet wide. 
The design was unique in that: Construction required no tools or 
heavy equipment. Bridge components were small enough to be 
carried in trucks and even man portable over short distances, The 
bridge was strong enough to bear the weight of vehicles up to 70 
tons (Bridge Classification 70). 
http://www.canadiansoldiers.com/equipment/engineerequipment/bail 
eybridge.htm 
Brigadier General Staff 
single movement, usually from cover to cover, made by troops often 
under artillery fire or small arms fire. 
An artificial division to define the limits of responsibility or 
manouevre of a formation or unit. 
The area in which unit rear echelons and service units of a brigade 
group , whose functions do not require them to be elsewhere are 
located. 
The route along which a formation, unit or sub-unit headquarters will 
move. 
410 
Chain of 
Command 
CIGS 
CO 
Corps 
CRA 
CRO 
Delivery Point 
Distribution 
Point 
Division 
Dump 
Engr 
fascine 
Fd 
First Line 
Holdings 
First Line 
Transport 
Flak units-
FOO 
GOC 
GOC-in-C 
GSO 
Harbour 
HE 
HQ 
HV 
The succession of commanding officers from superior to a 
subordinate through which command is exercised. 
Chief of te Imperial general Staff 
Commanding Officer 
An organization larger than a division and smaller than a field army: 
usually consist of two or more divisions together with supporting 
arms and services. 
Commander Royal Artillery 
Current Reports form Overseas 
A point where the logistic vehicles of a formation issue maintenance 
items to a consumer unit. 
A point at which supplies and or ammunition obtained from 
supporting supply points by a division or other units are broken 
down for distribution to subordinate units. Distribution points 
usually carry no stock; items are issued completely as soon as 
possible 
A major administrative and tactical unit/formation which combines 
in itself the necessary arms and services required for sustained 
combat larger than a regiment/brigade and smaller than a corps 
A temporary storage area, usually in the open, for bombs, 
ammunition, equipment or supplies 
Engineer 
a bundle of sticks bound together, used to fill ditches, strengthen the 
sides of trenches, the banks of streams etc. 
http://www.yourdictionary.com/fascine 
Field 
The quantity of maintenance items held by units on a scale 
determined by the formation commander 
Unit transport, the administrative echelons of which take over 
ammunition, POL, supplies and other stores from second line 
transport at delivery points. 
anti-aircraft units 
Forward Observer Officer 
General Officer Commanding 
General Officer Commander -in-Chief 
General Staff Officer 
Any area occupied by a unit or battle group when halted. The main 
purpose of a harbour is to permit the dispersal and concealment of 
vehicles and troops against attack. Also allows for the maintenance 
of the unit or battle group 
High Explosive 
Headquarters 
High velocity 
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Hy 
Inf 
LofC 
LofC 
LAA 
LMG 
LOB-
Logistics 
M10 17 Pdr 
maintenance 
MTP 
Mutual Support 
NCO 
NTW 
O Group 
One day's Supply 
OR 
Order of Battle 
POL 
PWs 
RAF 
RASC 
RCASC 
RE 
Recce-
Heavy 
Infantry 
Lines of Communications. All routes, land, water and air, which 
connect an operational military force with support areas and along 
which men and material move 
Lines of communication 
Light Anti-aircraft 
Light machine gun 
Left out of Battle 
Unlike the US Army or Navy the Canadian and British military did 
not officially use the term logistics or understand it in its modern 
sense. In commonwealth forces the terms administration and 
maintenance were used. 
Tank destroyer with a 17-pdr gun 
Maintenance was the process of keeping the forces in the field 
complete in personnel, animals and material 
Military Training Pamphlet 
The ability on one post, locality, or area to bring fireto bear upon 
enemy attacking a neighbouring post, locality or area, having regard 
to the weapons within it. 
Non Commissioned Officer 
Notes From Theatres of War 
Orders Group 
A unit or quantity of supplies adopted as a standard of measurement, 
used in estimating the average daily expenditure understated 
conditions. It may be expressed in terms of a factor, such as rounds 
of ammunition per weapon per day. 
Other Rank 
the identification , strength, command structure and disposition of 
the personnel, units and equipment of a military force. 
Petroleum, Oils and Lubricants. A broad term which includes all 
petroleum and associated products used by the armed forces. 
prisoners of war 
Royal Air Force 
Royal Army Service Corps (British) 
Royal Canadian Army Service Corps-The role of the RCASC in the 
field is the provision of supplies, the operation of transport for the 
carriage of personnel and materiel of all kinds and the delivery of 
requirements to the field units at a time and place convenient to 
them. 
Royal Engineers 
reconnaissance 
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Report line 
RHQs 
RMA 
Second Line 
Reserves 
Second Line 
Transport 
Shadow divisions 
Standin 
Operating 
Procedure 
Start Line 
Start Point 
Sustainment 
Tac Hq-
Tactical 
Movement 
TCV-
TEWT 
Warning Order 
Lines on which units or formations report but do not halt. They have 
no tactical significance but should follow clearly defined features 
such as lateral roads, rivers or railways 
regimental headquarters 
Rear Maintenance Area 
stocks of maintenance items held by supporting service units within 
a formation on a scale determined by the formation commander for 
the immediate replenishment of the first line holdings. 
Basic RCASC transport allotted for the maintenance of brigade 
groups, AGRAs, corps and army group troops 
were bodies of troops organized like divisions but without supply 
troops and used to reform badly shattered formations. 
A set of instructions covering those features of operations which 
lend themselves to a definite or standardized procedure without loss 
of effectiveness 
The line from which, at a specified time, assaulting troops advance 
to attack. It should follow a clearly defined feature and be nearly at 
right angles to the direction of attack. 
The point along a route where control of movement becomes the 
responsibility of the commander ordering the movement 
Sustainment is the ability of a force to maintain the necessary level 
of combat power for the duration required to achieve its objectives. 
tactical headquarters 
Any movement that is influenced by battle conditions so that the 
tactical order of march, deployment, grouping and dispersion must 
be taken into account. 
Troop carrying vehicle 
Tactical Exercise Without Troops 
A preliminary notice of an order or action which is to follow. It is 
designed to give subordinates time to make necessary plans and 
preparations. 
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Abteilung 
Flak 
Heer 
Jagdpanzer 
Kampfgruppen 
Kompanie 
OKH 
Panzer Grenadier 
Division 
Panzerabteilung 
Panzercorps 
Panzerdivision 
Panzerjaeger 
Panzerkampfwagen 
Panzerregiment 
Schwere 
Sturmgeschutz 
GERMAN 
battalion, detachment 
Anti-aircraft gun 
Army 
tank destroyer 
Task force, or battlegroup 
company 
Oberkommando des Heeres-Army High Command 
Motorized Infantry division 
tank battalion 
tank or armoured corps 
tank or armoured division 
tank destroyer 
tank 
tank regiment, armoured regiment 
heavy 
(StuG) self-propelled gun. Sturmgeschuetz were a series of assault guns and 
tank destroyers produced by the Germans during the war. Sturmgeschuetz 
were typically large caliber guns mounted on a tank chassis. They were 
easier, cheaper and less time consuming to produce than turreted tanks and 
were produced in large numbers form German factories. 
Tigerkompanie 
Wehrmacht 
Zimmerit 
company of Tiger tanks 
correct name for German Armed Forces as a whole Heer, Kreigsmarine and 
Luftwaffe but often in Allied terminology as meaning the German army 
itself 
an anti-magnetic cement applied to tanks to prevent the adhesion of 
magnetic mines 
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Appendix 2. Outline oflnstrs issued by GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div 071300B Aug 44 Op 
TOTALIZE[R]sp 
INFM 
1. Enemy 
The 2 Cdn Corps front is held by 89 Inf Div and 272 Inf Div, reinforces by one bn 
from 711 Div, on the gen line FONTENAY-le-MARMION 0358-ROQUANCOURT 
0578-LA HOGUE 0960 0678 TILLY LA CAMPAGNE 0760-LA -HOGUE 0960. 
There are definite indications that 1 and 12 SS Pz Divs are moving WEST, some 
elements already having crossed the R ORNE. 
2. Own Tps 
Outline Order of Battle, 2 Cdn Corps: 
(a) 4 Cdn Armd Div 
(b) POLISH Armd Div 
(c) 2 Cdn Div 
(d) 3 Cdn Div 
(e) 51(H) Div 
(f) 2CdnArmdBde 
(g) 33 Armd Bde 
(h) 2 Cdn AGRA 
(i) 9 AGRA 
3. The task of 2 Cdn Corps is to beak through enemy posns astride the CAEN-
FALAISE rd. 
4. Outline of Ops -2 Cdn Corps 
The op is divided into two phases: 
(a) Phase I (i) Right - 2 Cdn Div with under comd 2 Cdn Armd Bde and 
(ii) Left - 51 (H) Div with under comd 33 Armd Bde are to capture 
the gen. line CAILLOURT 0554-GAUMESNIL 0756-woods 
SOUTH of ST AIGNAN de CRAMESNIL area 0588 woods area 
1058- 1160. H-hr 072330B Aug 44. 
(b) Phase II (i) RIGHT-^1 Cdn Armd Div is to pass through 2 Cdn Div and 
capture the FONTAINE-le PIN feature (pt 180 0737-pt 195 
0846-pt 206) 
(ii) Left - POLISH Armd Div is to pass through 51 (H) Div and 
Capture high ground NORTH of FALAISE (area pt 170 1442 
--pt 159 1451). 
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5. Corps SL, report lines and bdys as already issued. 
6. AIR 
(a) Phase I - RAF Bomber Command is to drop hy bombs in the 
area indicated on the trace already issued. 
(b) Phase II - RAF med bombers are to drop fragmentation bombs 
in areas indicated on trace already issued. 
(c) 83 Gp RAF in sp First Cdn Army fighter-bombers and RP 
typhoons are available on call. 
7. Additional Tsp Under Comd 2 Cdn Corps: 
(a) 1 LOTHIANS (Flail Regt) 
(b) 87 Sqn AVRE 
8. Inter-Div Bdv - 4 Cdn Armd Div - POLISH Armd Div - Phase II 
All incl 4 CDN Armd Div - pt 112 084549—church 07527 
BRETTEVILLE LE RABET 1060-WEST edge of woods 116483— 
woods 117475-exclbr 127449. 
TASK OF 4 CDN ARMD DIV 
9. To capture FONTAINE-le-PIN feature (pt 180 0747 pt 195 0846-206 0943) 
METHOD 
10. 4 Cdn Armd Div will adv two up. 
(a) RIGHT—10 Cdn Inf Bde with 
(i) under comd 
One sqn 1 LOTHIANS 
Two btys 17 pr A Tk (towed) 
One tp 17 pr Tk (SP) 
(ii) in sp 
15 Cdn Fd Regt 
One sqn less one tp 87 Sqn AVRE 
One tp 8 Cdn Fd Sqn 
(b) LEFT-^1 Cdn Armd Bde with 
(i) under comd 
One sqn 1 LOTHIANS 
One bty A Tk (SP) 
(ii) in sp 
23 Cdn Fd Regt (SP) 
One bty 17 pr A Tk (SP) 
One tp 8 Cdn Fd Sqn 
11. The op will be carried out in two phases: 
(a) Phase I - Move from cone area, VAUCELLES, to assembly area, 
NORTH of Corps SL on two routes as per instrs already issued. 
(b) Phase II - Adv to capture FONTAINE-le-PIN feature—SL for 
this Phase to be bomb-line for Phase II. 
12. Task - 4 Cdn Armd Bde—Phase II 
(a) To adv SOUTH, by passing CINTREAUX 0853 and 
HAUTMESNIL 0852 to the East. 
(b) Est a firm base in the area BRETTEVILLE LE RABET and 
(c) Adv South to capture the FONTAINE-LE-PIN feature, 
(d) A special force composed of the ALQ R embossed in White 
scout cars and half tracks, with supporting arms, will be under 
comd 4 Cdn Armd Bde for move in order to relieve elements 4 
Cdn Armd Bde in BRETTVILLE LE RABET. This force will 
revert to comd 10 Cdn Inf Bde as soon as the firm base is 
consolidated in BRETTSVILLE LE RABET. 
13. Task - 10 Cdn Inf Bde- Phase II 
(a) To capture and hold in succession 
(i) CINTHEAUX 0853 
HAUTNESML incl Quarry 0853 
A force of NOT more than one bn will be employed on this task. 
(b) To firm up and hold with one bn BRETTEVILLE LE RABET 
and then firm up woods and houses between BRETTEVILLE LE 
RABET and woods. 
14. Task - 18 Cdn Armd Regt 
(a) To be prepared to provide one sqn to act as convoy escort for 
adm vehs moving fwd to the FONTAINE-LE-PIN feature from 
the assembly area. 
(b) To be prepared to exploit SOUTH and EAST from the gen line 
MESLAY 0043 FONTAINE-le-PIN 0644 FALAISE 1455 
ARGENTAN2618 
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15. CL, report lines and bdys as already issued. 
16. Timings. 
(a) Phase I -Move to assembly area completed by 060600B 
(b) To cross SL for phase II at approx 061400B 
17. Arty. 
Arty sp in the form of pre-arranged cones on-call will be provided by 4 Cdn Armd 
Div Fd Arty with under comd 19 Cdn Fd Regt (sp) and one med regt sp by one 
AGRA after phase I. 
18, Engrs. 
(a) Task during phase II to construct, if necessary, crossing of the rly 
between 068563 and 070580. 
(b) After capture of CINTHEAUX and HAUTMESNIL open up CL 
on main rd CAEN-FALAISE, as far SOUTH as 
LANGANNERIE 0949. 
19. Adm. 
Issued Separately. 
20. Inter-Corn 
(a) Axis of Adv, 4 Cdn Armd Div - Rd CAEN-FALAISE except between rd June 
047645- CINTHEAUX, when it will be the EAST track developed by 2 Cdn 
Div parallel to the rd CAEN-FALAISE. 
(b) HQs locations (i) Phase I - Area X rds 042665 
(ii) Phase II - Axis of Adv. 
(c) Code words as already issued. 
(d) Sigs instrs issued separately. 
21. Ack 
F E Wigle Lt Col 
GS 4 Cdn Armd Div 
Time 2359 
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Appendix 3. TOPSEC Summary of GOCs plan for 10 Aug 
1. By approx 100300B the following situation is envisaged 
1) 4 Cdn Armd Bde less Lak Sup R positioned in the gen area 0848 prepared to attack 
south with objectives 
a) Pt 195 if necessary 
b) Pt206 
2) 10 Cdn Inf Bde with under command Lake Sup R positioned as follows 
a) Line & Welld R pt 180 0747, Alg R area woods and buildings 0847 A & SH of C 
Pt 195 0846, 29 Cdn Recce Regt as required by Bde Comd 
b) Or (ii) as for (i) but with A & SH of C not in occupation of Pt 195 0846. 
3) 18 Cdn Armd C Regt positioned in rear and to the north of 4 Cdn Armd Bde prepared 
to exploit south with two alternatives 
a) If 4 Cdn Armd Bde is required to capture pt 195 0846 the Regt will exploit south 
directed on POTGNY 1014 
b) If 4 Cdn Armd Bde is only required to capture pt 206 the Regt will exploit south 
to Falaise and west to contact elements of Second Br Army advancing from the 
west. 
2. The outline plan follows 
a. Plan I 
i. If 10 Cdn Inf Bde are in possession of pt 180 0747-wood and building 0847-pt 
195 then 
ii. 4 Cdn Armd Bde will attack south and capture pt 206 0943 at first lt[light] 
iii. 18 Cdn Armd C Regt following in rear of 4 Cdn Armd Bde will after capture 
of Pt 206 by Armd Bde exploit south and west as outlined above in para 1 (ii) 
b. Plan II 
i. If 10 Cdn Inf Bde are not in possession of pt 195 then 
ii. 4 Cdn Armd Bde will attack south at first light and capture in succession pt 
195 and pt 206 
iii. 18 Cdn Armd C Regt after capture of objectives by 4 Cdn Armd Bde will 
exploit south directed on POTIGNY-FALAISE and R[iver] ANTE. 
It is suggested that very close liaison be maintained between 4 Cdn Armd Bde , 10 Cdn 
Inf Bde and 18 Cdn Armd C Regt so that all concerned will know the definite situation 
before first It [light] and the comds intentions carried out. 
F Wigle 
LtCol 
GS 4 Cdn Armd Div 
Time of signature 092355B 
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Appendix 4. TOPSEC Summary ofinstrs issued up to 102300B hrs [10 Aug] 
1. Gen 
As the enemy were found in some str[strength] in the area MOULNES 0{]46 by 
special patrols 18 Cdn Armd C Regt it was decided by comd NOT to emp 4 Cdn 
Armd Bde on the right flanking move to capture high ground USSY 0842-pt 195 
0840. 
2. Plan for 11 Aug 
a. Timing for attack by 10 Cdn Inf Bde to capture USSY 0842-pt 195 0840 
at this time are tentative dependant on arrival of PRIESTS for tpt 
[transport] A &SH of C in 10 Cdn Inf Bde area. 
b. 4 Cdn Armd Bde less 21 Armd Regt and Lake Sup R are to remain present 
posn with 22 Cdn Armd Ret to be prepared to hold USSY-pt 195 in 
conjunction with 21 Cdn Armd Regt 
c. 10 Cdn Inf Bde with under comd 21 Cdn Armd Regt and Lake SUP R are 
to capture pt 206 0943 and USSY-pt 195. The attack is to be carried out in 
two phases 
i. Phase IA & SH of C embossed in PRIESTS and supported by 21 
Cdn Armd Regt under the cover of arty smoke [?] only are to 
capture pt 206. H Hour 111000B. 
ii. Phase II. It is understood that the 21 Cdn Armd Regt and LAKE 
SUP R less one coy are to capture USSY-Pt 195 0840. On 
completion of this phase 21 Cdn Armd Regt and Lake Sup R less 
one coy are to revert to comd 4 Cdn Armd Bde . 4 Cdn Armd Bde 
is to firm up the USSY posn. 
d. 18 Cdn Armd C Regt is sweep WEST, SOUTH and EAST on the gen line 
BARBERY 0349-MESLAY 0043-MARTIGNY 0736-high ground 
SOUTH of FALAISE. 
3. It is desired to have the div positioned as flows 
a. 4 Cdn Armd Bde in the gen area USSY-pt 195 0840 
b. 10 Cdn Inf Bde in the gen area pt 180 0747-pt 195 0846-pt 206 0943 
c. 18 Cdn Armd C Regt with elements SOUTH of Falaise and elements 
protecting the div RIGHT flank between URVILLE 0750 -pt 180 0747 by 
last It 11 Aug. 
4. Attack by 3 Cdn Div was launched at 102000B. The present situation is somewhat 
obscure but it appears that 8 Cdn Inf Bde are now firming up and mopping up 
QUESNAY wood area 10 47. 
F Wigle Lt Col 
GS 4 Cdn Armd Div 
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Appendix 5 SECRET. Summary ofGOCs instrs up to 111500B and relevant infm. 
1. Enemy 
Enemy resistance has stiffened an div front 4 Cdn Armd Bde being held 
SOUTH of pt 195 0841 by A tk screen which extends in semi circle on 
gen line of rly[sp] Le HAMLET FONRAINE 0647-FONTAINE -LE PIN 
0844- ASY 0945 QUESNAY woods 1047 still held in str. 
2. Own Tps 
a. On our right 12 Corps have cleared the Foret du Cinglais but a patrol from 
9 Cdn Bde crossed the R LAIZE in the area GOURIX 0651 and reported 
no enemy. 
b. 3 Cdn Div is taking over a sector of the 2 Cdn Corps front between 4 Cdn 
Armd Div and Polish armd Div. they are attacking south at approx 111700 
with objectives QUESNAY Woods and POTIGNY 1044. Phase I Quesnay 
Woods {unknown word] completed by 112400 B. Phase IIPOITGNY by 
first light 12 Aug Phase III to secure brhead over R LAISON. 
c. Polish Armd Div are attacking SE when 3 Cdn Div captures Quesnay 
woods with objective phase I area pt 132 1448 phase II area pt 118 1645 
phase III area pt 115 area 1849. 
3. 4 Cdn Armd Div 
a. 4 Cdn Armd Bde is to either 
i. Remain in present posn area pt 195 0846 or 
ii. With Lake Sup R back under comd adv south and capture pt 206 
0943 when a favourable opportunity is presented 
1. attack by 3 Cdn Div at or 
2. when air and arty sp make it possible to break through 
enemy A ttk screen. 
b. 10 Cdn Inf Bde is to either 
i. Remain in present position prepared to send one inf bn fwd to take 
over pt 206 from 4 Cdn Armd Bde or 
ii. With under comd one armd regt 4 Cdn Armd Bde attack south to 
capture pt 206 the armd regt will exploit south and seize area 
USSY 0842-pt 0840. 
18 Cdn Armd C Regt is to exploit south to the high ground south of Falaise and 
either remain there overnight or return to dev area at OCs discretion as well as moving 
west to meet Second Brit Army. 
F Wigle Lt Col 
GS 4 Cdn Armd Div 
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• <5fH. l-L' * ^ .V TOP SECRET 
*'• J . & - - * * " 
• • • - " " \ ^ ^ , . , 1 " 6 
Ifcin HQ 4 Cdn Armd Div 
13 Aug 44 
Copy number - ^ - -
OUTLINE OF INSIRS ISSUED BY 
GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div 131230B Aug 44 
OP TRACTABLE 
Rof Mips i PRANCE l / sO,000 shee ts 7P/3 7F/4 7P/S 7P/6 
Enemy 
The enemy an the d i v f r o n t appears t o have formed an A t k screen 
pivotod on the a r ea QUESNAY 1047 - POTIGNY 1044. The soreen t o the EAST 
follows the l i n e of the R IA1S0N. Die p i v o t i s held by p a r t of 85 Inf Div 
and 12 SS Pz Div. The l ine of the R LIASON down stream t o the a r ea CONDE 
SUR IPS 20S2 i s held by 12 SS Ps Div. 
Own Tpa 
2 Cdn Corps with RIGHT 3 Cdn Div and LEFT 4^  Cdn Armd Div i s a t t aok ing 
COUTH wi th the object, of gaining comd of the enemy's oomns through FALAISE. 
The Op w i l l be c a r r i e d out in th roe phases . 
( a ) Phase I 
Tho c ross ing of the R L&ISON and se izu re of the h igh ground a r ea 
p t 118 1546 - woods pt 103 1645. 
(b) Hiase I I 
To adv SOUTH and SW to capture the high ground ME of FALAISE a r e a | 
pt 170 1442 - p t 175 1441. by 3 Cdn Div and a rea r i n g oontour 160 1438 
by i Cdn Armd Div . 
(&) Hiaao IIX 
E x p l o i t a t i o n t o capture the brs a t ERA1NES 1737 and DAMBLAINEVILLE 
2038 p repara to ry t o advancing on TRUII 3029 t o moot 15 US Corps by 
4 Cdn Armd Div. 
51 (H) B r i t Div is to capture LA BU SUR ROUVRES 1651 op oonmenoing a t 
2 Cdn Corps H h r , . • 
Addi t iona l tpa under oomd 4 Cdn Armd Div 
(a ) f) Cdn Inf Bdo (ttiase I only) 
lb) 1 LOTHIAMS ( F l a i l Regt ) 
Co) A Sqn 141 RAC (Crocodi les) 
(d) 19 Cdn Fd Regt (SP) 
(o ) One sqn AWE 5 Asl t Regt 
The RAF i s suppor t ing 2 Cdn Corps during Op. TRACTABLE as follows 
( a ) Bombing of the va l l ey of the R LAISON from i n o l PLAYB 1345 t o 
ino l ERAINES 1949 from H hr minus 20 mins t o H hr "minus 5 mina 
wi>th Hied bombers. 
(b) Pombing of tho fol lowing areas by mod bombers 
>•• ^ 4 '.Wirt 
» 2 -
(o) Hy bombers on the POTIGNY pivot area from H plus 2 hrs to H plus 
4 h r s . I t i s considered that t h i s prolonged bombing w i l l e i ther 
destroy the enemy in the POTIGNY area or prevent thorn from 
counter attaoking the 2 Cdn Corps t h r u s t . 
6 Corps bdys, SL and inter d iv bdy as shown on Traoo "X" a t t . 
TASKS 4 CDM ARMD DIV 
7 (a) To s e i z e the high ground NE of FALAISE 
(bj To capture the brs a t ERAINES 1737 and DAMBLAINVILLE 2036 
( c ) To be prepared t o e x p l o i t SOUTH and SB t o meet 15 OS Corps in the area 
TRUN 3029. 
fcTlfCP 
8 The d iv w i l l adv one up as fol lows 
(a) 4 Cdn Armd Bde 
(i) with under oomd 
Two sqns 1 LOTHIANS 
96 Cdn A Tk 3ty (SP) 
(11) with in sp 
19 Cdn Pd Reg* (SP) 
23 Cdn Pd Regt (SP) 
One sqn AVRE 5 As l t Regt 
Two tps 0 Cdn Fd Sqn 
(b) 8 Cdn Inf Bde with a t t tps inol A Sqn 141 RAC 
(o) 10 Cdn Inf Bde 
( i ) with under oomd 
One sqn 1 LOTHIANS 
3 Cdn A Tk Bty 
( i i ) with in sp 
IS Cdn Pd Regt 
One tp 8 Cdn Pd Sqn 
f Tasks 4 Cdn Armd Bde 
(a ) To lead the d iv adv 
(b) To croso the R 1AISCN and by-passing a l l opposition oapture the objective 
ring contour 16 C/ area 1430, 
(o) To capture and hold PIERRIERES with elements of the mot bn u n t i l re l i eved 
by one bn 10 Cdn Inf Bde 
(d) To be prepared to send reoce elements to the brs at ERAINES and 
DAMBLAINVILLE 
10 Taska 8 Cdn Inf Bde 
(a) Phase I 
( i ) Two bns embussed inPRIESTS, half - tracks and carriers w i l l clear tho 
- v a l l e y of the R UISQN betwoon oxol br a t 156475 and inol MUZIERES 
1749 and se i ze tho high ground pt 103 area 1646 
( i i ) Remaining bn marching w i l l mop up area between Corps SL and v a l l e y 
of R LAISON 
(b) On completion of above tasks w i l l rovort t o oomd 3 Cdn Div and move t o 
oapture SASSY 1845 
f 
- 5 -
11 Tasks 10 Cdn Inf Bde 
(a) Phase II 
( i ) To capture OLENDCN 1644, i f necessa ry 
( i i ) To r e l i e v e the mot bn 4 Cdn Armd Bde in PIERRIERES 1043 and e s t a 
f irm base the re 
( i i i ) To capture EPANCY 1641, i f necessa ry and push fwd t o l i f lk up with 
4 Cdn Armd Bde on f i n a l object ive 
( i v ) Depending on opposi t ion encountered the bde may be requi red to 
leave elements in OLENDCN and EPANCY 
"-?• Tasks 18 Cdn Armd C Regt 
( a ) When 4 Cdn Armd Bde orosses the Corps SL t o make a recoe in foroe to 
p r o t e c t the LEFT f lank of t h e d i v between BT SYLVABf 1354 and MAIZIERES 
1749. (In view of para 3 d i r e c t l i a i s o n wi th 51 (H) Div w i l l be nocossiu'y) 
(b) To fol low 8 Cdn Inf Bde aaoroas the R tAISON and p r a t e o t the LEFT flank 
of the d iv between MAIZIERES and SASSY 
( c ) To be prepared to oa r ry out a roeee in fo rce of the wooded a reas 18o9 -
1940 - 2041 and e x p l o i t t o EHAHIES and DAMBLAINVILLE 
( d ) Hold in r e s one sqn f o r e x p l o i t a t i o n SOUTH and EAST from ERAIMES and 
DALlBLAIffVILLE on orders GOC 4 Cdn Armd Div 
13 Ar ty 
(a ) Phase I 
( i ) A smoke soroen i s t o be l a id on both f l anks of the adv on tho 
RIGHT in the a rea QUESNAY and an the LEFT EAST of the gen l ino 
MMZIERES - SASSY 
( i i ) A smoke barrage precoding the' armour from the Corps SL t o tho 
f i r s t ob jec t ive p t 103 from H minus 5 t o H plus 3 5 . Timings a re 
so arranged t h a t the armour w i l l have 15 mins smoke in t h e a r ea 
from i n o l . t h e v a l l e y of the R l&ISON fwd to the f i r s t objeot ive 
p t 103 to-complete t h o r i v e r o r o s s i n g . 
( i i i ) f*d a r t y oanas on known and suspeoted 88 mm gun posna 
(b) Phase I I 
Pre-arranged conos by mod a r t y an c a l l on known and suspected 88 ran gun 
posns and o^umy l o c a l i t i e s 
(o) Comds w i l l onsuro t h a t no hy smoke programme involving moro than one f d 
r eg t w i l l bela id down from H plus 1 hr u n t i l a f t e r H plus 4 hrs as hy 
smoke may obsoure t a r g e t i n d i c a t o r s for RAF hy bombers 
14 En^rs 
under CREs oont ro l 
( a ) One sqn AVRE 5 As I t Regt and one tp 8 Cdn Fd Sqn w i l l be in sp 4 Cdn Armd 
Bdo to a s s i s t i n the c ross ing of the R 1AI30N 
(b) Ono t p 8 Cdn Vd Sqn with necessary explosives w i l l move wi th 4 Cdn Arm'. 
Bdo to prepare p i t a for t k s to be dug in on tho f i n a l ob jec t ive 
(c) Two tps 8 Cdn 7d Sqn w i l l QSSiflt 10 Cdn Inf Bdo In tho c ross ing of* "tho 
R LIASON 
]& SL, Bdys, Report Lines 
As d e t a i l e d on Trace "X" a t t . 
Kitching Note to Lt Col Scott undated [14 August 44] 
Dear Murray 
I am sorry to hear about Boothie. But I'm very confident in our ability to fight the 
Bde. Keep going tonight until dark then regroup your armour for a big effort tomorrow 
morning. Brig Jefferson is going to capture (a) OLENDON (b) High ground 182438 
(unless already taken by your motor Bn (c) Epancy. 
We have to capture FALAISE tomorrow. 
Sincerely 
George Kitching 

Appendix 11. Op Smash 
Enemy 
Digging in at 2142-2239 
Dug in tanks & Atk guns at 1836 
Enemy activity in Fresney le Mere 1935 
Enemy in some strength at Morteaux-Coulbeauf 2339 
Lt opposition in NE sector of Falaise 
Own Trps 
2 Div on high ground south of Falaise 
Argylls-1 Coy in Falaise 
Poles cleaning up opposition in Morteaux Coulibeeauf & have sent patrols on to Trun 
(code word of recognition " Jordon " 
French forces (armd) east of 2825 Bailleul 
US at 2346 (Moulins sur Orne) 
10 CEB recce of crossing Irish & Japan & will follow 4 Bde 
Argylls to 2039 by morning 
Algonq- Japan " " [by morning] 
L &W move up behind Blacks [sp] (MR 420139) 
Intention: 4 Bde will seize Trun firm p on high ground to north & NE 
Method: SP [start point] main Rd junc 1743 
Route I Epancy-track across high ground to Irish (Damblainville) 
Route U Perrieres-Japan (Morteaux-Couliboeuf) 
Route I for Irish to CL[centre line] RR[railroad] Br [bridge] 2036-Pt 77-Ners 
Route for Japan to CL -? 
Order of march 
LSR with under comd 28CAR-96 Atk, 14 Atk Bty less 1 Tp LAA-2Tp Lt Fd sqn 
21 CAR with under comd 1 Tp flails 
BdeHQ 
9vehsof23SpRegt 
22 CAR 
2 Sqn Flails 
23 Sp Regt 
Provost 
23 Sp Regt will deploy "arctic" 
Units will liaise [] for start time 
441 
Tasks-LSR &28 CAR seize Pt 147 3331 
21 & 22 CAR firm up at high ground 3233- 3232 (22 on 3233) -(21 on 3232) 
Route to objective x-country or through Trun depends on sit 
Route will be picketted by adv gd(LSR) 
Regts responsible for own left flank 
AA prot crossing at Damblainville 
Eng will prepare bridge at Irish for Dem[demolition] 
Admin 
2 Pet[troll]-l Amm[unition] 1 Vz trucks per sqn 
1 art-regt 
Remainder of Al remain present location 
Comds to stand by for move up 
A2 remain locn 151463 
CCP at Olendon 
Intercom 
Start Time -0500-depart time given on air 
Recce Trp will liaise with Bde to find route to sp & time of move to SP 
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Appendix 12. Summary ofGOC's O Grp subsequent instructions received from Comd 2 
Cdn Corps 
1) 2 Cdn Div is being relieved by 12 Corps and will in turn relieve 3 Cdn Div ob R 
Dives SOUTH to incl 260333 during 19 and 20 Aug 
2) 3 Cdn Div 
a. 7 Cdn Bde remain present posn on R Dives from 260333 to excl Trun 
b. 9 Cdn Bde will relive 10 Cdn Bde in Trun night 19/20 Aug and in St 
Lambert Sur Dives area 20 Aug Polish Armd Div will be relieved in 
CHAMBOIS 20 Aug 
c. 8 Cdn Bde will take over from 4 Cdn Armd Bde and 10 Cdn Inf Bde 
following areas 
i. 258 4159 
ii. Hordouseaux 3333 
iii. 259 3334 
iv. During 20 Aug 
3) Polish Armd Div is to Firm up Corps Left flank by occupation of following areas 
a. Pt 262 4355 with one armd and two inf Regts 
b. Pt 262 4352 with two armd and one Inf regt 
c. Chambois with the mot Bn 
4) 4 Cdn Armd Div 
4 Cdn Armd Bde 
a. 4 Cdn Armd Bde Regts will remain in present locations although area will 
be taken over by 8 Cdn Inf bde during daylight 20 Aug 
b. 4 Cdn Armd Bde will STAND DOWN on relief by 8 Cdn Bde and will 
NOT be required for ops before FIRST LIGHT 21 Aug 
10 Cdn Inf Bde 
c. 10 Cdn Inf Bde will be relieved by 9 Cdn Bde in Trun during night 19/20 
Aug. Units and sub units committed in St LAMBERT SUR DIVES and 
CHAMBOIS area will NOT be relieved until daylight 20 AUG by 9 Cdn Bde. 
These units and sub units will then CONC in area HORDOUSEAUX Pt 147 
331 3232 
d. 10 Cdn Inf Bde will provide two sc pis mounted in carriers under comd A 
Sqn 18 Cdn Armd C Regt for recce in force being carried out during daylight 
20 Aug by A Sqn 18 Cdn Armd C Regt which will RV at 4 Cdn Armd Bde in 
Hordouseaux 200930B 
e. Remainder of 10 Cdn Inf Bde 
446 
1. one Bn on wheels to be at instant readiness frm 201000B to take 
over coy localities when captured by 18 Cdn Armd C Regt on 
CL to Vimoutiers 4867. CO A Sqn will report when suitable coy 
localities have been captured on CL to DIV HQ. Div HQ will 
advise 10 CIB who will have a coy despatched forthwith Atk 
guns will be taken with coy to consolidate locality. 
2. Rem two Bns will be on two hours notice to move to take over 
areas on CL to Vimoutiers 
3. Unless considered otherwise necessary by Bde Comd 29 Recce 
Regt after release and cone will be allowed to stand down until 
first light. 
f. "A" Sqn 18 Cdn Armd C Regt will carry out a recce in Force from the 
area HORDOUSEAUX on the projected DIV CL rd HORDOUSEAUX -
Le CHAMPEAU 4261-Le 4462 LAFAUVETIERE 4862 VIMOUTIERS. 
Sqn will have u/c two Sc pis 10 CIB in carriers, one FOO 4 Bde Offr 
Recce parties Engr 4 Div On conclusion of the task Sqn will withdraw to 
rear of leading unit to HARBOUR night 20/21 Aug 
5. ARTY 4 CAD 
1. Three Fd regts & two med regt now under comd 
2. Fd regts cone area Le Menil Girard 3231 
3. Will provide A Sqn 18 Cdn Armd C Regt with one FOO (RV HQ 4 
CAB) who will have call on as much arty as CRA considers necessary 
or can provide 
6. Engrs4CAD 
Will provide offr recce on following A Sqn 18 Cdn Armd C to carry out 
detailed rd recce of projected div CL Offr RV 4 CAB HQ 0930 B 
Detail of the adv on the CL VIMOUTIERS ORBEC will be issued 20 Aug. 
Report line & code words already issued. 
Main HQ 4 CAD moving to area MONTREUIL LA CAMBE 304347during 
morning of 20 Aug 
21 CAR & 22 CAR will probably be the only units of this form who will have 8 
bde bodies in their area. 
A Chubb Maj 
BM 4 CAB 
447 
} 

fraA 
A..?, 
PROM I OMof of 3tAff 
TO i ooo l a o 
ixnr f%t IMLa Oar\vm% 
t!i*f7«?*i?7f«« v*f7T»., 
ltfft Part fi fla ftrw art 
0 of 8 1-1-0 
Main first 04a Avay 
19 Jog 44 
o**fc 
At 1040 bra, It* teg 44, Cbltf of Staff SI Amy Of < 
' aooeptaale oa tha *d 
vara s t i l l assaying 
or 
not further attaake; by airaraft 
VXMOUZaBS-as thalr-infa was that 
90X8 through MOtf^OfitBL up to VJMO 
X stated' tfcat we- would not bo ablo to aooept suoh. attaoka alltora* 
the prior approval of 1 Pol AmdBlv, and that X doubtad i f UMOT would 
agree l a vlev of yeatetfday's unfortunate ooourrenoea* X aaid taat X 
#ould ohook with OaaemOlavnda to aaa i f he was prepared for vbe — 
naval of suea attaoka* 
5 
6 
At 1043 bra flea' Slaonds stated that ha aaa J»f prepared to agraa to 
the above proposals*'and that ha bad Just had i t reported to.Ma that 
aa and reooa ragt was at pt U 8 l a 4158, and tbat the Aaarleans had ' 
lust asked for / and had boon denied, ponlaaloa to attapk OBIMBOXA from 
the SOUTH, Oaa Slaoads aald that ho had laatruated thl Amarloana to 
dlraot thalr- fprosa- to aaka Juno with. Ma oaa by mow from (fee SB* 
I than reported thlsinfla to the'OMsf of Staff 81 Amy <**» •»« *blla 
doing so had- a further oall froa Ota Slnonds giving further aav i n n 
regarding too Polish, altuatloa *» follows i -
(a) Aa amd ragt and ha at pt"368 la 4465# 
(b) An amd regt and bn l a so. 4054* 
(o) Aa armd ragt and) ba la so. 4164* 
(d) A reooa sqnHDRKH of tha rd 4868* •**% 
(a) 4 can Amd WLv vara now la dlraot touoh vita OB Pbrosa and ware aa* 
paratad by approx two alias* 
Z passed this lam to tha Gtalef of Staff 81 Amy Op* 
' At 1186"bra 0ea' almonds tele'to say that ha waa aoat anxious to Xoave 
Ms HQ in order to keep a RT witk Ma Dlv Oatdt- and that ba would be a 
half far lata If ha l e f t at onoe* Be aakad whan the Amy Obnd wouJLd be 
baok or vhaa he oould axpeot a tale oal l . aa ha did not.have a olaar 
idea as to how ha should operata during today and In tha laaadlata-
future* Z said that Z would tela the dMaf of Staff 8X Amy q 
pt and endeavour'to'obtain a forecast of the 0 l a 0»s lntentlo: 
Op oa this 
ns at onea* 
a 
At 1136 hrs9 the' CMaf of Staff: 81 Amy Op said that he had JOT bean in oontaot'with'the 0 In 0 tails aornlng but that. In his opinion, the 
lustra were' almost certain to bei» 
) Ibr 8 Ofln Corps*to oonttaua to olose tha gap and to koap i t olosed 
until Seoond Brit Amy ware able to take ores* this task* and 
(b) lhat l'firlt Corps should oontlnue to push oa towards UflXSTDC* 
At 1140 hra, X passed tha infa In para 7 above to'Oaa 81attnds> J 
Ida a release to prooeed to Mo RV with Ms Mf Obada# l a f a l l knowledge {hat we would almost'at onea ba out of liae'ooaa until late this evening 
owing to the' tapondlng nova of HQ 8 Odu Cbrpa, and tha oonsoaueatlal 
outtTng of 'ooams during the period of the nova* < 
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Appendix 16. 4 Can Armd Bde Casualties-Ojficers-Augustl944 
Brig 
LCol 
Maj 
Capt 
Lt 
total 
ORs 
4 Cdn Armd Bde 
Est Str 
1 
0 
4 
8 
4 
17 
202 
5-Aug 
1 
0 
4 
8 
5 
18 
202 
12-Aug 
1 
0 
4 
7 
5 
17 
200 
19-Aug 
0 
0 
4 
5 
4 
13 
175 
26-Aug 
0 
0 
4 
5 
3 
12 
10 of the original 17 officers were left on 26 Aug 
Brig 
LCol 
Maj 
Capt 
Lt 
total 
ORs 
LCol 
Maj 
Capt 
Lt 
total 
ORs 
lOCdnlnf Bde 
Est Str 
1 
0 
2 
14 
2 
19 
59 
5-Aug 
1 
0 
2 
12 
2 
17 
59 
12-Aug 
1 
0 
2 
12 
3 
18 
58 
19-Aug 
1 
0 
2 
11 
2 
16 
57 
26-Aug 
1 
0 
2 
11 
2 
16 
21 Cdn Armd Reg GGFG 
Est Str 
1 
5 
11 
20 
37 
657 
5-Aug 
1 
5 
11 
19 
36 
649 
12-Aug 
1 
3 
10 
17 
31 
622 
19-Aug 
0 
2 
8 
13 
23 
558 
26-Aug Original 
0 
2 
9 
8 
19 
19 of the original 37 Officers were left on 19 Aug- 8 officers were reported 
killed and 11 wounded 
30 Ors were reported killed and 62 wounded 
LCol 
Maj 
Capt 
Lt 
total 
ORs 
22 Cc 
Est Str 
1 
5 
11 
20 
37 
657 
5-Aug 
1 
5 
11 
20 
37 
642 
n Armd Reg CGG 
12-Aug 
1 
5 
10 
14 
30 
571 
19-Aug 
1 
5 
11 
13 
30 
536 
26-Aug 
1 
4 
10 
16 
31 
521 
1 
3 
8 
11 
23 
23 of the original 37 officers were left on 26 Aug 
LCol 
Maj 
Capt 
28 Cdn Armd Reg BCR 
Est Str 
1 
5 
11 
5-Aug 
1 
5 
11 
12-Aug 
1 
5 
11 
19-Aug 
1 
3 
10 
26-Aug 
1 
3 
10 
0 
2 
4 
Lt 
total 
ORs 
20 
37 
657 
19 
36 
656 
21 
38 
622 
16 
30 
593 
13 
27 
554 
10 
16 
16 of the original 36 officers were left on 26 Aug 
LCol 
Maj 
Capt 
Lt 
total 
ORs 
29 Cdn Armd Reg SAR 
Est Str 
1 
5 
11 
20 
37 
657 
5-Aug 
1 
5 
12 
20 
38 
648 
12-Aug 
1 
5 
11 
20 
37 
650 
19-Aug 
1 
4 
12 
21 
38 
639 
26-Aug 
1 
5 
10 
13 
29 
589 
1 
4 
7 
11 
23 
23 of the original 37 officers were left on 26 Aug 
Average of 55% of original officers left 
44% senior officers in 4 bde 
left 
Appendix 17. 4 Cdn Armd Div Strength Returns 
CONSOLIDATED STRENGHT RETURNS AUGUST 1944 
BRIG 
COL 
LCOL 
MAJ 
CAPT 
LT 
TOTAL 
RANK 
LCOL 
MAJ 
A/MAJ 
CAPT 
A/CAPT 
LT 
QM 
TOTAL 
RANK 
WO I 
won 
CSM 
SSGTS 
SGTS 
CPL 
PTE 
TOTAL 
LCOL 
MAJ 
A/MAJ 
CAPT 
A/CAPT 
LT 
QM 
TOTAL 
RANK 
WO I 
won 
HQ 4TH CDN ARMD BDE 
EST 
1 
0 
0 
4 
8 
4 
17 
29-Jul 5-Aug 
1 
0 
0 
4 
8 
5 
18 
12-Aug 
1 
0 
0 
4 
7 
5 
17 
19-Aug 
0 
0 
0 
4 
5 
4 
13 
26-Aug 
0 
0 
0 
4 
5 
3 
12 
ORIGINAL 
0 
0 
0 
Governor General Foot Guards 
EST 
1 
5 
11 
20 
1 
38 
EST 
1 
7 
4 
43 
63 
539 
657 
29-Jul 
29-Jul 
5-Aug 
1 
3 
2 
11 
1 
19 
37 
5-Aug 
1 
7 
4 
39 
70 
528 
649 
12-Aug 
1 
2 
1 
11 
17 
32 
12-Aug 
1 
7 
4 
0 
35 
68 
507 
622 
19-Aug 
0 
1 
1 
9 
12 
23 
19-Aug 
1 
7 
4 
0 
34 
59 
453 
558 
26-Aug 
26-Aug 
ORIGINAL 
0 
1 
2 
8 
8 
19 
Canadian Grenadier Guards 
EST 
1 
5 
0 
11 
0 
20 
1 
38 
EST 
1 
7 
29-Jul 
29-Jul 
5-Aug 
1 
5 
0 
12 
0 
20 
1 
39 
5-Aug 
1 
6 
12-Aug 
1 
5 
0 
10 
0 
14 
1 
31 
12-Aug 
1 
7 
19-Aug 
1 
5 
0 
11 
0 
13 
1 
31 
19-Aug 
1 
7 
26-Aug 
1 
3 
1 
10 
0 
16 
0 
31 
26-Aug 
1 
7 
ORIGINAL 
1 
3 
1 
8 
1 
11 
0 
25 
CSM 
SSGTS 
SGTS 
CPL 
PTE 
TOTAL 
LCOL 
MAJ 
A/MAJ 
CAPT 
A/CAPT 
LT 
QM 
TOTAL 
RANK 
WOI 
won 
CSM 
SSGTS 
SGTS 
CPL 
PTE 
TOTAL 
LCOL 
MAJ 
A/MAJ 
CAPT 
A/CAPT 
LT 
QM 
TOTAL 
RANK 
WOI 
WON 
CSM 
SSGTS 
SGTS 
CPL 
PTE 
TOTAL 
4 
43 
75 
527 
657 
4 
0 
40 
55 
526 
642 
4 
0 
36 
55 
468 
571 
4 
0 
23 
54 
436 
525 
4 
0 
27 
52 
430 
521 
British Columbia Regiment 
EST 
1 
5 
0 
11 
0 
20 
1 
38 
EST 
1 
7 
4 
43 
75 
527 
657 
29-Jul 
29-Jul 
5-Aug 
1 
4 
1 
11 
0 
19 
1 
37 
5-Aug 
1 
7 
4 
0 
43 
72 
529 
656 
12-Aug 
0 
1 
1 
7 
0 
15 
0 
24 
12-Aug 
1 
7 
4 
0 
41 
71 
499 
623 
19-Aug 
1 
1 
2 
7 
5 
15 
0 
31 
19-Aug 
1 
7 
4 
0 
39 
63 
479 
593 
26-Aug 
1 
1 
2 
5 
5 
13 
0 
27 
26-Aug 
1 
7 
4 
0 
35 
59 
442 
548 
ORIGINAL 
0 
1 
1 
6 
0 
8 
0 
16 
Lake Superior Regiment 
EST 
1 
5 
0 
12 
0 
18 
1 
37 
EST 
1 
6 
6 
0 
50 
89 
663 
815 
29-Jul 
1 
4 
1 
6 
4 
20 
0 
36 
29-Jul 
1 
6 
6 
0 
50 
84 
664 
811 
5-Aug 
1 
4 
1 
6 
4 
19 
0 
35 
5-Aug 
1 
6 
6 
0 
49 
80 
649 
791 
12-Aug 
0 
3 
1 
6 
3 
19 
0 
32 
12-Aug 
1 
6 
6 
0 
46 
81 
624 
764 
19-Aug 
1 
0 
3 
5 
5 
22 
0 
36 
19-Aug 
0 
6 
5 
0 
50 
73 
638 
772 
26-Aug 
1 
0 
4 
5 
7 
16 
0 
33 
26-Aug 
1 
6 
6 
0 
49 
74 
610 
746 
ORIGINAL 
0 
1 
1 
6 
3 
13 
0 
24 
CONSOLIDATED STRENGTH RETURNS 10 CDN INF BDE 
BRIG 
COL 
LCOL 
MAJ 
CAPT 
LT 
TOTAL 
LCOL 
MAJ 
A/MAJ 
CAPT 
A/CAPT 
LT 
QM 
TOTAL 
RANK 
WO I 
won 
CSM 
SSGTS 
SGTS 
CPL 
PTE 
TOTAL 
LCOL 
MAJ 
A/MAJ 
CAPT 
A/CAPT 
LT 
QM 
TOTAL 
RANK 
WO I 
WON 
10th Cdn 
EST 
1 
0 
0 
2 
14 
2 
19 
29-Jul 5-Aug 
1 
0 
0 
2 
12 
2 
17 
12-Aug 
1 
0 
0 
2 
12 
3 
18 
nf Bde HQ 
19-Aug 
1 
0 
0 
2 
11 
2 
16 
26-Aug 
1 
0 
0 
2 
11 
2 
16 
ORIGINAL 
1 
Algonquin Regiment 
EST 
1 
5 
0 
12 
0 
18 
1 
37 
EST 
1 
7 
6 
0 
39 
73 
685 
811 
29-Jul 
29-Jul 
1 
7 
6 
0 
38 
74 
677 
803 
5-Aug 
1 
3 
1 
9 
4 
17 
0 
35 
5-Aug 
1 
7 
6 
0 
38 
70 
667 
789 
The Argyll and 
EST 
1 
5 
0 
12 
0 
18 
1 
37 
EST 
1 
7 
29-Jul 
29-Jul 
5-Aug 
1 
5 
0 
11 
1 
18 
0 
36 
5-Aug 
1 
7 
12-Aug 
12-Aug 
19-Aug 
19-Aug 
26-Aug 
26-Aug 
ORIGINAL 
Sutherland Highlanders of Canada 
12-Aug 
1 
0 
0 
9 
1 
13 
0 
24 
12-Aug 
1 
6 
19-Aug 
19-Aug 
26-Aug 
1 
2 
2 
8 
3 
17 
1 
34 
26-Aug 
1 
6 
ORIGINAL 
1 
2 
0 
8 
1 
10 
0 
22 
CSM 
SSGTS 
SGTS 
CPL 
PTE 
TOTAL 
LCOL 
MAJ 
A/MAJ 
CAPT 
A/CAPT 
LT 
QM 
TOTAL 
RANK 
WOI 
WON 
CSM 
SSGTS 
SGTS 
CPL 
PTE 
TOTAL 
6 
0 
40 
73 
685 
812 
6 
0 
39 
73 
645 
771 
6 
0 
36 
65 
563 
677 
5 
0 
38 
63 
495 
608 
Lincoln and Welland Regiment 
EST 
1 
5 
0 
12 
0 
18 
1 
37 
EST 
1 
7 
6 
0 
39 
73 
685 
811 
29-Jul 
1 
5 
0 
10 
3 
17 
1 
37 
29-Jul 
1 
7 
6 
0 
40 
73 
683 
810 
5-Aug 
1 
4 
1 
9 
3 
15 
1 
34 
5-Aug 
1 
7 
5 
0 
38 
66 
625 
742 
12-Aug 
1 
4 
1 
10 
3 
17 
1 
37 
12-Aug 
1 
7 
5 
0 
41 
69 
624 
747 
19-Aug 
2 
2 
2 
9 
3 
13 
1 
32 
19-Aug 
1 
6 
6 
0 
37 
64 
510 
624 
26-Aug 
2 
3 
2 
9 
3 
19 
1 
39 
26-Aug 
1 
6 
6 
0 
38 
61 
491 
603 
ORIGINAL 
1 
3 
0 
9 
3 
12 
0 
28 
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Appendix 19. ADREPs August 44 
4 CDN ARMD DIV ADREPS AUGUST 1944 
Day 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
16 
time 
100245 
102105 
112020 
122140 
132155 
2100 
420 
2125 
Dys 
rations 
A 
5 
5 
5 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
miles 
POL 
B 
190 
190 
190 
190 
190 
190 
180 
165 
150 
175 
175 
175 
175 
160 
175 
strof 
units 
below 
85% 
F 
BCR 
71% 
LSR 
85% 
ASHOF 
C 82% 
ALG 
82% 
LINC 
72% 
LSR 
85% 
ASH82% 
ALG 
82% 
LINC 
75% 
ASH83% 
ALG 
83% 
LINC 
83% 
ASH83% 
ALG 
83% 
LINC 
83% 
battle 
wortiness 
of veh 
tanks 
G 
333 
331 
332 
325 
326 
328 
247 
234 
235 
235 
237 
259 
190 
Armd 
Cars 
103 
102 
72 
72 
72 
75 
78 
70 
71 
71 
71 
70 
71 
71 
Scout 
cars 
140 
140 
138 
139 
139 
138 
97 
135 
133 
135 
133 
133 
128 
132 
MED 
H 
21 
CAS 
J 
25 
126 
28 
93 
6 
10 
91 
400 
67 
21 
45 
OTHER 
K 
6pdr&17 
Pdr sabot 
deficient 
&essential 
6pdr& 17 
Pdr sabot 
deficient 
&essential 
17 Pdr 
sabot 
deficient 
&essential 
473 
17 
31 
2140 
1805 
5 
3 
175 
195 
206 
212 
68 
73 
17Pdr 
sabot 
deficient 
&essential 
The omitted columns are C -ammunition expended, D- Ammunition held, E- PWs 
Strength Returns from August 44 
ADREPs 
Date 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
Officers 
829 
868 
867 
874 
867 
868 
869 
849 
824 
678 
872 
871 
854 
849 
821 
768 
816 
768 
772 
771 
762 
782 
785 
785 
730 
730 
73 
807 
806 
806 
ORs 
14757 
15516 
15423 
15461 
15277 
15296 
15383 
14616 
14248 
15193 
15118 
15111 
14973 
14950 
14489 
13681 
14518 
13681 
13855 
13581 
13507 
13507 
13538 
13538 
13448 
13448 
13483 
13876 
13876 
14058 
474 
475 
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